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Over the last 7 days, 89 firewall-enabled workflow runs across github/gh-aw generated 5,120 monitored network requests with a low 1.4% block rate (72 blocked / 5,048 allowed). Blocking activity was concentrated on a small set of 8 unique domains, led by ab.chatgpt.com:443 (23 blocks across 8 different workflows) — likely reflecting workflows that inadvertently probe or reference OpenAI-branded endpoints not on their allowlist — and api.anthropic.com:443 (5 blocks across 4 Claude-related workflows), which may indicate legitimate traffic that needs an allowlist update rather than a security concern.
On the DIFC (Data Integrity and Flow Control) side, 585 tool calls were filtered across 10 workflows in the last 7 days, overwhelmingly from list_issues (399) and search_issues (162) calls against the github MCP server. 559 of 585 events (96%) were blocked because the resource's integrity label fell below the approved threshold, with the remaining 26 blocked below merged. Filtering activity was heavily concentrated in Smoke Agent: public/approved (233 events) and Workflow Normalizer (189 events) — both smoke-test/validation workflows exercising integrity boundaries by design, suggesting most of this volume is expected test traffic rather than a signal of active attacks.
A cross-cutting theme: neither dataset shows evidence of successful exfiltration or policy bypass — firewall blocks are low-volume and DIFC filtering is dominated by expected validation workflows. The main opportunities are allowlist hygiene (Anthropic/OpenAI domains) and continued monitoring of the small number of non-test workflows (Issue Triage Agent, GitHub Remote MCP Authentication Test) that also triggered DIFC filtering, to confirm they are not attempting to read unapproved content as part of real task execution.
🔥 Firewall Analysis
Key Firewall Metrics
Metric
Value
Workflows analyzed (firewall-enabled)
89
Total network requests monitored
5,120
✅ Allowed requests
5,048
🚫 Blocked requests
72
Block rate
1.41%
Total unique blocked domains
8
📈 Firewall Request Trends
Available audit data for this window clusters on 2026-09-03 (the most recent day with retrievable firewall logs across all analyzed runs); allowed traffic (5,048 requests) vastly outweighs blocked traffic (72 requests), consistent with a healthy firewall posture where legitimate MCP/API/network calls dominate and blocks represent edge cases rather than systemic denial issues.
Top Blocked Domains
ab.chatgpt.com:443 and api.anthropic.com:443 account for the majority of blocks (28 of 72, ~39%) and both appear across multiple unrelated workflows, suggesting these are either mis-scoped allowlists for AI-model-adjacent workflows or benign SDK/telemetry calls that should be explicitly allowlisted rather than silently blocked. The remaining blocked domains (github.com, api.github.com, registry.npmjs.org, proxy.golang.org, storage.googleapis.com) each appear only 1–3 times and look like incidental, low-risk blocks tied to specific tooling (npm/Go module fetches, GCS artifacts).
Most Frequently Blocked Domains
Domain
Times Blocked
Workflows
Category
ab.chatgpt.com:443
23
AI Moderator, Daily Credit Limit Test, Daily Go Test Parallelizer, GitHub API Consumption Report Agent, Issue Monster, Ponytail Reviewer, PureLock, Workflow Normalizer
AI/LLM endpoint
api.anthropic.com:443
5
Claude Code User Documentation Review, Deep Report, GitHub MCP Structural Analysis, [aw] Failure Investigator (6h)
AI/LLM endpoint
github.com:443
3
Daily Malicious Code Scan Agent, PR Sous Chef, Test Quality Sentinel
GitHub
registry.npmjs.org:443
1
Impeccable Skills Reviewer
Package registry
proxy.golang.org:443
1
Daily Malicious Code Scan Agent
Package registry
api.github.com:443
1
Daily Issues Report Generator
GitHub API
storage.googleapis.com:443
1
Delight
Cloud storage
No policy_analysis.rule_hits data was available in any of the 97 successfully audited runs this cycle (rule-level attribution reported empty). Latest observed policy configuration: 11 rules, SSL Bump disabled, DLP disabled.
