1 2	3BHLPADA UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2	FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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4	JOSE PADILLA, DONNA R. NEWMAN,
4	AS NEXT FRIEND OF JOSE
5	PADILLA,
5	,
6	Petitioner-Appellee/
6	Cross-Appellant,
7	
7	v. New York, N.Y.
8	03-2235(L)
8	03-2438(con)
9	DONALD RUMSFELD,
9	
10	Respondent-Appellant/
10	Cross-Appellee.
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11	X
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12	November 17, 2003
13	10:00 a.m.
13	
14	Before:
14	WON DOODWAN G DOOTED GI ' C T I
15	HON. ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Chief Judge
15	HON. BARRINGTON D. PARKER, JR.
16	HON. RICHARD C. WESLEY
16	
17 17	
18	APPEARANCES
18	ALL EANANCES
19	DONNA R. NEWMAN, ESQ.
19	ANDREW G. PATEL, ESQ.
20	Attorneys for
20	Petitioner-Appellee/Cross Appellant
21	recreated important important
21	JENNY S. MARTINEZ
22	Professor - Stanford Law School
22	Amicus Curiae in support of
23	Petitioner-Appellee/Cross Appellant
23	
24	PAUL D. CLEMENT,
24	Deputy Solicitor General for
25	Respondent-Appellant/Cross Appellee
25	
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	(212) 805-0300

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 (10:00 a.m.)
- JUDGE POOLER: Good morning. Please
- 4 be seated. We have only one case on our
- 5 calendar this morning. Padilla and Newman, as
- 6 it's styled, versus Rumsfeld.
- 7 This panel has issued two orders on
- 8 the course of argument, which I assume all
- 9 parties have received. So we'll begin with the
- 10 first set of issues, and then we'll take
- 11 appearances and hear who's arguing on those
- 12 issues.
- 13 The first set of issues, to which
- 14 we've allotted 10 minutes per side -- and you
- 15 will let me know if you have reserve rebuttal.
- 16 And on those issues, since the petitioner
- 17 prevailed, the government will go first. And I
- 18 see the respondent reserved two minutes for
- 19 rebuttal. And those issues are whether
- Ms. Newman can bring this habeas proceeding as
- Jose Padilla's next friend, not certified, I
- believe, but still before us; whether Secretary
- of Defense Rumsfeld is a proper respondent; and
- 24 if so, whether the District Court had personal
- jurisdiction over Rumsfeld.

1	3BHLPADA
2	We'll begin with Mr. Clement.
3	MR. CLEMENT: Thank you, your Honors,
4	and may it please the Court:
5	This case certainly raises momentous
6	questions of the proper separation of powers
7	when the nation comes under attack. But the
8	unanswered questions about the separation of
9	powers and what ability the Executive has to
10	respond when the nation comes under attack as it
11	did on September 11th should be resolved in the
12	proper forum.
13	Mr. Padilla is being held in
14	Charleston, South Carolina, and both common
15	sense and ample case law suggests that this
16	petition, too, should have been filed in
17	Charleston, South Carolina. The case law in the
18	specific context where somebody is in prison and
19	challenges their confinement, that very
20	confinement, the law is clear that the proper
21	respondent in such a habeas petition is the
22	prisoner's immediate custodian, and that would
23	be Commander Marr, who is the commandant of the
24	facility in South Carolina.
25	Now, to be sure, there is case law

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1	3BHLPADA
2	that adopts a more flexible approach in unusual
3	situations or in situations that deviate from
4	the traditional habeas context.
5	JUDGE PARKER: Why isn't this as
6	unusual as it gets? Here we have a situation
7	where an American citizen was picked up on a
8	material witness warrant, brought into this
9	district; in the course of litigating the
10	propriety of his detention, two delegates from
11	the Department of Defense showed up and took him
12	to Charleston. I as far as I can see, that
13	fact pattern is unprecedented.
14	MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, this
15	certainly is an unusual case. I would simply
16	state, though, it is not unusual for relevant
17	purposes under the habeas action, because this
18	is a classic case where a petitioner challenges
19	the fact of their current confinement. And
20	although there are unusual
21	JUDGE WESLEY: In the normal
22	circumstance, though, you have someone who's

been convicted of a crime and they have held by

a warden in a particular area and this court --

any many courts -- have recognized that the

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2	location of the habeas proceeding is more
3	relevant to particularly the criminal proceeding
4	from which he is held, or, in the instance of,
5	say, looking for release, where his military
6	superiors were. So why wouldn't Secretary
7	Rumsfeld be the logical person to sue? He's the
8	one that's certified to the President that
9	Mr. Padilla is an enemy combatant. Isn't he a
10	logical person to sue, whose determination as
11	what holds Mr. Padilla
12	MR. CLEMENT: With respect to your
13	Honor, might be a logical person to sue in a
14	habeas petition, but the law on habeas is clear,
15	and now 2255 and the divisions implement that
16	have a specific statutory exemption for federal
17	habeas when it comes to the sentencing court.
18	JUDGE WESLEY: If Secretary Rumsfeld
19	were to change his mind and determine this would
20	be no longer a representative enemy combatant,
21	or the policy reasons behind his detention were
22	no longer present, would he not be the logical
23	person to order Mr. Padilla's release?
24	MR. CLEMENT: Certainly, but in the

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other situation, the attorney general would be

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1	3BHLPADA
2	the logical person to order the release of any
3	individual.
4	JUDGE WESLEY: I didn't mean that
5	whole process. Here you have the individual who
6	made, in conjunction with the President of the
7	United States, made the determination to hold
8	Mr. Padilla uncharged, unaccused of anything
9	other than his complaisance with regard to
10	al Qaeda activities. So isn't Secretary
11	Rumsfeld the logical person to sue?
12	MR. CLEMENT: Again, with respect, no.
13	The military this Court recognized that the
14	parole board was the person that ordered the
15	release of the prisoner, and yet this Court held
16	that it's not the parole board who's the
17	JUDGE POOLER: But the parole board
18	wasn't in the same chain of command as the
19	warden. Could Commandant Marr produce
20	Mr. Padilla before this Court if Secretary
21	Rumsfeld was opposed to that production? That's
22	the question.
23	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, I'm not
24	sure it is, because if that were the

JUDGE PARKER: That was Judge Pooler's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1	3BHLPADA
2	question.
3	MR. CLEMENT: I realize that, but if
4	that were the rule, then every military habeas
5	would have to be brought against the Secretary
6	of Defense because there is a chain of command.
7	JUDGE POOLER: It's not in every
8	military habeas where the Secretary of Defense
9	has taken a personal role in procuring the
10	movements of the petitioner from one district to
11	another, and has been personally involved in the
12	decision-making. Doesn't that make it
13	different?
14	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, I don't
15	think that makes a different for habeas.
16	purposes. This Court, in its Hamdi decision
17	said, the military cases say, when somebody is
18	in the chain of command if their immediate
19	custodian is available for suited then you don't
20	move up the chain of command to the top.
21	JUDGE POOLER: But the parole board
22	wasn't even in the same system as the warden let
23	alone the same chain of command. They're

25 MR. CLEMENT: If I could direct this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

operating separately.

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2	court's attention to the way that this court has
3	treated the difference between unattached
4	reserve itself who are not directly in the chain
5	of command and those that are in active service
6	in their units, this Court had two cases in the
7	early 70's or late 60's, one of which is Orlando
8	against Taylor, which is cited in the briefs,
9	and that unattached reservists just like
10	Strait against Taylor.
11	This Court also had a decision which
12	unfortunately we did not cite in the briefs but
13	I'd like to cite it for you, and that is United
14	States ex rel. Rudick against the United States,
15	412 F2d 16, and in that case, this Court held
16	that it was not proper to sue the Secretary of
17	Defense in the Southern District of New York,
18	but that rather the proper person to sue was
19	that individual's commanding officer in
20	California.
21	And in Orlando, this Court
22	distinguished that prior precedent of this Court
23	and said, Well, it's a different situation when
24	you have unattached reservists because there

isn't any sort of normal chain of command, and

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2	in a sense, you don't have custody in the actual
3	physical custody sense. But they distinguished
4	the prior and said, No, in the context of
5	somebody actually attached to a unit, there you
6	do have the kind of custody that's relevant for
7	the military, and you cannot go up to the top of
8	the chain of command just because that's more
9	convenient.
10	JUDGE WESLEY: Are you going to argue
11	the jurisdictional sweep of the Court, whether
12	Secretary Rumsfeld is within the present in
13	the Southern District? Is that part of your
14	argument?
15	MR. CLEMENT: It is part of my
16	argument, your Honor, I think that the Court,
17	too
18	JUDGE WESLEY: I don't want to cut
19	across anything else you wanted to say with
20	regard to proper party, but I do have some
21	questions about that.
22	JUDGE PARKER: I'm still curious.
23	Suppose Secretary Rumsfeld orders Commander Marr

not to produce Mr. Padilla? Where are we at

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that point?

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2 MR. CLEMENT: Well, your Honor, I

3 don't know, but --

4 JUDGE PARKER: What options does she

5 have?

6 MR. CLEMENT: I think she would have

7 the same options in this case as she would in

8 any other case where somebody is being detained

9 by the military, and I think there is no

10 indication that anybody in the military chain of

11 command is going to disobey an order of this

12 Court or the Southern District, and I think the

answer to that question is the same as in any

14 other habeas petition, which is we can imagine a

15 situation where hypothetically there would be a

16 problem with having the immediate custodian as

opposed to the person at the top of the chain

18 because that immediate custodian is in that

19 chain of command under the person at the top of

20 the chain and you can imagine the person at the

21 top of the chain instructing the person on the

22 bottom not to obey a court order. But, I mean,

as a realistic matter, that's not going to

24 happen. And as a practical matter, if that were

25 a reason to skip over the immediate custodian,

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 that would be a reason in every military habeas
- 3 to do so.
- I notice my time is out.
- 5 JUDGE POOLER: Why don't you just turn
- 6 to the other issue?
- 7 JUDGE WESLEY: Let me ask you a couple
- 8 of questions. I want to understand if I have my
- 9 facts right. Padilla comes in to Chicago on a
- 10 flight from overseas. He is seized on a
- 11 material witness order signed by Mukasey in the
- 12 Southern District with regard to a grand jury
- 13 sitting investigating the World Trade Center
- 14 attack of September 11th, 2001. Correct?
- MR. CLEMENT: Right.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Early May of 2002.
- 17 MR. CLEMENT: Exactly right, your
- 18 Honor.
- JUDGE WESLEY: He's held in Chicago
- 20 for a few days -- and the material witness
- 21 warrant was filed upon an affidavit by an FBI
- 22 agent.
- MR. CLEMENT: I believe that's right.
- JUDGE WESLEY: He's then transported
- 25 by FBI agents, who are employees of the federal

- 1 3BHLPADA 2 government but serve under the Attorney 3 General's direction. 4 MR. CLEMENT: That's right. 5 JUDGE WESLEY: And he comes to New York and he's held in the Metropolitan 6 Correctional Center. 8 MR. CLEMENT: I believe that's right. JUDGE WESLEY: Is that a Department of 10 Justice facility also? 11 MR. CLEMENT: I think it either is, or 12 by contract is. 13 JUDGE WESLEY: Pursuant to a material 14 witness warrant. He's then held for a number of days here and Miss Newman is appointed. 15 MR. CLEMENT: That's correct. 16 JUDGE WESLEY: He confers with Miss 17 Newman, still under the material witness 18 19 warrant. 20 MR. CLEMENT: Correct. 21 JUDGE WESLEY: In early June, the 22 Department of Justice informs Judge Mukasey that
- MR. CLEMENT: That's correct.

  JUDGE WESLEY: And sometime that day

it wants the material witness warrant withdrawn.

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- 2 or the -- at least before Padilla leaves
- 3 New York.
- 4 MR. CLEMENT: That's correct.
- 5 JUDGE WESLEY: At or about the time
- 6 the President of the United States signs an
- 7 order concluding he's an enemy combatant.
- 8 MR. CLEMENT: That's correct.
- 9 JUDGE WESLEY: What acts of Secretary
- 10 Rumsfeld other than the removal of Padilla did a
- 11 Department of Defense employee travel from South
- 12 Carolina to New York and pick up Mr. Padilla and
- 13 remove him to South Carolina?
- 14 MR. CLEMENT: I believe they did, your
- 15 Honor. The exact facts of this were not
- 16 explored fully below. My understanding is that
- it was -- it was the dEfense Department's
- 18 transport service that picked up Mr. Padilla.
- 19 He may have been in marshal custody. I'm
- 20 actually not positive. It appears the actual
- 21 transfer of custody took place in South Carolina
- 22 by -- I believe the transportation arrangements
- 23 were made by the Defense Department.
- JUDGE WESLEY: So at most, a
- 25 Department of Defense employee of -- under the

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- 2 direction of Secretary Rumsfeld came to New York
- 3 and removed Mr. Padilla?
- 4 MR. CLEMENT: That's correct.
- 5 JUDGE POOLER: So your argument is not
- 6 that the Secretary of Defense didn't perform
- 7 acts that would bring him under the long-arm
- 8 statute. You just said the long-arm statute
- 9 doesn't apply to habeas.
- 10 MR. CLEMENT: That's correct. Our --
- 11 with respect to the habeas statute, in light of
- 12 the text of the habeas statute, that the
- 13 relevant concept is territorial jurisdiction,
- 14 whether or not the individual can be served in
- 15 the territory of the Southern District.
- 16 JUDGE WESLEY: If Secretary Rumsfeld
- 17 were present in New York, like the Court
- analyzed in other cases, then his presence would
- 19 serve as a solid jurisdictional basis, would it
- 20 not?
- MR. CLEMENT: It would, but --
- JUDGE WESLEY: The -- "present" in the
- 23 constitutional sense.
- MR. CLEMENT: Yes, in the
- 25 constitutional sense. But, your Honor, with the

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2	caveat that in the Rudick case, this Court, you
3	know, looked at it as a territorial jurisdiction
4	matter, and I think the difference is
5	significant because I think in the Orlando and
6	Strait class of cases where what you're talking
7	about is sort of hypothetical custody, and
8	you're already relaxing the normal rules of
9	habeas, it makes sense in those cases to have a
10	more flexible standard about services of
11	process, because the whole theory of those cases
12	is that the Army is the custodian of the
13	individual in the Southern District of New York,
14	and so it would be inconsistent with the theory
15	that gets you past the first issue to not have a
16	more relaxed standard.
17	But I think in Rudick and Schlanger
18	and Semitz, which is the Supreme Court sort of
19	analogue in those cases where you're talking
20	about actual custody, I think in those cases
21	there's no point in deviating from the habeas
22	statute and you really look to the territory

jurisdiction of the District Court because

that's how you give meaning to the statutory

direction that the habeas petition enacts in

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1	3BHLPADA
2	respect to the Court's jurisdiction.
3	JUDGE WESLEY: Is it your position
4	that if Secretary Rumsfeld is an appropriate
5	party, this action should be transferred to the
6	D.C. circuit as opposed to South Carolina?
7	MR. CLEMENT: I think that
8	JUDGE WESLEY: Indeed, that's where he
9	is actually present, is he not?
10	MR. CLEMENT: Actually, I think it's
11	the Eastern District of Virginia, and the Monk
12	case has a footnote that addresses that very
13	question, but certainly either the District of
14	Columbia or the Eastern District of Virginia
15	would be a more appropriate form.
16	But our position is Commandant Marr is
17	the proper respondent and the case should be
18	transferred to South Carolina.
19	JUDGE PARKER: I take it from the
20	government's written presentation that Padilla
21	ostensibly is being held so that he can be
22	questioned for intelligence-related materials.
23	MR. CLEMENT: That's certainly one of
24	the reasons for his detention, your Honor.
25	JUDGE PARKER: Right. Well, suppose
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2	the government determined that the discussions
3	with Mr. Padilla would go more expeditiously or
4	would be more fruitful in, say, Guantanamo, and
5	Mr. Rumsfeld decided to move him to Guantanamo?
6	Would he be reachable by writ there?
7	MR. CLEMENT: Certainly in the case
8	where the writ had already been filed while
9	Mr. Padilla was held in South Carolina, we think
10	that that Court would retain jurisdiction.
11	JUDGE PARKER: On the facts here,
12	let's says that we adjourned here and you get
13	back to your office and you see a note on your
14	desk that Mr. Padilla has been taken to
15	Guantanamo.
16	MR. CLEMENT: Then I would think, your
17	Honor, if this Court were to transfer the case
18	to South Carolina as opposed to dismiss the
19	case, then I think that the rule of Endo is once
20	a petition is properly filed where somebody is
21	within the territorial jurisdiction of a

specific court, that court does not lose

moved to Guantanamo.

