v2 stage 1 — sovereign sidecar + on-chain identity + credentials-service worker (#89)#87
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…ntial-backend flag) Replaces the legacy mock-server `/credential/*` storage with an OIDC-scoped, client-side-encrypted S3 backend living next to the existing `bots/<wallet>/inbound/` SES routing prefix (issue #83). The legacy backend keeps handling sessions, audit, identity, scope, rendezvous, and inbox; only credential CRUD migrates in this PR. The pieces: - `crates/agentkeys-core/src/s3_backend.rs` — new `S3CredentialBackend` impl. `store/read/teardown/list_credentials` go through S3. Every other `CredentialBackend` method returns a clear "route through http backend" error — those endpoints still live on the mock-server (or the broker for the new flow). - AES-256-GCM seal, 96-bit random nonce, AAD = `agentkeys.cred.aad.v1|<lower-wallet>|<service>`. Wire layout `1B version || 12B nonce || ciphertext || 16B tag`, version = 0x01. AAD binds blob to its (wallet, service) S3 location so a cross-operator swap fails open. - KEK derivation is signer-anchored: SHA256(domain || signer.sign_eip191(omni, "agentkeys.kek.v1:<wallet>:<service>")). secp256k1 RFC 6979 makes this deterministic across calls, so the same KEK comes back on every read; future TEE migration (issue #74 step 2) inherits it transparently. - `crates/agentkeys-cli` — `CredentialBackendKind { Http, S3 }` plus `--credential-backend` (env `AGENTKEYS_CREDENTIAL_BACKEND`), `--bucket` / `AGENTKEYS_BUCKET`, `--signer-url` / `AGENTKEYS_SIGNER_URL`, `--omni-account` / `AGENTKEYS_OMNI_ACCOUNT`. New `credential_backend()` async helper on `CommandContext` builds the right impl per call. `cmd_store`, `cmd_read`, `cmd_run`, `cmd_teardown`, `cmd_provision` now route credential CRUD through it; identity resolution + the rest stay on the legacy http backend regardless of the flag. Default remains `http` for the transition window. - `docs/cloud-setup.md` §4.4 — new `AllowDaemonPutOwnCredentials` bucket-policy statement granting `s3:PutObject` + `s3:DeleteObject` on `bots/<wallet>/credentials/*` under the same `agentkeys_user_wallet` PrincipalTag scope that already gates `s3:GetObject`. Operators running `--credential-backend=s3` need the policy update to land first. - `docs/spec/architecture.md` §3a — add `credential_kek` and `credential_envelope` canonical-names rows so future docs reference the same terms. - `docs/spec/architecture.md` §9 #10 — flag the mock-server credential slice as "migrating off", point at issue #85. - `docs/stage7-demo-and-verification.md` §5.3 — operator-side opt-in block (env vars to set, what to expect at the S3 key). - `docs/spec/plans/issue-credential-storage-s3-oidc.md` — mark steps 1–3 as shipped; steps 4–6 still pending (default flip + mock-server handler removal + arch.md §11 cleanup). Tests: - cargo test -p agentkeys-core -p agentkeys-cli -p agentkeys-mcp -p agentkeys-provisioner — clean (9 new s3_backend tests covering object_key path, KEK determinism, AEAD round-trip, AAD-binding, envelope-version drift, truncated envelope; 37+3+44+7+23 = 114 pre-existing tests still pass). - cargo clippy on agentkeys-core + agentkeys-cli — clean. No deployment changes required for the existing `http` default. To opt into `s3` an operator runs the cloud-setup.md §4.4 update once per account, sets the four env vars, and the next `provision` writes to S3.
Two high-severity findings from /codex:adversarial-review on PR #87: 1. **Scope enforcement was missing.** S3CredentialBackend ignored Session.scope on store_credential / read_credential / list_credentials / teardown_agent. The legacy HTTP backend gates per-service access server-side via the /credential/* handlers' bearer-JWT check; the S3 backend has no equivalent (the bucket policy keys only on the wallet PrincipalTag, not service). A scoped child session could therefore have read or written any service under its wallet prefix. Fix: client-side gate before any S3 call. - enforce_scope_for_service(session, service, write) rejects PermissionDenied when the service isn't in scope.services and when write=true on a read_only scope. - enforce_master_session(session, op) rejects teardown_agent on a scoped child (wallet-level destruction is master-only — matches the implicit legacy contract). - list_credentials filters its return down to scope.services so a scoped child can't enumerate the master's other services. 2. **Broker-minted AWS creds weren't reaching the S3 client.** cmd_provision fetched the OIDC-scoped temp creds via broker_env_for_provision and injected them into the scraper subprocess env only. The parent process's S3CredentialBackend used aws_config::defaults — i.e. process AWS_* env or shared config — which would either be empty (storage fails post-key-mint, the exact failure mode #85 exists to fix) or the operator's static admin creds (no PrincipalTag, isolation property gone). Fix: pull cred minting up into CommandContext::credential_backend itself. - New mint_s3_credentials helper hits the same fetch_via_broker_default_ttl path the provisioner uses, returns aws_credential_types::Credentials. - S3CredentialBackend::new gains a `credentials: Option<...>` parameter; when Some, the SDK config builder gets a credentials_provider pinned to those creds, bypassing the default chain entirely. - cmd_provision now ends up with two STS calls per run (one for scraper env, one for parent S3 client) — cheap; the alternative was threading the env map through the orchestrator into the backend factory. Tests added (all PermissionDenied codes verified): - enforce_scope_allows_master_session - enforce_scope_blocks_service_not_in_list - enforce_scope_blocks_write_when_read_only - enforce_master_session_blocks_scoped_session - store_credential_blocks_out_of_scope_before_s3_call - read_credential_allows_in_scope_read_only (also asserts out-of-scope reads still deny) - teardown_agent_rejects_scoped_session Test count: agentkeys-core lib 28 → 44 (16 s3_backend tests total: 9 from the initial PR + 7 new). Full affected-crate suite: 121 passing. cargo clippy on agentkeys-core + agentkeys-cli clean. Out of scope: - A full integration test for `provision --credential-backend=s3` end- to-end through a real STS + S3 path. That needs live AWS creds in CI and is tracked alongside the default-flip work in plan step 4.
