docs: Heima EVM level is Cancun, not London (correct the rationale; keep the foundry pin)#168
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…don foundry pin, fix the rationale) The "Heima is London EVM level" claim was derived from block-header introspection (baseFeePerGas present; mixHash/withdrawalsRoot/blobGasUsed absent). That reflects the Substrate/Aura consensus header FORMAT, not the EVM opcode-execution level — which Frontier sets independently via pallet_evm::config(). Verified on a local heima-node --dev chain (2026-06-01): - Frontier stable2412 config() returns &CANCUN_CONFIG. - PUSH0 (Shanghai): a Shanghai-compiled set(42) executed; x() == 42. - TSTORE/TLOAD (EIP-1153, Cancun-only): rt(99) == 99. So Heima does NOT reject PUSH0 / post-London opcodes (the old note was wrong). The evm_version = "london" pin in foundry.toml is RETAINED, but its reason is corrected: it is a 'forge script' simulator header-validation workaround (forge script validates the prevrandao-less Heima header against the target revision and rejects paris+), NOT an EVM-capability ceiling. Verified: DeployAgentKeysV1.s.sol with FOUNDRY_EVM_VERSION=cancun reproduces "header validation error: prevrandao not set"; london deploys. (forge create --broadcast with cancun does NOT hit this.) Updates the canonical CLAUDE.md section + foundry.toml comment + 5 docs that repeated the "Heima is London" framing.
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…live mainnet infra & demo (#171) * agentkeys: ERC-4337 P-256 master plan (#164) + correct stale London→Cancun comments (#168) * agentkeys: ERC-4337 P256Account + CREATE2 factory (#164 E1/E2) — WebAuthn-gated master, 14 tests green * agentkeys: ERC-4337 threat-model delta (#164 E0) + plan cross-link * agentkeys: P256Account map verifier/decode reverts to SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED (codex P2) +3 tests * agentkeys: #164 docs — ED/Sybil funding model + E3 design + build status * agentkeys: ERC-4337 E3 — thin AgentKeysScope to account-auth (retire in-contract K11 + scopeNonce); 59 tests * agentkeys: record #164 E1 live addresses (EntryPoint v0.7 + factory) + E3 status + cutover ripples * agentkeys: consolidate deployed addresses into docs/contracts.md + arch.md §5 anchor; deployed-contracts.md→redirect * agentkeys: ERC-4337 E5 — guardian M-of-N social recovery (generation rotation, independent of primary passkey); +6 tests * agentkeys: ERC-4337 E6 — VerifyingPaymaster (broker-co-signed sponsorship = Sybil gate) +6 tests; unsafe-mode bundler runner * agentkeys: ERC-4337 E7+E8 — WebAuthn UserOp signer + passkey-only master demo landed on phase1-wire-demo.sh (phase6); ran green on Heima mainnet (acct 0x3e79925F, addSigner via UserOp, no secp256k1 key) * agentkeys: #164 plan — E4-E8 complete (E8 ran green on mainnet); cutover redeploy notes * docs(runbook): document Phase 6 ERC-4337 passkey-master (#164 E8) in operator-runbook-wire.md * agentkeys: make #164 E8 (Phase 6) default in --real wire demo (skip in --light; opt out --skip-6 / AGENTKEYS_ERC4337_E8=0) + runbook * agentkeys: E8 fresh-per-run (local) / reuse-one-account (CI auto) + Phase-0 agentkeys-cli guard (#164) - erc4337-master-e8.sh: fresh (default) vs reuse (auto when $CI) modes; reuse uses a persistent passkey+fixed salt (deterministic account), funds only when low; delta assertion (count +1) works for both. Fix _has_code (cast code '0x' != empty). - webauthn-sign.py: keygen idempotent (load-if-exists) so reuse keeps its address. - phase1-wire-demo.sh: 0.2b real-mode guard fails loud if the on-PATH agentkeys lacks the 'agent' subcommand (the stale-binary cascade). - runbook: document