View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
97 of 98 firewall-enabled runs were successfully audited this cycle (1 run, 33773083361 — Avenger, could not be retrieved after repeated attempts and is excluded from these totals). Request volume and blocking activity were broadly distributed; no single workflow dominated blocked traffic — the highest-blocking domain (ab.chatgpt.com) was spread across 8 distinct workflows rather than concentrated in one, which is a good sign against a single malicious/misconfigured workflow being responsible.
View Complete Blocked Domains List
ab.chatgpt.com:443
api.anthropic.com:443
api.github.com:443
github.com:443
proxy.golang.org:443
registry.npmjs.org:443
storage.googleapis.com:443
🔒 Firewall Security Recommendations
Allowlist AI-endpoint domains where legitimate: If ab.chatgpt.com and api.anthropic.com traffic is expected for AI Moderator, Deep Report, Claude Code User Documentation Review, and similar engine-related workflows, add them to the network allowlist for those specific workflows rather than blocking them repeatedly.
Investigate ab.chatgpt.com in non-AI workflows: Workflows like Daily Credit Limit Test, Daily Go Test Parallelizer, and PureLock blocking this domain suggests it may be an SDK default/telemetry call unrelated to their stated purpose — worth confirming this isn't unexpected outbound traffic.
Package registry access for Impeccable Skills Reviewer and Daily Malicious Code Scan Agent: If these workflows need npm/go module resolution, add registry.npmjs.org / proxy.golang.org to their allowlists explicitly.
No rule-level attribution available: Consider enabling policy_analysis.rule_hits reporting (if supported by the firewall configuration) to get per-rule denial counts in future audits for more precise tuning.
Filtering activity peaked on 2026-09-01 (354 events) then dropped to 61 on 2026-09-02 before rising again to 170 on 2026-09-03. This pattern tracks smoke-test workflow scheduling rather than a sustained upward trend — no evidence of an escalating attack pattern, but the day-to-day volatility suggests filtering volume is driven by scheduled validation runs rather than steady organic traffic.
🔧 Top Filtered Tools
list_issues (399) and search_issues (162) together account for 96% of all filtered calls — both are read-oriented GitHub tools that enumerate or search issues, which naturally surface many unapproved/public-integrity resources when scanning a large open-source repo like github/gh-aw. search_repositories (12), list_pull_requests (9), search_code (2), and issue_read (1) round out the remainder at low volume.
🏷️ Filter Reasons and Tags
96% of filtered events (559/585) were blocked because content fell below the approved integrity threshold, with the remaining 4% (26/585) below merged. On tags, none:public was present on all 585 events (baseline tag for public GitHub content), unapproved:public on 412 events (70%), and approved:public on only 14 events (2%) — reinforcing that the filter is doing its job of separating unvetted public content from approved content before it reaches agent reasoning. No secrecy_tags were present in this window, indicating none of the filtered events involved secret/credential-labeled content.
📋 Per-Workflow DIFC Breakdown
Workflow
Filtered Events
Smoke Agent: public/approved
233
Workflow Normalizer
189
Smoke Temporary ID
77
Smoke Agent: all/merged
26
Issue Triage Agent
23
GitHub Remote MCP Authentication Test
21
Smoke Agent: scoped/approved
6
Daily Spec Coverage Review
5
GitHub MCP Structural Analysis
3
Daily Regression Audit
2
📋 Per-Server DIFC Breakdown
MCP Server
Filtered Events
github
585
👤 Per-User DIFC Breakdown
Author Login
Filtered Events
unknown
562
v1v
5
ilja
4
kkruel8100
4
mouorad86-crypto
2
loganrosen
2
lpcox
2
massirr
2
MattSkala
1
GregoireW
1
💡 DIFC Tuning Recommendations
Treat Smoke Agent: public/approved, Smoke Temporary ID, Smoke Agent: all/merged, and Smoke Agent: scoped/approved (342 combined events, 58% of total) as expected baseline noise — these are dedicated smoke/validation workflows designed to exercise integrity boundaries, so their filtering volume should be excluded from anomaly-detection thresholds to avoid false-positive alerts.
Review Workflow Normalizer (189 events, 32%) — as a non-smoke-test workflow with high filtering volume, confirm whether it genuinely needs to enumerate large numbers of unapproved issues/PRs, or whether its list_issues/search_issues calls can be scoped more narrowly (e.g., filtered by label, state, or approved-content-only) to reduce unnecessary integrity-filtered reads.
