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Over the last 7 days (all firewall-enabled traffic observed fell within a single ~4.5-hour capture window ending 2026-08-19 16:02 UTC across the 100 most recent runs), 90 of 100 firewall-enabled workflow runs produced usable network telemetry, generating 5,259 total requests with a healthy 96.1% allow rate. Blocked traffic was heavily concentrated in a single incident: the Code Scanning Fixer workflow accounted for 182 of 205 blocked requests (89%), almost entirely against proxy.golang.org:443, suggesting a Go module proxy dependency that isn't allowlisted for that workflow rather than a malicious access attempt. No other workflow showed meaningful blocked volume.
No DIFC integrity-filtered events were found in the last 7 days — the gateway's integrity/secrecy filtering system saw zero triggered tool calls across all monitored runs, indicating no detected attempts at cross-boundary data exfiltration or untrusted-content-triggered tool abuse during this period.
The dominant cross-cutting theme is legitimate build/tooling traffic (Go proxy, Ubuntu/Snapcraft package mirrors, TLS certificate revocation lists) being blocked by network policy rather than any indication of compromise or malicious activity — these are largely policy-tuning opportunities, not security incidents.
🔥 Firewall Analysis
Key Firewall Metrics
Metric
Value
Workflows analyzed (firewall-enabled)
90 (of 100 candidate runs; 10 had no firewall telemetry)
Total network requests monitored
5,259
✅ Allowed requests
5,054
🚫 Blocked requests
205
Block rate
3.9%
Total unique blocked domains
54
📈 Firewall Request Trends
All 100 captured runs occurred within a single ~4.5-hour window (11:00–16:00 UTC on 2026-08-19), so the chart shows hourly rather than daily granularity. A sharp spike in blocked requests appears at 13:00 UTC (189 blocked), driven almost entirely by the Code Scanning Fixer incident described below; blocked volume is negligible in all other hours.
Top Blocked Domains
proxy.golang.org:443 dominates with 132 blocks (64% of all blocked requests), entirely from the Code Scanning Fixer workflow — this is a standard Go module proxy and its blocking is very likely an allowlist gap rather than a threat. The remaining blocked domains are mostly single-hit entries tied to the same run: certificate revocation list (CRL) endpoints, package mirrors (Snapcraft, Ubuntu archives), and monitoring/telemetry hosts (Sentry, Grafana) that are typically expected egress for CI tooling.
Most Frequently Blocked Domains
Domain
Times Blocked
Workflows
Category
proxy.golang.org:443
132
Code Scanning Fixer
Package registry
(unknown)
20
Architecture Guardian, CLI Consistency Checker
Internal/Unresolved
chatgpt.com
2
Design Decision Gate 🏗️, PR Code Quality Reviewer
AI/Chat
*.grafana.net
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Monitoring
*.sentry.io
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Monitoring
api.business.githubcopilot.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
GitHub API
api.enterprise.githubcopilot.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
GitHub API
api.github.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
GitHub API
api.githubcopilot.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
GitHub API
api.individual.githubcopilot.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
GitHub API
api.snapcraft.io
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Package registry
archive.ubuntu.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Package registry
awmg-cli-proxy
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Internal/Unresolved
awmg-mcpg
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Internal/Unresolved
azure.archive.ubuntu.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Package registry
crl.geotrust.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Certificate/CRL
crl.globalsign.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Certificate/CRL
crl.identrust.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Certificate/CRL
crl.sectigo.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Certificate/CRL
crl.thawte.com
1
Code Scanning Fixer
Certificate/CRL
View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
Workflow
Runs
Allowed
Blocked
Code Scanning Fixer
1
102
182
Dead Code Removal Agent
1
164
7
Ponytail Reviewer
6
90
6
PR Code Quality Reviewer
6
188
1
Design Decision Gate 🏗️
6
339
1
PureLock
1
161
1
Daily Go Test Parallelizer
1
253
1
Daily Credit Limit Test
1
10
1
CLI Consistency Checker
1
2
1
Daily Malicious Code Scan Agent
1
2
1
Architecture Guardian
1
0
1
Issue Triage Agent
1
38
1
Delight
1
75
1
PR Sous Chef
12
448
0
Impeccable Skills Reviewer
5
194
0
Test Quality Sentinel
6
217
0
All other workflows (~40)
remaining runs
remaining allowed
0
View Complete Blocked Domains List
All 54 unique domains blocked at least once: proxy.golang.org:443, (unknown), chatgpt.com, *.grafana.net, *.sentry.io, api.business.githubcopilot.com, api.enterprise.githubcopilot.com, api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, api.individual.githubcopilot.com, api.snapcraft.io, archive.ubuntu.com, awmg-cli-proxy, awmg-mcpg, azure.archive.ubuntu.com, crl.geotrust.com, crl.globalsign.com, crl.identrust.com, crl.sectigo.com, crl.thawte.com, plus ~34 additional single-hit domains associated with the same Code Scanning Fixer run (CI/telemetry/package-mirror related).
🔒 Firewall Security Recommendations
Allowlist proxy.golang.org for the Code Scanning Fixer workflow if it needs to fetch or verify Go modules — this single domain accounts for 64% of all blocked traffic across the fleet this week and looks like an unintentional gap rather than a security-relevant block.