jurisdiction over the petition just because the

individual's moved to a different district or is

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- 2 But the key point is that only applies
- 3 once the petition has been filed.
- 4 JUDGE PARKER: Which is not the case
- 5 here.
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: Which is not the case
- 7 here.
- 8 JUDGE PARKER: But then if you get
- 9 back to your office and you find he's gone to
- 10 Guantanamo, he's history.
- MR. CLEMENT: I want to be specific --
- 12 JUDGE PARKER: Is that right?
- 13 MR. CLEMENT: If this Court were to
- 14 dismiss the petition so that at a moment in time
- there was no petition pending and then at that
- 16 point, this individual was moved to
- 17 Guantanamo --
- JUDGE PARKER: This U.S. citizen.
- 19 MR. CLEMENT: This U.S. citizen was
- 20 moved to Guantanamo -- which, by the way, isn't
- 21 what they would do, but I'm answering a
- 22 hypothetical. I say that because if that were
- 23 to happen, then in that instance, a new habeas
- 24 petition would properly be filed, in our view,
- 25 in the Eastern District of Virginia or, as the

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 colloquy suggests, perhaps in the District of
- 3 Columbia.
- 4 JUDGE PARKER: But would that reach a
- 5 U.S. citizen detained in Guantanamo?
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely. Our
- 7 position is if it's a U.S. citizen, wherever
- 8 they are held there will be habeas jurisdiction.
- 9 JUDGE POOLER: Why wasn't the motion
- 10 to quash the material witness subpoena, which is
- 11 what started this legal action, why wouldn't
- that qualify as a previous action? After all,
- there was no need to file a habeas until the
- 14 petitioner was spirited out of this district.
- 15 MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, the law on
- 16 that is quite clear that it's the finding --
- filing of the habeas petition, not any other
- filing, not any preliminary proceedings, that is
- 19 the relevant points for judging whether or not
- 20 the petition is filed and whether or not the
- 21 rule of Endo would apply. And I think there's a
- 22 Seventh Circuit case the citation of which
- escapes me for the moment, but there's a
- 24 citation that makes it clear close doesn't count
- in this context. It's a matter of whether or

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2	not the movement took place after the petition
3	and the habeas petition was filed.
4	JUDGE POOLER: I was just going to
5	move on.
6	JUDGE WESLEY: Well, at the time of
7	the material witness proceedings, he was held
8	pursuant to the act of the Attorney General.
9	MR. CLEMENT: That's right. Not the
10	Secretary of Defense.
11	JUDGE WESLEY: Where is Mobbs located?
12	MR. CLEMENT: Mr. Mobbs is located in
13	the Pentagon.
14	JUDGE WESLEY: And Jacoby, where is
15	he?
16	MR. CLEMENT: The Pentagon as well.
17	JUDGE WESLEY: They were not in
18	New York?
19	MR. CLEMENT: No.
20	JUDGE WESLEY: Assuming we affirm

Judge Mukasey's position, set it back for a

22 hearing, where would all the witnesses come

23 from?

MR. CLEMENT: That begs a lot of

25 questions.

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- JUDGE WESLEY: Talked about
- 3 convenience to the parties. The only person
- 4 here is Ms. Newman, is she not?
- 5 MR. CLEMENT: Under our view, there
- 6 would not be a lot of witnesses. So it depends
- 7 a little bit on how this Court envisions the
- 8 proceedings taking place, but certainly Mobbs,
- 9 certainly.
- 10 JUDGE POOLER: Actually, the
- 11 government thinks no witnesses are necessary.
- MR. CLEMENT: That's right. We do
- think this can be decided on the declaration, so
- it's a hard question to answer.
- 15 JUDGE PARKER: So affirmance is
- 16 irrelevant.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Is what I asked.
- 18 MR. CLEMENT: I suppose under
- 19 affirmance, we would be arguing for a limited
- 20 scope of witnesses, but if you start envisioning
- 21 who you want to talk to, it's probably folks
- 22 like Mr. Mobbs, Vice Admiral Jacoby, maybe the
- 23 FBI agents from Chicago and D.C. So I'm not
- sure that, in the end, the convenience factor
- 25 is -- really point this Court to New York as the

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 proper forum.
- JUDGE POOLER: In spite of running out
- 4 of time, you have reserved two minutes, which
- 5 you continue to maintain.
- And I now will hear from petitioner on
- 7 these procedural issues. Thank you very much.
- 8 MS. NEWMAN: May it please the Court:
- 9 A writ of habeas corpus is designed to
- 10 be flexible, a flexible remedy, but the
- government has raised here procedural hurdles
- 12 which have precluded resolution in this matter.
- 13 Unless the Court has questions on next
- friend, we'll move onto the jurisdictional
- 15 issue.
- JUDGE POOLER: Please.
- MS. NEWMAN: Thank you. According to
- the government, they present an extraordinary
- 19 argument here. They say that the federal court,
- where their transaction that is the subject
- 21 matter of this litigation arose, the seizure of
- 22 Mr. Padilla, from the Metropolitan Correction
- 23 Center, just a few yards away from here, by the
- 24 military, has no power to judge the lawfulness
- of the action by the federal officer whose

1	3BHLPADA
2	conduct is at issue. The argument really boils
3	down to an attempt to resurrect a rigid formula
4	to habeas jurisdiction that long ago was
5	rejected by the Supreme Court and this Circuit.
6	JUDGE PARKER: All they're saying is
7	that Padilla's custodian is the commander of the
8	brig in Charleston.
9	MS. NEWMAN: The statute does not
10	direct that the custodian must be the of
11	which it speaks must be the immediate custodian.
12	In addition, if you look at really the factual
13	context here, Commander Marr, whom they say is
14	the immediate custodian, at best is a nominal
15	custodian. She takes her directions from
16	Secretary Rumsfeld. It is not the same it is
17	not analogous to the warden situation. As
18	Judge Chief Judge Mukasey found, this is a
19	unique case. This is different than the
20	traditional case. It's a nontraditional case,
21	and as the government agrees, that there are
22	exceptions to any rule that they
23	JUDGE PARKER: How is Commander Marr
24	different from the garden variety warden?

MS. NEWMAN: The focus, your Honor, is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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- 2 not only to look at Commander Marr, because, in
- 3 fact, under Braden, the petition can issue as
- 4 long as a custodian can be reached by service of
- 5 process. So while the government may say that
- 6 Commander Marr is the appropriate custodian, in
- 7 fact, as Chief Judge Mukasey said, for the
- 8 reasons he stated, some of the reasons that
- Judge Wesley said, he is so intimately involved,
- 10 that is, Secretary Rumsfeld, in this case, from
- 11 the very inception.
- 12 JUDGE PARKER: Suppose you had some
- major criminal the prosecution of whom was
- 14 directed by the Attorney General? We had a case
- awhile back here, there was a fellow named
- Barnes who was a major drug dealer up in Harlem.
- 17 And the Attorney General, you know, directed the
- 18 U.S. Attorney here to prosecute him and directed
- 19 the U.S. Attorney here to try the case
- 20 personally. Under that fact situation, I
- 21 suppose you would argue that Attorney General
- 22 Bell would have been the custodian?
- MS. NEWMAN: Well, the distinction is
- in that case, the Barnes case that you're
- 25 mentioning, Defendant Barnes went through a

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- whole process, went through a trial, through the
- judicial system, so the only time he would bring
- 4 the habeas -- of course, the collateral
- 5 attack -- would be well down the road.
- JUDGE PARKER: So what? What
- 7 difference does that make?
- 8 MS. NEWMAN: Your Honor, there is a
- 9 distinct difference. Here, Secretary Rumsfeld
- from the inception, there's no legal -- there's
- 11 no process here. So that he really -- unlike in
- the Barnes situation where whether or not he's
- 13 released, acquitted, etc., goes to the jury,
- 14 here in this situation, Secretary Rumsfeld from
- 15 the inception directed -- exercised control,
- 16 direct control, and continues to have a
- 17 substantial role. So that he determines whether
- or not at some point --
- JUDGE PARKER: He did what he did, but
- 20 he left Mr. Padilla in the hands of the
- 21 commandant of the brig, i.e., the warden of the
- 22 penitentiary.
- 23 JUDGE POOLER: And you heard counsel
- 24 say that no commandant, no commander of the
- brig, would disobey an order of this Court.

# 1 3BHLPADA

2	MS. NEWMAN: I understand that, your
3	Honor. I don't know that. With all due respect
4	to my adversary, I think we do really need
5	Commander Marr to tell us that. We do have, of
6	course, in our history ex parte Merryman. I'm
7	not suggesting all I am saying, that you
8	wouldn't all I'm suggesting is that we have
9	history that says otherwise. We have Department
10	of Defense regulations that tell us otherwise.
11	But the significance is not to
12	focus because there could be other
13	respondents. There is not it is not
14	necessary to have one respondent, in many, many
15	cases, particularly military cases.
16	JUDGE WESLEY: You get a lot of
17	support in Braden, I take it?
18	MS. NEWMAN: Yes.
19	JUDGE WESLEY: But in that case, the
20	individual served the writ was incarcerated in
21	another state, so the sense of bringing a writ
22	of habeas corpus in that state, contesting the
23	conviction in another state, it doesn't seem to
24	make too much sense. And the Court said, Look,
25	in essence to the warden in Alabama this

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2	is where he was being held, and the writ was
3	going to be filed in Kentucky, right?
4	MS. NEWMAN: Detainer in Kentucky.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: In essence, they said
6	the warden in the other state is in essence
7	holding him as an agent for the state. He's
8	temporarily detained there. But to make him
9	wait until he's served his time in the other
10	state and come back is just imponderable. Can't
11	allow that to happen. So therefore they said
12	it's appropriate to bring the proceeding in the
13	state where the conviction was held.
14	Maybe it was speedy trial, but isn't
15	that substantively quite different than the
16	circumstance here? This isn't two competing
17	parties with regard to his rights. It's a
18	warden that's holding him pursuant to a
19	determination by the President of the United
20	States, and the legitimacy of which then is the
21	focus of a writ of habeas corpus. And is it not
22	then most appropriate to bring it where he is,
23	because by bringing it there doesn't preclude,
24	as it might have in Braden or Braden from

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examining the merits of his contention? They're

1	3BHLPADA
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- 2 easily examined there.
- 3 Mr. Hamdi was able to get review of
- 4 his situation and get to the Circuit. In fact,
- 5 he's been in the circuit twice faster than here.
- 6 That doesn't say anything about us and Judge
- 7 Mukasey, but that -- with much great success, I
- 8 might add.
- 9 But in any event, I mean -- seriously,
- 10 that other case is about the difficulty of
- 11 litigating the legitimacy of his claim. You
- don't have that barrier here.
- 13 Why should we allow the Southern
- 14 District to be the place where it's litigated
- when he's not here?
- MS. NEWMAN: There are specific
- 17 reasons, your Honor, that this is the best
- 18 forum. Because, in fact, certainly in Braden,
- 19 Braden said not only custodians be reached by
- 20 service of process.
- JUDGE WESLEY: I'm not talking about
- 22 convenience. I'm talking about legitimate
- 23 objection or differentiation from a lot of what
- 24 it normally says in the normal case: Bring the
- 25 writ where the individual's detained. And I

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25

2	would submit to you that there are instances
3	where there are exceptions to that. Where,
4	because of the peculiar facts of the case, you
5	can't litigate the right to obtain a writ in the
6	jurisdiction where he's detained. And I don't
7	see that problem here. Is that problem here?
8	MS. NEWMAN: I think, in fact, your
9	Honor, there are cases that go beyond that.
10	It's not only because it's not feasible, as you
11	say in the Braden example, but if you really
12	look through the trilogy of the Supreme Court's
13	cases in the 1970s, which is Schlanger, Strait
14	and Braden, look through all those cases, where
15	in fact the immediate custodian was one of the
16	issues.
17	So if you look first at Schlanger,
18	again, the immediate custodian, they said you
19	have to go to Georgia. But there was no reason,
20	as we learned in Strait, which clarified it, as
21	there was no context to Arizona, here, to get to
22	the context issue here, because that's what your
23	Honor's alluding to, yes. All three cases
24	really deal, practicality, if you look at

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everything, you go down to where is it really

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 the context.
- 3 The cause of action here arose here.
- 4 That is, Mr. Padilla was seized from the
- 5 Metropolitan Correction Center without notice to
- 6 me. Judge Mukasey, of course, who's intimately
- 7 familiar with the facts, having signed the
- 8 material witness warrant, as we then learned was
- 9 essentially the same facts which were presented
- 10 to the President for him to sign the June 9th
- 11 order.
- The independent knowledge of that that
- Judge Mukasey has isn't just papers, as the
- 14 Court's aware; it's not just sending down
- papers. It's much more than that. It's
- 16 knowledge. It's a genuine knowledge of the case
- 17 that cannot be duplicated anyplace else. And
- 18 because Secretary Rumsfeld --
- JUDGE PARKER: What do you mean
- "general knowledge of the case"? Can't be
- 21 duplicated anywhere else? We all have read a
- foot of wonderful briefs. Anybody who reads the
- 23 briefs knows what the case is about.
- MS. NEWMAN: I think there's an
- 25 intimate knowledge, just like in a 2255

3rht.pada

- 2 collateral attack to a sentence. That's why the
- 3 Congress, if I could just -- I'm sorry.
- 4 JUDGE WESLEY: I'm dying to ask a
- 5 question, but I'm waiting.
- 6 MS. NEWMAN: I wanted to say that
- 7 Congress then, in reviewing it then in a 2255,
- 8 where the question is sentencing -- sentencing,
- 9 it goes back to the district court judge.
- 10 Certainly the same analogy. All the trial,
- 11 etc., the transcripts, etc., can go back -- if
- 12 there's not a trial, just even a simple
- sentence, can go back someplace else. But in
- 14 fact, it's significant that the District Court
- judge ruled that -- I'm sorry, your Honor?
- JUDGE WESLEY: What strikes me is that
- 17 when one reads Strait.
- MS. NEWMAN: Yes.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Strait seems to imply
- 20 that the Supreme Court indicated the commander
- is really present where he is because all of his
- 22 contacts were in California with him, right?
- 23 And the government wanted the case to be brought
- 24 in Indiana. And the government -- the court
- 25 said, Look, let's be serious. Everything is

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 here. He had face-to-face dealings with
- 3 everybody. His enrollment in the military
- 4 program and everything else was there. That's
- 5 the logical place to bring it. That's really
- 6 where the presence is, and the Commander was
- 7 actually operating through the circuits there.
- 8 So at that moment in time, it seems to
- 9 me that the United States Supreme Court was
- 10 merging its due process understanding of
- 11 presence, as articulated in Burger King and all
- 12 the cases that came before that, and juxtaposing
- it to the statute and understanding what
- 14 jurisdiction meant.
- Now, the problem I have in your case
- is this: The only connection between
- 17 Mr. Padilla and all of this information in
- 18 New York was his momentary presence here under
- 19 the control of the Attorney General. The
- 20 Attorney General's acts, the affidavit of the
- 21 FBI agent, not -- Mr. Padilla didn't do a thing
- in New York other than be brought here and he's
- 23 taken from here. The determination made by
- 24 Rumsfeld and the President is done in Washington
- on information that's gathered by intelligence