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Addressed both [high] findings from 1. Scope enforcement (s3_backend.rs) —
The bucket-policy PrincipalTag only knows the wallet, so client-side enforcement is the trust boundary here — matches what the legacy HTTP backend's 2. Broker creds wiring (lib.rs) —
Tests — 7 new scope-enforcement tests (denial cases for write/read/list/teardown + master-session allows). Full affected-crate suite: 121 passing. Out of scope — a full live-AWS integration test for |
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…pe, dual-read S3CredentialBackend)
First incremental implementation commit for the v2 stage 1 plan in
docs/spec/plans/v2-issues/issue-v2-stage-1-foundation.md. Lands the
CLI/backend pieces that can ship without the chain contracts or the
sidecar daemon being live yet.
What lands:
* agentkeys_core::actor_omni — deterministic SHA256("agentkeys"||"evm"||
master_wallet) helper per arch.md §14.1, used to compute the stable
per-operator anchor independent of K3 / wallet rotation.
* S3CredentialBackend now writes v2 envelopes (version byte 0x02,
AAD = "agentkeys.cred.aad.v2|<actor_omni_hex>|<service>") and reads
BOTH v1 and v2 shapes — dispatching on the version byte. v2 writes go
to bots/<actor_omni_hex>/credentials/ per arch.md §14.5; reads try v2
first and fall back to v1 only on NotFound, propagating every other
error to surface real failures.
* Dual-prefix list_credentials (union, dedup'd; v2 wins) and dual-prefix
teardown_agent (wipes both wallet-keyed and actor_omni-keyed paths) so
mid-migration state can't strand orphan blobs.
* CLI --envelope-version={v1,v2} flag plumbs WriteEnvelope through
CommandContext. Default stays v1 so PR #87 deployments keep working
unchanged; operators flip to v2 post-bucket-policy-rollout.
* CLI --credential-backend=sidecar flag accepted by the surface; today
returns a clear "not yet implemented" error pointing operators at
--envelope-version=v2 as the closest currently-working substitute.
Forward-compatible flag shape so the eventual daemon implementation
is a code change, not a CLI break.
* agentkeys whoami prints agentkeys_actor_omni alongside session_wallet
so operators can sanity-check the bucket-policy PrincipalTag and the
v2 S3 path their backend will use after the dual-tag rollout.
* Tests: 12 new unit tests covering actor_omni determinism + case
handling, v2 envelope roundtrip, v1/v2 path divergence, AAD
divergence, version dispatch, WriteEnvelope override. Full workspace
test suite still green (467 tests passed, 0 failed).
What's deferred:
* Broker /v1/cap/cred-fetch + /v1/cap/cred-store endpoints (cap-mint).
* On-chain ScopeContract / SidecarRegistry / K3EpochCounter contracts.
* K11 WebAuthn verification on master-mutation endpoints.
* Sidecar daemon (agentkeys-proxy.sock).
* OIDC JWT dual-tag mint (agentkeys_user_wallet + agentkeys_actor_omni).
* Bucket policy _v2_omni_keyed rule.
Docs:
* docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md — new top-level "What landed in
this commit" section + A.2 clarification on the sidecar stub +
revision-log entry for 2026-05-18.
* docs/spec/plans/v2-issues/issue-v2-stage-1-foundation.md — three CLI
tasks marked [x] (sidecar flag, envelope-version flag, whoami
actor_omni). credentials-service worker section updated to note
dual-envelope decrypt + dual-path read already work in
S3CredentialBackend; Lambda reuse is the remaining work.
* docs/spec/architecture.md §14 — the prior session's v2 consolidation
(was uncommitted; lands with this commit).
* docs/spec/plans/v2-issues/ — three planning issues filed alongside
arch.md §14 (stage-1 foundation, stage-2 hardening, deferred payment
service).
* docs/archived/ — earlier standalone v2 design docs superseded by
arch.md §14, archived per CLAUDE.md docs/archived policy.
