fix(security): pin litellm<=1.82.6 to mitigate supply chain attack#298
Closed
drewdrewthis wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
Closed
fix(security): pin litellm<=1.82.6 to mitigate supply chain attack#298drewdrewthis wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
drewdrewthis wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
Conversation
litellm versions 1.82.7-1.82.8 were compromised via PyPI account takeover (TeamPCP). Adds upper bound pin to prevent accidental installation of malicious versions. Ref: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47501729 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Contributor
|
Automated low-risk assessment This PR was evaluated against the repository's Low-Risk Pull Requests procedure and does not qualify as low risk.
This PR requires a manual review before merging. |
sergioestebance
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 1, 2026
- #88: Update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to >=1.25.2 (ReDoS via @openai/agents bump) - #132: Update protobuf to 5.29.6 (JSON recursion depth bypass) - #160: Override minimatch to >=9.0.6 (ReDoS via repeated wildcards) - #200: Override liquidjs to >=10.25.0 (path traversal fallback) - #298: Override lodash to >=4.18.0 (code injection via _.template)
2 tasks
Aryansharma28
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 4, 2026
- #88: Update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to >=1.25.2 (ReDoS via @openai/agents bump) - #132: Update protobuf to 5.29.6 (JSON recursion depth bypass) - #200: Override liquidjs to >=10.25.0 (path traversal fallback) - #298: Override lodash to >=4.18.0 (code injection via _.template) Co-authored-by: aryansharma28 <aryansharma2k2@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
litellm<=1.82.6inpython/pyproject.tomlto block compromised versions 1.82.7–1.82.8.pthauto-execution payload targeting crypto wallets and API keys>=1.49.0range would pull malicious versions on a fresh resolveImpact assessment
This project was NOT compromised. Our
uv.lockpins litellm at 1.81.13, which predates the malicious versions (1.82.7–1.82.8). This pin is a preventive measure to ensure no future resolve can pull the affected versions.CI status
CI failure is expected. PyPI has quarantined the entire
litellmpackage (all versions, not just the malicious ones). Since this PR changespyproject.toml,uv runtries to re-resolve against PyPI and fails. This is transient — once PyPI restores the safe versions, the lockfile can be regenerated and CI will pass. Note:mainwould also fail if any change triggeredpython-ci.ymlright now.To merge: regenerate
uv.lockafter PyPI restores litellm, then push.Test plan
uv.lockonce PyPI restores litellm (runuv lockinpython/)<=1.82.6pin once litellm publishes a verified clean releaseRef: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47501729
🤖 Generated with Claude Code