Zero-trust AI knowledge processing. Data that protects itself.
After CVE-2026-0866 (Zombie ZIP) showed that 50 out of 51 AV engines can be fooled by header manipulation, and McKinsey's Lilli breach exposed 46.5 million chat messages through a single SQL injection, one thing is clear: the data itself must be the security boundary, not the application around it.
TIBET Cortex is a Rust framework for building AI knowledge systems where every document chunk protects itself — cryptographically, at every layer, in every state.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TIBET Cortex │
│ │
│ STORE TBZ envelopes + JIS levels │
│ Embedding JIS 0 (searchable) │
│ Content JIS N (encrypted) │
│ │
│ GATE Multi-dimensional JIS claims │
│ role × department × time × geo │
│ │
│ AIRLOCK Zero plaintext lifetime │
│ mlock + zeroize + scope-bound │
│ │
│ AUDIT Blackbox-met-window │
│ See WHO/WHEN/HOW MUCH, not WHAT │
│ Immutable TIBET provenance chain │
│ │
│ VAULT Time-locked audit trails │
│ Dead man's switch for compliance │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Every RAG stack today:
User Query → Embedding → Vector Search → ALL docs → LLM → Response
No layer between "found" and "allowed to read." One SQL injection, one IDOR, one misconfigured endpoint — and your entire knowledge base is exposed.
TIBET Cortex separates search from access:
- Embeddings are JIS level 0 — always searchable
- Content is JIS level N — cryptographically gated
- Processing happens inside an Airlock — zero plaintext lifetime
- Every operation generates a TIBET audit token
SQL injection dumps the DB?
→ You get encrypted TBZ envelopes. Unreadable.
Memory dump during processing?
→ Airlock wiped. mlock'd memory zeroed.
Audit trail tampered?
→ TIBET chain broken. Immediately detectable.
System prompt modified?
→ Integrity hash fails. Execution refused.
| Crate | Description |
|---|---|
cortex-core |
TBZ envelopes, TIBET tokens, Ed25519 crypto, zeroizing buffers |
cortex-airlock |
mlock'd memory, scope-bound processing, auto-wipe |
cortex-jis |
Multi-dimensional claims: clearance × role × dept × time × geo |
cortex-store |
sled-backed JIS-gated vector storage |
cortex-audit |
Blackbox-met-window audit trails, TIBET chain verification |
cortex-cli |
Command-line interface |
cargo install cortex-cli# Ingest a document at JIS level 2 (confidential)
cortex ingest ./strategy.pdf --jis-level 2 --source strategy-db
# Query with your identity claim
cortex query "M&A targets" --clearance 3 --role partner --department strategy
# Verify audit chain integrity
cortex verify
# View audit statistics (blackbox-met-window)
cortex audit
cortex audit --full
# Show architecture
cortex infoJIS is not a single number. It's a multi-dimensional identity claim:
let claim = JisClaim::new("partner@mckinsey.com", 3)
.with_role("partner")
.with_department("strategy")
.with_geo(vec!["NL".into(), "DE".into()]);
let policy = JisPolicy::clearance(3)
.with_roles(vec!["partner".into()])
.with_departments(vec!["strategy".into()])
.with_geos(vec!["NL".into(), "DE".into(), "FR".into()]);
// All dimensions must match
assert!(JisGate::is_allowed(&claim, &policy));An intern in the US sees different data than a partner in the EU — from the same query, on the same system.
let airlock = Airlock::with_defaults();
let (result, audit) = airlock.process(
encrypted_content,
"analyst@company.com",
2, // JIS level
|plaintext| {
// This closure is the ONLY place plaintext exists
// Memory is mlock'd (never swapped to disk)
Ok(process(plaintext))
},
)?;
// After closure: all plaintext memory zeroized
// audit token generated for the trailThe auditor sees:
- WHO accessed data
- WHEN it was accessed
- HOW MUCH data was touched (chunks accessed/denied)
- WHAT JIS level was used
The auditor does NOT see:
- The actual content
- The query itself (only its hash)
Unless they have matching JIS credentials to resolve the hashes.
Run it yourself:
git clone https://github.com/jaspertvdm/tibet-cortex.git
cd tibet-cortex
cargo test --release --test bench_airlock -- --nocapture| Test | What it measures | Iterations |
|---|---|---|
bench_airlock_single_chunk |
Airlock overhead for one 4KB chunk: mlock → memcpy → closure (SHA-256 hash) → zeroize → munlock |
1,000 |
bench_airlock_batch_chunks |
Same pipeline for 10 chunks (typical RAG response), processed sequentially in one Airlock session | 100 |
bench_full_search_pipeline |
End-to-end: scan 100 embeddings + JIS gate evaluation + cosine similarity ranking + Airlock processing of top-5 results | 100 |
Timing uses std::time::Instant (monotonic clock). No warmup runs — first iteration included. Assertions are relaxed for debug mode; the numbers below are release mode.
| Metric | Latency | Throughput |
|---|---|---|
| Airlock single chunk (4KB) | 134µs | 7,436 ops/sec |
| Airlock batch (10 × 4KB) | 611µs (61µs/chunk) | 16,374 chunks/sec |
| Full search (100 docs, top-5) | 1.5ms | 665 searches/sec |
Measured on: Xeon E5-2650 v3 @ 2.30GHz, 64GB DDR4, Linux 6.12. Your numbers will vary — mlock latency depends on kernel config, available RAM, and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
A typical LLM response takes 500ms–2s. The entire zero-trust pipeline (envelope unpacking, JIS gate, cosine search, Airlock) adds ~1.5ms — less than 0.3% overhead.
- TBZ — Block-level authenticated compression
- TIBET — Trust & Identity Blockchain for Ethical Transactions
- OomLlama — Rust-native LLM inference engine
MIT OR Apache-2.0