Fix localhost download redirects behind reverse proxies#498
Merged
jamiepine merged 1 commit intojamiepine:mainfrom Apr 19, 2026
Merged
Fix localhost download redirects behind reverse proxies#498jamiepine merged 1 commit intojamiepine:mainfrom
jamiepine merged 1 commit intojamiepine:mainfrom
Conversation
Prefer x-forwarded host/proto for redirect URL construction so users are not sent to internal localhost origins. Fixes jamiepine#496
Contributor
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughA targeted fix that corrects download redirect URLs by properly detecting the public origin through proxy/CDN headers ( Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes Poem
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Pull request overview
Fixes incorrect redirect origins for the /download/[platform] route when the app is deployed behind a reverse proxy/CDN, preventing redirects to internal upstream origins (e.g. localhost).
Changes:
- Added a
getPublicOrigin(request)helper that prefersx-forwarded-proto+x-forwarded-host. - Updated download and linux-install redirects to use the computed public origin instead of
request.url.
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Comment on lines
+18
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+27
| function getPublicOrigin(request: NextRequest): string { | ||
| const forwardedHost = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host'); | ||
| const forwardedProto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'); | ||
|
|
||
| if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) { | ||
| // Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin | ||
| // (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects | ||
| // keep users on the public domain. | ||
| return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`; | ||
| } |
Comment on lines
+19
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| const forwardedHost = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host'); | ||
| const forwardedProto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'); | ||
|
|
||
| if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) { | ||
| // Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin | ||
| // (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects | ||
| // keep users on the public domain. | ||
| return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`; | ||
| } |
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Contributor
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@landing/src/app/download/`[platform]/route.ts:
- Around line 18-30: The getPublicOrigin function currently trusts
x-forwarded-host and x-forwarded-proto directly; fix it by normalizing and
validating these headers before use: extract the first comma-separated value
from request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host') and
request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'), trim them, ensure proto is exactly
"http" or "https", and validate the host against a configured allowlist (from an
env var) of trusted public hosts; only when both normalized proto and host pass
validation should you return `${proto}://${host}`, otherwise fall back to new
URL(request.url).origin. Ensure you reference and update getPublicOrigin and the
header reads to perform these checks and rejection logic.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: c59ff1e7-6ae2-49c9-b7a8-1acfeb785f90
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
landing/src/app/download/[platform]/route.ts
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| function getPublicOrigin(request: NextRequest): string { | ||
| const forwardedHost = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host'); | ||
| const forwardedProto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'); | ||
|
|
||
| if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) { | ||
| // Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin | ||
| // (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects | ||
| // keep users on the public domain. | ||
| return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| return new URL(request.url).origin; | ||
| } |
Contributor
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🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Look for existing forwarded-header handling, trusted-host config,
# or canonical public-origin configuration relevant to download redirects.
set -euo pipefail
rg -n -C3 '\b(x-forwarded-host|x-forwarded-proto|Forwarded|trustedHosts|allowedHosts|DOWNLOAD_PUBLIC_HOSTS|NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE|PUBLIC_URL|SITE_URL|BASE_URL)\b' \
--glob '!**/node_modules/**' \
--glob '!**/.next/**' \
--glob '!**/dist/**' \
--glob '!**/build/**' || true
fd -i '^(next\.config\.(js|mjs|ts)|middleware\.(ts|js)|vercel\.json|Caddyfile|.*nginx.*|.*traefik.*|docker-compose.*|.*\.conf)$' \
-x sh -c 'printf "\n--- %s ---\n" "$1"; sed -n "1,180p" "$1"' sh {}Repository: jamiepine/voicebox
Length of output: 3009
🏁 Script executed:
cat -n landing/src/app/download/[platform]/route.tsRepository: jamiepine/voicebox
Length of output: 2100
🏁 Script executed:
fd -type f -name "middleware*" landing/ || echo "No middleware files found"Repository: jamiepine/voicebox
Length of output: 275
🏁 Script executed:
rg -n "getPublicOrigin" landing/src/app/download/[platform]/route.ts -A 10 -B 2Repository: jamiepine/voicebox
Length of output: 1160
Validate forwarded headers before using them as a redirect origin.
Lines 19–20 and 26 read and use x-forwarded-host and x-forwarded-proto headers directly without validation. If an upstream reverse proxy misconfigures or fails to strip client-supplied forwarded headers, this becomes an open redirect vulnerability—attackers can craft requests with x-forwarded-host: attacker.com to redirect users to arbitrary domains. Additionally, comma-separated proxy chains are not handled, and invalid protocols are not restricted.