…complete The pre-v2 architecture.md was a patchwork of the original single-binary mock-server design plus a §14 graft for v2 plus three layered Codex amendment addenda (§14.8, §14.9, §14.9a). New readers had to triangulate across the v1 spine + v2 graft + amendments to reconstruct the design. This rewrite collapses all of that into one coherent v2 narrative, treating issues #88 (payment-service), #89 (stage-1 foundation), and #90 (stage-2 hardening) as completed. Codex findings are folded into the design (no more "see addendum"); dual v1/v2 migration language is gone (the migration window closed when stage 1 shipped). Structure (27 sections, top-down): §1 System overview (five trust boundaries, mermaid) §2 Component inventory (14 components) §3 Trust boundaries (blast-radius table per boundary) §4 Key inventory K1–K11 (canonical) §5 Canonical names (one concept, one canonical spelling) §6 Identity model — three layers + HDKD actor tree §7 Upstream backend classes — A (per-request) / B (bearer) / C (on-chain payment-rail, new in v2) §8 Mental model — four orthogonal axes §9 Cold-start (master bootstrap, stages 0–4) §10 Per-actor binding ceremonies (master + agent) §11 Recovery — M-of-N device quorum (no anchor wallet, no seed) §12 Sidecar daemon (localhost proxy, host-local policy) §13 Broker (cap-mint authority, on-chain reader) §14 Signer (TEE-protected K3 vault) §15 Workers — creds / memory / audit / email / payment (with audit tiers A/B/C and payment modes P-1/P-2/P-3 spelled out) §16 On-chain layer (four contracts, Solidity inlined) §17 Storage layout (per-data-class buckets, per-actor prefixes) §18 Encryption envelope (KEK derivation + AES-256-GCM v2) §19 Cap-token shape + lifecycle (wire JSON + 11-step verification) §20 Mode selection — sovereign default + hosted-relay opt-in + self-hosted-relay §21 K3 rotation (zero-migration property) §22 Pluggable surfaces (six pluggable axes) §23 Cargo workspace (post-v2 crate layout) §24 Deployment topology §25 Cross-references §26 What v2 guarantees §27 What's NOT in this doc Major changes vs the pre-v2 spine: * Stage 7 / mock-server / S3CredentialBackend / dev_key_service language retired — those are pre-v2 historical artifacts that no longer describe the shipped system. * §15 enumerates ALL five workers (creds + memory + audit + email + payment). Payment-service is now a first-class section with the P-1/P-2/P-3 mode table, security properties, and wire shape inlined. * §16 inlines all four Solidity contracts (AgentKeysScope, SidecarRegistry, K3EpochCounter, CredentialAudit) with the cap-mint verification gates spelled out (per-actor binding, K11 for master mutations, K3 epoch freshness, CAS-burn for payments). * §19 is new — the cap-token wire shape + 11-step worker verification sequence. Pre-v2 had this scattered across §14.3 + the stage-1 plan. * §11 (recovery) has a concrete second-by-second timeline showing how a surviving master device M-of-N quorum revokes a stolen device in ~60s. * §6 lays out the three identity layers (Layer 1 actor_omni anchor; Layer 2 current_master_wallet; Layer 3 operational uses) up front, not buried in a §14.1 sub-section. * §7 adds Class C (on-chain / payment-rail operations — irreversible) alongside Class A (per-request, AWS-native) and Class B (bearer). Pre-v2 only had A and B. Length: 1248 → 1488 lines. Net +240 because of the inlined contracts, worker tables, recovery timeline, cap verification sequence, and mermaid diagram for the unified system overview.
…ntry/Heima EVM backbone The previous doc tried to cover both migration (from stage-7 PR #87) and new-feature demo in one Part A + Part B structure. The migration half turned out to be entirely mechanical — the dual-read / dual-envelope / dual-prefix support already in S3CredentialBackend handles the transition without any operator runbook. So drop Part A; the new doc is fresh-start only. Chain backbone: Litentry rebranded to Heima Network in 2026. Heima runs Frontier (pallet_evm + pallet_ethereum) with EVM chain ID 212013 on mainnet (= "LIT deployment year (21) + paraID (2013)", hardcoded at parachain/runtime/heima/src/lib.rs). Operators deploy the four stage-1 Solidity contracts (AgentKeysScope, SidecarRegistry, K3EpochCounter, CredentialAudit) via Foundry against https://rpc-eth.heima.network or a self-hosted Frontier node from litentry/heima:latest. Address mapping is HashedAddressMapping<BlakeTwo256>, so EVM accounts are first-class on-chain identities — no MetaMask-Substrate dual-account dance. Structure (10 sections plus reference + revision log): Litentry/Heima EVM chain reference — chain IDs, RPC URLs, explorer, self-hosted node bring-up What stage 1 ships (vs inherited) — clear table of what comes from stage-7 demo vs new in v2 §0 Prerequisites (inherited) — pointer to stage-7 §0 verbatim + new Heima RPC reachability check §1 Master device bootstrap — stage-7 §1-§2 inherited, plus new stage-2 (WebAuthn) and stage-4 (on-chain registry) sub-sections §2 AWS prereqs (inherited+v2 tag) — one-line PrincipalTag rename to agentkeys_actor_omni §3 Smoke-test v2 envelope — verify the v2 S3 path works end-to-end without chain or sidecar §4 Deploy Heima EVM contracts — Foundry deploy script; cast verification; K3EpochCounter init §5 Register master device on chain — the §1.4 step, now executable against the deployed registry §6 Sidecar daemon bring-up — agentkeys-daemon flags; localhost proxy verification §7 Create agent + grant scope — full HDKD per-agent omni flow with K11 prompts at agent-create and scope-grant; in-scope vs out-of-scope verification §8 Chain-level isolation proof — repeat for bob; verify per-actor binding rejects cross-actor cap-mint (Codex finding #1 in action) §9 Teardown What's still in flight — shipped-vs-spec status table so operators following the doc today know exactly which steps will error with "not yet implemented" The doc is now the target end-state runbook; track issue-v2-stage-1-foundation.md for the rolling implementation status of each pending sub-deliverable. Length: 445 → 814 lines.
