

# Unemployment in a Production Network: Theory

Finn Schüle and Haoyu Sheng

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## 1. Households and final goods production

We consider a closed, static economy model with no government spending. There is no saving mechanism in the economy, and real household consumption equates real GDP, denoted by  $Y$ . A final goods producer with constant returns to scale technology aggregates  $J$  sector outputs to produce  $Y$

$$Y = \max_{\{c_i\}_{i=1}^J} \mathcal{D} \left( \{c_i\}_{i=1}^J \right)$$

Subject to the budget constraint

$$\sum_{i=1}^J p_i c_i = \sum_{i=1}^J w_i L_i.$$

$\mathcal{D}$  captures household preferences over final consumption goods, and  $w_i$  is the wage of sector  $i$  labor  $L_i$ .

The household's consumption decision can be computed using the first order condition:

$$(1) \quad \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} = \frac{p_i c_i}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k},$$

where  $\varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}}$  denotes the households elasticity of utility with regards to the consumption of good  $i$ .

## 2. Sector level labor markets

We assume each sector has a separate labor market with a labor force of  $H_i$  possible workers, an exogenous separation rate  $s_i$ , and an exogenous recruiting cost  $r_i$  which measures the units of labor required to maintain each posted vacancy. When workers and firms meet there is a mutual gain from matching. There is no accepted theory for how wages are set in this context. For now we assume  $w_i$  follows a general wage schedule taken as given by both firms and workers. Hires are generated by a constant returns matching function in sector-level unemployment  $u_i$  and vacancies  $v_i$

$$h_i = \phi_i m(u_i, v_i)$$

The household supplies  $H_i$  searching workers to each sector. Let the sector-specific labor market tightness be  $\theta_i = \frac{v_i}{H_i}$ , the vacancy-filling rate  $\mathcal{Q}_i(\theta_i) = \phi_i m\left(\frac{u_i}{H_i}, 1\right)$ , and the job-finding rate  $\mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i) = \phi_i m\left(1, \frac{v_i}{H_i}\right)$ . Therefore, a fraction  $\mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i)$  of  $H_i$  household finds a job, and labor supply satisfies

$$(2) \quad L_i^s(\theta_i) = \mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i) H_i$$

Let  $N_i$  denote productive employees and  $r_i$  the cost of each vacancy. In order to hire  $N_i$  productive employees, the number of vacancy posted  $v_i$  has to satisfy  $\mathcal{Q}_i(\theta_i) v_i = N_i + r_i v_i$ , where  $r_i v_i$  denotes the cost of posting the vacancies. Rearranging this yields that  $v_i = \frac{N_i}{\mathcal{Q}_i(\theta_i) - r_i}$ . Thus, hiring one unit of productive worker requires  $\frac{1}{\mathcal{Q}_i(\theta_i) - r_i}$  vacancy postings, and costs  $1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)$  units of labor, where

$$\tau_i(\theta_i) \equiv \frac{r_i}{\mathcal{Q}_i(\theta_i) - r_i}.$$

For a given target level of employment  $N_i$ , total required labor is  $L_i^d(\theta_i) = (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) N_i$ . We describe how labor demand,  $L_i^d(\theta_i)$ , is determined by firms' profit maximization in the next section.

### 3. Sector level firms

A representative firm in sector  $i$  uses labor  $N_i$  and intermediate inputs from sector  $j$ ,  $x_{ij}$ , to produce output  $y_i$  using production technology  $f_i$ .

$$y_i = A_i f_i \left( N_i, \{x_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \right)$$

Firms choose  $N_i$  and  $\{x_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J$  to maximize profits, or equivalently to minimize costs. We assume firms are price takers in both input and output markets. Profits are given by

$$\pi_i = p_i f_i \left( N_i, \{x_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \right) - w_i (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) N_i - \sum_{j=1}^J p_j x_{ij}$$

Firms choose inputs to solve

$$\max_{N_i, \{x_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J} \pi_i \left( N_i, \{x_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \right)$$

Giving the first order conditions

$$\begin{aligned} p_i f_{i, x_{ij}} &= p_j \\ p_i f_{i, N_i} &= w_i (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \end{aligned}$$

And labor demand is  $L_i^d(\theta_i) = (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) N_i$  for the optimal  $N_i$ . The equilibrium tightness equates labor demand and labor supply.

