[uk ai resilience] UK AI Open Code Risk & Resilience Governance — Weekly Review (2026-09-17) #61635
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Executive summary
Recent-changes governance sweep of
github/gh-awover the 7-day window (2026-09-10→2026-09-17): 162 commits (all GPG-verified), 44 flagged as security-relevant, 274 open code-scanning alerts, 56 open security issues (most already tracked under prior[uk-ai-resilience]runs), 0 open secret-scanning alerts. The dominant new, untracked signal is a cluster of 256 dependency-determinism alerts (246npm-install-non-deterministic+ 10uv-pip-install-non-deterministic) that appeared 2026-09-15 across dozens of generated.github/workflows/*.lock.ymlfiles. These originate from a single compiler-level control point (pkg/workflow/copilot_engine_installation.go,engine_helpers.go,run_install_scripts_validation.go) that emits pinned-versionnpm install -g <pkg>@<version>/uv pip installsteps without a lockfile/hash-pinning mechanism the scanner recognizes. No repository-hiding action is recommended; the fix path is compiler-level (add lockfile or hash-pinned install mode), not per-generated-file edits. Automation (Copilot bot, dependabot, github-actions bot) accounts for ~95% of commit volume, with human (pelikhan) review trailers on Copilot PRs providing the primary human-in-the-loop control.Asset graph summary (recent-change scoped)
Asset graph (recent-change scoped)
pkg/workflow/*.go, engine install/mount/setup).github/workflows/*.lock.yml, ~250+ files)make recompile; no direct human editspkg/cli/add_package_manifest_*.go)Most important untracked risks:
pkg/workflow/copilot_engine_installation.go/engine_helpers.go(add hash-pinned or lockfile-based install pattern, or document a pinned-version-only accepted-risk exception), not per-lock.yml edits — editing generated files directly would be immediately overwritten bymake recompile..github/CODEOWNERSexists in this repo, a governance gap worth flagging but not urgent given 100% commit signature verification.Control verification gaps
Control verification detail
.github/CODEOWNERS; review load concentrated on pelikhan as co-author on Copilot PRs.changeset/used (1 changeset commit in window)@openai/codex@0.154.0) but no lockfile/hash pinning → scanner flags non-determinism at 256 sitesaudit-workflows.lock.ymlpresent and alert-affected (generated); MCP logs guardrail convention documented in repo instructionsRisk-scoring table and rationale
AI-aware risk scoring (dimensions 1-5, higher = more risk)
Remediation queue with SLAs
pkg/workflow/copilot_engine_installation.go/engine_helpers.go(or document accepted-risk exception for pinned-version-only installs across ~250 generated workflows) — SLA: high, single compiler-level fix, large blast-radius reduction..github/CODEOWNERSmappingpkg/workflow/,pkg/cli/, and.github/workflows/*.mdsources to accountable maintainers — SLA: medium.Exception register
None proposed this run — no permanent hidden-repo or scope-suppression exceptions are warranted; the npm/uv-pip finding is addressable at the compiler level within a bounded SLA.
Operational metrics baseline
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