Daily Firewall Report2026-08-05 #50461
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🔥 Executive Summary
Report date: 2026-08-05 | Period analyzed: Past 7 days
This report covers 19 distinct workflows across 30 firewall-enabled workflow runs identified in the past 7 days on
github/gh-aw. Full firewall traffic data (request/domain-level logs) was successfully recovered for 28 of the 30 runs (2 runs had no printed firewall activity summary, likely due to early failure before the firewall logging step executed). Overall, firewall activity was very light and clean: 1,710 total requests were observed, with only 2 requests (0.12%) blocked, both to the same domain (proxy.golang.org), which was not on the network allowlist for the affected workflows. No suspicious or unexpected domains were seen — all blocked/observed traffic aligns with legitimate development tooling (GitHub Copilot API, Sentry, Grafana OTLP, Go module proxy, npm, PyPI).📊 Key Metrics
🚫 Top Blocked Domains
proxy.golang.orgOnly one domain was blocked during the analysis period, and only twice in total — a negligible volume.
proxy.golang.orgis the official Go module proxy; workflows that build/test Go code but don't have it explicitly allowlisted will see it denied by default-deny.📋 Policy Configuration & Rule Attribution
📋 Policy: 13 rules observed (aggregated across runs), SSL Bump disabled, DLP disabled (standard AWF network-isolation mode).
Policy Rule Hit Table
Denied Requests with Rule Attribution
Rule Effectiveness Summary
allow-both-plainis by far the busiest legitimate pathway (1,148 hits, ~67% of all traffic), handling the majority of standard HTTP/HTTPS allowlisted domain traffic.allow-both-regex(552 hits, ~32%) handles pattern-based allow rules — likely covering wildcard/subdomain matches (e.g., telemetry endpoints).deny-defaultcaught 100% of the observed blocked traffic (2 hits) — both againstproxy.golang.org, confirming the default-deny is working as the safety net for non-allowlisted domains.unknown) deny hits were recorded but couldn't be mapped to a specific replay rule from the logs — these are likely port/method-based denies (e.g., non-HTTP(S) ports) that the log format doesn't capture with full rule granularity. Worth a closer look if this pattern grows.allow-topology-peer-awmg-mcpg,allow-topology-peer-awmg-cli-proxy,deny-unsafe-ports,deny-connect-unsafe-ports,allow-api-proxy-ip,allow-from-api-proxy,deny-raw-ipv4,deny-raw-ipv6, andallow-ip-172-30-0-1had zero hits in this period. These are structural/defense-in-depth rules (topology, raw-IP, unsafe-port protections) that are expected to rarely fire under normal, well-behaved workflow traffic — they should be retained as guardrails rather than removed.View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
Workflow: Documentation Unbloat (1 run analyzed)
Workflow: Smoke Crush (2 runs analyzed)
All other 17 analyzed workflows (AI Moderator, Avenger, Code Scanning Fixer, Daily Credit Limit Test, Daily GitHub Docs SEO Optimizer, Design Decision Gate 🏗️, Discussion Task Miner, Impeccable Skills Reviewer, Issue Monster, Matt Pocock Skills Reviewer, PR Code Quality Reviewer, PR Description Updater, PR Sous Chef, Smoke Aider, Smoke Cursor, Test Quality Sentinel, and Failure Investigator) had zero blocked requests during this period.
View Complete Blocked Domains List
🔒 Security Recommendations
proxy.golang.orgfor workflows that build or test Go code (e.g.,Documentation Unbloat,Smoke Crush, and any other Go-related workflows) — it's the official, legitimate Go module proxy and its current blocking is purely a missing-allowlist-entry issue, not a security concern.deny-raw-ipv4,deny-raw-ipv6,deny-unsafe-ports,deny-connect-unsafe-ports, topology-peer allows, api-proxy allows, and the specific IP allow) show no activity but should be retained — they exist to catch edge-case bypass attempts (raw IPs, unsafe ports) rather than everyday traffic, and their absence of hits is a good sign, not evidence they're unnecessary.Chart generation was attempted via the firewall-chart-generator sub-agent but did not return usable results (empty responses after multiple retries) — trend charts are omitted from this report. All other data was collected via fresh
logsand manual firewall-log analysis (audit tool encountered timeout issues on large batch queries, so per-run firewall activity logs were parsed directly from the downloaded workflow log artifacts).All reactions