1	3BHLPADA
2	agencies from all over the world and synthesized
3	into two affidavits which are presented to the
4	President in Washington.
5	And so what is it about New York, what
6	is it about Mr. Padilla being here one day and
7	the material witness warrant being withdrawn,
8	he's being held by the Department of Justice,
9	and then being taken from New York is it the
10	taking of New York that's the gravamen of your
11	complaint? Certainly not the gravamen of your
12	complaint is the legitimacy of the President's
13	order, and that has nothing to do with New York.
14	And I don't understand Judge
15	Mukasey makes an argument that prior versus
16	McFadden Oil, a case written by Judge Symonds in
17	the New York Court of Appeals somehow says
18	New York has a jurisdictional basis. But
19	New York's long-arm statute isn't written in
20	that context. It speaks in terms of a
21	substantial relationship between the transaction
22	and the claim. What is the relationship between
23	Mr. Padilla's removal and the legitimacy of that

25

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removal? It seems to me they're completely

different, and there's no connection from

1	3BHLPADA
1	SBRLPADA

- 2 New York. This should be litigated in South
- 3 Carolina.
- 4 MS. NEWMAN: If I may, your Honor, I
- 5 think there are two answers to that. I would
- 6 start with an analogy to 18 USC 3238 which -- in
- 7 U.S. versus Yusef. 327 F3d 6, Second Circuit
- 8 2003, and that statute really has to do with a
- 9 charge, but it says, where the allegations occur
- 10 overseas, the place that you bring that
- individual to the U.S. has to be where the first
- instance -- it's not Chicago. They didn't bring
- 13 him to Chicago. It's where you bring him.
- Where he is. Where the allegations first start.
- 15 That's where the jurisdiction lies. And it's
- under a concept that, as here, the government
- 17 chose this forum. They chose this -- the
- 18 Southern District of New York. They brought
- 19 Mr. Padilla here in the first instance.
- JUDGE WESLEY: They had a grand jury
- going on, because 3,000 people were killed in --
- 22 2,700-plus people were killed as a result of
- 23 coordinated -- two terrorist planes striking the
- 24 World Trade Center and dropping it to the
- ground, so it seems to me there's a logical

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#### 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 connection that a grand jury investigation might
- 3 occur in New York.
- 4 But that's not the point. Mr. Padilla
- 5 was thought to have been a material witness to
- 6 that. Then something happened, and it didn't
- 7 happen here. It happened in Washington. What
- 8 is the connection of the acts that occurred in
- 9 New York that somehow made this the logical and
- 10 substantial place to litigate the legitimacy of
- 11 those acts?
- MS. NEWMAN: Directing your attention
- to New York's long-arm statute, to answer your
- 14 question. The statute provides that the cause
- of action arises from actions which is the
- subject of this lawsuit, and I believe what your
- 17 Honor is directing the inquiry to. It is our
- 18 position that our habeas begins with the cause
- of action of the seizure from the Metropolitan
- 20 Correction Center. Not only -- and as your
- 21 Honor is aware, it's a one-act statute, and you
- 22 can act through your agents. So you don't have
- 23 to be sitting in Washington, D.C. and making the
- 24 phone calls and never appear in this
- 25 jurisdiction.

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# 1 3BHLPADA

2	JUDGE POOLER: So the seizure itself
3	is enough to give jurisdiction to this district
4	in which Mr. Padilla was pursuing legal relief,
5	and the person who is sought to be the
6	respondent was responsible for the one act
7	through his agents? That's your argument?
8	MS. NEWMAN: Yes. There was nothing
9	more than one act, but we're directing to the
10	first part of the statute, because the acts
11	through his agents not only negotiated,
12	obviously a phone call from the very start to
13	get this ball rolling, which is the transfer,
14	you know, from the Department of Justice to the
15	Department of Defense there has to be
16	conversations back and forth. There is
17	obviously the several conversations on how
18	the warrant will be withdrawn. So there's a lot
19	of action there. But we're directing to the
20	first part of the statute.

- 21 JUDGE WESLEY: It's definitely a
- 22 single-act statute. I'm somewhat familiar with
- 23 it....
- MS. NEWMAN: Yes, I know.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Let me read to you

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37

3BHLPADA

- 2 something Judge Symonds wrote after he said it
- 3 was a single-act statute. This is the case that
- 4 Judge Mukasey says this doesn't take much time
- 5 to resolve.
- MS. NEWMAN: That's correct.
- JUDGE WESLEY: It says -- it is a
- 8 single-act statute. I'm quoting Page 467:
- 9 Single act statute. Approve of one transaction
- in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction
- 11 even if the defendant never enters New York, so
- long as the defendant's activities here were
- purposeful and there is a substantial
- 14 relationship between the transaction and the
- 15 claim asserted.
- That's why I asked you. It's your
- position that his removal is that substantial
- 18 relationship between the transaction, the
- illegal determination that he's an enemy
- 20 combatant, and his continued retention in South
- 21 Carolina?
- MS. NEWMAN: It's also the very
- 23 seizure. As the Court is aware, the seizure,
- that is very problematic here as well. That's
- 25 what occurred in this jurisdiction, just a few

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 yards away. So yes, that is our point, that his
- 3 coming here and that the transfer occurred here,
- 4 as we've just learned definitively, is the
- 5 point, and it does, as that case, as the habeas,
- 6 as the petition reads.
- 7 I'm out of time. I'm more than happy
- 8 to answer questions.
- 9 JUDGE WESLEY: Thank you very much.
- 10 JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel.
- Now is the time for the rebuttal.
- MR. CLEMENT: Thank you, your Honor.
- 13 I'd like to make just a few brief points in
- 14 rebuttal.
- 15 Specifically, Miss Newman makes the
- point correctly that the statute itself doesn't
- 17 refer to immediate custodian and only talks
- about the person who has custody over the
- 19 individual. But -- and I think the statutory
- 20 term itself suggests that there is one person,
- 21 the person who has custody. And in any event,
- 22 the immediate custodian rule certainly is not
- 23 something that was made up here. It stems from
- the Supreme Court case Whales against Whitney,
- 25 1885. And in some of these more unusual

1	3BHLPADA
2	situations, that rule's been slightly relaxed,
3	but never in the classic situation where
4	somebody challenges the lawfulness of their
5	current confinement and actual normal
6	confinement.
7	Now, there's reference made to the
8	Braden case, and I think that is an unusual
9	situation and I think it bears emphasis, to
10	focus on what was specifically involved in
11	Braden, because there the Court was confronting
12	the ramifications of a relatively recent
13	decision, the Peyton decision from 1968 that
14	overruled an earlier case, and it was only with
15	the Peyton decision that it was even possible
16	for a habeas petitioner to challenge the
17	lawfulness of indictment or detention in another
18	state, so in the Peyton decision of 1968, the
19	Court had to decide what is the best rule to
20	deal with that specific unusual situation, and
21	they said, Well it makes sense if what you're
22	challenging is your indictment in Kentucky, it
23	certainly makes sense to challenge the action in

25 The last point I'd like to make is to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

Kentucky.

24

1	3BHLPADA
2	reinforce the point of what is the proper
3	gravamen of the complaint in this habeas
4	petition. And in essence, the gravamen in the
5	habeas is not the procedure. If you're worried
6	about the procedure, some different kind of
7	action should have been brought. But the habeas
8	petition challenges the lawfulness of your
9	confinement.
10	The seizure may be tangentially
11	relevant to that. The actions in Washington,
12	D.C., may be much more relevant to that. None
13	of those are what is directly challenged. It's
14	the current confinement.
15	JUDGE WESLEY: Your right answer is
16	do we have the power to transfer it?
17	MR. CLEMENT: I think this Court does
18	have power to transfer it.
19	JUDGE WESLEY: Should the Court wait
20	another 18 months before it's adjudicated in
21	circuit court and he spends three years in
22	detention?
23	MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, I think it

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

would be a regrettable consequence, but I do not

think that the government bears responsibility

24

25

1	3BHLPADA
2	for that. In the very first pleading before
3	Judge Mukasey, we told him that this case raises
4	serious issues, but they should be litigated in
5	South Carolina. As you your Honor indicated,
6	the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated an ability
7	to deal with these cases quite expeditiously, so
8	I don't think
9	JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel. A
10	little chauvinistic comparison.
11	We turn now to the next set of issues
12	and they revolve around whether the President
13	has the authority to designate an American
14	citizen on American soil as an enemy combatant
15	and to detain that citizen till the end of
16	hostilities. On this issue, the respondents
17	prevailed, so we'll hear first from Petitioner
18	Professor Martinez, and you have reserved three
19	minutes for rebuttal, I see.
20	PROF. MARTINEZ: Thank you, your
21	Honor. May it please the Court:

Never before in this nation's history
has the President been granted the unilateral
authority to imprison indefinitely and without
trial an American citizen seized in a civilian
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1	3BHLPADA
2	setting on U.S. soil. Your Honors, the
3	Constitution allows him no such power. History
4	shows the power to imprison citizens on the
5	grounds that they present a threat to the
6	security of the state is one of powers most
7	easily abused by government, so our Founding
8	Fathers includes in the Constitution numerous
9	protections and safeguards, including the habeas
10	suspension, called the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
11	Amendments, and even the treason clause of
12	Article Three.
13	Today the executive branch seeks to
14	invade these carefully contrasted protections of
15	the Constitution by claiming sweeping and
16	ill-defined powers to detain without trial
17	persons the appellate declares enemy combatants.
18	JUDGE WESLEY: Does he have any
19	authority to detain at all, in your view?
20	PROF. MARTINEZ: Certainly he does,
21	under the criminal laws of this country, under
22	the material witness warrants statute.
23	JUDGE WESLEY: How long can he hold
24	him under the material witness statute? It
25	would require a crime had been committed,

1	3BHLPADA
2	wouldn't it? There would have to be a grand
3	jury, for which there would be an investigation?
4	PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes, your Honor.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: Let me ask you.
6	Mohamed Atta had been caught at the airport, and
7	he was a United States citizen. Could the
8	President have detained him on September 11th?
9	PROF. MARTINEZ: Certainly, your
10	Honor.
11	JUDGE WESLEY: In your view, could the
12	President of the United States detain Mohamed
13	Atta as he's done Jose Padilla? The leader of
14	the attack on September 11th? Could he have
15	detained him?
16	PROF. MARTINEZ: I think he could have
17	detained him.
18	JUDGE WESLEY: On what grounds?
19	PROF. MARTINEZ: If there were
20	probable cause to believe he had committed a
21	crime. Certainly the President or any executive
22	officer has the power to arrest someone without
23	a warrant in exigent circumstances.
24	JUDGE WESLEY: What if he had some
25	evidence that he believed that Mohamed Atta was

1	3BHLPADA
2	the ringleader of 20 both U.S. citizens and
3	other foreign nationals who were going to
4	begin a large-scale attack upon specific targets
5	in the United States? Would he be able to hold
6	him just to get other information from Mr. Atta
7	to learn the identity of those other
8	coconspirators who might still be in the public?
9	PROF. MARTINEZ: Under the facts you
10	describe, certainly he would be allowed to
11	detain him if those facts were clearly
12	demonstrated.
13	JUDGE WESLEY: Without filing a
14	charge?
15	PROF. MARTINEZ: Those facts clearly
16	demonstrate probable cause, at the very least.
17	JUDGE WESLEY: Let me take some
18	probable cause off. He's strongly suspected
19	he's received money from overseas, he's received
20	training in airplanes, and there have been
21	intercepts from identified al Qaeda operatives
22	outside of the United States that a large attack
23	is about to begin. Then the name Atta showed
24	up.
25	JUDGE POOLER: If only what you

1	3BHLPADA
2	described were true.
3	JUDGE WESLEY: But what I'd like to
4	know is what the authorities are we taking
5	this beyond what we envisioned? This happened.
6	This happened on our soil. And what I ask you
7	is: Does the President have the authority,
8	short of probably cause, to detain someone and
9	interrogate them to learn what they know about
10	criminal conspiracies or conspiracies to do harm
11	to American citizens on American soil?
12	PROF. MARTINEZ: Certainly, your
13	Honor, the ability of an executive official
14	under the Fourth Amendment to seize someone for
15	a short investigative purpose, even longer, if
16	there's a need for some questioning, we
17	certainly wouldn't dispute the ability of the
18	executive branch to seize that person. But that
19	situation is a far cry from the detention of
20	someone for 18 months without any judicial
21	review.
22	JUDGE WESLEY: Is the time low?

23

24

25 factor?

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

PROF. MARTINEZ: Your Honor --

JUDGE WESLEY: Is time a relevant

- 2 PROF. MARTINEZ: Certainly. I think
- 3 the court's have previously held when someone is
- 4 arrested they must be brought before a court
- 5 within 48 hours.
- JUDGE WESLEY: In a criminal context.
- We're talking about his powers as commander in
- 8 chief. Is 30 days too long?
- 9 PROF. MARTINEZ: I think, your Honor,
- 10 that the question really is whether the courts
- 11 are open and operating. If the courts are open
- 12 and operating and it is not a situation where
- there is no ability to avail oneself of the
- 14 normal process, then obviously the President
- would have that power. But where the courts are
- open and operating, within a short frame of
- 17 time, if Congress has not acted to say the
- 18 situation needs to be suspended, then that
- 19 person must be brought before the court.
- JUDGE WESLEY: I wouldn't say he
- 21 wouldn't have habeas, but the courts were open
- 22 and clear -- the courts were open and operating
- 23 in 1944.
- 24 PROF. MARTINEZ: But in that case, the
- 25 President was acting pursuant to specific

1	3BHLPADA
2	Congressional authorization allowing trial
3	before a military commission, which was also a
4	legitimate process.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: Of the Articles of War.
6	PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes, sir.
7	JUDGE WESLEY: Are there any corollary
8	articles enacted by Congress today with regard
9	to this situation?
10	PROF. MARTINEZ: No, your Honor,
11	believe it or not. The term "enemy combatant"
12	is not mentioned in any act of Congress, not
13	mentioned in any treaty on the law of war.
14	There is no specific authority which gives the
15	President this power.
16	And I might note that other nations
17	have developed that the threat of terrorism is
18	sufficient to provide an alternative to criminal
19	process and have done that through legislation,
20	and our Congress has not seen fit to do that,
21	although in enacting the Patriot Act after
22	September 11th, they gave the President numerous
23	powers to deal with the threat of terrorism,

including the power to detain aliens who the

President suspected were terrorists, and yet

24

25

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 Congress placed a strict time limit on that of
- 3 seven days.
- 4 JUDGE WESLEY: If Mr. Atta were
- 5 captured, he could have been held for seven days
- 6 and detained for only six more, right?
- 7 JUDGE POOLER: That, plus that
- 8 postdates --
- 9 JUDGE WESLEY: Obviously.
- 10 PROF. MARTINEZ: It does postdate
- 11 that. But the fact it placed limits on the
- 12 detention of aliens strongly suggests that
- 13 Congress did not believe the President had an
- inherent authority to detain American citizens
- for a year and a half without any kind of
- 16 process at all.
- 17 The cases that the government cites in
- which persons have been detained as enemy
- 19 combatants without meaningful judicial review
- 20 all involve circumstances far different from
- 21 this: Persons who are captured on the
- 22 battlefield where there is a heightened argument
- that the commander in chief's power are
- 24 enhanced, and the courts have consistently held
- 25 that whatever the commander in chief's power may

1	3BHLPADA
2	be on the battlefield, they don't extend to
3	areas where the courts are open and operating.
4	JUDGE WESLEY: I take it you don't
5	find solace in Judge Mukasey's embracing of the
6	September 18th resolution of Congress, the joint
7	resolution.
8	PROF. MARTINEZ: No, your Honor, we do
9	not believe that the authorization for military
10	force on September 18th can properly be read to
11	encompass the detention of citizens on American
12	soil.
13	JUDGE POOLER: Do you think that has
14	to be specifically granted, that power.
15	PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes, your Honor. A
16	general authorization, of course, conveys the
17	power to use troops in battle, but conveys no
18	independent authority for the President to seize
19	persons or property in the United States where
20	the courts are open and operating.
21	JUDGE POOLER: The government is
22	impressed that Congress agreed to pay for the

detention of people held. You don't think that

gives the President the power, either, the

authorization to pay for it?