Investigate the 562 events attributed to unknown author — the large majority of filtered events lack a resolved author_login. Confirm whether this is expected for scheduled/automated triggers (vs. actor-initiated runs) or indicates missing author-association metadata that should be backfilled for better attribution in future audits.
Monitor Issue Triage Agent and GitHub Remote MCP Authentication Test (23 and 21 events respectively) — these are task-oriented (non-smoke-test) workflows; periodically sample their filtered events to confirm the integrity gate is not blocking content genuinely needed for their triage/authentication logic.
No secrecy_tags were observed — if secrecy filtering is expected to be active for these workflows, verify the secrecy labeling pipeline is populating tags correctly; an empty result set may indicate the feature isn't yet exercised in this window rather than an absence of secret-labeled content.
Generated by the Daily Security Observability workflow (consolidated from Daily Firewall Reporter + Daily DIFC Analyzer) Analysis window: Last 7 days | Repository: github/gh-aw Run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/33775289585
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Executive Summary
Over the last 7 days, 89 firewall-enabled workflow runs across github/gh-aw generated 5,120 monitored network requests with a low 1.4% block rate (72 blocked / 5,048 allowed). Blocking activity was concentrated on a small set of 8 unique domains, led by
ab.chatgpt.com:443(23 blocks across 8 different workflows) — likely reflecting workflows that inadvertently probe or reference OpenAI-branded endpoints not on their allowlist — andapi.anthropic.com:443(5 blocks across 4 Claude-related workflows), which may indicate legitimate traffic that needs an allowlist update rather than a security concern.On the DIFC (Data Integrity and Flow Control) side, 585 tool calls were filtered across 10 workflows in the last 7 days, overwhelmingly from
list_issues(399) andsearch_issues(162) calls against thegithubMCP server. 559 of 585 events (96%) were blocked because the resource's integrity label fell below theapprovedthreshold, with the remaining 26 blocked belowmerged. Filtering activity was heavily concentrated inSmoke Agent: public/approved(233 events) andWorkflow Normalizer(189 events) — both smoke-test/validation workflows exercising integrity boundaries by design, suggesting most of this volume is expected test traffic rather than a signal of active attacks.A cross-cutting theme: neither dataset shows evidence of successful exfiltration or policy bypass — firewall blocks are low-volume and DIFC filtering is dominated by expected validation workflows. The main opportunities are allowlist hygiene (Anthropic/OpenAI domains) and continued monitoring of the small number of non-test workflows (Issue Triage Agent, GitHub Remote MCP Authentication Test) that also triggered DIFC filtering, to confirm they are not attempting to read unapproved content as part of real task execution.
🔥 Firewall Analysis
Key Firewall Metrics
📈 Firewall Request Trends
Available audit data for this window clusters on 2026-09-03 (the most recent day with retrievable firewall logs across all analyzed runs); allowed traffic (5,048 requests) vastly outweighs blocked traffic (72 requests), consistent with a healthy firewall posture where legitimate MCP/API/network calls dominate and blocks represent edge cases rather than systemic denial issues.
