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Route Antigravity AWF target through Gemini provider key #34839

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Merged
pelikhan merged 8 commits into from
May 26, 2026
Merged

Route Antigravity AWF target through Gemini provider key #34839

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6c38268
Route antigravity AWF target through gemini provider
Copilot May 26, 2026
4776d19
Refine antigravity-to-gemini target mapping logs
Copilot May 26, 2026
f6f6b44
Clarify gemini target mapping for antigravity
Copilot May 26, 2026
36e20fd
Recompile smoke antigravity lock workflow
Copilot May 26, 2026
13f69a2
Fix antigravity CLI arguments in generated workflow
Copilot May 26, 2026
a015dfd
Clarify antigravity permission flag rationale
Copilot May 26, 2026
4aeed01
Map antigravity key to Gemini proxy auth env
Copilot May 26, 2026
875ea78
Avoid mutating required-secrets slice in antigravity env filtering
Copilot May 26, 2026
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14 changes: 8 additions & 6 deletions .github/workflows/smoke-antigravity.lock.yml
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28 changes: 12 additions & 16 deletions pkg/workflow/antigravity_engine.go
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -164,20 +164,10 @@ func (e *AntigravityEngine) GetExecutionSteps(workflowData *WorkflowData, logFil
// The conversion script (convert_gateway_config_antigravity.sh) writes settings.json
// during the MCP setup step, so no --mcp-config flag is needed here.

// Auto-approve all tool executions (equivalent to Codex's --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox)
// Without this, Antigravity CLI's default approval mode rejects tool calls with "Tool execution denied by policy"
agyArgs = append(agyArgs, "--yolo")

// Skip the workspace trust check so --yolo is not overridden to "default" approval mode.
// Antigravity CLI v1.x checks whether the working directory is trusted and overrides --yolo
// with "default" approval mode (exit code 55) when the folder is untrusted.
// ANTIGRAVITY_CLI_TRUST_WORKSPACE=true (also set in the step env) handles the same case via
// environment variable, but --skip-trust is more reliable when AWF's sandbox does not
// forward all host environment variables into the container.
agyArgs = append(agyArgs, "--skip-trust")

// Add streaming JSON output (JSONL format, compatible with the log parser)
agyArgs = append(agyArgs, "--output-format", "stream-json")
// Auto-approve all tool executions so non-interactive CI runs don't block on permission prompts.
// agy does not support the Gemini-style --yolo/--skip-trust flags.
// This flag grants broad tool permission inside the workflow sandbox, so it is only used in AWF-managed runs.
agyArgs = append(agyArgs, "--dangerously-skip-permissions")

// Note: the --prompt argument is appended raw after shellJoinArgs below because it contains
// a shell command substitution ("$(cat ...)") that must NOT go through shellEscapeArg —
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -233,7 +223,7 @@ func (e *AntigravityEngine) GetExecutionSteps(workflowData *WorkflowData, logFil
PathSetup: "touch " + AgentStepSummaryPath,
// Exclude every env var whose step-env value is a secret so the agent
// cannot read raw token values via bash tools (env / printenv).
ExcludeEnvVarNames: ComputeAWFExcludeEnvVarNames(workflowData, []string{"ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY"}),
ExcludeEnvVarNames: ComputeAWFExcludeEnvVarNames(workflowData, []string{"ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY"}),
})
} else {
command = fmt.Sprintf(`set -o pipefail
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -320,6 +310,12 @@ touch %s
maps.Copy(env, agentConfig.Env)
antigravityLog.Printf("Added %d custom env vars from agent config", len(agentConfig.Env))
}
// The Antigravity CLI and AWF's Gemini API proxy both rely on a Gemini provider key.
// Keep GEMINI_API_KEY aligned with the effective ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY by default so the
// workflow can authenticate non-interactively without requiring users to duplicate secrets.
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@github-actions github-actions Bot May 26, 2026

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Silent empty-string assignment if ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY is absent from env: env["GEMINI_API_KEY"] will be set to "" rather than being omitted, injecting a blank credential into the step environment.

💡 Suggested fix 
    if v := env["ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY"]; v != "" {
        env["GEMINI_API_KEY"] = v
    }
}

If ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY is missing or empty (e.g., due to a misconfigured workflow or a future reordering of env population), the current code silently forwards an empty string as GEMINI_API_KEY. The proxy will then receive a blank API key and fail with a confusing auth error rather than a clear "key not set" diagnostic. An explicit non-empty guard prevents this silent path.

if _, hasGeminiKey := env["GEMINI_API_KEY"]; !hasGeminiKey {
env["GEMINI_API_KEY"] = env["ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY"]
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[/diagnose] If ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY is absent from env, this silently sets GEMINI_API_KEY to an empty string, which will pass the FilterEnvForSecrets check and appear in the step env as an empty value — a subtle auth failure that's hard to diagnose.

💡 Suggested guard 
if apiKey, hasAPIKey := env["ANTIGRAVITY_API_KEY"]; hasAPIKey && apiKey != "" {
    env["GEMINI_API_KEY"] = apiKey
}

Or at minimum log a warning when propagation is skipped, so the misconfiguration surfaces early in the run log rather than as a 401 from the proxy.

}

// Generate the execution step
stepLines := []string{
Expand All @@ -328,7 +324,7 @@ touch %s
}

// Filter environment variables for security
allowedSecrets := e.GetRequiredSecretNames(workflowData)
allowedSecrets := append([]string{"GEMINI_API_KEY"}, e.GetRequiredSecretNames(workflowData)...)
filteredEnv := FilterEnvForSecrets(env, allowedSecrets)

// Inject GH_TOKEN for CLI proxy (added after filtering since it uses a special
Expand Down
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