23

24

25

## 1 3BHLPADA

2	PROF. MARTINEZ: No, your Honor. We
3	likewise believe that the appropriation statute
4	is not sufficiently specific, and the Court so
5	held in ex parte Endo in considering whether the
6	appropriations bill by Congress that had paid
7	for the Japanese internment camps were
8	sufficient to authorize those camps. And the
9	Court held in Endo that it was not, that the
10	power to deprive citizens of liberty must be
11	clearly and legitimately indicated by Congress,
12	the precise nature of that.
13	JUDGE POOLER: Don't you believe that
14	joint resolution actually implies the joint
15	resolution, by his terms after all, we need
16	to read this if this was the source of the
17	President's power, to whom does it apply?
18	PROF. MARTINEZ: Your Honor, I believe
19	the joint resolution for use of force authorizes
20	the President to engage our troops in combat
21	against those persons or conditions and nations
22	that he believes are responsible for
23	September 11th. So certainly the action as
24	taken in Afghanistan was when Congress had in
25	mind when it passed that resolution which it
	SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1	3BHLPADA
2	intended to pass to comply with the War Powers
3	Act and to authorize our presence of troops in
4	Afghanistan.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: What do you make of one
6	of the introductory clauses and findings of that
7	resolution that the acts rendered both necessary
8	and appropriate the United States exercises it's
9	rights to self defense and to protect United
10	States citizens, both at home and abroad is
11	it your view that the President's powers were
12	limited to beyond the territorial waters of the
13	United States? That he wasn't authorized to act
14	to protect people at home, particularly in light
15	of the fact that all the attacks that occurred
16	on September 11th were on U.S. soil?
17	PROF. MARTINEZ: Certainly, your
18	Honor, I think that the purpose of the use of
19	force is always to protect Americans at home.
20	That is why the President has war powers. I
21	believe the relevant distinction is between the
22	zone of active combat and parts of the United
23	States where the courts are open and
24	functioning.
25	JUDGE WESLEY: If the President became

1	3BHLPADA
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- 2 aware of a plan to fly a jetliner into Indian
- 3 Point nuclear plant just north of New York City,
- 4 could he invoke, pursuant to the resolution of
- 5 18th September, 2001 -- could be interdict those
- 6 that were planning that and detain them and
- 7 question them as he has done Mr. Padilla for 30
- 8 days?
- 9 PROF. MARTINEZ: Your Honor, if there
- were a situation of imminent use of armed force,
- that would most likely fall within the Commander
- in Chief's powers in the field of battle.
- JUDGE WESLEY: So the field of battle
- can be on U.S. soil, can it not?
- 15 PROF. MARTINEZ: It could. I think
- it's helpful to look at prior cases in which the
- field of battle has been on U.S. soil, and in
- 18 fact, the courts in those cases have drawn the
- 19 line between where the field of battle is and
- 20 where it is not.
- So -- for example, in the Duncan case,
- 22 which was Hawaii in World War II, the courts
- 23 held that although Hawaii had obviously been
- 24 part of the theater of combat on the day of
- 25 Pearl Harbor, and although it was under the

1	3BHLPADA
2	threat of invasion throughout World War II, that
3	it was still within the Court's purview to say
4	that because the courts were open and operating,
5	because there was not active combat going on
6	there, that cases should be tried in front of
7	civilian courts and not in front of military
8	courts.
9	And so the fact that it's possible to
10	have combat on U.S. soil does not mean that the
11	U.S. is at all times and all places a
12	battlefield, for purposes of the Commander in
13	Chief's power.
14	The rule that would subvert the
15	supremacy of civilian authority, that is the
16	cornerstone of our Constitution
17	JUDGE WESLEY: But we do know the
18	resolution wasn't enacted in a vacuum. It was
19	enacted seven days after 3,000 Americans were
20	killed on American soil as a result of the
21	conspiracy brought off by 20 individuals who had
22	some allegiance to a terrorist organization.
23	Those are the findings of the resolution, are
24	they not?
25	PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes, your Honor. And

1	3BHLPADA

- 2 again, I think it's relevant to look at what
- 3 Congress did within a few weeks of passing the
- 4 Patriot Act, in defining the bounds of the
- 5 President's authority and granting him
- 6 additional powers to fight the threat of
- 7 terrorism in our nation, and it's quite notable
- 8 again, as I said, that Congress placed
- 9 substantial limits on the power of the President
- 10 to detain aliens and not to any extent with
- 11 regard to citizens.
- 12 In no way did Congress demonstrate in
- any way that it thought they were granting the
- 14 President unlimited power to imprison citizens
- 15 without trial.
- 16 Historically, the declaration of war
- 17 has given the President authority on the field
- of battle but has not made him Commander in
- 19 Chief of this nation's peoples and inhabitants.
- 20 And I think that the government's position has
- 21 no limits. Under their theory, the President
- 22 could do this to any American at anytime, no
- 23 matter where they are, no matter the fact that
- the courts are open and operating and normal
- 25 civilian processes are available.

- 2 So your Honors, I would suggest that
- 3 this new power the government reaches for is
- 4 entirely unprecedented, and if such a new power
- is to be created, it must come from Congress,
- 6 and Congress did not give the President that
- 7 power.
- JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel.
- 9 You have reserved three minutes. Mr. Clement?
- 10 In response?
- MR. CLEMENT: Thank you, your Honor.
- 12 May it please the Court:
- 13 As I mentioned earlier, this case does
- indeed raise momentous issues about the
- separation of powers when the nation comes under
- 16 attack.
- JUDGE WESLEY: If Mr. Atta was out
- there working today and he's an alien and the
- 19 President declared him an enemy combatant -- or
- 20 must the President, through the Attorney
- 21 General, only deal with Mr. Atta pursuant to the
- 22 Patriot Act?
- MR. CLEMENT: No, your Honor. The
- 24 President could certainly designate him enemy
- 25 combatant.

## 1 3BHLPADA

2	JUDGE WESLEY: Where in the Patriot
3	Act does the Congress recognize that specific
4	authority of the President?
5	MR. CLEMENT: That specific authority
6	wouldn't come from the Patriot Act, your Honor.
7	But I think it's important to recognize that the
8	specific provision of the Patriot Act that is
9	relied on is a direction to the attorney general
10	as a complement or an addendum to his
11	immigration authority. It in no way affects the
12	President's authority as commander in chief to
13	hold somebody as an enemy combatant.
14	JUDGE WESLEY: Doesn't it create a
14 15	JUDGE WESLEY: Doesn't it create a curious circumstance where the President could
15	curious circumstance where the President could
15 16	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold
15 16 17	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is
15 16 17 18	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is likely to be a danger, reasonably the
15 16 17 18 19	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is likely to be a danger, reasonably the Attorney General only had reason to believe that
15 16 17 18 19 20	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is likely to be a danger, reasonably the Attorney General only had reason to believe that he's a danger to the United States, that the
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is likely to be a danger, reasonably the Attorney General only had reason to believe that he's a danger to the United States, that the Attorney General in seven days has to either
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	curious circumstance where the President could designate a citizen an enemy combatant and hold him indefinitely, but if it's an alien who is likely to be a danger, reasonably the Attorney General only had reason to believe that he's a danger to the United States, that the Attorney General in seven days has to either deport him to charge him; or, in the

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- 2 curious that an alien is treated better than a
- 3 citizen?
- 4 MR. CLEMENT: An alien is not treated
- 5 better -- with respect to your Honor. The
- 6 Patriot Act provision is an additional power for
- 7 which there is absolutely no anologue in the law
- 8 to a citizen. Because with respect to both, the
- 9 President has the authority to treat them as
- 10 enemy combatants. In al-Mari, for example, who
- is seized in Peoria and transferred to the brig
- in Charleston, is an alien.
- 13 JUDGE WESLEY: Can you point to me in
- 14 the record somewhere that says that Congress
- didn't intend to preempt the field but define
- the field with regard to how war was to be
- 17 conducted on native soil in the context of the
- 18 Patriot Act?
- 19 MR. CLEMENT: Well --
- JUDGE WESLEY: Is there, something in
- 21 the legislative history that tells us, Well,
- this doesn't preclude the President from
- 23 identifying an alien as an enemy combatant, but
- holding Mr. Padilla?
- 25 MR. CLEMENT: I couldn't -- I could

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1	3BHLPADA
2	point to something along the line of what you
3	have in mind. I think that the ordinary
4	presumption is that if Congress doesn't make it
5	explicit, you don't assume that they've tried to
6	encroach on the President's authority in a way
7	that raises one of the greatest separation of
8	power problems.
9	JUDGE POOLER: You've heard counsel
10	before you say that in order to detain an
11	American citizen on American soil, not on the
12	battlefield, it's her belief that Congress has
13	to explicitly give this power to the President.
14	MR. CLEMENT: With respect your Honor,
15	we would disagree. I mean, we think that
16	whatever authority
17	JUDGE POOLER: Doesn't 4001 mean that
18	they have to tell the President that you can
19	overcome the prohibition of that statute by
20	giving him that specific power?
21	MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, if it
22	weren't for the joint authorization of force in
23	the provision that you refer to in Title 10, I
24	would be here arguing that 4001(a) should not be
25	read to require that kind of Congressional

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- 2 authorization. And --
- JUDGE PARKER: How could you do that?
- 4 It says, "except pursuant to an act of
- 5 Congress." What would be your argument?
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: My argument would be
- 7 that first of all, one would want to apply a
- 8 presumption that one would not want to easily
- 9 infer that Congress meant to intrude on the
- 10 president's military authority.
- JUDGE POOLER: How can there be
- 12 presumptions and inferences when the plain
- language of the statute says that we need an act
- of Congress for the President to do what he's
- done in this case?
- MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, I don't want
- 17 to spend too much time making an argument I
- don't think I need to make to win, but I do
- 19 think if you look at its location, in Title 18;
- 20 and you look at the fact -- and the other side
- 21 wants to point to the fact that you should pay
- 22 attention to the fact that the purpose of
- 4001(a) was to overrule the Emergency Detention
- 24 Act of 1950. And I would take offense to that
- 25 because I think if you look at that legislative

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 history and you look at that act --
- 3 JUDGE PARKER: He could have been
- 4 detained under the Emergency Detention Act;
- 5 isn't that correct?
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: Yes, as it existed. But
- 7 that, again, was authority before the Attorney
- 8 General, and I think if you look at all of these
- 9 various points, the Emergency Detention Act was
- 10 an additional authority for the Attorney
- 11 General.
- The Endo decision on which my opposing
- 13 counsel relies, in that case, the court was very
- 14 careful to say that it wasn't making any
- pronouncement whatsoever about the authority of
- the military to hold individuals as enemy
- 17 combatants. The individual in Endo was held
- 18 pursuant to civilian authority, not as an enemy
- 19 combatant, and the Court made it very clear and
- 20 cited Quirin and said that's different.
- JUDGE PARKER: The problem is the
- 22 Congress has spoken specifically on -- with
- 23 respect to this subject matter. Congress has
- passed 4001, and, as you've pointed out, the
- 25 context is reasonably clear. People were upset

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 and embarrassed about Koramatsu. People -- the
- 3 Congress, wanted to specifically subtract that
- 4 power from the governments arsenal. It wanted
- 5 to protect U.S. citizens, so it passed a statute
- 6 that says no citizen shall be imprisoned except
- 7 pursuant to act of Congress. And unless -- I
- 8 take it your argument is that the requisite act
- 9 of Congress is the resolution.
- 10 MR. CLEMENT: I think it's 956.5.
- JUDGE PARKER: You mean the
- 12 appropriations.
- MR. CLEMENT: It's an authorization to
- 14 use appropriated funds. So I don't think a
- back-of-the-hand -- that is, an appropriations
- 16 really works.
- JUDGE PARKER: The problem is what is
- 18 the language of the authorization -- excuse me,
- of the joint resolution, it seems to me has to
- 20 be stretched to reach your position with respect
- 21 to what it permits. And you have that potential
- interpretation of the statute juxtaposed to 4001
- which couldn't be clearer.
- MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your
- 25 Honor, I think the context of 4001 doesn't

1	3BHLPADA
2	inform how to interpret that provision, but with
3	respect to the authorization itself, it clearly
4	authorizes the use of the armed forces and the
5	military force. And I think the important thing
6	to understand is the Supreme Court has said over
7	and over again that the ability to hold enemy
8	combatants is part and parcel of the use of
9	force and the authorization of military force.
10	JUDGE POOLER: Go to the language of
11	the joint resolution, and maybe you could help
12	me with what I'm concerned about. The important
13	paragraph says that the President is authorized
14	to use all necessary and prohibitive force
15	against those nations, organizations or persons
16	he determines planned, authorized, committed or
17	aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
18	September 11th. Or harbor such persons or
19	organizations. Okay?
20	And is it your argument I want to
21	do the rest of that sentence but is it your
22	argument that Mr. Padilla fits within that

MR. CLEMENT: I would take the position it does, your Honor.

23 definition?

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1	3BHLPADA
2	JUDGE POOLER: Can you tell me which
3	were the triggers of his relationship to that
4	part of the sentence? No one says he planned
5	MR. CLEMENT: Right.
6	JUDGE POOLER: authorized,
7	committed or aided the terrorist attacks on
8	September 11th, as far as we know. Or that he
9	harbored any organization or person. I think
10	you're saying he's associated in the affidavits
11	before us. So tell me where he gets connected
12	to those words I just read.
13	MR. CLEMENT: He would get connected
14	as somebody who aided the terrorist attacks.
15	JUDGE POOLER: He aided the terrorist
16	attacks on September 11th?
17	MR. CLEMENT: Just on the theory that
18	if you are a member of al Qaeda or that you have
19	been trained at their camps, then
20	JUDGE POOLER: But I don't think
21	there's any allegation in the documents before
22	us that he was involved before September 11th.
23	MR. CLEMENT: Well, he was I think
24	that
25	JUDGE POOLER: I think the charge is
	SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1	3BHLPADA
2	that he wants to do something new. That's the
3	dispersion the radiological dispersion
4	device, okay? This seems, after the fact, to
5	get at the people who did that. Right?
6	Are you saying he's one of the people
7	that did that?
8	MR. CLEMENT: I think we're talking
9	past each other because I'm not trying to tell
10	you that he was one of the that he was the
11	21st hijacker. What I'm trying to tell you is
12	that anybody who is associated with al Qaeda
13	fits within that description and that is the way
14	you treat these issues with respect to military
15	authority. If you have somebody who is part of
16	the enemy, who is associated with the enemy,
17	that he is aiding the enemy.
18	JUDGE POOLER: But here is a case
19	where we really do have to draw some inferences
20	and add some interpretative rules, unlike
21	4001(a) perhaps.
22	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your

this Court's decision in Orlando against Taylor.

And this Court in that decision made clear that

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23

Honor, I would direct the Court's attention to

## 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 in interpreting a Congressional resolution, that
- 3 the courts ought to be very wary about parsing
- 4 the text the way that you are, precisely because
- 5 this Court recognized that the exact wording --
- 6 or that whether one does a formal declaration of
- 7 war, whether one primarily focuses on 9/11 or
- 8 looks forward, and the exact wording are all the
- 9 product of diplomatic concerns, foreign policy
- 10 concerns --
- JUDGE POOLER: So have the people,
- when Congress speaks, so it's a product of
- perhaps compromise or the will of the people?
- MR. CLEMENT: Or diplomatic concerns,
- or foreign policy concerns.
- JUDGE POOLER: Perhaps you can help me
- 17 with this: The rest of that sentence originally
- 18 read: And to deter and preempt any future acts
- of terrorists or aggression, and that was
- 20 changed, I understand, from the Congressional
- 21 Record to read: In order to prevent any further
- 22 acts. Can I take any meaning from that or is
- that just not meaningful at all?
- MR. CLEMENT: I wouldn't take any
- 25 meaning from that. If you put yourself back

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1	3BHLPADA
2	into the mindset of Congress at the time they
3	passed this resolution, they were not looking
4	for ways to cut back on the President's
5	authority.
6	JUDGE POOLER: Except they wrote it
7	first it said "to deter", and after a speech by
8	Senator Byrd, he claims, it was changed, the
9	word was taken out. "To deter and preempt" were
10	taken out the joint authorization on which you
11	rely so heavily. It had to mean something.
12	Words mean something.
13	MR. CLEMENT: Words mean something,
14	your Honor, but in this context, this Court has
15	specifically warned against parsing those terms.
16	I don't know why Congress changed those words,
17	and of course none of us will ever really know
18	what the corporate Congress was trying to do.
19	JUDGE WESLEY: That presumes that
20	there's a collective will of Congress, which, in
21	my experience, is Matsomoru.
22	MR CLEMENT. In mine, too, your

MR. CLEMENT: In mine, too, your

Honor, which is why I was speaking advisedly,

but we'll never know why that was done exactly.