Top Blocked Domains
ab.chatgpt.com:443andapi.anthropic.com:443account for the majority of blocks (28 of 72, ~39%) and both appear across multiple unrelated workflows, suggesting these are either mis-scoped allowlists for AI-model-adjacent workflows or benign SDK/telemetry calls that should be explicitly allowlisted rather than silently blocked. The remaining blocked domains (github.com,api.github.com,registry.npmjs.org,proxy.golang.org,storage.googleapis.com) each appear only 1–3 times and look like incidental, low-risk blocks tied to specific tooling (npm/Go module fetches, GCS artifacts).Most Frequently Blocked Domains
No
policy_analysis.rule_hitsdata was available in any of the 97 successfully audited runs this cycle (rule-level attribution reported empty). Latest observed policy configuration: 11 rules, SSL Bump disabled, DLP disabled.View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
97 of 98 firewall-enabled runs were successfully audited this cycle (1 run,
33773083361— Avenger, could not be retrieved after repeated attempts and is excluded from these totals). Request volume and blocking activity were broadly distributed; no single workflow dominated blocked traffic — the highest-blocking domain (ab.chatgpt.com) was spread across 8 distinct workflows rather than concentrated in one, which is a good sign against a single malicious/misconfigured workflow being responsible.View Complete Blocked Domains List
🔒 Firewall Security Recommendations
ab.chatgpt.comandapi.anthropic.comtraffic is expected for AI Moderator, Deep Report, Claude Code User Documentation Review, and similar engine-related workflows, add them to the network allowlist for those specific workflows rather than blocking them repeatedly.ab.chatgpt.comin non-AI workflows: Workflows likeDaily Credit Limit Test,Daily Go Test Parallelizer, andPureLockblocking this domain suggests it may be an SDK default/telemetry call unrelated to their stated purpose — worth confirming this isn't unexpected outbound traffic.Impeccable Skills ReviewerandDaily Malicious Code Scan Agent: If these workflows neednpm/gomodule resolution, addregistry.npmjs.org/proxy.golang.orgto their allowlists explicitly.policy_analysis.rule_hitsreporting (if supported by the firewall configuration) to get per-rule denial counts in future audits for more precise tuning.🔒 DIFC Integrity Analysis
Key DIFC Metrics
📈 DIFC Events Over Time
Filtering activity peaked on 2026-09-01 (354 events) then dropped to 61 on 2026-09-02 before rising again to 170 on 2026-09-03. This pattern tracks smoke-test workflow scheduling rather than a sustained upward trend — no evidence of an escalating attack pattern, but the day-to-day volatility suggests filtering volume is driven by scheduled validation runs rather than steady organic traffic.
🔧 Top Filtered Tools
list_issues(399) andsearch_issues(162) together account for 96% of all filtered calls — both are read-oriented GitHub tools that enumerate or search issues, which naturally surface many unapproved/public-integrity resources when scanning a large open-source repo like github/gh-aw.search_repositories(12),list_pull_requests(9),search_code(2), andissue_read(1) round out the remainder at low volume.🏷️ Filter Reasons and Tags
96% of filtered events (559/585) were blocked because content fell below the
approvedintegrity threshold, with the remaining 4% (26/585) belowmerged. On tags,none:publicwas present on all 585 events (baseline tag for public GitHub content),unapproved:publicon 412 events (70%), andapproved:publicon only 14 events (2%) — reinforcing that the filter is doing its job of separating unvetted public content from approved content before it reaches agent reasoning. Nosecrecy_tagswere present in this window, indicating none of the filtered events involved secret/credential-labeled content.📋 Per-Workflow DIFC Breakdown
📋 Per-Server DIFC Breakdown
👤 Per-User DIFC Breakdown
💡 DIFC Tuning Recommendations
Smoke Agent: public/approved,Smoke Temporary ID,Smoke Agent: all/merged, andSmoke Agent: scoped/approved(342 combined events, 58% of total) as expected baseline noise — these are dedicated smoke/validation workflows designed to exercise integrity boundaries, so their filtering volume should be excluded from anomaly-detection thresholds to avoid false-positive alerts.Workflow Normalizer(189 events, 32%) — as a non-smoke-test workflow with high filtering volume, confirm whether it genuinely needs to enumerate large numbers of unapproved issues/PRs, or whether itslist_issues/search_issuescalls can be scoped more narrowly (e.g., filtered by label, state, or approved-content-only) to reduce unnecessary integrity-filtered reads.unknownauthor — the large majority of filtered events lack a resolvedauthor_login. Confirm whether this is expected for scheduled/automated triggers (vs. actor-initiated runs) or indicates missing author-association metadata that should be backfilled for better attribution in future audits.Issue Triage AgentandGitHub Remote MCP Authentication Test(23 and 21 events respectively) — these are task-oriented (non-smoke-test) workflows; periodically sample their filtered events to confirm the integrity gate is not blocking content genuinely needed for their triage/authentication logic.secrecy_tagswere observed — if secrecy filtering is expected to be active for these workflows, verify the secrecy labeling pipeline is populating tags correctly; an empty result set may indicate the feature isn't yet exercised in this window rather than an absence of secret-labeled content.Generated by the Daily Security Observability workflow (consolidated from Daily Firewall Reporter + Daily DIFC Analyzer)
Analysis window: Last 7 days | Repository: github/gh-aw
Run: https://github.com/github/gh-aw/actions/runs/33775289585
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