Created BlockhashRNGFallbackRange.sol #313
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clesaege
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clesaege
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remedcu
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Created a new RNG Generator with a Fallback using two of our previous smart contracts:
https://github.com/kleros/kleros-interaction/blob/6ec7f11/contracts/standard/rng/BlockhashRNGFallback.sol
https://github.com/kleros/kleros-interaction/blob/cf43218/contracts/standard/rng/BlockhashRNGFallback.sol
Instead of taking the previous hash like the latter one, we take any one of the last 256 block hashes of the mined blocks. But avoiding the former's vulnerability of allowing anyone to manipulate a
randomNumberearlier than 256 blocks.