It may have been done out of concerns of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

1	3BHLPADA
2	international law, about concerns about
3	JUDGE POOLER: It may have been done,
4	if I can just finish, out of concern that the
5	first language, which was so broad, that it
6	might allow the President to detain a citizen,
7	an American citizen, found on American soil,
8	without access to counsel and call him an enemy
9	combatant. That may be why they changed the
10	words. We don't know that either, do we,
11	Counsel?
12	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, I think
13	that would be quite an inference. I think one
14	would search the Congressional record for a
15	reference to 4001(a) in vain, just as you would
16	search the original.
17	JUDGE POOLER: Not 4001(a). This is
18	the joint resolution.
19	MR. CLEMENT: What I'm saying in
20	the contention of passing the joint resolution,
21	I don't think anybody was saying, Oh, be careful
22	here because if we're too explicit about this
23	authority here, we're going to override the
24	provisions of 4001(a).
25	JUDGE POOLER: They took out the words

## 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 "to deter and preempt". They took that out,
- 3 seven days after 9/11. As bitter, as unhappy,
- 4 as grieving as this nation was, they took out
- 5 the words "to deter and preempt" from the power
- 6 given to the President. Does that mean nothing
- 7 to you?
- 8 MR. CLEMENT: I think it does not come
- 9 within the category of things that this Court
- 10 should draw an inference from. I think to do so
- 11 flatly is inconsistent with what this Court said
- in Orlando. One doesn't parse these things in
- 13 that way. And I think that the authority here
- was granted by that provision.
- I think the authority is also
- 16 contained in 10 USC 956. I think there is ample
- 17 authority. The Fourth Circuit reached that
- 18 conclusion in the Hamdi decision, I think
- 19 correctly. I think the other side would like to
- 20 ignore the Hamdi decision.
- JUDGE PARKER: Parse it. What does
- that mean. Don't read it carefully?
- MR. CLEMENT: I think what it means is
- 24 that there are different ways that this could
- 25 have been phrased. But to draw an inference

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 from that that limits the President's
- 3 authority --
- 4 JUDGE PARKER: We're lawyers. Our
- 5 lives are our language.
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: I realize that, your
- 7 Honor. And if this were a domestic case that
- 8 didn't implicate the President's war power --
- 9 JUDGE PARKER: It implicates our
- 10 powers as Article Three courts to advise our
- 11 coordinate branches on what the Constitution
- 12 means.
- MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely, your Honor.
- But as this Court recognized in Orlando, as the
- 15 Fourth Circuit recognized in Hamdi, and as the
- Supreme Court recognized over and over again in
- these realms of foreign policy and the
- 18 president's commander in chief authority, the
- 19 power of the courts is at its limit.
- JUDGE PARKER: This is a person picked
- 21 up in Chicago.
- 22 MR. CLEMENT: And Ouirin also involved
- 23 a U.S. official picked up in Chicago. And it
- 24 may be that that case, you know --
- 25 JUDGE PARKER: Who got counsel. And

1	3BHLPADA
2	the civilians in Quirin were tried in civilian
3	courts, after articles of war.
4	JUDGE POOLER: After articles of war.
5	MR. CLEMENT: The Quirin court was
6	focussed not just on the specific war crime for
7	which he was charged but also the lawfulness of
8	the detention for that war crime. And for that
9	broader detention, there was no specific
10	authorization.
11	JUDGE POOLER: They were all members
12	of the German Army, weren't they? Didn't they
13	admit they were members of the German Army?
14	JUDGE PARKER: That was stipulated.
15	MR. CLEMENT: It was stipulated.
16	JUDGE POOLER: Do we know, has he
17	admitted that he's a member of, let alone an
18	army all you say is that he's associated with
19	al Qaeda.
20	MR. CLEMENT: No, and I think in a
21	sense I think maybe it's up to the Court.
22	I'm happy to explore any issue at anytime, but I
23	think that that may be better explored in the
24	next set of issues, because I assume that the

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question here was assuming sort of the state of

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- 2 affairs as laid out in the President's
- 3 declaration and Mobbs' declaration.
- 4 JUDGE POOLER: Assuming it's true.
- 5 MR. CLEMENT: Then he is -- within the
- 6 terms of Quirin, he is affiliated with the enemy
- 7 forces. I mean, the fact that --
- JUDGE POOLER: They were more than
- 9 just affiliated. They were members of the
- 10 German Army, and that was stipulated, as Judge
- 11 Parker points out.
- MR. CLEMENT: Yes, and I think it's
- 13 equally true if the German Army could have
- 14 avoided the laws of war by not making them
- members and keeping a looser affiliation, they
- 16 would gladly stipulate to that.
- 17 JUDGE WESLEY: I wasn't aware that
- 18 they issued membership cards.
- 19 MR. CLEMENT: That's exactly right.
- 20 And unless this Court want to hold that the
- 21 President is powerless to deal with an enemy
- 22 that doesn't respect --
- JUDGE PARKER: He could go back to
- 24 Congress and get this authorization.
- MR. CLEMENT: I suppose he could, but

1	3BHLPADA
2	I don't think that any natural reading of this
3	would suggest any need to go back to Congress.
4	JUDGE POOLER: But if he's dealing
5	with a different kind of enemy, which is what
6	you are saying, that al Qaeda probably doesn't
7	hand out membership cards, then the President
8	has to go to Congress because they have the
9	power to make an American citizen, captured on
10	American soil, who is associated with, maybe
11	just an associate member or a full member, of
12	al Qaeda, he Congress is the one that says
13	that this is someone who the President can act
14	against.
15	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your
16	Honor, I just don't think that's the right
17	allocation of the separation of powers here. I
18	think the President's Commander in Chief power
19	is given, as the federalist papers make clear,
20	precisely so he can adapt to different
21	JUDGE POOLER: On that, when there's
22	an article of war, when two nation states are at
23	war. But this is an American citizen captured
24	in O'Hare airport.

25 MR. CLEMENT: As was the case in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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1	
L	3BHLPADA

- 2 Quirin, your Honor. And I just don't think that
- 3 the difference between a declared war and
- 4 dealing with an enemy who is distinguished
- 5 largely because they do not obey the laws of
- 6 war, that that enemy somehow gets an immunity
- 7 from the laws of war.
- JUDGE POOLER: Congress has to say
- 9 that.
- 10 MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your
- Honor, I disagree, and I think that the extent
- there's a need for Congressional authorization,
- 13 you find it in the authorization of force and
- 14 you find it in 10 USC. So I think that -- and
- again, I think you go back and look at 18 USC
- 4001(a), it is designed to deal with the problem
- of civilian detentions. It is not directed to
- 18 the military.
- 19 JUDGE PARKER: But in the
- 20 constitutional structure, the power to define
- offenses against the law of nations, which is
- 22 what this is, is not an Article 2 power. It's
- an Article 1 power. It's Congress's power.
- MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, that may be
- 25 true with respect to specific offenses against

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1	3BHLPADA
2	the law of war. But there is also an authority,
3	and Quirin clearly drew a distinction between
4	the two, to hold an individual as an unlawful
5	combatant or as a prisoner of war.
6	JUDGE WESLEY: The article was that
7	Article 15 wasn't specific and the United States
8	Supreme Court said the specificity isn't
9	required; there's enough there to try Quirin.
10	But for a second, can we return to the
11	language of the authorization? Is it your
12	position that Mr. Padilla's a member of al Qaeda
13	or associated therewith?
14	MR. CLEMENT: Associated therewith.
15	JUDGE WESLEY: Is not al Qaeda
16	identified as one of the organizations that
17	planned the terrorist attack on September 11th?
18	MR. CLEMENT: That's right, your
19	Honor.
20	JUDGE WESLEY: The resolution, to be
21	fair, to read it in total, says that the
22	President is authorized to use all necessary and
23	appropriate force against those nations,
24	organizations I presume that means

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al Qaeda -- or persons he determines planned,

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1	3BHLPADA
2	authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
3	attack that occurred on September 11th or
4	harbored such organizations or persons, comma,
5	in order to prevent any future attacks
6	JUDGE POOLER: Further.
7	JUDGE WESLEY: Further attacks.
8	JUDGE POOLER: Further.
9	JUDGE WESLEY: Mine says future I'm
10	reading from my copy against the United
11	States.
12	So he's a member of an organization
13	identified as having conducted it. Then there's
14	a comma. I think I understand what commas mean.
15	It means that if you either aided you're part
16	of an organization that either aided, committed
17	or harbored, then you can act against them in
18	order to prevent future attacks.
19	Is that that's what it says,
20	doesn't it?
21	MR. CLEMENT: That is what it says,

JUDGE PARKER: Is there anything in this record that establishes Mr. Padilla as a

25 member of al Qaeda?

your Honor.

22

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1	3BHLPADA
Τ.	JDDLFADA

- 2 MR. CLEMENT: There is nothing in this
- 3 record that establishes he is a member of
- 4 al Qaeda. There are ample things in the record
- 5 that say that he is affiliated and associated
- 6 with the al Qaeda.
- JUDGE POOLER: I think you're right.
- 8 That will come up when we talk about what proof
- 9 the government needs to supply.
- 10 Do you want to finish any comments on
- 11 this topic before I turn to the rebuttal?
- 12 MR. CLEMENT: If I could make two
- 13 brief closing comments.
- 14 JUDGE POOLER: Sure.
- MR. CLEMENT: One is: I think this is
- important since this is an authorization of
- force to keep in mind that the authority to hold
- 18 enemy combatants, not try them for specific war
- 19 crimes but to hold them, has always been held
- 20 part and parcel of the war powers. The -- also
- 21 Quirin. Also Ludecke versus Watkins, and the
- 22 Isver decision as the justice made in the Arada
- case.
- 24 So there's ample authority that when
- 25 the Congress authorizes force to get the persons

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- and organizations that are involved here, then
- 3 that was an authorization to hold the
- 4 individual.
- 5 JUDGE POOLER: All those cases, many
- of them battlefield cases, many of them with
- 7 Articles of War, many of them between nations.
- 8 You will agree, I think, that this case before
- 9 us is an extension of all of those cases to the
- 10 extent that this petitioner was not found on a
- 11 battlefield, and to the further extent that he
- 12 is an American citizen and to the further extent
- that as far as we know, he's not a member of an
- 14 Army of a nation state with whom we are at war.
- 15 Isn't that? -- can we agree at least on that,
- that's not to decide the ultimate question, but
- 17 I'm just asking, doesn't it just move the
- 18 outside of the box somewhat?
- MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your
- 20 Honor, I guess I'm not -- I agree at the level
- 21 that there are differences between this case and
- 22 the Quirin. But the only two differences --
- JUDGE POOLER: This is all leading to
- further expansion of the Executive's power.
- MR. CLEMENT: I think some of the

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 factors that you mentioned are on all fours with
- 3 Quirin. That was somebody who was a U.S.
- 4 citizen or alleged to be and the Court found
- 5 that so immaterial they didn't delve into the
- 6 question.
- JUDGE PARKER: But also a member of
- 8 the German Army.
- 9 MR. CLEMENT: But also seized in
- 10 Chicago. But I think both stem from the same
- 11 fact. That was a war against a formal nation
- 12 state. This is not. So as a formal nation
- state, sure, you have a card-carrying member of
- 14 the German military. And because it's a nation
- state you have a declaration of war. So really
- it just comes down to the question -- with
- 17 respect, your Honor -- as to whether or not it
- makes a difference that there's a declaration of
- 19 war. And it's hard for us to understand why
- when you're waging what is clearly a war against
- 21 an adversary who is different from the German
- 22 Army, mostly because they steadfastly refused to
- obey the laws of war and have insignias and have
- 24 memberships that are formal, that somehow that
- 25 gives the al Qaeda an exemption from the laws of

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 war.
- JUDGE POOLER: Do you envision treaty
- 4 signing when the war on terrorism is over?
- 5 MR. CLEMENT: I don't, but I do
- 6 envision a declaration by the President that
- 7 either phases of the war are over or that the
- 8 struggle is over or complete. And I think what
- 9 we may likely see in this context is something
- 10 where the President maybe makes first a
- 11 determination that with respect to say the
- ground war in Afghanistan as that affects the
- 13 Taliban, that that's complete, but that the war
- 14 continues against the al Qaeda.
- 15 JUDGE POOLER: But is the war of
- 16 terrorism really different in quality and
- 17 character than the war on poverty or the war on
- 18 drugs?
- MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely, it is, your
- 20 Honor. And I think in fairness that is the
- 21 question that gets to the heart of this:
- 22 Because if the Court is of the view that
- 23 notwithstanding the attacks of September 11th,
- 24 notwithstanding the authorization of force,
- 25 notwithstanding the events that are happening

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L	3BHLPADA

- 2 all over the world, that this is just the war on
- 3 poverty or perhaps, in a closer analogue, the
- 4 war on drugs, then I think that one wouldn't
- 5 find the authority for the Executive.
- But if one understands that the war of
- 7 terrorism is quite different, then the
- 8 President's authority I think is ample.
- 9 JUDGE WESLEY: Let's presume you're
- 10 right for a second and that this qualifies as an
- 11 armed conflict and that Mr. Padilla -- that
- there's reason to believe that Mr. Padilla is a
- 13 member of al Qaeda, given the fact that he's
- 14 spent a considerable period of time in Egypt and
- 15 Afghanistan with those whom he associated during
- 16 that period of time.
- 17 How long does Mr. Padilla remain an
- 18 enemy combatant? Because the purpose of holding
- 19 him is twofold. Under the laws of war, the
- 20 first is to take him out of play, I understand.
- 21 The second of all is to get information from
- 22 him. And the government really hinges its case
- on the need to keep him from his attorney.
- 24 That's why they wanted to -- they wanted to take
- Ms. Newman out of it. They didn't want her

1	3BHLPADA
2	contacting him. Not that she was undercutting
3	it in the sense of not being a good American,
4	but that she was served as a reference point
5	for him so he'd decide whether to get involved,
6	he would break the interrogation chain, break
7	the relationship with his interrogator.
8	How long, and who decides how long,
9	and is it unfettered discretion? If you're
10	right, is Mr. Padilla in limbo until the
11	President decides? Or should there be a regular
12	review? What are the outer limits?
13	I asked Ms. Martinez how long because
14	she conceded that perhaps he could be, for a
15	period of time, as an enemy combatant, as an
16	alien or a citizen. How long could Mr. Padilla
17	be held as an enemy combatant and who decides
18	and who reviews it?
19	MR. CLEMENT: Well, your Honor, I
20	think that, as your question pointed out,
21	there's two reasons for detention. And
22	JUDGE WESLEY: To take him out of

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play, we understand.

intelligence gathering.

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MR. CLEMENT: And for purposes of

1	3BHLPADA
Τ.	JDDLFADA

- JUDGE WESLEY: But once you take him
- 3 out of play, he's no longer worth anything,
- 4 what's wrong with having him see his lawyer?
- 5 MR. CLEMENT: I think our position
- 6 would be a point is reached where one of those
- 7 two purposes is no longer being served, so that
- 8 the access to counsel no longer interferes with
- 9 the intelligence gathering process or the
- 10 intelligence gathering process is complete.
- 11 That at that point, when the United States
- doesn't want to deny persons held in the United
- 13 States access to counsel just for the sake of
- 14 it.
- So an initial determination would be
- made that access to counsel is now appropriate.
- 17 That wouldn't necessarily -- that's not the same
- 18 determination.
- JUDGE PARKER: By whom?
- 20 MR. CLEMENT: By -- by -- by the
- 21 intelligence community. Principally, the
- 22 Secretary of Defense. Or ultimately, the
- 23 Secretary of Defense.
- 24 JUDGE WESLEY: But in Quirin, we know
- 25 he was going to be tried by a military council.