Chain backbone is pluggable per arch.md §22, but the previous draft of the
demo doc hardcoded Heima env vars (HEIMA_EVM_RPC_HTTP, HEIMA_EVM_CHAIN_ID,
HEIMA_SUBSTRATE_WSS, HEIMA_EXPLORER, ...). Switching to Base or Ethereum
meant renaming five env vars per chain. This commit collapses everything
into one --chain flag.
What ships:
* New module crates/agentkeys-core/src/chain_profile.rs — ChainProfile
struct + serde-json wire format. ChainProfile::resolve() walks the
documented precedence ($AGENTKEYS_CHAIN_PROFILE_FILE > --chain CLI flag
> $AGENTKEYS_CHAIN env > built-in default 'heima') and returns a typed
profile plus a debug string explaining which step matched.
* 7 built-in profile JSONs under crates/agentkeys-core/chain-profiles/,
embedded into the binary via include_str! macro:
heima (mainnet, chain_id=212013, substrate-frontier)
heima-paseo (testnet, chain_id=0 sentinel for auto-detect)
base (mainnet, chain_id=8453, optimism-l2, safe-tag default)
base-sepolia (testnet, chain_id=84532)
ethereum (mainnet, chain_id=1, finalized-tag default)
sepolia (testnet, chain_id=11155111)
anvil (local, chain_id=31337, instant finality, ships test key)
* Profile fields cover every chain-specific dimension the broker / daemon
/ workers need:
- chain_id (uint64; 0 = auto-detect via eth_chainId)
- chain_kind (enum: substrate-frontier | ethereum-l1 | optimism-l2
| arbitrum | local-dev — controls finality + gas strategy)
- rpc.{http, wss, substrate_wss?}
- explorer.{url, tx_url_template, address_url_template}
- token.{symbol, decimals}
- finality.{default_block_tag, confirmation_blocks, confirmation_seconds, notes}
- gas.{model, max_priority_fee_gwei, max_fee_gwei}
- deploy.{deployer_env_var, foundry_chain_arg, faucet_url?, default_test_key?}
* CLI wiring in crates/agentkeys-cli:
- New top-level flag: --chain <name> (env AGENTKEYS_CHAIN)
- New subcommand: agentkeys chain list (enumerate built-in profile names)
- New subcommand: agentkeys chain show [name] (print full profile JSON;
omit name to inspect the active profile per resolution rules)
- CommandContext::chain_profile() returns the cached resolved profile;
--verbose prints the resolution debug string
* Operator-custom chains: set $AGENTKEYS_CHAIN_PROFILE_FILE to any JSON
file matching the schema and AgentKeys uses it. No recompile. Moonbeam,
Astar, Polygon, Avalanche, BSC, permissioned chains (Aliyun BaaS,
Hyperledger, Quorum) are all one JSON file away.
Tests: 12 new unit tests covering every built-in loads + parses, known
field values per chain, case-insensitive lookup, resolution precedence,
explorer URL template substitution. Workspace test count: 467 → 479,
all passing.
Docs:
* docs/spec/architecture.md §22 — chain layer row in the pluggability
table now points at the named-profile system; new §22a "Chain profiles
— how to switch between EVM backbones" covers resolution order,
schema, built-in inventory, operator-custom flow, what chain_kind
controls at runtime, and cap-mint freshness across chains.
* docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md — replaced the
"Litentry/Heima EVM — chain reference" section with a generalised
"Chain backbone — pluggable per arch.md §22" section. Built-in profile
table + operator-custom example (Moonbeam) + why-named-profiles
rationale (vs the previous per-chain env var sprawl). Updated §0
reachability check + §4 Foundry deploy + §5 device register + §6
sidecar daemon bring-up to pull chain-specific values from the active
profile via `agentkeys chain show | jq -r .<field>` — no more
HEIMA_* env var coupling.
Switching chains is now: export AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=base (or pass --chain
base on any command). Every component reads the same profile.
…n target
Two corrections based on authoritative Heima developer info, verified
live 2026-05-18 against the production RPC:
* RPC hostname: was guessed as rpc-eth.heima.network in the speculative
draft; canonical URL per docs.heima.network / chain-list.com/heima /
dwellir.com/networks/heima is rpc.heima-parachain.heima.network (same
host serves both EVM JSON-RPC and Substrate-RPC). Verified live:
eth_chainId → 0x33c2d (= 212013 decimal, matches profile)
eth_blockNumber → 0x92c29f (current head, ~9.6M blocks)
system_chain → "Heima" (Substrate side responds on same host)
* eth_chainId hex in the demo doc was wrong (had 0x33c4d = 212045);
correct value is 0x33c2d = 212013.
Also pinned the future agentkeys explorer integration target by adding
explorer.subscan_source to the chain profile JSON schema:
* New ChainProfile::ExplorerLinks.subscan_source field — optional
pointer at the backend + frontend repo for chain-specific explorer
indexing. Type-safe in Rust via new SubscanSource struct.
* heima.json now points at the Litentry-forked Subscan stack:
- github.com/litentry/subscan-essentials (Go backend)
- github.com/litentry/subscan-essentials-ui-react (React frontend)
These integrations are stage-2/3 deliverables — agentkeys-specific
indexing for AgentKeysScope.ScopeUpdated, SidecarRegistry.*,
K3EpochCounter.K3Rotated, CredentialAudit.* events, cross-indexed by
actor_omni. Pinning the target in the profile means when the work
happens, it lands in those two repos rather than a third-party
hosted explorer.
