[Coverage Report] Test Coverage Report — 2026-09-04

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📊 Test Coverage Report — 2026-09-04

Overall Coverage

Metric	Coverage	Trend
Statements	92.67% (13,297 / 14,348)	✅ Excellent
Branches	86.37% (7,564 / 8,757)	✅ Excellent
Functions	93.31% (1,940 / 2,079)	✅ Excellent
Lines	94.04% (12,675 / 13,477)	✅ Excellent

Assessment: Overall coverage is strong and well above industry standards (>85%). All security-critical paths are well-covered except where noted below.

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🛡️ Security-Critical Path Status

Component	Statements	Branches	Functions	Status
host-iptables-shared.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
host-iptables-rules.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
host-iptables-chain.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
domain-patterns.ts	100%	89.47%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
squid/acl-generator.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
squid/domain-acl.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
squid/config-sections.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
docker-manager.ts	100%	100%	100%	✅ Full Coverage
cli.ts	85.71%	50%	100%	⚠️ Minor Gap

Key Finding: All core firewall policy engines (iptables, domain ACLs, Squid config) have 100% statement coverage. The CLI wrapper has minor branch gaps that don't affect firewall security logic.

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📋 Coverage Table

✅ Perfect Coverage (100%)

File	Statements	Branches	Functions
squid/access-rules.ts	100% (44/44)	100% (42/42)	100% (4/4)
squid/acl-generator.ts	100% (53/53)	100% (20/20)	100% (4/4)
squid/config-generator.ts	100% (27/27)	100% (22/22)	100% (2/2)
squid/config-sections.ts	100% (67/67)	100% (37/37)	100% (11/11)
squid/domain-acl.ts	100% (29/29)	100% (12/12)	100% (8/8)
squid/ssl-bump.ts	100% (16/16)	100% (15/15)	100% (2/2)
squid/upstream-proxy.ts	100% (16/16)	100% (8/8)	100% (1/1)
squid/validation.ts	100% (36/36)	100% (34/34)	100% (5/5)
squid/policy-rules/section-builders.ts	100% (66/66)	100% (30/30)	100% (21/21)
host-iptables-shared.ts	100% (91/91)	100% (20/20)	100% (15/15)
host-iptables-rules.ts	100% (97/97)	100% (36/36)	100% (9/9)
host-iptables-chain.ts	100% (42/42)	100% (10/10)	100% (3/3)
domain-patterns.ts	100% (25/25)	89.47% (17/19)	100% (3/3)
services/squid-service.ts	100% (30/30)	100% (13/13)	100% (1/1)
docker-manager.ts	100% (20/20)	100% (0/0)	100% (15/15)

⚠️ Good Coverage (80-99%)

File	Statements	Branches	Functions	Gap
cli.ts	85.71% (6/7)	50% (1/2)	100% (0/0)	1 uncovered branch
squid-log-reader.ts	91.52% (54/59)	84.84% (28/33)	83.33% (5/6)	1 function uncovered

🔴 Coverage Gaps (50-79%)

File	Statements	Branches	Functions	Lines	Issue
enclave/runtime-preflight.ts	66.66% (24/36)	41.02% (16/39)	75% (6/8)	66.66%	Pre-flight validations need testing
microvm/rootfs.ts	71.69% (38/53)	54.54% (12/22)	83.33% (5/6)	71.69%	Root filesystem setup partially tested
commands/validators/config-assembly.ts	73.68% (28/38)	25% (3/12)	100% (3/3)	73.68%	Branch coverage weak
microvm/network-reservation.ts	50.22% (111/221)	54.26% (70/129)	59.09% (13/22)	50.22%	Major gap in network resource allocation

🔴 Critical Gaps (<50%)

File	Statements	Branches	Functions	Lines	Severity
bounded-execution/finite-disclosure.ts	38.12% (183/480)	25.89% (101/390)	55.31% (26/47)	44.32%	CRITICAL — Process isolation untested

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🔧 Function Audit

Uncovered Functions & Branches

1. finite-disclosure.ts (Critical)

   • Statements: Only 183 of 480 covered (38.12%)
   • Branches: Only 101 of 390 covered (25.89%)
   • Risk: Core process isolation and credential-hiding logic is largely untested
   • Impact: Sandbox escape or credential leakage possible if regression introduced
   • Root Cause: Bounded execution / process isolation is complex and requires deep kernel knowledge; many edge cases aren't tested