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- 2 Can Mr. Padilla be tried by a military court on
- 3 the President's orders now?
- 4 MR. CLEMENT: Not under that current
- 5 order. That doesn't suggest --
- JUDGE WESLEY: The current order
- 7 doesn't cover U.S. citizens, does it?
- 8 MR. CLEMENT: It does not, your Honor.
- 9 That doesn't mean that couldn't be amended.
- 10 JUDGE WESLEY: Then we're in an odd
- 11 circumstance. We have the Patriot Act on one
- 12 side, which seems to set specific time limits
- and incorporate habeas corpus, and you say,
- 14 Well, we could use our war powers to hold an
- 15 alien enemy combatant.
- Now, on the other side, we have
- 17 tribunals where these enemy combatants could be
- 18 tried in military courts as the President has
- 19 already decided with regard to some people on
- 20 Guantanamo Bay.
- 21 And then we have Mr. Padilla. We have
- 22 Mr. Padilla, whose purpose of being held is for
- 23 intelligence gathering, and yet -- we don't
- 24 know? Certainly, you don't believe that the
- 25 appellate has the right to suspend a writ of

1	3BHLPADA
2	habeas corpus?
3	MR. CLEMENT: I wouldn't take a
4	position whether certainly he hasn't done it.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: We know that Congress
6	is the only with the power to do that.
7	MR. CLEMENT: We know that Congress
8	can do it.
9	JUDGE WESLEY: So he has a right to a
10	writ of habeas corpus.
11	MR. CLEMENT: We've never denied him
12	the right of habeas corpus. I think the dispute
13	has always been what is the proper scope of that
14	writ in these circumstances.
15	JUDGE POOLER: Can I ask you one
16	question about intelligence gathering?
17	MR. CLEMENT: I'd be happy to, but one
18	piece of the puzzle that I think is missing on
19	your question, and I just want to place it
20	there, which is that an alien also can be held
21	exactly as Mr. Padilla is, and al-Mari is the
22	example. So in a situation with respect to an

alien where the President has more --

MR. CLEMENT: Yes.

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JUDGE PARKER: Under this resolution.

1	3BHLPADA
2	JUDGE PARKER: So why did Congress
3	waste its time passing 1226AA if the power
4	existed already?
5	MR. CLEMENT: To give the Attorney
6	General an additional authority as to an
7	adjunct to his immigration power. That was my
8	point in that the alien has a variety of
9	weapons. And those are more limited as to a
10	citizen, but that doesn't take off the table the
11	one thing, both with respect to 18 and a
12	citizen, which is the ability
13	JUDGE PARKER: If the President has
14	authority under the resolution, why did the
15	Attorney General need any additional authority?
16	MR. CLEMENT: First of all, there are
17	individuals who can be held, your Honor, via the
18	Patriot Act who cannot be held as an enemy
19	combatant, both because the standard's lower,
20	but also because it's not an element of the
21	Patriot Act detention authority that you should
22	be affiliated with the al Qaeda. So it's really
23	analogous to the Quirin court.
24	The Quirin court heard an argument
25	that you can't hold these individuals for

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## 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 military commission because treason's available
- 3 as a criminal offense. The Court said no.
- 4 First of all, broader authority than that. And
- 5 second of all, it's not an element of treason to
- 6 be affiliated with the enemy. So in that sense,
- 7 there's different authorities.
- JUDGE POOLER: I just wanted to ask
- 9 about the process of intelligence gathering,
- 10 which is one of your twin goals, from what I
- 11 hear you say, maybe the more important of the
- goals that are extant right now vis-a-vis this
- 13 petitioner.
- In the past, we have had roque agents
- of the CIA or the FBI who it turns out have
- 16 compromised this country's national security by
- 17 giving information to countries with whom we
- 18 were at war or -- the Cold War, the war on
- 19 terrorism -- let's just say "at war". And we
- 20 needed that information to protect ourselves.
- 21 But we didn't hold them incommunicado.
- What did we do, actually?
- MR. CLEMENT: With respect to most of
- 24 those individuals, criminal charges were brought
- and then an agreement was reached where there

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## 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 was an exchange --
- JUDGE POOLER: So we bargained with
- 4 them and took the death penalty off the table --
- 5 in some cases, pensions, as homely as that --
- 6 and got the information we went.
- 7 Now, isn't it true that Mr. Padilla,
- 8 based on assuming everything you say is true in
- 9 the declarations before us, isn't it true that
- 10 he could be charged with several crimes that
- 11 would bring either life imprisonment or the
- 12 death penalty?
- MR. CLEMENT: I would think that's
- 14 true. I haven't looked at the record with that
- 15 question in mind.
- JUDGE POOLER: So why isn't the
- 17 traditional plea bargain, which the government
- 18 knows how to do, why isn't that the way to get
- information from someone who has it and you want
- 20 it rather than keeping him incommunicado in a
- 21 brig?
- 22 MR. CLEMENT: Your Honor, I think that
- 23 there are different ways of dealing with
- 24 different individuals, and there are some
- 25 individuals who have been charged in the

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1	3BHLPADA
2	criminal justice system and have effectively
3	pled to an offense and have provided information
4	as a result. So that is a tool that with
5	respect to some individuals is deemed the best
6	way to proceed and the best way to gather
7	intelligence.
8	JUDGE POOLER: And it's
9	constitutional.
10	MR. CLEMENT: It is constitutional.
11	But there's another constitutionally available
12	mechanism that the Quirin case says is
13	constitutional
14	JUDGE POOLER: But what I'm saying is
15	if you had done that, what you did with the
16	rogue agents, you wouldn't be facing these
17	ultimate issues of the President's powers or the
18	constitutionality of the government's actions.
19	Isn't that correct?
20	MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely correct. If
21	the executive branch wanted to limit itself to
22	one intelligence gathering tool and close
23	another, it could have done that and avoid this
24	question. But the Executive made a question

that the intelligence value and the intelligence

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1	3BHLPADA
2	gathering processes with respect to al Qaeda was
3	so important that they did not want to take any
4	tools off the table. And I think with respect
5	that, that intelligence-based judgment is the
6	kind of judgment to which courts have
7	traditionally deferred.
8	JUDGE WESLEY: Article 3 trial. And
9	if the Court says tried for treason, doesn't
10	mean he can't be tried in a military court as an
11	enemy combatant.
12	JUDGE POOLER: I think it's the
13	battlefield judgments where Article 3 has
14	been has been shown, battlefield judgments.
15	MR. CLEMENT: With respect, the
16	al Qaeda made the battlefield the United States,
17	and there's substantial evidence that they're
18	trying to make the battlefield the United States
19	again. So when we see somebody in the United
20	States, given the locus of the attacks to date,
21	the locus of where future attacks are planned,

it would seem to be an odd view indeed -- the

authority is fine if we can capture somebody

basis in authority here.

over in Afghanistan, but we can't use the same

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# 1 3BHLPADA

2	JUDGE POOLER: If what you say is
3	true, that the battlefield is now the United
4	States and I'm not going to bow to you about
5	9/11; I walked out my building right next door
6	and saw both towers on fire. So I understand

8 But if that has become the
9 battlefield, Congress has to say that, and I'm

what you're talking about.

4001(a) stands in the way.

10 not certain they did yet.

MR. CLEMENT: With respect, I think the President has a reservoir of authority to respond, and -- when the battlefield is in the United States. And with respect, I think the problem with both your reading of 4001(a) and your authorization of force reading is that doesn't allow you to draw any distinction between Mr. Padilla and Mr. Atta. And if there's an imminent attack on the United States and the President is in a position to stop that because he's the Executive and can act with dispatch, he shouldn't have to call up on the phone and say, Geez, guys, we need a resolution before I can do anything. Otherwise, 18 USC

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 JUDGE POOLER: There is a vehicle to
- 3 stop that, but we weren't addressing that, so
- 4 those questions just are -- I just don't know
- 5 how useful they are.
- 6 MR. CLEMENT: Fair point, your Honor.
- 7 I don't think this Court -- if there had been
- 8 the ability to stop these attacks, I don't think
- 9 this Court would tarry long over the question of
- 10 whether or not the officers had to pay damages
- 11 because they violated 18 USC 4001(a).
- JUDGE WESLEY: What might develop is
- possibility they might occur again.
- 14 MR. CLEMENT: I think that's right,
- 15 your Honor.
- JUDGE POOLER: Thank you for a lively
- 17 discussion.
- 18 Professor Martinez? Three minutes
- 19 rebuttal.
- 20 PROF. MARTINEZ: Thank you, your
- Honors.
- Your Honors, Congress is open for
- 23 business. It's been open for business for the
- 24 past 18 months. The courts are open and
- operating, and so Mr. Clement's hypotheticals

1	3BHLPADA
2	about the President's necessity of action where
3	he doesn't have time to get the authority he
4	needs are a far cry from the situation.
5	JUDGE WESLEY: It's that the
6	President's action's been on the table since
7	June, 2002. He hasn't done a single thing to
8	repudiate what he did to Mr. Padilla, has he?
9	PROF. MARTINEZ: Correct, your Honor.
10	JUDGE WESLEY: Can't we infer then,
11	because isn't there a firm statutory instruction
12	that when Congress doesn't act faced with a
13	condition it's chosen not to intervene? Has
14	there been a single bill introduced or
15	resolution condemning Mr. Padilla's detention?
16	PROF. MARTINEZ: No, Congress has not
17	said anything.
18	JUDGE WESLEY: Completely silent? All
19	465 members of Congress have been completely
20	silent for 18 months. In light of
21	PROF. MARTINEZ: Congressional
22	inaction is insufficient to satisfy the
23	necessity of the Congress for the
24	Constitution to create Congressional action
25	dramatically upsets the separation of powers.
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3BHT.PADA

- 2 The same argument was made in the steel seizure
- 3 case.
- 4 JUDGE PARKER: Perhaps Congress is
- 5 waiting to see what we say to this issue, since
- 6 it's our position, is it not, to determine
- 7 whether the kind of actions of the President
- 8 were consistent with his Constitutional
- 9 authority.
- 10 PROF. MARTINEZ: That's correct, your
- 11 Honor. And I would also just reiterate in the
- 12 seizure case that exact argument was made. It
- was held insufficient that Congress had not
- 14 attempted the president's seizure of the steel
- 15 mills.
- JUDGE WESLEY: May be a little more
- 17 realistic.
- 18 PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes, your Honor. As
- 19 your Honor's indicated, the plain text of 4001
- 20 makes it clear what is implicit, which is that
- 21 no citizen may be imprisoned except pursuant to
- 22 an act of Congress, and I think it's clear here
- 23 that Congress has in no way indicated its
- 24 intention to depart from our nation's long
- 25 constitutional history that off the battlefield,

## 1 3BHLPADA

- 2 where the courts are open and functioning, that
- 3 citizens cannot be imprisoned without trial.
- 4 Contrary to the government's evidence,
- 5 an authorization for use of force on the
- 6 battlefield, even in a traditional conflict,
- 7 cannot be read to confer authority on the
- 8 President to detain persons or property off the
- 9 battlefield. In Quirin, there was an express
- 10 authorization from Congress allowing Quirin to
- 11 be tried in military commission, and the Quirin
- 12 court made clear that it had no occasion to
- describe the meticulous care the boundaries of
- 14 military jurisdiction and limited its holding to
- the facts before it, which is that on the facts
- 16 conceded there, namely that they were members of
- 17 the German Army, on those conceded facts they
- 18 were tried.
- 19 JUDGE WESLEY: That was the real
- 20 argument. They were trying to say criminal
- 21 court and the Court said, Well, I'm sorry, but
- 22 you're addressed in the guidelines, and they
- felt enough Congressional authorization.
- 24 But Quirin is what it is, but it's --
- 25 but it's not everything that everybody wants it

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- 1 3BHLPADA
- 2 to be. It's merely the decision as to where the
- 3 individual can be tried.
- 4 PROF. MARTINEZ: That's correct, your
- 5 Honor.
- To conclude, your Honor, the
- 7 government's arguments about the scope of this
- 8 war demonstrate the breadth of the position that
- 9 the government seeks -- namely, that this power
- 10 can be exercised anywhere at anytime against any
- 11 person in the United States for as long as the
- 12 appellate deems fit. The President seeks an
- 13 unchecked power to substitute military rule for
- the rule of law, wherever and whenever he wants,
- 15 without Congressional authorization, without
- 16 review by the courts when they're open and
- functioning. Your Honors, such power we believe
- is inconsistent with a free and democratic
- 19 society, and the Constitution demands that it be
- 20 rejected.
- JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel.
- 22 We'll turn to our last set of issues
- 23 which assume, for the sake of this discussion,
- 24 that the President does have the power to
- designate Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant, and

3BHT.PADA

- 2 we will discuss here the proper scope of review
- 3 for the President's decision. The government's
- 4 burden to prove. And Padilla's access to
- 5 counsel.
- 6 Even though both parties prevailed on
- 7 one or a set of the issues, we view the
- 8 respondent here as prevailing, so we'll begin
- 9 with petitioner. Mr. Patel will argue, and
- 10 Professor Martinez will have rebuttal.
- 11 Mr. Patel?
- MR. PATEL: Thank you, your Honor.
- 13 For 17 months, Jose Padilla has been confined in
- 14 a military prison without access to family,
- 15 counsel or any court. The government asks this
- 16 Court to endorse the indefinite incommunicado
- 17 military detention of a U.S. citizen based on
- 18 multiple levels of hearsay without allowing that
- 19 citizen an opportunity to be heard.
- The writ of habeas corpus is the tool
- 21 to test the legality of executive intention, and
- the government concedes that Mr. Padilla has the
- 23 right to file such a writ. But in this Court
- 24 and in the court below, they have raised
- 25 procedural objections to make the filing of that

1	3BHLPADA
2	writ a meaningless act. The government has
3	asked this Court to endorse the constructive
4	intention of a writ of habeas corpus, a power
5	that the Constitution gives exclusively to
6	Congress.
7	JUDGE WESLEY: You say constructive

8 Fill it out for me a little bit.

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MR. PATEL: There has been no act by which the Executive has asked Congress to suspend a writ of habeas corpus. They have merely made the filing of the writ of habeas corpus meaningless by preventing counsel from meeting with Mr. Padilla.

What normally happens in a habeas proceeding is the petitioner, Mr. Padilla, is allowed to respond to the facts that the government allege. They have prevented that from happening. So the very factual determinations that ultimately have to be made in this case cannot be made because the government has acted in such a way as to prevent him from having any access to his attorneys.