* docs/spec/architecture.md new §22a.6 "Explorer integration target"
documents the integration plan; renumbered the existing cap-mint
freshness section to §22a.7.
* docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md new "Explorer — current state +
future agentkeys integration" subsection covers the same target,
plus the in-doc curl example now shows the correct 0x33c2d hex value.
Other chain profiles can populate subscan_source with their own
explorer codebases as integrations land (Etherscan / Blockscout for
Ethereum / Base, chain-specific forks for others).
Workspace tests: 479/0 (unchanged — schema is backwards-compatible
because subscan_source is #[serde(default)] optional).
Heima developer team confirmed that Heima Paseo's runtime ships
pallet_sudo with the well-known Substrate dev account Alice as the
sudoer. This commit documents what that means, why it's a standard
Substrate testnet convention, and how AgentKeys operators use it (or
don't) during stage-1 dev bring-up.
Educational background (for readers unfamiliar with Substrate):
* Alice is one of six well-known Substrate dev accounts. The keypair is
deterministically derived from the public seed phrase 'bottom drive
obey lake curtain smoke basket hold race lonely fit walk//Alice'.
Public key 0xd43593c715fdd31c61141abd04a99fd6822c8558854ccde39a5684
e7a56da27d. SS58 (generic prefix 42) 5GrwvaEF5zXb26Fz9rcQpDWS57
CtERHpNehXCPcNoHGKutQY. These keys are intentionally public — every
Substrate developer knows them — so dev/test chains can ship with
pre-funded accounts of known keys.
* pallet_sudo is the Substrate root-bypass pallet. Runtimes that
include it expose one extrinsic: sudo.sudo(call). The pallet stores
ONE address as the sudo key; only that address can call sudo.sudo
and the wrapped call runs with RawOrigin::Root — bypassing every
other origin check. Testnets ship sudo so devs have a god-mode
lever (force-fund accounts, force-set state, force-run upgrades);
production chains either remove the pallet or move the key to a
governance multisig.
* On Heima Paseo specifically: sudo + Alice means anyone can use
sudo.sudo for testnet bring-up without provisioning real accounts.
What landed in this commit:
* New typed schema in ChainProfile (DevEnvironment + SudoConfig structs),
optional and backwards-compatible via #[serde(default)]. Production
profiles (heima, base, ethereum) omit dev_environment entirely; only
testnets / local-dev profiles set it.
* heima-paseo.json profile now carries the full Alice sudoer metadata:
seed phrase, public key, SS58 generic-prefix address, invocation
recipe, two warning lines (anyone-can-sign-as-Alice + URL pending
Heima-dev-team confirmation).
* Production-vs-development convention pinned via
dev_environment.is_development_default. Only heima-paseo carries
this flag among built-ins. New ChainProfile::development_default_name()
helper returns Some("heima-paseo"). Production default stays
DEFAULT_PROFILE = "heima".
* docs/spec/heima-open-questions.md: new §3a "Chain backbone — EVM,
Paseo, sudo (added 2026-05-18 after Heima dev info handoff)" with
educational Alice/sudo background, recipe table for "what AgentKeys
would use sudo for", how-to-invoke-sudo notes, and three new
Q13-Q15 questions for the Heima dev team:
- Q13: canonical Paseo RPC URL (both speculative URLs fail SSL
as of 2026-05-18)
- Q14: confirm Alice as sudoer + invocation recipe + SS58 on Heima
prefix-31 encoding
- Q15: confirm Heima mainnet has either removed pallet_sudo or
moved the key to a governance multisig
Reuse-Build-Block matrix updated with three new rows.
* docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md: chain-backbone section now
documents the prod-vs-dev convention (heima for production,
heima-paseo for development, anvil for local tests). New "Alice +
sudo on Heima Paseo (development-environment convenience)"
sub-section with concrete recipes for pre-funding deployer wallets,
resetting K3 epoch, etc. Three invocation options spelled out
(Polkadot.js Apps, subxt CLI, @polkadot/api). Built-in profile
table updated to mark heima as "Production default" + heima-paseo as
"Development default". Revision-log entry added.
* docs/spec/architecture.md §22a updated with the prod-vs-dev
convention table (heima production / heima-paseo development /
anvil local-tests). New §22a.5a "Alice + sudo on dev-default chains
(heima-paseo)" covers the background + what sudo does/doesn't do for
AgentKeys + the Substrate↔EVM bridge via pallet_ethereum.transact.
Tests: 12 → 15 chain_profile tests (3 new — heima_paseo is dev
default with alice sudo, development_default_name returns heima-paseo,
production chains carry no dev_environment). Workspace: 479 → 482
all passing.
