ssrf-guard

SSRF protection for Node.js and Cloudflare Workers.

The key differentiator: validateUrl returns the resolved IP addresses so you can pin them directly to the socket — eliminating the TOCTOU/DNS-rebind window that exists between a validation step and the actual fetch. safeFetch does this automatically.

Unlike request-filtering-agent, ssrf-guard exposes the resolved addresses to the caller, letting you reuse them across retries or pass them to your own HTTP client.

Installation

pnpm add ssrf-guard

Requires Node.js ≥ 24. The ssrf-guard entry point (isPrivateIp, validateResolvedAddresses, etc.) is pure and also runs in Cloudflare Workers. The ssrf-guard/node entry point requires Node.js and uses node:dns, node:net, and undici.

Quick start

Check whether an IP is private (core, works everywhere)

import { isPrivateIp } from "ssrf-guard";

isPrivateIp("127.0.0.1"); // true
isPrivateIp("10.0.0.1"); // true
isPrivateIp("::ffff:10.0.0.1"); // true  (IPv4-mapped IPv6)
isPrivateIp("0x7f000001"); // true  (hex form of 127.0.0.1)
isPrivateIp("8.8.8.8"); // false

Validate a URL and get pinned addresses (Node.js)

import { validateUrl } from "ssrf-guard/node";

const addresses = await validateUrl("https://example.com/", {
  blockedHostnames: {
    exact: ["localhost", "metadata.google.internal"],
    suffixes: [".local", ".internal"],
  },
});
// addresses: [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }]

// Now use those addresses to build a pinned dispatcher — DNS won't be
// queried again so rebinding between check and fetch is impossible.

Safe fetch with automatic pinning (Node.js)

import { safeFetch } from "ssrf-guard/node";

const response = await safeFetch("https://example.com/image.png", {
  blockedHostnames: {
    exact: ["metadata.google.internal"],
    suffixes: [".internal"],
  },
  headers: { "user-agent": "my-crawler/1.0" },
});

safeFetch resolves DNS once, validates the result, pins the addresses to the socket via an undici Agent, and follows redirects — re-validating each hop.

API reference

ssrf-guard (core — pure, no Node built-ins)

isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean

Returns true if ip is a private, loopback, link-local, or unspecified address. Handles all RFC-legal IPv4 forms (dotted decimal, octal components, hex components, integer), IPv6, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:), and ULA/link-local IPv6 ranges.

normalizeUrlHostname(hostname: string): string

Lowercases, strips trailing dots, and unwraps brackets from IPv6 hostnames as extracted from a URL object.

isBlockedHostname(hostname: string, policy: BlockedHostnamePolicy): boolean

Returns true if hostname matches an exact entry or a suffix in policy.

validateResolvedAddresses<T>(rawUrl, hostname, addresses): T[]

Filters out null-route addresses (0.0.0.0, ::), throws UnsafeResolvedAddressError for private IPs, and throws with code: DNS_NULL_ROUTE_CODE when no usable addresses remain.

UnsafeResolvedAddressError

Thrown by validateResolvedAddresses. Properties: rawUrl: string, address: string.

DNS_NULL_ROUTE_CODE

String constant 'DNS_NULL_ROUTE' — the code property on the error thrown when DNS resolves only to null-route addresses.

BlockedHostnamePolicy

interface BlockedHostnamePolicy {
  exact: readonly string[];
  suffixes: readonly string[];
}

ResolvedSafeAddress

interface ResolvedSafeAddress {
  address: string;
  family: 4 | 6;
}

---

ssrf-guard/node (Node.js ≥ 24 only)

validateUrl(rawUrl: string, options?: ValidateUrlOptions): Promise<ResolvedSafeAddress[]>

Validates a URL and returns the resolved addresses:

1. Parses the URL — throws UnsafeUrlError for invalid URLs.
2. Rejects non-http:/https: schemes.
3. Checks against blockedHostnames policy.
4. Rejects literal private IP addresses without DNS lookup.
5. Resolves DNS and validates all returned addresses.

interface ValidateUrlOptions {
  blockedHostnames?: BlockedHostnamePolicy;
}

safeFetch(initialUrl: string | URL, options?: SafeFetchOptions): Promise<Response>

Fetches a URL safely:

• Validates and pins DNS addresses before each hop.
• Follows redirects up to maxRedirects (default: 10), re-validating each.
• Passes remaining RequestInit options through to undici.

interface SafeFetchOptions extends Omit<RequestInit, "signal"> {
  blockedHostnames?: BlockedHostnamePolicy;
  maxRedirects?: number;
  signal?: AbortSignal;
}

createPinnedDispatcher(resolvedAddresses: [ResolvedSafeAddress, ...]): Agent

Creates an undici Agent whose lookup callback is hardwired to the provided addresses, preventing any further DNS resolution.

UnsafeUrlError

Thrown by validateUrl and safeFetch. Properties: rawUrl: string, reason: string.

License

MIT