Prevent script injection in fork PR comment workflow#120
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mokuzon
approved these changes
Mar 24, 2026
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At least for now, injection based on user names may not be possible, and this workflow shouldn't allow dangerous actions. However, applying this as a precaution against future incidents is a good idea. also we use
pull_request_targetso external user can't fix this workflow until merging.