Daily Firewall Report2026-09-25 #63331
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This discussion has been marked as outdated by Daily Firewall Logs Collector and Reporter. A newer discussion is available at Discussion #63542. |
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🔥 Executive Summary
Report date: 2026-09-25 · Period: last 24 hours
This report covers 199 firewall-enabled workflow runs analyzed from the cached logs (out of 318 total downloaded run summaries; 103 were malformed/missing and 16 had no firewall data — see note below). Overall firewall activity was very quiet: 99.9% of all monitored requests were allowed, with only 14 blocked requests across the entire period, spread over just 3 unique domains and 6 workflow runs. No suspicious or high-volume blocking patterns were observed — blocks look like routine noise from browser/update telemetry and one local Docker networking probe, not signs of an active security issue.
📊 Key Metrics
🚫 Top Blocked Domains
clients2.google.comgithub.comhost.docker.internal:4173View Detailed Request Patterns by Workflow
Workflow: Matt Pocock Skills Reviewer (6 runs analyzed)
github.com(the run allowedgithub.com:443normally; the plain-HTTP/port-80 variant was blocked)Workflow: Daily Model Inventory Checker (1 run analyzed)
clients2.google.comWorkflow: Smoke Codex (1 run analyzed)
clients2.google.comWorkflow: Smoke Claude (1 run analyzed)
clients2.google.comWorkflow: Smoke Agent: scoped/approved (1 run analyzed)
host.docker.internal:4173Workflow: Smoke Copilot (1 run analyzed)
clients2.google.comView Complete Blocked Domains List
clients2.google.comgithub.comhost.docker.internal:4173🛡️ Security Recommendations
clients2.google.com(Google/Chrome component-update service): seen across 5 different "Smoke *" and model-inventory workflows, always fully blocked. This is background telemetry from a headless Chrome/Chromium instance (used by browser-automation or model-check tooling) and is not something these workflows need to reach. No allowlisting action recommended — safe to continue blocking.github.com(plain host, no explicit port) in "Matt Pocock Skills Reviewer": the workflow already successfully reachesgithub.com:443,api.github.com, etc., but 5 requests to the baregithub.comentry were blocked. This looks like a duplicate/normalization artifact (e.g., a redirect or non-TLS probe) rather than a real functional gap, since the equivalent HTTPS host is allowed. Worth a quick check of that workflow's tooling to confirm it isn't retrying over plain HTTP unnecessarily, but no urgent firewall change needed.host.docker.internal:4173in "Smoke Agent: scoped/approved": a local Docker-loopback address blocked 3 times. This is expected/intentional if the workflow is a "scoped/approved" smoke test verifying that out-of-scope local network access is denied — appears to be the firewall working as designed rather than a gap.policy_analysis(rule-level) data this cycle. Recommend checking the log-fetch/summary-generation pipeline for the malformed subset and confirming whether policy rule attribution should be emitted by the firewall analyzer for future reports.All reactions