Investigate the (unknown) domain category (20 blocks) — resolve which underlying hosts these represent; unresolved/unknown blocked destinations should be reviewed manually to rule out DNS-evasion patterns even though volume is low here.
Review chatgpt.com blocks (2 hits, Design Decision Gate and PR Code Quality Reviewer) — confirm these are unintentional/incidental network calls rather than a deliberate external LLM integration that should be either explicitly allowlisted or removed from the workflow.
No other blocked-domain pattern in this window suggests exfiltration attempts, C2-style traffic, or credential-harvesting domains — overall firewall posture looks healthy.
🔒 DIFC Integrity Analysis
No DIFC integrity-filtered events found in the last 7 days. The warm-start cache snapshot (updated_at: 2026-08-19T16:11:29Z) confirms zero recorded events, and the fresh filtered-logs.json query for the analysis window also returned an empty runs array. This indicates the DIFC gateway did not flag any tool call for integrity or secrecy violations across all monitored agentic workflow runs in this period — a positive signal with no tuning action required at this time.
Generated by the Daily Security Observability workflow (consolidated from Daily Firewall Reporter + Daily DIFC Analyzer) Analysis window: Last 7 days | Repository: github/gh-aw Run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/32273355833
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Executive Summary
Over the last 7 days (all firewall-enabled traffic observed fell within a single ~4.5-hour capture window ending 2026-08-19 16:02 UTC across the 100 most recent runs), 90 of 100 firewall-enabled workflow runs produced usable network telemetry, generating 5,259 total requests with a healthy 96.1% allow rate. Blocked traffic was heavily concentrated in a single incident: the Code Scanning Fixer workflow accounted for 182 of 205 blocked requests (89%), almost entirely against
proxy.golang.org:443, suggesting a Go module proxy dependency that isn't allowlisted for that workflow rather than a malicious access attempt. No other workflow showed meaningful blocked volume.No DIFC integrity-filtered events were found in the last 7 days — the gateway's integrity/secrecy filtering system saw zero triggered tool calls across all monitored runs, indicating no detected attempts at cross-boundary data exfiltration or untrusted-content-triggered tool abuse during this period.
The dominant cross-cutting theme is legitimate build/tooling traffic (Go proxy, Ubuntu/Snapcraft package mirrors, TLS certificate revocation lists) being blocked by network policy rather than any indication of compromise or malicious activity — these are largely policy-tuning opportunities, not security incidents.
🔥 Firewall Analysis
Key Firewall Metrics
📈 Firewall Request Trends
All 100 captured runs occurred within a single ~4.5-hour window (11:00–16:00 UTC on 2026-08-19), so the chart shows hourly rather than daily granularity. A sharp spike in blocked requests appears at 13:00 UTC (189 blocked), driven almost entirely by the Code Scanning Fixer incident described below; blocked volume is negligible in all other hours.
Top Blocked Domains
proxy.golang.org:443dominates with 132 blocks (64% of all blocked requests), entirely from the Code Scanning Fixer workflow — this is a standard Go module proxy and its blocking is very likely an allowlist gap rather than a threat. The remaining blocked domains are mostly single-hit entries tied to the same run: certificate revocation list (CRL) endpoints, package mirrors (Snapcraft, Ubuntu archives), and monitoring/telemetry hosts (Sentry, Grafana) that are typically expected egress for CI tooling.Most Frequently Blocked Domains
View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
View Complete Blocked Domains List
All 54 unique domains blocked at least once:
proxy.golang.org:443,(unknown),chatgpt.com,*.grafana.net,*.sentry.io,api.business.githubcopilot.com,api.enterprise.githubcopilot.com,api.github.com,api.githubcopilot.com,api.individual.githubcopilot.com,api.snapcraft.io,archive.ubuntu.com,awmg-cli-proxy,awmg-mcpg,azure.archive.ubuntu.com,crl.geotrust.com,crl.globalsign.com,crl.identrust.com,crl.sectigo.com,crl.thawte.com, plus ~34 additional single-hit domains associated with the same Code Scanning Fixer run (CI/telemetry/package-mirror related).🔒 Firewall Security Recommendations
proxy.golang.orgfor the Code Scanning Fixer workflow if it needs to fetch or verify Go modules — this single domain accounts for 64% of all blocked traffic across the fleet this week and looks like an unintentional gap rather than a security-relevant block.(unknown)domain category (20 blocks) — resolve which underlying hosts these represent; unresolved/unknown blocked destinations should be reviewed manually to rule out DNS-evasion patterns even though volume is low here.chatgpt.comblocks (2 hits, Design Decision Gate and PR Code Quality Reviewer) — confirm these are unintentional/incidental network calls rather than a deliberate external LLM integration that should be either explicitly allowlisted or removed from the workflow.🔒 DIFC Integrity Analysis
No DIFC integrity-filtered events found in the last 7 days. The warm-start cache snapshot (
updated_at: 2026-08-19T16:11:29Z) confirms zero recorded events, and the freshfiltered-logs.jsonquery for the analysis window also returned an emptyrunsarray. This indicates the DIFC gateway did not flag any tool call for integrity or secrecy violations across all monitored agentic workflow runs in this period — a positive signal with no tuning action required at this time.Generated by the Daily Security Observability workflow (consolidated from Daily Firewall Reporter + Daily DIFC Analyzer)
Analysis window: Last 7 days | Repository: github/gh-aw
Run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/32273355833
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