We can rewrite these expressions in terms of elasticities.

$$(3) \quad \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} = \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{p_i y_i}$$

$$(4) \quad \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} = (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \frac{w_i N_i}{p_i y_i}$$

From Equation 4, we can derive the labor demand equation:

$$(5) \quad L_i^d(\theta_i) = \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \frac{p_i y_i}{w_i}$$

## 4. Equilibrium

The equilibrium in this model can be characterized by a set of conditions guaranteeing labor market equilibrium and goods market equilibrium. The equilibrium is a collection of  $10J + 2J^2$  endogenous variables  $\left\{ p_i, y_i, \left\{ x_{ij}, \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \right\}_{j=1}^J, c_i, \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}}, N_i, \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i}, \theta_i, w_i, L_i^d, L_i^s \right\}_{i=1}^J$  that satisfy equations 1 through 5, along with goods market clearing, labor market clearing conditions, and constant returns restrictions, given exogenous variables  $\{A_i, H_i\}_{i=1}^J$ . We summarize the equilibrium conditions below for convenience.

### 4.1. Goods Market Equilibrium

In an equilibrium, firms intermediate input choices given prices and labor market characteristics are profit maximizing:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Intermediate input decision)} \quad & \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} = \frac{p_j x_{ij}}{p_i y_i}, \\ \text{(Labor input decision)} \quad & \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} = (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \frac{w_i N_i}{p_i y_i}. \end{aligned}$$

Firms produce output via production technology  $f_i$

$$\text{(Production technology)} \quad y_i = A_i f_i \left( N_i, \left\{ x_{ij} \right\}_{j=1}^J \right)$$

By constant returns to scale in production,

$$\text{(Constant returns production)} \quad 1 - \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} = \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i}$$

In addition, the household maximizes their utility by choosing a consumption bundle that satisfies its first-order condition.

$$\text{(Consumption decision)} \quad \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} = \frac{p_i c_i}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k}.$$

And by constant returns

$$\text{(Constant returns utility)} \quad 1 = \sum_{i=1}^J \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}}$$

Finally, the goods market has to clear, which means that, for each sector  $i$ , total production has to be equal to the sum of the household's consumption of good  $i$  and all other sectors' use of good  $i$  in their production:

$$\text{(Goods market clearing)} \quad y_i = c_i + \sum_{j=1}^J x_{ji}.$$

In total, the goods market provides  $5J + J^2 + 1$  restrictions.

#### 4.2. Labor Market Equilibrium

From Equation 4, labor demand in sector  $i$  is defined as

$$\text{(Labor Demand)} \quad L_i^d(\theta_i) = \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \frac{p_i y_i}{w_i}.$$

Recall, given sector level labor force participation  $H_i$  labor supply is

$$\text{(Labor Supply)} \quad L_i^s(\theta_i) = \mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i) H_i.$$

Labor demand equals labor supply at an equilibrium in the labor market.

$$\text{(LM equilibrium)} \quad L_i^d(\theta_i) = L_i^s(\theta_i).$$

These equilibrium conditions provide an additional  $3J$  restrictions.

#### 4.3. Summary

The equilibrium conditions outline above provide just  $8J + J^2 + 1$  equations in  $10J + 2J^2$  endogenous variables. The wage schedules taken as given by both households and firms provide another  $J$  restrictions. Nevertheless, as is typical in the literature, we need additional functional form assumptions on production and household preferences to close the model.

For instance, assuming Cobb-Douglas production and preferences fully parameterizes  $\left\{ \left\{ \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \right\}_{j=1}^J, \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i}, \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} \right\}_{i=1}^J$ , giving us  $2J + J^2$  additional restrictions, but removing  $J + 1$  of the restrictions above. Parametrizing production by assuming Cobb-Douglas therefore gives exactly the number of restrictions we need to close the model. Alternatively,

assuming CES production indirectly provides restrictions to pin down the same set of elasticities.