2. network-reservation.ts (High)

   • Statements: 111 of 221 covered (50.22%)
   • Branches: 70 of 129 covered (54.26%)
   • Risk: Network resource allocation (/32 IP reservations, VLAN isolation) may have untested failure paths
   • Impact: Multi-user runner scenarios could leak traffic between agents

3. config-assembly.ts (Medium)

   • Statements: 28 of 38 covered (73.68%)
   • Branches: Only 3 of 12 covered (25%)
   • Risk: Configuration validation has untested conditional paths
   • Impact: Invalid configs might not be caught during preflight

4. runtime-preflight.ts (Medium)

   • Statements: 24 of 36 covered (66.66%)
   • Branches: 16 of 39 covered (41.02%)
   • Risk: Pre-flight checks (kernel version, seccomp support, etc.) partially untested
   • Impact: Undetected kernel incompatibilities

5. rootfs.ts (Medium)

   • Statements: 38 of 53 covered (71.69%)
   • Branches: 12 of 22 covered (54.54%)
   • Risk: MicroVM root filesystem setup has untested branches
   • Impact: Edge cases in fsverity, verity setup, or chroot operations untested

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📅 Recent Source Changes (last 7 days)

Unable to determine recent changes due to repository access restrictions. Coverage report reflects the current state of the codebase.

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🔎 Notable Findings

1. Firewall Core Is Well-Protected: All Squid ACL, iptables rule generation, and domain pattern matching code has 100% statement coverage. This is excellent for a security-critical system.

2. Process Isolation Needs Urgent Testing: finite-disclosure.ts (38% coverage) is the highest-risk gap. This module handles credential hiding, process namespace isolation, and capability dropping—all critical to sandbox security. A regression here could expose agent processes to each other or to host credentials.

3. MicroVM/Enclave Paths Have Gaps: The newer microVM and enclave subsystems (network-reservation, runtime-preflight, rootfs) have 50–67% coverage. These are newer code paths and may benefit from integration tests.

4. Branch Coverage Lags Statement Coverage: Even well-covered files sometimes have branch gaps (e.g., config-assembly.ts 74% statements but only 25% branches). Error handling paths and conditional fallbacks need more test cases.

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🎯 Recommendations

1. [HIGH] Test Finite Disclosure Process Isolation

• Priority: Urgent
• Effort: 3–5 days
• Target: Increase bounded-execution/finite-disclosure.ts statements from 38% → 75%+
• Action:
  • Add unit tests for credential-hiding overlays (/dev/null mounts)
  • Test capability drop sequences (SYS_CHROOT, SYS_ADMIN)
  • Add negative tests: verify that agent cannot read /etc/shadow, host env, or sibling process memory
  • Test edge cases: missing home dir, unusual UID/GID mappings
• Acceptance: Branch coverage >60%, statements >75%

2. [MEDIUM] Add Network Reservation Integration Tests

• Priority: Medium
• Effort: 2–3 days
• Target: Increase microvm/network-reservation.ts branches from 54% → 80%+
• Action:
  • Test /32 IP allocation and conflict detection in multi-agent scenarios
  • Test VLAN tag assignment edge cases
  • Test rollback when reservation fails (partial cleanup)
  • Test concurrent reservation requests
• Acceptance: Branches >75%, statements >85%

3. [MEDIUM] Improve Config Validation Branch Coverage

• Priority: Medium
• Effort: 1–2 days
• Target: Increase commands/validators/config-assembly.ts branches from 25% → 80%+
• Action:
  • Add tests for each validation branch (e.g., missing required field → error, valid field → pass)
  • Test interaction between validators (e.g., invalid option in combination with another option)
  • Add negative tests for each branch (e.g., type mismatches, invalid enum values)
• Acceptance: Branches >75%

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Report Generated: 2026-09-04
Coverage Tool: Jest Istanbul
Repository: github/gh-aw-firewall

Generated by Test Coverage Reporter · copilot · sum00 · 24.5 AIC · ⊞ 5.4K · ◷

• expires on Sep 11, 2026, 5:19 AM UTC