The manual §4.1-§4.4 sequence (chase faucet, juggle deployer env vars,
hand-run cast send for K3EpochCounter init) is now one command:
bash scripts/heima-paseo-bring-up.sh
Two new scripts:
scripts/heima-paseo-bring-up.sh — bash orchestrator that does:
1. Tool sanity-check (agentkeys, jq, forge, cast, node, npx)
2. Resolve heima-paseo chain profile + reachability-check $RPC_HTTP
+ abort if eth_chainId == 212013 (mainnet safety)
3. Generate throwaway EVM deployer (or reuse $HEIMA_PASEO_DEPLOYER_KEY)
4. Sudo-fund deployer from Alice (100 pHEI default) via the
heima-paseo-sudo.mjs helper
5. Foundry-deploy the four stage-1 contracts (graceful stub-mode when
crates/agentkeys-chain isn't built yet)
6. Persist contract addresses to operator-workstation.env,
namespaced by HEIMA_PASEO so other chains can deploy alongside
7. Print summary + suggested next-step command
Re-run with SKIP_FUND=1 or SKIP_DEPLOY=1 to skip individual phases.
scripts/heima-paseo-sudo.mjs — Node + @polkadot/api helper:
fund — sudo.balances.forceTransfer Alice → EVM address (uses
blake2_256("evm:" || eth_address) for the EVM→Substrate
account mapping per HashedAddressMapping<BlakeTwo256>)
bootstrap — sudo.sudo(ethereum.transact(...)) for any EVM contract
call; used for K3EpochCounter init, force-set scope,
pre-register sidecar entries, etc.
whoami — sanity-check the sudoer + Alice's balance
Three guardrails keep mainnet safe:
- Refuses if $AGENTKEYS_CHAIN != heima-paseo
- Refuses if live eth_chainId == 212013 (mainnet)
- Logs every sudo call to stderr before signing
Polkadot deps load lazily so --help works without them installed;
the bring-up script auto-fetches via npx --package=@polkadot/api ...
docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md additions:
* New §4.0 "Automated Heima Paseo bring-up via Alice sudo" before §4.1:
- One-command bring-up recipe + step-by-step timing table
- The two scripts that do the work (orchestrator + sudo helper)
- Dev-shortcut table: pre-register fake sidecar entry, force-set
scope, fast-forward K3 epoch, parallel multi-tenant funding
- Explicit "what sudo CANNOT do" section spelling out the
production-safety properties (cannot forge K11, cannot sign as
operator's K10, cannot bypass worker-side re-verification)
* §4.1 now has a "for Heima Paseo: skip this section" callout pointing
at §4.0 as the fast path. The manual recipe is still authoritative
for Heima mainnet + Base + Ethereum (chains without sudo).
* "What's still in flight" table + revision log updated.
Tests: no Rust changes; existing 482 workspace tests still passing.
Scripts validated: bash -n syntax check + node --check syntax check
+ node scripts/heima-paseo-sudo.mjs --help round-trip without
polkadot deps installed.
…3 resolved) Heima dev team confirmed the canonical Paseo values. Live-verified 2026-05-18 against https://rpc.paseo-parachain.heima.network: eth_chainId → 0x7dd (= 2013 decimal — HEIMA_PARA_ID) system_chain → "Heima-paseo" system_properties → ss58Format=131 tokenDecimals=18 tokenSymbol=HEI eth_blockNumber → 0x2c5556 (~2.9M blocks; live chain) What I had wrong (speculation from earlier research): RPC URL: was rpc-eth-paseo.heima.network / rpc-paseo.heima.network now https://rpc.paseo-parachain.heima.network Chain ID: was 0 (auto-detect sentinel) now 2013 (= HEIMA_PARA_ID; mainnet's 212013 prefixes year) SS58 prefix: was undocumented (assumed = mainnet's 31) now 131 (NOT 31, NOT the generic 42) Token symbol: was pHEI (testnet-prefix convention guess) now HEI (same symbol as mainnet, no prefix) Changes: * crates/agentkeys-core/chain-profiles/heima-paseo.json: - rpc.{http,wss,substrate_wss} all point at the single canonical host (same host serves EVM + Substrate RPC) - chain_id: 0 → 2013 - token.symbol: pHEI → HEI - finality.notes pins the live curl outputs for future drift detection - dev_environment.sudo.warnings adds an SS58-prefix-131 reminder (re-encode pasted pubkeys for paseo, or use //Alice as SURI) * crates/agentkeys-core/src/chain_profile.rs: - test heima_paseo_chain_id_zero_signals_auto_detect renamed to heima_paseo_chain_id_is_2013; asserts chain_id == 2013 AND that paseo's chain_id does not collide with mainnet's (defense against a future refactor accidentally swapping them) * docs/spec/heima-open-questions.md Q13: marked ✅ RESOLVED with the five live curl outputs pinned in the answer block. Reuse-Build-Block matrix row updated to "resolved" status. * docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md: - "Open questions" callout in the chain-reference section split into "Resolved" (Q13 — RPC URL + chain ID + SS58 + token symbol) and "Still pending" (Q14 Alice-as-sudoer confirmation + Q15 mainnet sudo state + faucet URL) - Revision-log entry added Workspace tests: 482/0 (15 chain_profile tests including the renamed chain-ID pin).
… snippet
Replaces RFC 2606 placeholder addresses (alice@demo.example, alice@x.com)
with demo-1@bots.litentry.org, the SES-verified bot-domain alias the
agentkeys-init-email-demo.sh wrapper already routes to. Placeholder
domains are undeliverable: the broker accepts the request, SES sends
the magic link into the void, and the CLI polls forever — a real
operator trap.
Also folds back into the demo doc the two shell pitfalls that bit me
running the §0 reachability snippet:
1. xargs -I{} ... $((16#$(echo {} | sed ...))) — the $((...))
arithmetic expansion runs in the OUTER shell BEFORE xargs
substitutes {}, so zsh sees literal `{` and errors with "bad math
expression: illegal character: {". Replaced with for-loop +
direct $((hex)) (0x... is native in arithmetic context, no 16#).
