security: implement deceptive URL detection and disclosure in tool confirmations#19288
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Summary of ChangesHello @ehedlund, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces robust security measures to detect and warn users about deceptive URLs, specifically targeting homograph attacks, within tool confirmation messages. It enhances user safety by clearly disclosing the actual Punycode identity of suspicious URLs and ensuring warnings are prominently displayed. Highlights
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Code Review
The pull request introduces important security features for detecting deceptive URLs (homograph attacks). However, two high-severity vulnerabilities were identified: a UI spoofing/markdown injection vulnerability in the URL reconstruction logic that could allow an attacker to manipulate the security warning message, and a case-sensitive regex bypass that allows deceptive URLs to go undetected if they use uppercase protocol schemes (e.g., HTTPS://). Both issues should be addressed to ensure the effectiveness of the homograph protection.
packages/cli/src/ui/components/messages/ToolConfirmationMessage.tsx
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Hi there! Thank you for your contribution to Gemini CLI. To improve our contribution process and better track changes, we now require all pull requests to be associated with an existing issue, as announced in our recent discussion and as detailed in our CONTRIBUTING.md. This pull request is being closed because it is not currently linked to an issue. Once you have updated the description of this PR to link an issue (e.g., by adding How to link an issue: Thank you for your understanding and for being a part of our community! |
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packages/cli/src/ui/components/messages/ToolConfirmationMessage.tsx
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…tacharacters from the regex for URL extraction.
Summary
This PR implements security protections against deceptive URLs (e.g., homograph attacks) in tool confirmations.
Details
urlSecurityUtils.tsprovidingisDeceptiveUrl,getDeceptiveUrlDetails, andtoUnicodeUrlusing robust WHATWG URL parsing.ToolConfirmationMessage.tsxthat reveals the Punycode (actual) identity of suspicious URLs.Related Issues
https://github.com/google-gemini/maintainers-gemini-cli/issues/1206
How to Validate
npm test -w @google/gemini-cli -- src/ui/utils/urlSecurityUtils.test.tsnpm test -w @google/gemini-cli -- src/ui/components/messages/ToolConfirmationMessage.test.tsx