## 5. The Production Network

In this section, we first introduce notations that are key in understanding the production network. We then discuss three propagation mechanisms: prices, sales shares, and tightness.

### 5.1. Notation

We denote vectors and matrices by bold letters. For instance,  $d \log \mathbf{x} = [d \log x_1 \ \cdots \ d \log x_J]'$ . We can conveniently capture many features of the production network through the following matrices

$$\mathbf{\Omega} = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{x_{11}}^{f_1} & \varepsilon_{x_{12}}^{f_1} & \cdots & \varepsilon_{x_{1J}}^{f_1} \\ \varepsilon_{x_{21}}^{f_2} & \varepsilon_{x_{22}}^{f_2} & \cdots & \varepsilon_{x_{2J}}^{f_2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \varepsilon_{x_{J1}}^{f_J} & \varepsilon_{x_{J2}}^{f_J} & \cdots & \varepsilon_{x_{JJ}}^{f_J} \end{bmatrix}, \mathbf{\Psi} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{\Omega})^{-1}.$$

In the standard production networks vocabulary,  $\mathbf{\Omega}$  is the sales based input-output matrix and  $\mathbf{\Psi}$  is the sales based Leontief inverse.

In addition define

$$\varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}} = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{c_1}^{\mathcal{D}} \\ \varepsilon_{c_2}^{\mathcal{D}} \\ \vdots \\ \varepsilon_{c_J}^{\mathcal{D}} \end{bmatrix}, \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^{\mathbf{f}} = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{N_1}^{f_1} \\ \varepsilon_{N_2}^{f_2} \\ \vdots \\ \varepsilon_{N_J}^{f_J} \end{bmatrix}, \varepsilon_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\mathcal{Q}} = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{\theta_1}^{q_1} \\ \varepsilon_{\theta_2}^{q_2} \\ \vdots \\ \varepsilon_{\theta_J}^{q_J} \end{bmatrix}, \boldsymbol{\tau} = \begin{bmatrix} \tau_1(\theta_1) \\ \tau_2(\theta_2) \\ \vdots \\ \tau_J(\theta_J) \end{bmatrix}$$

### 5.2. Price Propagation

Log-linearizing the production function, for each sector  $i$ , we have:

$$d \log y_i = \underbrace{\varepsilon_{A_i}^{f_i}}_{=1} d \log A_i + \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} d \log N_i + \sum_{j=1}^N \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} d \log x_{ij}$$

Plugging in Equation 4 and Equation 3, the first order conditions for optimal input usage, into the log-linearized production function gives

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log y_i &= \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ d \log \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} + d \log y_i + d \log p_i - d \log w_i - d \log (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \right] \\
&+ \sum_{j=1}^N \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \left[ d \log \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} + d \log y_i + d \log p_i - d \log p_j \right] + d \log A_i \\
&= \left[ d \log y_i + d \log p_i \right] \underbrace{\left[ \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} + \sum_{j=1}^N \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \right]}_{=1 \text{ by crts}} + \underbrace{\left[ d \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} + \sum_{j=1}^N d \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \right]}_{=0 \text{ by crts}} \\
&- \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ d \log w_i + d \log (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \right] - \sum_{j=1}^N \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \left[ d \log p_j \right] + d \log A_i,
\end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality holds because the sum of elasticities equals one for constant returns to scale technology and  $\varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} d \log \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} = d \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i}$ .

Rearranging terms gives

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log p_i &= \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ d \log w_i + d \log (1 + \tau_i(\theta_i)) \right] + \sum_{j=1}^N \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \left[ d \log p_j \right] - d \log A_i \\
&= \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ d \log w_i + \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^{1+\tau_i} d \log \theta_i \right] + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \left[ d \log p_j \right] - d \log A_i \\
(6) \quad &= \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ d \log w_i - \tau_i(\theta_i) \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^Q d \log \theta_i \right] + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} \left[ d \log p_j \right] - d \log A_i
\end{aligned}$$

By stacking equation (6) for each sector, we get the following expression for how prices change across the production network