24 JUDGE PARKER: What remedy do you want 25 for that? Do you propose for that?

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- 2 MR. PATEL: I think the remedy that
- 3 Judge Mukasey outlined is appropriate, your
- 4 Honor: That he be permitted to meet with
- 5 counsel; that he be permitted to submit factual
- 6 responses; and Judge Mukasey can then decide the
- 7 merits of the writ.
- 8 JUDGE POOLER: You would argue for a
- 9 different standard.
- MR. PATEL: That is correct, your
- Honor. It is actually to both the standard of
- 12 review of the jurisdictional facts and for the
- 13 ultimate burden of proof that the government has
- 14 to establish.
- JUDGE WESLEY: But the government
- doesn't say that you're not entitled to writ.
- 17 It's just that they seem to parse out how much
- of it you can get in a traditional sense. Can
- 19 you tell me of any case that you're aware of in
- 20 which someone who's entitled to a writ of habeas
- 21 corpus doesn't have counsel and/or has no
- 22 contact with his or her next friend, nor do they
- 23 have the ability to discuss factual assertions?
- 24 MR. PATEL: Judge, not only can I cite
- 25 you the cases, but even during the Civil War

# 1 3BHLPADA

- when the writ was suspended, people who were
- 3 considered, quote, "enemies of the state",
- 4 prisoners of states, as opposed to prisoners of
- 5 war, were still allowed access to their family
- 6 and allowed access to the courts. And that's,
- 7 in fact, where the Milligan case arose. Those
- 8 people did have access to counsel, and
- 9 ultimately the Supreme Court said that was
- someone who should not be tried by a military
- 11 tribunal.
- 12 JUDGE WESLEY: The government offers a
- 13 number of immigration cases where an offer of --
- 14 standard of some evidence, and that that should
- be the standard. Judge Mukasey accepted that,
- and you take exception do that. Are you -- can
- you cite to me a case in which habeas has been
- 18 examined without a hearing? I mean, some
- 19 evidence means some evidence to support a
- 20 conclusion, but generally it's some evidence
- 21 that arises from an administrative proceeding
- 22 where evidence was presented.
- MR. PATEL: If I understand your
- 24 Honor's question correctly, you are correct. Ir
- 25 every case where the some evidence standard has

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- been applied, there has been some fact finding
- 3 proceeding below in which the petitioner was
- 4 allowed to participate. That is about now
- 5 notice of the claim against him and he had the
- 6 opportunity to respond. And in reviewing the
- 7 administrative determination, what the courts
- 8 have looked at initially was: Was the process
- 9 fair? That's really what the heart and soul of
- 10 the some evidence standard is about. It is a
- 11 procedural review. Was the process fair? Did
- this person have a realistic truthful
- opportunity to participate? And then to make
- sure that it was not a complete arbitrary
- decision, to see whether in fact there was some
- 16 evidence.
- 17 In all candor, your Honor, we aspire
- 18 to the level of due process that the convicted
- 19 felons in Hill got. We have had nothing. Zero.
- 20 Zero.
- JUDGE WESLEY: But you got Judge
- 22 Mukasey. If we -- I know some evidence
- 23 standards, but presuming that to be the case,
- 24 such presumptions are always dangerous to make
- as to end results, but presume that that

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- 2 occurred, what kind of evidence would you seek
- 3 to presented to Judge Mukasey? I mean,
- 4 Ms. Newman put an affidavit in on behalf of
- 5 Mr. Padilla which is fair based and said, Well,
- 6 your Honor, he was going to Chicago because of
- 7 his son. Didn't deny some of the allegations
- 8 that were in the redacted affidavit. But in
- 9 essence said he was going to Chicago to see his
- 10 son. Would it be your position that you would
- want to call Secretary Rumsfeld?
- 12 JUDGE POOLER: The affidavit, I think,
- postdates.
- MR. PATEL: Your Honor is correct.
- JUDGE WESLEY: I apologize. What I
- 16 really want to know is do you want to call
- Jacoby, do you want to call Mobbs, do you want
- 18 to call --
- JUDGE POOLER: They don't have
- 20 personal knowledge, I think they admit that.
- 21 MR. PATEL: Your Honor, I don't think
- 22 that they're competent witnesses. In the sense,
- 23 the evidentiary sense --
- JUDGE WESLEY: Be careful now.
- MR. PATEL: In other words, your

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- 2 Honor --
- JUDGE WESLEY: I'm sure you don't mean
- 4 disrespect.
- 5 MR. PATEL: No, I don't.
- JUDGE WESLEY: I suspect you don't.
- 7 But in any event, Counselor, what evidence do
- 8 you want to present?
- 9 MR. PATEL: I can't answer that
- 10 question, your Honor, because I haven't spoken
- 11 to my client. I can assume that there are any
- 12 number of scenarios that are completely
- 13 consistent --
- JUDGE WESLEY: Do you want to call the
- informants that were used in the Mobbs
- 16 affidavit?
- MR. PATEL: Judge --
- JUDGE WESLEY: I'm just asking.
- MR. PATEL: You're asking me what the
- 20 government's going to do to prove their --
- JUDGE WESLEY: The government will
- 22 submit their affidavits that say there is some
- evidence.
- MR. PATEL: We will submit a
- 25 responding affidavit, and if Judge Mukasey

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- 2 determines then that there's a still a factual
- 3 dispute, then he will order a hearing.
- 4 JUDGE WESLEY: Isn't that exactly what
- 5 Canby was nervous about, that there would be
- 6 some kind of weighing by the three judges about
- 7 military decisions as to whether this fellow, in
- 8 the confines of --
- 9 MR. PATEL: That, your Honor, whether
- 10 an American citizen falls within military
- jurisdiction is classically a decision made by
- 12 an Article 3 court.
- JUDGE WESLEY: We know entitled. He's
- 14 entitled to a writ. But I'd still like to know
- what you'd prove -- you're a smart fellow. You
- are here. Tell me what you think you'll prove.
- 17 MR. PATEL: What I think I'll prove,
- 18 your Honor -- this is again pure speculation --
- 19 I think we'll prove that Mr. Padilla deserves to
- 20 be released and go home. And that's it.
- JUDGE PARKER: What you're suggesting
- is that given an opportunity to put on proof,
- 23 presumably after you've had a chance to meet
- 24 with your client and talk to your client and
- 25 explore the facts with your client, that you

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- 2 would, at least in broad brush, be prepared to
- 3 demonstrate at a hearing or at the appropriate
- 4 time that he was not an enemy combatant.
- 5 MR. PATEL: That's correct, your
- 6 Honor. That is absolutely correct.
- 7 JUDGE POOLER: And the standard of
- 8 review that the Article 3 court brings to a
- 9 declaration to the President.
- 10 MR. PATEL: Traditionally, your Honor,
- 11 the standard of review of whether or not someone
- is subject to military authority is a de novo
- 13 review as to the burden of proof.
- 14 JUDGE POOLER: They have been
- 15 conflated in our discussions, the standard of
- 16 review and the burden. So it's helpful to point
- out that they're two separate issues.
- 18 MR. PATEL: Your Honor, actually, I
- 19 thought the way this Court's order of
- November 7th articulated the two issues was
- 21 right on. And I think that the initial -- there
- is an initial jurisdictional fact that has to be
- 23 determined: Is this man, is Jose Padilla
- 24 subject to military jurisdiction? That is a
- de novo review. It is a factual determination

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- 2 that the Court must make.
- Then the question becomes, Well, has
- 4 the government proved that? And that we submit
- 5 should be done by clear and convincing evidence.
- 6 And your Honor, in Addington, the Supreme Court
- 7 really talked a great deal about what it means
- 8 to be -- what a burden of proof is. And it
- 9 really reflects the level of confidence that the
- 10 fact finders should have in the correctness of
- its determination, and when we're talking about
- 12 the loss of liberty, traditionally courts have
- 13 required a higher standard.
- We are not suggesting today that this
- should be done to the reasonable doubts
- 16 standards as it would be done in a criminal
- 17 case, but we are asking at least the same level
- 18 of certainty that a citizen -- that the
- 19 government must prove before a mentally
- 20 incompetent individual can be detained in the
- 21 hospital for medical treatment; before an alien
- 22 can be deported to a friendly country; and
- 23 before someone who is accused of crime, who has
- the entire panoply of constitutional rights,
- 25 including the speedy trial clock --

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- JUDGE POOLER: But, Counsel, I think
- 3 the government would be impatient with your
- 4 comparison to the civilian panoply of rights.
- 5 You heard the discussions here about the
- 6 battlefield now being our own soil. And we've
- 7 heard some descriptions of September 11th and
- 8 what it did to this country. I think the
- government now argues that the panoply of rights
- 10 that you rely on don't apply to September 11th,
- 11 to certain circumstances. That's the heart of
- 12 what we are talking about.
- MR. PATEL: Your Honor, there is no
- 14 act of Congress that in any way limits that
- after September 11th would breach the due
- 16 process laws.
- JUDGE WESLEY: We do know, like in the
- 18 Patriot Act, that Congress severely restricts
- 19 reviewing the discretion of the Attorney
- 20 General.
- MR. PATEL: Your Honor, but there has
- 22 been no act of Congress that says that an
- 23 American citizen can be detained without access
- 24 to a court reviewing that. There is just no
- 25 such act of Congress.

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- 2 The Fifth Amendment, due process
- 3 clause, as Justice Frankfurter said in his
- 4 concurring opinion, the requirement of due
- 5 process is not a fairweather or timid assurance.
- 6 It must be respected in periods of calm and in
- 7 times of trouble.
- 8 Your Honor, this is the land of the
- 9 free and the home of the brave. That means
- 10 something. Those words mean something.
- 11 JUDGE POOLER: As terrible as 9/11
- was, it didn't repeal the Constitution, you
- mean.
- MR. PATEL: That's correct, your
- 15 Honor. That's correct. That's absolutely
- 16 right. That which makes this country great did
- not change, and we still owe it to ourselves to
- 18 require that citizens be treated to due process
- 19 and a fair hearing before an impartial jurist.
- JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel.
- Now we'll have rebuttal from cocounsel, and
- we'll hear from Mr. Clement, who's taking on all
- three of you, I see.
- MR. CLEMENT: Thank you again, your
- 25 Honor. May it please the Court --

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2	JUDGE POOLER: Mr. Clement, if we
3	reverse the District Court on the second
4	constellation of issues, that is, whether the
5	President has the power, would we have to reach
6	these issues?
7	MR. CLEMENT: I don't think so, your
8	Honor. If you say the President has no
9	authority to do this, then I think these issues
10	effectively go away. I think, though, that the
11	same reasons that you would take the position
12	that the separation of powers allows the
13	President to make this designation in the first
14	place also inform the standard of review and
15	also inform the role of counsel and require that
16	the role be strictly circumscribed.
17	JUDGE POOLER: Do you see how we have
18	conflated, as Mr. Patel just agreed, the
19	standard of review and the burden of proof?
20	MR. CLEMENT: I do, your Honor.
21	The I think the government may have
22	contributed to the conflation, because to my
23	standpoint they were conflated for a reason.
24	JUDGE POOLER: There is no review.
25	MR. CLEMENT: There is a review, but

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- 2 this is ultimately, in our view, a review of a
- 3 military judgment, and in that context of -- I
- 4 would say it's a little to bifurcate it, the
- 5 proof that's necessary for the original military
- 6 decision, and then a standard of review for the
- 7 judicial review.
- JUDGE POOLER: Are there other
- 9 military decisions that weren't made on a
- 10 battlefield or when there were nation states at
- 11 war?
- MR. CLEMENT: I don't --
- JUDGE POOLER: You call this a
- 14 military decision, and of course once the
- 15 Secretary of Defense is involved it becomes
- 16 military. But are there other cases that are
- 17 similar to this that have not taken place on a
- 18 battlefield where nation states were at war?
- 19 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I think, if I
- 20 understand the question correctly, that the
- answer would be yes. I'm not sure, though, that
- 22 they would lead to the same kind of reviewable
- 23 situations or they would implicate the habeas
- 24 petition, but if you look at the kind of
- 25 information that the government had here and the

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- judgment that it made, it was a military
- 3 determination to take somebody they thought was
- 4 affiliated with enemy forces and incapacitate
- 5 them.
- JUDGE POOLER: So what I'm getting is
- 7 the moment where the military takes charge of
- 8 Mr. Padilla, when he's already in jail.
- 9 MR. CLEMENT: Right.
- 10 JUDGE POOLER: That's different from
- 11 finding Mr. Hamdi on a battlefield in
- 12 Afghanistan, isn't it?
- MR. CLEMENT: Well, with respect, your
- 14 Honor, I guess I don't think so. I mean, I
- 15 think that.
- JUDGE POOLER: Ah --
- 17 MR. CLEMENT: I think in all wars --
- JUDGE POOLER: Even though the Fourth
- 19 Circuit, who you desperately want to be in front
- of rather than us, even though they said the two
- 21 cases are apples and oranges.
- MR. CLEMENT: They did say that, your
- 23 Honor, and I think with respect to certain
- 24 aspects of the case, it may make a difference,
- 25 but I think at the same time that the Hamdi

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- 2 panel said -- I guess it was en banc -- they
- 3 said apples and oranges, even the panel said
- 4 this doesn't prejudge the Padilla case in any
- 5 way. They went on to cite the Quirin case no
- 6 less than 10 times, and pretty much at every
- 7 critical juncture of their opinion.
- 8 So in light of the fact that the
- 9 primary precedent that the AMB court was relying
- on was the Quirin case, that involved domestic
- incapacitation, seizure of somebody
- domestically, it's a little hard to say that the
- 13 Hamdi situation is just so fundamentally
- 14 different than this situation that we have
- before us, what was before the Supreme Court in
- 16 the Quirin case.
- 17 JUDGE WESLEY: The reason for cutting
- off his lawyer, offered by the government, is
- 19 that the lawyer will, in essence, interrupt the
- interrogation chain. If that's a valid reason,
- 21 then he has a right to habeas corpus action,
- doesn't he? He's got to bring it by himself.
- Ms. Newman brought it on his behalf. And what's
- the value of that writ of habeas corpus if he's
- left on his own in the brig in South Carolina?

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- 3 MR. CLEMENT: I think it's quite a
- 4 robust right, your Honor. And I think the value
- of it, as suggested by Mr. -- suggested by Judge
- 6 Pooler's first question to me, which is to say
- 7 that if this Court were to hold that the purely
- 8 legal claims that are brought in this habeas
- 9 petition are sufficient to invalidate the
- 10 detention, then if that's the holding of the
- 11 Court, then that is, obviously, a significant
- value of the writ of habeas corpus. But our
- view is that the writ's available, but --
- JUDGE WESLEY: But that's where it
- 15 ends, in your view.
- MR. CLEMENT: Our view is it ends with
- 17 these legal arguments, and we think that it
- 18 would also allow -- I mean, it plays an
- 19 important role because what it does is force the
- 20 government to articulate the basis for its
- 21 detention of the individual and why it feels
- 22 this individual's --
- JUDGE WESLEY: We understand the legal
- 24 arguments, and they're opining about the law in
- another matter, but once you go past that,

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2	there's the netherworld, and the netherworld is
3	the conflation of the standard of review and the
4	standard and the support of the Executive's
5	determination. In your view, he's entitled to
6	no hearing on that question at all. All we have
7	to do is satisfy ourselves that there is hope.
8	MR. CLEMENT: I think this is the
9	proper way to answer that question. We feel the
10	habeas does not necessitate access to counsel.
11	That's not to say, as I said earlier, that if
12	the intelligence purposes are no longer served
13	by not allowing access to counsel, access would
14	be provided, but we think the habeas can
15	identify both the important legal issues but
16	there's two other roles that the habeas petition
17	serves in this area that I think are important
18	and are not purely legal.
19	One is, by forcing the government to
20	articulate its basis for holding the individual,
21	that would allow this Court to, for example,
22	police the line between Quirin and Milligan and
23	make sure that the government's not asserting an
24	authority to hold somebody who's not affiliated

with the enemy or the like. They couldn't go

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- 2 beyond the determination that the Executive
- 3 feels the individual is affiliated, but that
- 4 places the role -- but the role --
- JUDGE POOLER: How can Mr. Padilla
- 6 contest that when the two affidavits on which
- 7 you ask us to rely are not on personal
- 8 knowledge -- they're what we call hearsay -- in
- 9 an evidentiary context? How will you ever
- 10 contest that without bringing the person
- 11 associated with al Qaeda into the courtroom for
- 12 cross-examination in our system?
- MR. CLEMENT: I think you're right.
- 14 That is the system, in our normal context. And
- our position would be the normal context would
- not apply. It never has in the past. If one is
- 17 not going to defer to the Executive's judgment
- what you would do is almost have to bring in the
- 19 individuals that are referenced in Footnote 1 of
- the Mobbs declaration on Page 5.
- I think it's fair to say, when you
- 22 talk about, is the testimony of two people who
- are in al Qaeda who are detained by the United
- 24 States military, who are viewed as important
- 25 confidential information and intelligence

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- 2 sources, they are not viewed as being entirely
- 3 forthcoming. We understand that they have
- 4 provided some information designed to mislead.
- 5 But they also provided much other information
- 6 that has been corroborative and very useful.
- 7 And that's exactly the kind of information that
- 8 the military is used to relying on in making
- 9 judgments about -- whether relying on in
- 10 selecting targets, in deploying troops, and in
- 11 this case, incapacitated somebody believed to be
- 12 an enemy combatant. And those are difficult
- judgments, but those are judgments the military
- 14 makes every day in the context of decisions that
- 15 are quintessentially military.
- JUDGE PARKER: But what troubles me,
- 17 Mr. Clement, is the ease with which you
- 18 transpose principals that are obviously
- 19 applicable in a military context to the domestic
- 20 situation, and I certainly take the force of
- 21 your point that the way al Qaeda has operated
- 22 has changed the landscape. But it strikes me
- 23 that when all is said and done, the power that
- 24 you are asking us to give to the Executive is
- 25 power that, as I read the Constitution, is

