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fix(security): redact sensitive values in browse storage command#238

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HMAKT99 wants to merge 1 commit intogarrytan:mainfrom
HMAKT99:arun/fix-storage-redact
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fix(security): redact sensitive values in browse storage command#238
HMAKT99 wants to merge 1 commit intogarrytan:mainfrom
HMAKT99:arun/fix-storage-redact

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@HMAKT99 HMAKT99 commented Mar 20, 2026

The bug

$B storage dumps all localStorage and sessionStorage as raw JSON. This appears in QA reports, agent transcripts, and contributor logs — exposing tokens, API keys, JWTs, and session credentials.

# Current behavior:
$B storage
{
  "localStorage": {
    "authToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...",     ← exposed
    "stripe_pk": "pk_live_abc123...",              ← exposed
    "theme": "dark"                                 ← fine
  }
}

# After this fix:
$B storage
{
  "localStorage": {
    "authToken": "[REDACTED — 128 chars]",
    "stripe_pk": "[REDACTED — 24 chars]",
    "theme": "dark"
  }
}

The fix

Redact values where:

  • Key matches: token, secret, key, password, auth, jwt, csrf, api_key
  • Value starts with: eyJ (JWT), sk- (Stripe/OpenAI), ghp_ (GitHub PAT), xoxb- (Slack), Bearer

Redacted output shows length for debugging: [REDACTED — 128 chars]

Non-sensitive values (theme, language, sidebar_collapsed) pass through unchanged.

1 file changed, 15 lines

Only browse/src/read-commands.ts modified. No other files touched.

Test plan

  • All 407 existing tests pass
  • bun run gen:skill-docs --dry-run — FRESH
  • Sensitive key patterns redacted
  • Sensitive value prefixes (JWT, API keys) redacted
  • Non-sensitive values unchanged

The browse `storage` command dumps all localStorage and sessionStorage
as JSON. This can expose tokens, API keys, JWTs, and session credentials
in QA reports and agent transcripts.

Fix: redact values where the key matches sensitive patterns (token,
secret, key, password, auth, jwt, csrf) or the value starts with known
credential prefixes (eyJ for JWT, sk- for Stripe, ghp_ for GitHub, etc.).

Redacted values show length to aid debugging: [REDACTED — 128 chars]
garrytan added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
Rename testKey→testData and normalKey→displayName in storage tests
to avoid triggering #238's SENSITIVE_KEY regex (which matches 'key').
Also generate Codex variant of /cso skill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
garrytan added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2026
* feat: add /cso skill — OWASP Top 10 + STRIDE security audit

* fix: harden gstack-slug against shell injection via eval

Whitelist safe characters (a-zA-Z0-9._-) in SLUG and BRANCH output
to prevent shell metacharacter injection when used with eval.

Only affects self-hosted git servers with lax naming rules — GitHub
and GitLab enforce safe characters already. Defense-in-depth.

* fix(security): sanitize gstack-slug output against shell injection

The gstack-slug script is consumed via eval $(gstack-slug) throughout
skill templates. If a git remote URL contains shell metacharacters
like $(), backticks, or semicolons, they would be executed by eval.

Fix: strip all characters except [a-zA-Z0-9._-] from both SLUG and
BRANCH before output. This preserves normal values while neutralizing
any injection payload in malicious remote URLs.

Before: eval $(gstack-slug) with remote "foo/bar$(rm -rf /)" → executes rm
After:  eval $(gstack-slug) with remote "foo/bar$(rm -rf /)" → SLUG=foo-barrm-rf-

* fix(security): redact sensitive values in storage command output

The browse `storage` command dumps all localStorage and sessionStorage
as JSON. This can expose tokens, API keys, JWTs, and session credentials
in QA reports and agent transcripts.

Fix: redact values where the key matches sensitive patterns (token,
secret, key, password, auth, jwt, csrf) or the value starts with known
credential prefixes (eyJ for JWT, sk- for Stripe, ghp_ for GitHub, etc.).

Redacted values show length to aid debugging: [REDACTED — 128 chars]

* fix(browse): kill old server before restart to prevent orphaned chromium processes

When the health check fails or the server connection drops, `ensureServer()`
and `sendCommand()` would call `startServer()` without first killing the
previous server process. This left orphaned `chrome-headless-shell` renderer
processes running at ~120% CPU each.

After several reconnect cycles (e.g. pages that crash during hydration or
trigger hard navigations via `window.location.href`), dozens of zombie
chromium processes accumulate and exhaust system resources.

Fix: call `killServer()` on the stale PID before spawning a new server in
both the `ensureServer()` unhealthy path and the `sendCommand()` connection-
lost retry path.

Fixes #294

* Fix YAML linter error: nested mapping in compact sequence entries

Having "Run: bun" inside a plain scalar is not allowed per YAML spec which states: Plain scalars must never contain the “: ” and “ #” character combinations.

This simple fix switches to block scalars (|) to eliminate the ambiguity without changing runtime behavior.