the two E8 modes + env vars. * agentkeys: harness Phase-0 builds the host agentkeys CLI (self-heal the stale-binary cascade) + runbook 0.2b now runs 'cargo build --release -p agentkeys-cli' so the master-side CLI Phase P uses ($REPO_ROOT/target/release/agentkeys — already preferred at P.0/P.1) is current, then verifies the actual binary has the 'agent' subcommand. Opt out AGENTKEYS_SKIP_CLI_BUILD=1. Runbook: real-mode prereq + troubleshooting row document the build + manual fallback. * fix(harness): brace ${BEFORE}/${AFTER} in E8 assert — UTF-8 locale absorbed the → byte into the var name (set -u: 'BEFORE: unbound variable') * agentkeys: unhook E8 from the wire demo — it's a standalone mechanism smoke, not a phase Per arch.md §9 the 4337 account binds to the MASTER ONBOARDING ceremony (K11 at stage 2, register the account at stage 4) = #164 E7, landing with the registry cutover. The standalone erc4337-master-e8.sh uses a throwaway software passkey, so it proves the mechanism but is NOT the ceremony (the real master K11 is in the platform authenticator → needs a Touch ID assert). Remove phase6 + the call + the --real header note from phase1-wire-demo.sh (keep the 0.2b Phase-P CLI guard). Runbook + plan reframed; #164 E8 row → mechanism smoke, E7 → ceremony binding. * agentkeys: address codex adversarial review (#164) - #1 HIGH: VerifyingPaymaster.getHash now binds the paymaster gas limits (paymasterAndData[20:52]) so a valid broker sig can't be reused with inflated limits. +test_RejectsTamperedGasLimits. - #3 MED: recover() dedups guardians by (pubX,pubY), not just credIdHash, so one physical key under two credIds can't satisfy an M>=2 quorum. +test. - #2 HIGH (deployment-ordering): warn in AgentKeysScope @dev + threat-model §10 — never deploy the thinned scope before the registry cutover (else an EOA master could setScope with no biometric). - #4/#5 documented in threat-model §10 (malleability is nonce-mitigated; recover-to- unusable-signer is operator error). 73 tests green.
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…4337, #168 Cancun, #166 bootstrap) The chain side this plan waited on has landed; reconcile the web-wiring plan with it and correct two now-false facts. - Top status banner: ERC-4337 P-256 master account is IMPLEMENTED (#171, Solution A) — EntryPoint v0.7 + P256Account + factory + VerifyingPaymaster live on Heima mainnet; #164 closed. Heima is Cancun, not London (#168). Bootstrap front-run fixed (#166). Defers to docs/plan/chain/erc4337-master-account.md. - §11 (gating): retitled '✅ RESOLVED by #171 (historical)' + a correction note; the 'does-NOT-auto-fix' block rewritten as 'all addressed' (bootstrap #166; full-intent structural via userOpHash; agent-bind/multi-device #171 E3/E4/E5); fixed the false 'London / no PUSH0' claim → Cancun + pure-Solidity P-256 (~707k gas, no RIP-7212). - §4.3 + §12 X4: the K11→chain bridge is now an ERC-4337 UserOp (passkey-signs userOpHash → broker-gated bundler / handleOps → P256Account); reference erc4337-webauthn-sign.py + erc4337-master-e8.sh. Retired the cast/--assertion-file path. - §5a/§5b: onboarding stage 2 derives the P256Account (CREATE2 from passkey); stage 4 = one initCode+registerFirstMasterDevice UserOp (= chain-plan E7, routed through #163); bind/grant via UserOp; setScopeWithWebauthn→setScope (E3). §6 W2 + §9 risk updated. - security-review.md: header marks every finding addressed (#166/#171); Cancun. - data-model.md phone-first note + arch.md §22c.3: 'decided/London/delegate' → 'implemented #171 / Cancun #168 / passkey-signed UserOp'. Incorporates #163 comments (codex prerequisites + Kailai's Cancun/P-256 feasibility).
