build: fix expression injection in triage-issue.yml#1672
Merged
dkhawk merged 1 commit intogooglemaps:mainfrom Apr 14, 2026
Merged
build: fix expression injection in triage-issue.yml#1672dkhawk merged 1 commit intogooglemaps:mainfrom
dkhawk merged 1 commit intogooglemaps:mainfrom
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Move ${{ steps.run_script.outputs.labels }} from run: block to env: block to prevent GitHub Actions expression injection. Attacker-controlled issue body can prompt-inject Gemini API response, which flows unsanitized through ${{ }} into shell, enabling arbitrary command execution and secret exfiltration.
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@XananasX7 , are you a large language model, or is this your own writing? |
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@kikoso |
kikoso
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dkhawk
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Apr 14, 2026
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Summary
Fixes GitHub Actions expression injection vulnerability in the Apply Labels step of the issue triage workflow.
Problem
${{ steps.run_script.outputs.labels }}was expanded directly into a shellrun:block. Since the labels originate from Gemini API output (which processes attacker-controlled issue body), a prompt injection attack can cause the API to return labels containing shell metacharacters ($(),",;). GitHub Actions expands${{ }}before bash parses the script, enabling arbitrary command execution and exfiltration ofGEMINI_API_KEYandGITHUB_TOKEN.Fix
Moved
${{ steps.run_script.outputs.labels }}to theenv:block asLABELS, then reference it as$LABELSin the shell. Environment variables are not subject to expression injection.