clean up signature events + harden release workflow#28
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The publish job runs with id-token:write (npm OIDC trusted publishing)
and contents:write, and interpolated the attacker-influenceable tag
name (github.ref_name and tag-derived step outputs) directly into run:
scripts. Git ref names permit shell metacharacters, so a tag like
v1.0.0$(...) could execute arbitrary commands with publish privileges.
- Move all tag-derived values to env: blocks, referenced as quoted
shell variables instead of ${{ }} interpolation in run: bodies
- Add strict semver tag validation that fails the workflow before any
untrusted value is used
Actions are already pinned to commit SHAs; npm pin intentionally
omitted (npm@latest retained by decision).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Autocaptured signature events shipped the produced signature (state.data) as `signatureHash` to events.formo.so — a replayable permit/Permit2/SIWE bearer credential, on by default. Scope: remove `signatureHash` only. The signed message (plaintext or EIP-712 struct) is still captured as before; no behavior change there and no new configuration option. - Remove `signatureHash` end-to-end: SignatureAPIEvent, IFormoAnalytics /IFormoAnalyticsInstance signature(), FormoAnalytics.signature(), EventFactory.generateSignatureEvent (+ lib/event/types.ts), and the WagmiEventHandler mutation handler (no longer reads state.data). - Add src/__tests__/signature.test.ts: asserts no signatureHash / no raw-signature value is emitted for signMessage or signTypedData. deepsec revalidate: CRITICAL other-signature-exfiltration -> fixed. typecheck/lint clean, 212/212 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Code Review
This pull request removes the signatureHash field from signature-related events across the codebase, including interfaces, event factories, and the Wagmi event handler. This change is a security measure to prevent the capture of replayable credentials such as signatures for Permit or SIWE. New tests have been added to ensure that raw signatures are never forwarded to the event pipeline. I have no feedback to provide.
Comment/label-only cleanup, no behavior change. Gates green (212/212). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security branch for
@formo/analytics-react-native. Two findings from the deepsec audit.Autocaptured signature events shipped the produced signature (
state.data) assignatureHashtoevents.formo.so— a replayable permit/Permit2/SIWE bearer credential, on by default.Scope: remove
signatureHashonly. The signed message (plaintext forsignMessage, EIP-712 struct forsignTypedData) is captured exactly as before; no behavior change there and no new configuration option.signatureHashremoved end-to-end:SignatureAPIEvent,IFormoAnalytics/IFormoAnalyticsInstancesignature(),FormoAnalytics.signature(),EventFactory.generateSignatureEvent(+lib/event/types.ts), and theWagmiEventHandlermutation handler (no longer readsstate.data).src/__tests__/signature.test.ts: asserts nosignatureHash/ no raw-signature value forsignMessageorsignTypedData.Verification: typecheck ✓ · lint ✓ · 212/212 tests ✓ · deepsec
revalidate(commit6314268) → CRITICALother-signature-exfiltration= fixed.${{ github.ref_name }}interpolated intorun:blocks inrelease.yml; moved toenv:+ quoted vars with a strict semver tag-name validation gate.Coordination
C1 is fixed identically in
@formo/analytics(web SDK,getformo/sdkbranchsec/deepsec). These are published packages leaking replayable credentials — recommend a coordinated GHSA covering both packages plus backend scrubbing of already-ingested raw signatures.Not in this PR
Other deepsec findings (M2/M3/M4 consent/attribution, queue bugs) remain open and tracked separately.
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