v0.1.2

share-artifact

Security fix — command injection in the upload path. The slug and local path
were inlined into shell source, so a quote or $(...)/; in the free-text image
description could break out of quoting and run before the runtime sanitizer ever
executed. Free-text inputs (description and path) are now captured via
single-quoted heredocs — the real safety boundary — and only then sanitized into
the slug.

Hardened in the same pass:

• empty / all-punctuation descriptions fall back to a stable slug instead of a bare trailing dash;
• a failed counter query now aborts instead of silently resetting to 001 (which could overwrite an existing asset);
• only a real https:// URL is ever surfaced — a failed upload no longer pastes the literal null;
• corrected the credential-disclosure guidance (cld config masks only the secret; the key and cloud name are still sensitive).

Docs. The README privacy model now states the signed URL doesn't expire and
stays live wherever the transcript lands (logs, backups, sync) — prune sensitive
shares at end of conversation.

git-history-rewrite is unchanged; its version moves to 0.1.2 only to keep the
marketplace lockstep.

Full Changelog: v0.1.1...v0.1.2