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log \mathbf{p} &= \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_N^f \right) \left[ d \log \mathbf{w} - \text{diag}(\tau) \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_\theta^Q \right) d \log \theta \right] + \Omega d \log \mathbf{p} - d \log \mathbf{A} \\
(7) \quad &\Rightarrow d \log \mathbf{p} = \underbrace{\Psi(\text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_N^f \right) d \log \mathbf{w})}_{\text{factor prices}} - \underbrace{\text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_N^f \right) \text{diag}(\tau) \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_\theta^Q \right) d \log \theta}_{\text{searching and matching}} - \underbrace{d \log \mathbf{A}}_{\text{productivity}}
\end{aligned}$$

In other words, changes in prices comes from three sources - changes in wages, tight-

ness, and productivity. The impact of changes in wages depends on labor elasticity of production, and the impact of changes in tightness depends additionally on the matching function and the recruiter-producer ratio. The impact of all three are amplified by the Leontief inverse  $\Psi$ .

### 5.3. Sales Share Propagation

We can rewrite the goods market clearing condition in terms of Domar weights:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_i &= c_i + \sum_{j=1}^J x_{ji} \\
 \Rightarrow \frac{p_i y_i}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k} &= \frac{p_i c_i}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k} + \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{p_i x_{ji}}{p_j x_j} \frac{p_j x_j}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k} \\
 (8) \quad \Rightarrow \lambda_i &= \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ji}}^{f_j} \lambda_j,
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\lambda_i = \frac{p_i y_i}{\sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k}$  is the Domar weight of sector  $i$ .

By stacking (8) for each sector, we get the following expression for Domar weights across the production network.

$$\lambda' = \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} + \lambda' \Omega$$

We can see how Domar weights change across the production network by totally differentiating

$$\begin{aligned}
 d\lambda' &= d\varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} + d\lambda' \Omega + \lambda' d\Omega \\
 (9) \quad \Rightarrow d\lambda' &= \left[ d\varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} + \lambda' d\Omega \right] \Psi
 \end{aligned}$$

### 5.4. Tightness Propagation

In response to shocks to either productivity or labor force, changes in labor demand has to equate changes in labor supply:

$$d \log L_i^s(\theta, \mathbf{H}) = d \log L_i^d(\theta, \mathbf{A}).$$



Let  $\mathcal{F} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{F}_1 & \cdots & \mathcal{F}_J \\ \varepsilon_{\theta_1} & \cdots & \varepsilon_{\theta_J} \end{bmatrix}$ , we can stack sector level Equation 2 and Equation 5 to get:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{diag}(\mathcal{F}) d \log \theta + d \log \mathbf{H} &= d \log \varepsilon_N^f(\theta, \mathbf{A}) + d \log \mathbf{p}(\theta, \mathbf{A}) - d \log \mathbf{w}(\theta, \mathbf{A}) + d \log \mathbf{y}(\theta, \mathbf{A}) \\ &= d \log \varepsilon_N^f(\theta, \mathbf{A}) - d \log \mathbf{w}(\theta, \mathbf{A}) \\ &\quad + \Psi(\text{diag}(\varepsilon_N^f) d \log \mathbf{w}) \\ &\quad + \Psi((\mathbf{I} - \text{diag}(\varepsilon_N^f) - \mathbf{\Omega}) d \log \lambda + \text{diag}(\varepsilon_N^f) [\text{diag}(\mathcal{F}) d \log \theta + d \log \mathbf{H}]) \end{aligned}$$

NOTE: the non-invertibility issue appears again. Potential solution: wage schedule that relates to output or price changes. Alternatively, finding different ways to sub in  $d \log p$  and  $d \log y$ . Key issue is that  $d \log y$  derived based on labor supply condition.

## 6. Sector-level Response

Before aggregating, we are interested in exploring how sector-level economic variables respond to different shocks.