Normalize the headers to extract the first value, restrict to http/https only, and require an allowlist of trusted public hosts via environment configuration.
🛡️ Proposed hardening
+const ALLOWED_PUBLIC_HOSTS = new Set(
+ (process.env.DOWNLOAD_PUBLIC_HOSTS ?? '')
+ .split(',')
+ .map((host) => host.trim().toLowerCase())
+ .filter(Boolean),
+);
+
+function firstForwardedValue(value: string | null): string | null {
+ return value?.split(',')[0]?.trim() || null;
+}
+
function getPublicOrigin(request: NextRequest): string {
- const forwardedHost = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host');
- const forwardedProto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto');
+ const forwardedHost = firstForwardedValue(request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host'));
+ const forwardedProto = firstForwardedValue(request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'));
+ const fallbackOrigin = new URL(request.url).origin;
if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) {
// Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin
// (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects
// keep users on the public domain.
- return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`;
+ try {
+ const origin = new URL(`${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`);
+ const isHttpOrigin = origin.protocol === 'https:' || origin.protocol === 'http:';
+ const isAllowedHost = ALLOWED_PUBLIC_HOSTS.has(origin.host.toLowerCase());
+
+ if (isHttpOrigin && isAllowedHost) {
+ return origin.origin;
+ }
+ } catch {
+ // Fall back below when forwarded headers are malformed.
+ }
}
- return new URL(request.url).origin;
+ return fallbackOrigin;
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| function getPublicOrigin(request: NextRequest): string { | |
| const forwardedHost = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host'); | |
| const forwardedProto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'); | |
| if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) { | |
| // Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin | |
| // (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects | |
| // keep users on the public domain. | |
| return `${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`; | |
| } | |
| return new URL(request.url).origin; | |
| } | |
| const ALLOWED_PUBLIC_HOSTS = new Set( | |
| (process.env.DOWNLOAD_PUBLIC_HOSTS ?? '') | |
| .split(',') | |
| .map((host) => host.trim().toLowerCase()) | |
| .filter(Boolean), | |
| ); | |
| function firstForwardedValue(value: string | null): string | null { | |
| return value?.split(',')[0]?.trim() || null; | |
| } | |
| function getPublicOrigin(request: NextRequest): string { | |
| const forwardedHost = firstForwardedValue(request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host')); | |
| const forwardedProto = firstForwardedValue(request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto')); | |
| const fallbackOrigin = new URL(request.url).origin; | |
| if (forwardedHost && forwardedProto) { | |
| // Behind reverse proxies/CDNs, request.url can be an internal origin | |
| // (for example localhost:8080). Prefer forwarded headers so redirects | |
| // keep users on the public domain. | |
| try { | |
| const origin = new URL(`${forwardedProto}://${forwardedHost}`); | |
| const isHttpOrigin = origin.protocol === 'https:' || origin.protocol === 'http:'; | |
| const isAllowedHost = ALLOWED_PUBLIC_HOSTS.has(origin.host.toLowerCase()); | |
| if (isHttpOrigin && isAllowedHost) { | |
| return origin.origin; | |
| } | |
| } catch { | |
| // Fall back below when forwarded headers are malformed. | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return fallbackOrigin; | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@landing/src/app/download/`[platform]/route.ts around lines 18 - 30, The
getPublicOrigin function currently trusts x-forwarded-host and x-forwarded-proto
directly; fix it by normalizing and validating these headers before use: extract
the first comma-separated value from request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host') and
request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto'), trim them, ensure proto is exactly
"http" or "https", and validate the host against a configured allowlist (from an
env var) of trusted public hosts; only when both normalized proto and host pass
validation should you return `${proto}://${host}`, otherwise fall back to new
URL(request.url).origin. Ensure you reference and update getPublicOrigin and the
header reads to perform these checks and rejection logic.
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Fixes incorrect download redirects that can point users to internal origins like
https://localhost:8080/download?...in production.What changed
landing/src/app/download/[platform]/route.tsgetPublicOrigin(request)helper that prefers:x-forwarded-protox-forwarded-hostrequest.urlorigin when behind a proxy/CDN.Why
In some deployments,
request.urlcarries an internal upstream origin (for example localhost). Using forwarded headers ensures end-users stay on the public domain.Notes
Fixes #496
Summary by CodeRabbit