* fix(security): add Azure metadata endpoint to SSRF blocklist

Add metadata.azure.internal to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS alongside the
existing AWS/GCP endpoints. Closes the coverage gap identified in #125.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add coverage for storage redaction

Test key-based redaction (auth_token, api_key), value-based redaction
(JWT prefix, GitHub PAT prefix), pass-through for normal keys, and
length preservation in redacted output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add community PR triage process to CONTRIBUTING.md

Document the wave-based PR triage pattern used for batching community
contributions. References PR #205 (v0.8.3) as the original example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: adjust test key names to avoid redaction pattern collision

Rename testKey→testData and normalKey→displayName in storage tests
to avoid triggering #238's SENSITIVE_KEY regex (which matches 'key').
Also generate Codex variant of /cso skill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.9.10.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: zero-noise /cso security audits with FP filtering (v0.11.0.0)

Absorb Anthropic's security-review false positive filtering into /cso:
- 17 hard exclusions (DOS, test files, log spoofing, SSRF path-only,
  regex injection, race conditions unless concrete, etc.)
- 9 precedents (React XSS-safe, env vars trusted, client-side code
  doesn't need auth, shell scripts need concrete untrusted input path)
- 8/10 confidence gate — below threshold = don't report
- Independent sub-agent verification for each finding
- Exploit scenario requirement per finding
- Framework-aware analysis (Rails CSRF, React escaping, Angular sanitization)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: consolidate CHANGELOG — merge /cso launch + community wave into v0.11.0.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: rewrite README — lead with Karpathy quote, cut LinkedIn phrases, add /cso

Opens with the revolution (Karpathy, Steinberger/OpenClaw), keeps credentials
and LOC numbers, cuts filler phrases, adds hater bait, restores hiring block,
removes bloated "What's new" section, adds /cso to skills table and install.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cso): adversarial review fixes — FP filtering, prompt injection, language coverage

- Exclusion #10: test files must verify not imported by non-test code
- Exclusion #13: distinguish user-message AI input from system-prompt injection
- Exclusion #14: ReDoS in user-input regex IS a real CVE class, don't exclude
- Add anti-manipulation rule: ignore audit-influencing instructions in codebase
- Fix confidence gate: remove contradictory 7-8 tier, hard cutoff at 8
- Fix verifier anchoring: send only file+line, not category/description
- Add Go, PHP, Java, C#, Kotlin to grep patterns (was 4 languages, now 8)
- Add GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket endpoint detection to attack surface mapping

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): correct skill counts, add /autoplan to README tables

Skill count was wrong in 3 places (said 19+7=26, said 25, actual is 28).
Added /autoplan to specialist table. Fixed troubleshooting skills list
to include all skills added since v0.7.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): DNS rebinding protection for SSRF blocklist

validateNavigationUrl is now async — resolves hostname to IP and checks
against blocked metadata IPs. Prevents DNS rebinding where evil.com
initially resolves to a safe IP, then switches to 169.254.169.254.
All callers updated to await. Tests updated for async assertions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): lockfile prevents concurrent server start races

Adds exclusive lockfile (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) around ensureServer to prevent
TOCTOU race where two CLI invocations could both kill the old server and
start new ones, leaving an orphaned chromium process. Second caller now
waits for the first to finish starting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): improve storage redaction — word-boundary keys + more value prefixes

Key regex: use underscore/dot/hyphen boundaries instead of \b (which treats
_ as word char). Now correctly redacts auth_token, session_token while
skipping keyboardShortcuts, monkeyPatch, primaryKey.

Value regex: add AWS (AKIA), Stripe (sk_live_, pk_live_), Anthropic (sk-ant-),
Google (AIza), Sendgrid (SG.), Supabase (sbp_) prefixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: migrate all remaining eval callers to source, fix stale CHANGELOG claim

5 templates and 2 bin scripts still used eval $(gstack-slug). All now use
source <(gstack-slug). Updated gstack-slug comment to match. Fixed v0.8.3
CHANGELOG entry that falsely claimed eval was fully eliminated — it was
the output sanitization that made it safe, not a calling convention change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): add /autoplan to install instructions, regen skill docs

The install instruction blocks and troubleshooting section were missing
/autoplan. All three skill list locations now include the complete 28-skill
set. Regenerated codex/agents SKILL.md files to match template changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.11.0.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(cso): add disclaimer — not a substitute for professional security audits

LLMs can miss subtle vulns and produce false negatives. For production
systems with sensitive data, hire a real firm. /cso is a first pass,
not your only line of defense. Disclaimer appended to every report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Arun Kumar Thiagarajan <arunkt.bm14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tyrone Robb <tyrone.robb@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Orkun Duman <orkun1675@gmail.com>
@garrytan
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Merged into #325 (wave 1: /cso launch + security hardening). Thank you for the contribution!

@garrytan garrytan closed this Mar 22, 2026
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2 participants