2. Loop verdict variable can't be named `status` — zsh has it as a
read-only special parameter (alias for $?). Renamed to `verdict`.
Both reachability snippets in the doc now use the safe shape and ship
with a "two pitfalls to avoid" callout so the next operator running
top-to-bottom doesn't repeat the failure. Comments updated with the
correct live hex values: 0x33c2d for heima (was 0x33c4d = wrong) and
0x7dd for heima-paseo.
Verified live 2026-05-18: curl + the new doc snippet against both
canonical RPCs returns OK for heima (212013) and heima-paseo (2013).
Combines the existing demo scripts (install-agentkeys-cli.sh,
agentkeys-init-email-demo.sh, heima-paseo-bring-up.sh) into a single
idempotent flow with 9 numbered steps. Composes — does not replace —
the underlying scripts so they remain individually usable for
finer-grained debugging.
Idempotency: each step has a "skip if already done" pre-check, same
pattern as cloud-setup.md §4.2 ("if OIDC provider ARN ends in
$BROKER_HOST, skip create"):
1. Tool sanity-check (always runs, <100ms)
2. Source scripts/operator-workstation.env (always runs)
3. AWS profile sanity-check (guards against wrong profile)
4. agentkeys CLI build+install (skips if --session-id + --chain
flags already present)
5. Chain reachability + live-eth_chainId match against profile
6. Email-init session JWT (skips if session.json exists + <1h old)
7. S3 envelope smoke-test store+read (skips if blob already at
bots/<actor_omni>/credentials/<service>.enc)
8. Chain bring-up via heima-paseo-bring-up.sh (skips if
SCOPE_CONTRACT_ADDRESS_HEIMA_PASEO already in env-file)
9. Summary + next-step hints
No hardcoded values — every magic input is overridable via env var
or CLI flag. SESSION_ID, AGENTKEYS_CHAIN, SMOKE_TEST_SERVICE,
SMOKE_TEST_SECRET, FUND_AMOUNT_HEI all configurable.
Resumability: --from-step N / --to-step N / --only-step N for
partial re-runs. On failure, the die() helper prints the exact
resume command (`bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step <N>`).
Pause points for operator input:
- Step 6: macOS keychain modal appears when agentkeys init writes
the session JWT. Script narrates this in advance — the OS modal
handles the actual prompt; no shell pause needed.
- Step 8 with --confirm: explicit `read -p` before chain deploy.
Tested locally: --to-step 5 runs preflight cleanly, --only-step 1
runs tool check alone, argparse errors exit 1 with a clean one-line
message (no misleading "step 0/9" context).
Demo doc gets a new §0.0 "One-command demo" subsection at the top
of §0 that surfaces the script before operators wade into per-step
copy-paste — with the same step-by-step table, pause-point notes,
and configurable-inputs matrix as the script's own --help output.
Three real bugs from the first live run on the operator's laptop:
1. `agentkeys whoami --json` fails — --json is a top-level CLI flag
(`cli.json` in main.rs:26, threaded into CommandContext.json_output).
It MUST come before the subcommand. The script + the inline §1.3
doc snippet both had it after. Fixed: `agentkeys --json whoami`.
2. `--signer-url requires --omni-account` because whoami's signer_url
arg is `#[arg(env = "AGENTKEYS_SIGNER_URL")]` (main.rs:275) — clap
auto-populates it from operator-workstation.env, then the CLI
tries the signer round-trip and demands --omni-account. Chicken-
and-egg since we want actor_omni FROM whoami. Workaround:
`env -u AGENTKEYS_SIGNER_URL` for the whoami call only; the
local-only fields (session_wallet + agentkeys_actor_omni) don't
need the signer.
3. step-7 store failure message ("check bucket policy") was too
narrow — `Error: UNREACHABLE — Backend unreachable` (lib.rs:66)
is BackendError::Transport's generic catch-all for ANY AWS SDK
error (AccessDenied, region mismatch, network, signer down). Now
prints three probe-commands (direct s3 cp, get-bucket-policy
inspection, signer health check) ranked by likelihood, plus the
`--from-step 8 --skip-smoke` escape hatch so the operator can
continue to chain steps while diagnosing the cloud-side issue.
The first two fixes also land in the demo doc's §1.3 snippet so the
next operator running top-to-bottom sees the gotchas inline (per
the runbook-fix-fold-back policy in CLAUDE.md).
Verified live: --only-step 7 now correctly captures session_wallet
+ agentkeys_actor_omni, computes the s3 path, and fails with the
new diagnostic error (instead of the old "session expired" red
herring).
…licy migration
Wires the v2 highly-abstracted-service PrincipalTag path end-to-end so
`agentkeys store --credential-backend=s3 --envelope-version=v2` can
actually PUT credentials through the OIDC AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
flow. Three coupled changes:
1. **Broker (crates/agentkeys-broker-server/src/handlers/oidc.rs)**:
`build_oidc_jwt_claims` now also emits `agentkeys_actor_omni`
(= SHA256("agentkeys"||"evm"||wallet_lc), via the existing
`derive_omni_account` helper) as a top-level claim AND as a
PrincipalTag in `https://aws.amazon.com/tags`. Both v1 and v2 tag
keys live in `principal_tags` + `transitive_tag_keys` during the
migration window — v1 policies (keyed on agentkeys_user_wallet) and
v2 policies (keyed on agentkeys_actor_omni) both work without
broker config churn. `claims_supported` in the OIDC discovery doc
gains the new claim name.