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…162) * docs(web-flow): plan to wire parent-control UI to real backends (learn from wire demo) Add docs/plan/web-flow/wire-real-paths.md — an execution plan for turning every narrated / in-memory-stub path in the parent-control UI + daemon ui-bridge into the SAME real calls harness/phase1-wire-demo.sh makes (broker auth, broker cap-mint, on-chain cast writes, S3-backed memory worker). Key decisions captured: - Daemon-as-orchestrator: browser → daemon ui-bridge only; daemon makes the real broker/chain/worker calls (the data-model.md seam). - Reuse what exists: the daemon's proxy.rs broker client (reqwest + bearer + fail-closed) for broker calls; shell out to the existing agentkeys CLI + scripts/heima-*.sh (cast) for chain writes — no new Rust chain client. - The load-bearing K11 bridge: browser does navigator.credentials WebAuthn → daemon injects the assertion into the chain tx via a new --assertion-file mode on heima-scope-set.sh (avoids a double Touch ID). - Per-flow wiring tables (onboarding §9 stages 0–4, pairing §10.2, memory) mapping UI surface → data-model.md endpoint → real backend call → arch ref. - Sequenced phases W0–W6, harness-parity test, and reconciliation of stale specs (superseded bootstrap endpoints, --upgrade no-op). Cross-linked from issue-9step-flow.md as the execution detail for P2.1–P2.4. * docs(web-flow): phone-first host model + verified gating decision + WASM lift scope Amends the wiring plan for the phone-first reality (most operators have only a phone, no desktop), keeping one consistent implementation across hosts: - wire-real-paths.md §0.5 (host-model decision): factor the master-plane logic into one portable agentkeys-core hosted as WASM (web) / native lib (mobile, via UniFFI) / daemon (desktop), all behind the same lib/client AgentKeysClient contract. The daemon is demoted to one host, not a requirement; the broker is the only always-on component; the master plane is event-driven + biometric-gated (push-woken). - wire-real-paths.md §11 (gating decision, VERIFIED): read SidecarRegistry.sol + AgentKeysScope.sol. Every master write is msg.sender-bound to the operator secp256k1 key; the K11 P-256 assertion is an additional gate, not a substitute. => no relayer / key-free path without a contract change. Phone holds the secp256k1 key in the Keychain (SE is P-256-only, so it seals the K11 passkey, not the EVM key); browser/WASM cannot custody it and must delegate the broadcast. Fork (A) keep msg.sender-bound vs (B) move to assertion-only auth — recommend (A) for the phone MVP. - wire-real-paths.md §12 (WASM lift scope): agentkeys-core carve-out, wasm-bindgen exports, CoreBackend, WebAuthn interop, chain-write delegation — shared with the future mobile UniFFI shell. - data-model.md: flag the browser-direct prohibition as desktop-first, relaxed for the master plane (chain writes still constrained per §11). - arch.md §22c.3: master control-plane host-model paragraph (defers to the plan). * docs(web-flow): adversarial security review of §11 gating (codex) — (A) not sound as written Codex adversarial review of the §11 gating decision, verified against the contracts. Verdict: fork (A) is the right direction (contracts are NOT assertion-only-safe) but NOT sound as written. Findings (full doc: wire-real-paths-security-review.md): - CRITICAL: registerFirstMasterDevice unauthenticated first-call-wins → front-runnable operator lockout (SidecarRegistry.sol:100-123). - HIGH: registerAgentDevice/revokeAgentDevice are msg.sender-only, no K11 (:214-251) — a compromised master EVM key binds rogue agents with no biometric. - HIGH: add-master K11 challenge omits newActorOmni + K11 cred/pubkey/attestation (:167-193). - HIGH: 'phone holds the key' = software secp256k1 root (not SE-sealed) — weaker than the K11 hardware promise; model it as a first-class key. - HIGH: single global operatorMasterWallet (:66) ⇒ multi-device/recovery story incomplete. - HIGH: browser→host delegation needs a native confirmation that re-derives the challenge. - MEDIUM: AgentKeysScope doesn't update WebAuthn signCount; fork (B) unsafe until full-intent K11 binding lands on every path. Confirms the relayer analysis: non-custodial relayer impossible under (A) without meta-tx/ERC-4337 (EIP-2771 sponsors gas but still needs the secp key). §11 recommendation updated to reflect 'not sound as written' + required-changes checklist. * docs(web-flow): record ERC-4337 P-256 smart-account master as the confirmed decision Supersedes the §11 fork-A-as-MVP framing. The master becomes an ERC-4337 smart account whose validateUserOp verifies a P-256 (K11/passkey) signature; a bundler broadcasts, an optional paymaster sponsors gas. Resolves the codex findings: - removes the software-secp256k1 root (clients sign UserOps with the SE-sealed passkey only); - key-free + relayer in one (no custodial relayer; bundler + paymaster); - account address is the stable master → multiple passkeys + quorum recovery (multi-device gap); - web + mobile become symmetric full masters → the browser→host delegation hop dissolves; - reuses existing on-chain P-256 verify (K11Verifier.sol). Residual (folded into the contract-hardening issue): authenticated first-master bootstrap (CRITICAL), full-intent binding in validateUserOp, and Heima EntryPoint + Solidity-P-256 (London-level, no RIP-7212). Updated §0.5 table, §11 (decision block), §12 (X4/scope), the security-review doc, and arch.md §22c.3. * docs(web-flow): revise #162 plan for the landed chain work (#171 ERC-4337, #168 Cancun, #166 bootstrap) The chain side this plan waited on has landed; reconcile the web-wiring plan with it and correct two now-false facts. - Top status banner: ERC-4337 P-256 master account is IMPLEMENTED (#171, Solution A) — EntryPoint v0.7 + P256Account + factory + VerifyingPaymaster live on Heima mainnet; #164 closed. Heima is Cancun, not London (#168). Bootstrap front-run fixed (#166). Defers to docs/plan/chain/erc4337-master-account.md. - §11 (gating): retitled '✅ RESOLVED by #171 (historical)' + a correction note; the 'does-NOT-auto-fix' block rewritten as 'all addressed' (bootstrap #166; full-intent structural via userOpHash; agent-bind/multi-device #171 E3/E4/E5); fixed the false 'London / no PUSH0' claim → Cancun + pure-Solidity P-256 (~707k gas, no RIP-7212). - §4.3 + §12 X4: the K11→chain bridge is now an ERC-4337 UserOp (passkey-signs userOpHash → broker-gated bundler / handleOps → P256Account); reference erc4337-webauthn-sign.py + erc4337-master-e8.sh. Retired the cast/--assertion-file path. - §5a/§5b: onboarding stage 2 derives the P256Account (CREATE2 from passkey); stage 4 = one initCode+registerFirstMasterDevice UserOp (= chain-plan E7, routed through #163); bind/grant via UserOp; setScopeWithWebauthn→setScope (E3). §6 W2 + §9 risk updated. - security-review.md: header marks every finding addressed (#166/#171); Cancun. - data-model.md phone-first note + arch.md §22c.3: 'decided/London/delegate' → 'implemented #171 / Cancun #168 / passkey-signed UserOp'. Incorporates #163 comments (codex prerequisites + Kailai's Cancun/P-256 feasibility).
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What & why
Our docs assert "Heima is London EVM level" and pin
evm_version = \"london\"incrates/agentkeys-chain/foundry.tomlon that basis. The EVM-level claim is wrong, and the reason for the pin is mis-stated. This PR corrects the rationale across the canonicalCLAUDE.mdsection +foundry.tomlcomment + 5 docs that repeated it. Thelondonpin itself is unchanged — it's still needed, just for a different reason.Root cause of the error
The "London" conclusion came from block-header introspection (
baseFeePerGaspresent;mixHash/withdrawalsRoot/blobGasUsedabsent → inferred< Shanghai). But Heima is a Substrate/Aura parachain via Frontier — those missing fields are Ethereum PoS-consensus header fields, not opcode-capability signals. The EVM's opcode level is set independently by Frontier'spallet_evm::config().Verified on-chain (local
heima-node --dev, 2026-06-01)set(42)(Shanghai-compiled)PUSH0(0x5f)x()== 42rt(99)TSTORE/TLOAD(EIP-1153)99Source confirms it: Frontier
stable2412frame/evm/src/lib.rsconfig()returns&CANCUN_CONFIG(the// Londondoc-comment one line up is stale upstream).➡️ Heima's EVM execution level is Cancun. It does not reject
PUSH0or other ≤Cancun opcodes — the oldfoundry.tomlnote ("london avoids PUSH0 which Heima would reject") was false.Why the
londonpin still stays (the real reason)forge script ... --broadcastruns a local simulation that validates the fetched block header against the target EVM revision before broadcasting. Heima's header has noprevrandao, so aparis+ target errors:Verified: running the real
DeployAgentKeysV1.s.solagainst the dev chain withFOUNDRY_EVM_VERSION=cancunreproduces this; withlondonit deploys. (Note:forge create --broadcastwithcancundoes not hit this — it's specific toforge script's simulator, which is our deploy path. So the pin stays.)So: opcode level = Cancun; the
londonpin = aforge scriptheader-validation workaround, not an EVM-capability ceiling. These are two independent facts the docs had conflated.Files changed (docs/config only — no code, no pin value change)
CLAUDE.md— rewrote "Heima EVM compatibility level" to separate the two facts + note that header-introspection is the wrong way to read opcode level.crates/agentkeys-chain/foundry.toml— corrected the comment aboveevm_version = \"london\"(value unchanged).docs/chain-setup.md,docs/v2-stage2-heima-deploy-and-test.md,docs/wiki/heima-setup-faq.md,docs/spec/deployed-contracts.md,docs/research/ai-hardware-companion-office-hours.md— corrected the repeated "Heima is London" framing.Note
The P-256 precompile absence mentioned in stage-2 docs is true and unaffected — Heima has no RIP-7212
0x100precompile regardless of EVM version; that's why we ship the pure-SolidityP256Verifier. This PR just stops tying that fact to a wrong "London" claim. (Broader P-256/4337 feasibility findings are in the comment on #163.)How to re-verify