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- 2 Congressional power. But beyond that, it seems
- 3 to me to be breathtaking in its sweep.
- 4 And were we to give -- were we to
- 5 construe the Constitution as permitting this
- 6 kind of power in the Executive with only the
- 7 modest -- according to the government's
- 8 proposal -- only the modest kind of judicial
- 9 review, we would be effecting a sea change in
- 10 the constitutional life of this country, and we
- 11 would be making changes that have been
- 12 unprecedented in civilized society.
- MR. CLEMENT: With respect, your
- 14 Honor, obviously the executive branch disagrees
- 15 with that assessment. I think that the sea
- 16 change -- there's no sea change here because the
- power that the Executive's asserting is the
- power that's exercised in virtually every
- military engagement in this nation's history,
- which is the power to hold enemy combatants,
- 21 even individuals not going to be tried with a
- 22 specific war crime, but to hold them for
- 23 purposes of detention and intelligence
- gathering. That has happened over and over
- 25 again in military engagement -- after military

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- 2 engagement, without specific authorization from
- 3 Congress, because as --
- 4 JUDGE PARKER: Then 4001, in your
- 5 view, is a provision that we should be prepared
- 6 to just forget about.
- 7 MR. CLEMENT: No. Again, I think the
- 8 Court should read it for what it's worth, but
- 9 it's location, Title 18, its history, as
- 10 repealing an authority of the Attorney General,
- but not the military, to hold individuals, all
- of that informs the fact that 18 USC 4001(a) has
- never been thought to constrain the power of the
- 14 military. And the history of detaining
- individuals as enemy combatants in military
- operations for purposes of detention and
- intelligence gathering does not just predate
- 18 4001(a), it postdates it as well, and there have
- 19 never been in the context of the current
- operations in Iraq and the like -- I don't know,
- 21 I've never tried to parse the various
- 22 resolutions in all of those situations -- but
- there's certainly been situations where the
- 24 United States has engaged in military force,
- 25 caught enemy combatants, and in those cases

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- 2 there was no Congressional authorization as well
- 3 because the whole operation was very
- 4 short-lived.
- 5 And so I think that this is not a sea
- 6 change. And I think that the Quirin case is
- 7 quite on point because that, too, involved
- 8 United States citizens held in the United
- 9 States. The court there talked about the
- 10 specific Congressional authorization for the
- 11 trial on specific military crimes which, of
- 12 course, resulted in death in the instance of 68
- individuals, but it also talked about the
- 14 authority to detain individuals, and it treated
- that as a lesser power.
- JUDGE PARKER: Does the authority to
- 17 define who an enemy combatant is rest with the
- 18 Executive or the Congress?
- 19 MR. CLEMENT: I think that it is -- it
- 20 rests primarily with the Executive. I think
- 21 that Congress -- you know, I think foreign
- 22 policy has always been an area --
- JUDGE PARKER: That is law-making, is
- 24 it not?
- JUDGE POOLER: That's what flows from

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- 2 it. The President can define it, but to then
- 3 take the acts, to be authorized to take the
- 4 acts, I think that's the question.
- 5 MR. CLEMENT: But I would view it as
- 6 primarily part of the Article 2 power and the
- 7 Commander in Chief power. And I think that
- 8 certainly Congress could -- I mean, you know,
- 9 foreign policy is an area of shared
- 10 responsibility. So obviously if Congress tried
- 11 to restrict the ability -- and in fairness, if
- 12 4001(a) wasn't in Title 18 and it was in
- 13 Title 10, and it was specifically directed at
- 14 military detentions, I think that would raise an
- 15 extremely difficult separation of powers
- 16 question. I can assure you I or somebody from
- 17 the executive branch would be up here telling
- you that that violates the separation of powers,
- 19 and I'm sure counsel for the Senate or the House
- of Representatives would be up here telling you,
- No, it doesn't.
- 22 But what I would say is that -- and
- 23 the Fourth Circuit did this in the Hamdi
- 24 opinion. Is it's best to avoid having to decide
- 25 that question. And I think that this is where

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2	it spills over into the secondary. But I think
3	if one has questions about exactly whether the
4	joint authorization specifically covers this, I
5	think the benefit of the doubt should be in
6	terms of finding the authority to do this and
7	avoiding those very difficult separation of
8	powers questions.
9	But to be responsive, we do think that
10	that power resides in Article 2 and is given to
11	the President as Commander in Chief at the
12	founding, because there's always been that
13	residual authority to hold individuals as enemy
14	combatants.
15	JUDGE PARKER: So could the President
16	then promulgate regulations defining conduct
17	that would turn someone into an enemy combatant?
18	MR. CLEMENT: Yes. In fact, the
19	President has essentially done that with respect
20	to the military commissions that have been
21	authorized for non-United States citizens. I
22	mean, obviously there are going to be some

questions --

U.S. citizens?

23

24

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JUDGE POOLER: Could he do that to

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2	MR. CLEMENT: We would say yes, he
3	could. He hasn't done that. I think that again
4	shows the Executive has respect for the
5	essentially, treatment of citizens versus
6	aliens, and has provided greater tools dealing
7	with aliens than United States citizens.
8	I guess it really comes back to Judge
9	Pooler's question, because all of these
10	authorities may strike us as being quite extreme
11	and quite unusual if one has the perspective of
12	the civil justice system or the typical criminal
13	justice system.
14	But with respect to the military
15	justice system, this is the way that things have
16	been done for 200 years. And I mean, there are
17	not that many cases challenging the detention of
18	enemy combatants or prisoners of war. But that
19	doesn't mean that thousands upon thousands upon
20	thousands of people have been detained in that
21	capacity over the nation's many conflicts. It's
22	always been understood that that authority to
23	hold somebody as an enemy combatant does not
24	immediately occasion the right to counsel and
25	does not get someone in the court system
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- bringing factual challenges.
- JUDGE WESLEY: If he's an enemy
- 4 combatant and the President has that authority
- 5 as Commander in Chief, how long is the
- 6 legitimacy of his being held without any
- 7 communication with anyone? What's the outer
- 8 limit of how long Jose Padilla can remain
- 9 incommunicado to the world?
- 10 MR. CLEMENT: The authority to hold
- someone as an enemy combatant lasts only so long
- 12 as the conflict.
- JUDGE WESLEY: But you offer up the
- 14 reason why he has no right to have contact with
- people, because it will, in fact, interrupt the
- interrogation chain. How are we supposed to
- 17 know that, and who assures us that you'll
- 18 regularly let someone know that? I mean, where
- is it in the law, where's the structure? If he
- loses this, if -- say we were to send it back to
- 21 Mukasey under an order and said, It's okay,
- 22 there's some evidence. And it comes back up and
- 23 it's affirmed again? That's res judicata. How
- long does Padilla wait before he submits it
- 25 again?

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- 2 MR. CLEMENT: I think that these kind
- 3 of -- I mean, if the gravamen of the challenge
- 4 is a Quirin challenge, that he's been held
- 5 without counsel too long, that he's been held as
- an enemy combatant too long.
- 7 JUDGE WESLEY: I'm telling you this as
- 8 the reason you offered to me. I'm not making
- 9 this up. You said he had no right to
- 10 communicate with counsel because it will
- interfere with this very important national
- 12 security interest of gathering intelligence.
- 13 And I would submit to you that that was the
- 14 reason you offered 18 months ago. What's the
- 15 reason today?
- MR. CLEMENT: That reason continues to
- 17 be true. Now, it may not be true that much
- 18 longer, I don't know. And as I've told you --
- 19 JUDGE POOLER: So one of the
- 20 affidavits, one of the public affidavits says
- 21 the information is perishable. He hasn't been
- associated with anyone, I assume, related to
- 23 al Qaeda since he's been in the brig.
- MR. CLEMENT: That's right, your
- 25 Honor. But to the extent that he has

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- 2 information about the way that these attacks
- 3 were planned -- you know, I don't want to get
- 4 into any of the classified information, but some
- 5 of these attacks have had long gestation
- 6 periods, so I don't think it's an easy
- 7 conclusion that this individual is already stale
- 8 and has nothing more to give.
- 9 But what I would like to make clear is
- 10 that at the point that that judgment is
- 11 remanded, which is absolutely an intelligence
- judgment, then access to counsel would be
- 13 provided.
- JUDGE PARKER: That's a pure Trust Me
- 15 argument.
- MR. CLEMENT: It's a pure Trust Me.
- 17 Trust the Executive to make the judgment about
- 18 the intelligence values, because that's the
- 19 branch entrusted with these kind of intelligence
- decisions. Are there are no further questions?
- JUDGE POOLER: We'll hear from
- 22 Professor Martinez on the rebuttal on these
- three issues.
- 24 PROF. MARTINEZ: Thank you, your
- 25 Honor. With all due respect to Mr. Clement,

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- 2 this is not the way our nation has done things
- 3 for the past 200 years. For the past 200 years,
- 4 citizens who have been found as civilians
- 5 sitting on American soil have gotten access to a
- 6 lawyer and have gotten a hearing --
- 7 JUDGE POOLER: Don't you think the
- 8 world's changed? That's what we've been
- 9 hearing. The world changed after
- 10 September 11th.
- 11 PROF. MARTINEZ: If that's true, your
- 12 Honor, it's a job for Congress, not for the
- 13 President alone. The cases Mr. Clement cites
- involve the detention of persons without process
- and all involve battlefield captures which, as
- Judge Parker's questions and others suggest, are
- 17 fundamentally different circumstances than an
- 18 individual picked up as a civilian on American
- 19 soil.
- JUDGE WESLEY: That's true in
- 21 conventional war. But conventional war is set
- 22 field pieces and insignias. Neither of those
- is -- the world is different.
- 24 The question is: What of the
- 25 difference and how does it interact with the

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- 2 Court? And how are the judicial principals that
- 3 you find to be determined? Can we rest assured
- 4 that, in your view, that the President could
- 5 conduct a war on U.S. soil and what would be
- 6 necessary for him to be allowed to do so?
- 7 PROF. MARTINEZ: Your Honor, I think
- 8 it's important to recognize the relationship
- 9 between this question and the authority
- 10 question.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Sure.
- 12 PROF. MARTINEZ: Because what the
- President seeks to do is to expand his power to
- detain persons far beyond what has ever been in
- any past conflict. And our position is that's
- primarily a job for Congress, and the difficulty
- of determining what procedures should be used in
- this new context also highlights the extent to
- 19 which legislation is necessary to define the
- 20 parameters of any such power and what procedures
- 21 ought to be followed.
- 22 But in addition, if this Court finds
- 23 that the President has the authority to expand
- 24 that category, I think this Court needs to
- 25 recognize that the balance of factors in a

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- 2 situation where a person is detained in a
- 3 civilian setting, where they don't concede that
- 4 they're maybe of an armed force, as the
- 5 defendants in Quirin did, there's a much greater
- 6 risk of error and a much greater potential for
- 7 abuse by the government of its power, and that
- 8 demands more process than would be appropriate
- 9 on the battlefield, and that's been done in the
- 10 past.
- 11 Other Democratic nations, confronted
- 12 with the threat of terrorism and recognizing it
- as a different problem from that they've dealt
- with in the past, have had legislation defining
- who can be detained, under what conditions,
- granting access to counsel, providing the means
- for judicial review at regular intervals. If
- that's what the government thinks is necessary
- 19 here, it's a job for Congress to come up with
- those measures.
- JUDGE WESLEY: Mr. Padilla's unique in
- 22 the sense that he's the only U.S. citizen
- 23 arrested on U.S. soil as an alleged al Qaeda
- operative who was deemed an enemy combatant.
- 25 Anyone else who have been arrested, all have

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- been tried in the current context, have they
- 3 not? Hamdi and everyone else?
- 4 PROF. MARTINEZ: Yes. The government
- 5 has used the threat of enemy combatant status in
- 6 those prosecutions.
- 7 JUDGE WESLEY: But he's the only one
- 8 on U.S. soil, a U.S. citizen -- U.S. soil, U.S.
- 9 citizen, detained as an enemy combatant.
- 10 PROF. MARTINEZ: He is the only person
- 11 now. That's correct, your Honor. I think
- 12 what's important to recognize is that the
- 13 government's position has no limits. Under
- their theory, they can do this to any American.
- They can pick up any person off the street, and
- so long as the President turns in a piece of
- paper that says that that person is associated
- 18 with al Qaeda, that person has no rights and the
- 19 courts are powerless to intervene.
- Your Honor, that has never been the
- law in this country, and it cannot be the law.
- Under our Constitutional tradition,
- 23 Mr. Padilla is entitled to the help of a lawyer
- and, at a minimum, is entitled to tell the Court
- 25 his side of the story, and the Court is

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2	empowered to grant his release. Thank you.
3	JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, Counsel.
4	One housekeeping matter. Mr. Clement,
5	we were informed that Judge Mukasey asked the
6	government to expedite access to the sealed
7	documents by Mr. Padilla's counsel. I think
8	that they said they asked for this months ago.
9	Is there any view on the horizon as to when they
10	might have access to those documents?
11	MR. CLEMENT: Give me one second, your
12	Honor.
13	(Off the record discussion)
14	MR. PATEL: Your Honor, just to
15	clarify the request, perhaps we had
16	submitted Ms. Newman and I had submitted
17	applications for security clearance.
18	JUDGE POOLER: You need security
19	clearance. I understand Judge Mukasey asked the
20	government to speed it along.
21	MR. PATEL: It's been my understanding
22	that the government's position, at least as to
23	the Mobbs classified document, was even if we
24	had clearances, that they would rather withdraw

it than turn it over to us.

25

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- JUDGE POOLER: Oh.
- 3 MR. CLEMENT: I think the position of
- 4 Judge Mukasey was, not with specific reference
- 5 to specific sealed affidavits, but if counsel is
- 6 going to ever get access to Mr. Padilla,
- 7 whether, you know, by Order of the Court or
- 8 because the Executive feels that the
- 9 intelligence gathering process is complete, then
- 10 at that stage, I think they would still need a
- 11 security clearance, because he would still, I
- 12 think --
- 13 JUDGE POOLER: Correct.
- MR. CLEMENT: And then there was a
- 15 colloquy -- I don't think there was any order
- 16 about this. But the background checks aren't
- 17 complete. There would need to be a briefing.
- 18 That hasn't happened, but it could happen
- 19 rapidly.
- JUDGE POOLER: So they have been
- 21 granted clearance to see the documents? Is that
- 22 what you mean by the background?
- MR. CLEMENT: There's two questions
- 24 here. There's whether or not the lawyers for
- 25 Mr. Padilla would get reference or access to the

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- 2 sealed materials. As far as I know, that's not
- 3 the order of Judge Mukasey. It's -- that wasn't
- 4 like the specific reason he thought it was
- 5 important to get the clearances.
- And then what I'm saying is with
- 7 respect to the processing of the clearances,
- 8 there's basically two steps: There has to be a
- 9 background investigation.
- 10 JUDGE POOLER: Which is done.
- 11 MR. CLEMENT: Which is done. And
- there then has to be a briefing, which doesn't
- 13 take long.
- JUDGE POOLER: So the answer is: It's
- in process?
- MR. CLEMENT: The answer is,
- 17 basically, the time-consuming part of it is
- 18 complete. And whenever there is a reason for
- 19 sort of either Court order or, you know, an
- 20 Executive decision that that access will no
- 21 longer interfere with the intelligence
- 22 gathering, that at that point they would be
- 23 briefed and we would be over that hurdle. So it
- 24 won't pose any time obstacle at this point.
- 25 If that's responsive....

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2	JUDGE POOLER: It is. Did you want to
3	say something?
4	MR. PATEL: No.
5	JUDGE POOLER: Before Counsel leave, I
6	want to thank you all for wonderful argument and
7	terrific briefing, and also from all the amici.
8	They give us plenty to think about. Thank you
9	all.
10	The Court will be adjourned.
11	(Adjourned)
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