### 6.1. Output

First, we look at output. Log-linearizing Domar weights gives us:

$$d \log \lambda_i = d \log p_i + d \log y_i - d \log \sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k.$$

Since this equation must hold for any  $i$  and  $j$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \lambda_i - d \log \lambda_j &= d \log p_i - d \log p_j + d \log y_i - d \log y_j \\ &= d \log x_{ij} - d \log y_j \\ \Rightarrow d \log x_{ij} &= d \log y_j + d \log \lambda_i - d \log \lambda_j \end{aligned}$$

Using the sector level production function,

$$d \log y_i = d \log A_i + \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} d \log N_i + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} (d \log y_j + d \log \lambda_i - d \log \lambda_j)$$

Since  $(1 + \tau_i(\theta_i))N_i = L_i$ ,  $\delta \log N_i = d \log L_i - d \log(1 + \tau_i(\theta_i))$ , where  $d \log L_i = d \log L_i^S =$

$d \log L_i^d$ . This implies that  $d \log N_i = \left( \frac{s_i}{s_i + \mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i)} \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^{\mathcal{F}_i} + \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^{\mathcal{Q}_i} \tau_i(\theta_i) \right) d \log \theta_i + d \log H_i$ .

The sector-level log-linearized production function can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned} d \log y_i = & d \log A_i + \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i} \left[ \left( \frac{s_i}{s_i + \mathcal{F}_i(\theta_i)} \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^{\mathcal{F}_i} + \varepsilon_{\theta_i}^{\mathcal{Q}_i} \tau_i(\theta_i) \right) d \log \theta_i + d \log H_i \right] \\ & + (1 - \varepsilon_{N_i}^{f_i}) d \log \lambda_i + \sum_{j=1}^J \varepsilon_{x_{ij}}^{f_i} (d \log y_j - d \log \lambda_j) \end{aligned}$$

Stacking equations over sectors, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \mathbf{y} = & d \log \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{\Omega} d \log \mathbf{y} + \left( \mathbf{I} - \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^{\mathbf{f}} \right) - \mathbf{\Omega} \right) d \log \boldsymbol{\lambda} \\ & + \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^{\mathbf{f}} \right) \left[ \left( \text{diag}(\mathcal{F}) + \text{diag}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\mathcal{Q}} \right) \right) d \log \boldsymbol{\theta} + d \log \mathbf{H} \right], \end{aligned}$$

which simplifies into:

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \mathbf{y} = & \Psi (d \log \mathbf{A} + \left( \mathbf{I} - \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^{\mathbf{f}} \right) - \mathbf{\Omega} \right) d \log \boldsymbol{\lambda} \\ & + \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^{\mathbf{f}} \right) \left[ \left( \text{diag}(\mathcal{F}) + \text{diag}(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \text{diag} \left( \varepsilon_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\mathcal{Q}} \right) \right) d \log \boldsymbol{\theta} + d \log \mathbf{H} \right]). \end{aligned}$$

In general, sector level output behaves differently from the Cobb-Douglas case, but that difference is captured entirely by changes in Domar weights. This is a useful result, as discussed in the previous production networks literature, because this means we do not need to keep track of all intermediate input choices.

## 6.2. Unemployment

# 7. Aggregation

## 7.1. General Case

Using the first order condition,

$$d \log \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} = d \log p_i + d \log c_i - d \log \sum_{j=1}^J p_j c_j$$

along with the definition of the Domar weight,

$$d \log \sum_{k=1}^J p_k c_k = d \log p_i + d \log y_i - d \log \lambda_i$$

gives

$$d \log c_i = d \log \varepsilon_{c_i}^{\mathcal{D}} + d \log y_i - d \log \lambda_i$$

Which implies the log change in real GDP is

$$\begin{aligned} d \log Y &= \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} d \log \mathbf{c} \\ &= \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} \left( d \log \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}} + d \log \mathbf{y} - d \log \lambda \right) \\ &= \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} \left( d \log \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}} - d \log \mathbf{p} + d \log \lambda + \Xi_{\varepsilon} d \log \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^f - d \log \lambda \right) \\ &= -\varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} d \log \mathbf{p} + \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}'} \left( d \log \varepsilon_{\mathbf{c}}^{\mathcal{D}} + \Xi_{\varepsilon} d \log \varepsilon_{\mathbf{N}}^f \right) \end{aligned}$$

## 7.2. Aggregate Output

## 7.3. Aggregate employment

## References