🔒 Fix path traversal vulnerability in local_file source by bashandbone · Pull Request #77 · knitli/recoco

bashandbone · 2026-03-13T02:52:05Z

🎯 What: A path traversal vulnerability in crates/recoco-core/src/ops/sources/local_file.rs allows reading arbitrary files outside the root_path.
⚠️ Risk: An attacker with control over the key parameter could craft paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd or /etc/passwd) that escape the intended root directory, potentially leading to unauthorized disclosure of sensitive system files.
🛡️ Solution: Modified get_value to validate the path by iterating through its components using std::path::Path::new(path).components(). The code now explicitly checks and rejects paths containing ParentDir (..), RootDir (/), or Prefix (e.g., C:) components before attempting to join the path with the root_path. If an unsafe path is provided, it gracefully returns NonExistence.

PR created automatically by Jules for task 17074725847278981384 started by @bashandbone

Added validation in `get_value` to ensure `path` components do not contain `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` elements before joining them with `self.root_path`. This prevents attackers from accessing files outside the specified root path. Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com>

google-labs-jules · 2026-03-13T02:52:07Z

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cloudflare-workers-and-pages · 2026-03-13T02:52:52Z

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Copilot

Pull request overview

This PR mitigates a path traversal issue in the local_file source by rejecting unsafe key paths before reading from disk.

Changes:

Adds component-based validation to reject .., absolute paths (/), and Windows drive/prefix paths (C:).
Keeps existing file-include pattern checks, returning NonExistence for rejected paths.

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+        let path_obj = Path::new(path);
+
+        // Prevent path traversal vulnerabilities by verifying the path
+        // doesn't contain parent directory or absolute components.
+        if path_obj.components().any(|c| {
+            matches!(
+                c,
+                std::path::Component::ParentDir
+                    | std::path::Component::RootDir
+                    | std::path::Component::Prefix(_)
+            )
+        }) || !self.pattern_matcher.is_file_included(path) {


bashandbone · 2026-03-13T03:03:16Z

@copilot open a new pull request to apply changes based on the comments in this thread

Copilot · 2026-03-13T03:03:22Z

@bashandbone I've opened a new pull request, #83, to work on those changes. Once the pull request is ready, I'll request review from you.

github-actions · 2026-03-13T03:06:33Z

🤖 Hi @bashandbone, I've received your request, and I'm working on it now! You can track my progress in the logs for more details.

google-labs-jules · 2026-03-13T03:08:21Z

@copilot open a new pull request to apply changes based on the comments in this thread

I have updated the PR to also canonicalize both the joined path and the root_path to ensure the resolved target file resides within the allowed root directory, preventing symlink-based traversals. If the file does not exist, it correctly returns NonExistence as before.

Added validation in `get_value` to ensure `path` components do not contain `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` elements before joining them with `self.root_path`. This prevents attackers from accessing files outside the specified root path. Also mitigates symlink-based path traversal by canonicalizing and checking boundaries to ensure the canonicalized target path starts with the canonicalized root path. Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com>

github-actions

## 📋 Review Summary

This Pull Request effectively addresses a path traversal vulnerability in the local_file source by implementing component-based path validation and boundary checks using canonicalization. These changes significantly improve the security posture of the local file ingestion by preventing unauthorized access to files outside the specified root directory.

🔍 General Feedback

Security: The combination of denylisting unsafe path components (.., absolute paths) and verifying canonical paths against the root is a robust defense-in-depth approach.
Performance: The frequent use of synchronous std::fs::canonicalize on the root path in the get_value method introduces unnecessary I/O overhead. Caching this value would be a beneficial optimization.
Async Hygiene: Moving towards tokio::fs for all I/O operations in this async executor will help ensure that the runtime threads are never blocked by file system operations.

github-actions · 2026-03-13T03:40:08Z

+
+        // Prevent path traversal vulnerabilities by verifying the path
+        // doesn't contain parent directory or absolute components.
+        if path_obj.components().any(|c| {


🟢 You can use path_obj.is_absolute() to check for RootDir and Prefix components more idiomatically. The current approach with components().any(...) is correct as it also handles ParentDir in the same pass, so this is just a minor stylistic suggestion.

github-actions · 2026-03-13T03:40:09Z

        let path = self.root_path.join(path);
+
+        // Mitigate symlink-based path traversal by canonicalizing and checking boundaries
+        let root_canon = match std::fs::canonicalize(&self.root_path) {


🟡 Calculating the canonical root path on every call to get_value is inefficient as it involves redundant I/O. Since root_path is constant for the lifetime of the Executor, it should be pre-calculated and stored in the Executor struct during construction in build_executor.

Additionally, std::fs::canonicalize is a synchronous operation that can block the async runtime thread. Consider using tokio::fs::canonicalize(...).await instead.

github-actions · 2026-03-13T03:40:10Z

+            }
+            Err(e) => Err(e)?,
+        };
+


🟡 std::fs::canonicalize is a synchronous I/O operation that can block the async executor thread. Since this function is async, it is recommended to use tokio::fs::canonicalize(&path).await to maintain responsiveness.

Added validation in `get_value` to ensure `path` components do not contain `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` elements before joining them with `self.root_path`. This prevents attackers from accessing files outside the specified root path. Also mitigates symlink-based path traversal by canonicalizing and checking boundaries to ensure the canonicalized target path starts with the canonicalized root path. Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com>

* Initial plan * fix: add symlink-safe path validation using canonicalize in local_file source Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Adam Poulemanos <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com>

bashandbone · 2026-03-13T04:08:18Z

@jules please address the comments/suggestions in this thread

google-labs-jules · 2026-03-13T04:17:06Z

@jules please address the comments/suggestions in this thread

I have addressed all the PR comments. The canonicalization of root_path has been moved to build_executor and cached on the Executor struct to avoid redundant I/O. Additionally, I have replaced the synchronous std::fs::canonicalize with tokio::fs::canonicalize(...).await inside the async get_value method to prevent blocking the async runtime thread.

Added validation in `get_value` to ensure `path` components do not contain `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` elements before joining them with `self.root_path`. This prevents attackers from accessing files outside the specified root path. Also mitigates symlink-based path traversal by canonicalizing and checking boundaries to ensure the canonicalized target path starts with the canonicalized root path. Cached root path canonicalization in Executor and swapped to tokio async canonicalize. Co-authored-by: bashandbone <89049923+bashandbone@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings March 13, 2026 02:52

github-project-automation Bot added this to Recoco v1.0.0 Mar 13, 2026

github-project-automation Bot moved this to Backlog in Recoco v1.0.0 Mar 13, 2026

Copilot AI reviewed Mar 13, 2026

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Copilot AI mentioned this pull request Mar 13, 2026

🔒 Fix symlink-based path traversal in local_file source #83

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Copilot started reviewing on behalf of bashandbone March 13, 2026 03:35 View session

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google-labs-jules Bot and others added 2 commits March 13, 2026 03:46

bashandbone merged commit 074eb3e into main Mar 13, 2026
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bashandbone deleted the jules-security-fix-local-file-traversal-17074725847278981384 branch March 13, 2026 04:18

github-project-automation Bot moved this from Backlog to Done in Recoco v1.0.0 Mar 13, 2026

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