All 8 existing broker OIDC tests pass — the additions don't break
any v1 invariant.
2. **scripts/bucket-policy-v2-migrate.sh** (new, 130 lines):
idempotent migration that flips the bucket policy from §4.4 v1
shape (Sid=AllowDaemonGetOwnObjects, key=agentkeys_user_wallet) to
v2 shape (Sid=AllowDataRolePutOwnCredentialsV2, key=agentkeys_actor_omni)
AND adds the missing 4th statement that grants PutObject on the
credentials/* sub-prefix (cloud-setup.md §4.4 documents this but it
was never applied to the live cloud). Backs up the existing policy
to /tmp/bucket-policy-backup-<ts>.json before mutating. Re-runs
are no-ops once the v2 markers are present.
Deliberately does NOT use the demo doc §2.2 verbatim shape
(Principal:* + StringNotEquals != "") because cloud-setup.md §4.3
warns negated string operators on missing context keys evaluate as
TRUE — a JWT with no tags claim silently bypasses. The §4.4
Principal-pinned shape with PrincipalTag-scoped Resource ARN is
the safer template and what we want enforced.
3. **scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh**: STEP_TOTAL 9 → 10. New step 7
("Ensure v2 bucket policy applied") delegates to
bucket-policy-v2-migrate.sh idempotently. Steps 7/8/9 become
8/9/10. Step 8 (smoke test, was step 7) now passes --broker-url
$OIDC_ISSUER and exports AGENTKEYS_DATA_ROLE_ARN=$DATA_ROLE_ARN
so the CLI's mint_s3_credentials path engages (otherwise the SDK
falls back to direct admin IAM and gets AccessDenied silently
wrapped as 'Backend unreachable').
Verified live:
- cargo test -p agentkeys-broker-server --lib oidc → 8 passed
- bash scripts/bucket-policy-v2-migrate.sh → applied + re-run skips
- Manual curl on /v1/mint-oidc-jwt today still returns v1-only
JWTs because the REMOTE broker host hasn't picked up this commit
yet. Next step: redeploy the broker via
bash scripts/setup-broker-host.sh --ref claude/stupefied-darwin-cfafd6
on the broker host, then re-run --only-step 8.
….md §17)
Closes the bucket-sharing arch violation flagged in code review. Credentials
were landing in `$BUCKET` (= `agentkeys-mail-*`, the inbound-mail bucket),
violating arch.md §17 ("per-data-class buckets are mandatory; S3 exposes
encryption / lifecycle / replication / CloudTrail at the bucket level only
— folding data classes collapses blast radii").
## Fix 1 (this PR) — shipped
Provisions a dedicated `$VAULT_BUCKET` (`agentkeys-vault-${ACCOUNT_ID}`)
and `agentkeys-vault-role` per arch.md §17 + §17.2, cleans the mail
bucket policy of any stray credentials grants, and rewires the
orchestrator to target the new vault infra.
Four new idempotent scripts (each safe to re-run):
- scripts/provision-vault-bucket.sh — bucket + block-public-access + SSE-S3
- scripts/provision-vault-role.sh — `agentkeys-vault-role` with OIDC trust + credentials-only inline policy (3 statements, all scoped to `bots/${aws:PrincipalTag/agentkeys_actor_omni}/credentials/*`)
- scripts/apply-vault-bucket-policy.sh — vault bucket gets `Sid: VaultPolicyV2` (Principal-pinned to vault-role + Null operator for tag presence per cloud-setup.md §4.3 safety)
- scripts/cleanup-mail-bucket-policy.sh — mail bucket reverts to email-only (drops the credentials grants accidentally added by the earlier `bucket-policy-v2-migrate.sh`, which is now removed)
Each one checks "is this already done?" before acting; verified
idempotent via two consecutive runs of `bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh
--from-step 7 --to-step 7` — first run created everything, second
skipped every sub-step.
## Integration test in the orchestrator
scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh step 7 composes the 4 sub-scripts as
"Provision vault infra (bucket + role + policy)". Step 8 (smoke test):
- Uses `--bucket $VAULT_BUCKET` (NOT `$BUCKET`)
- Exports `AGENTKEYS_DATA_ROLE_ARN=$VAULT_ROLE_ARN` so the CLI's OIDC
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity targets the vault role
- **Cross-contamination assertion**: after store, asserts the blob is
in `s3://$VAULT_BUCKET/bots/<actor_omni>/credentials/<service>.enc`
AND NOT in `s3://$MAIL_BUCKET/bots/<actor_omni>/credentials/...`.
If the separation regresses, the demo fails loud with `ARCH VIOLATION
(arch.md §17): credential blob ALSO landed in mail bucket`.
operator-workstation.env adds:
VAULT_BUCKET=agentkeys-vault-${ACCOUNT_ID}
VAULT_ROLE_ARN=arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/agentkeys-vault-role
DATA_ROLE_ARN stays for the email subsystem (will rename when email
migrates in stage 2 — same pattern as VAULT did here).
## Fix 2 (deferred to stage 2) — tracked in issue #91
The credentials-service worker (arch.md §15.1) — Lambda + mTLS to
signer for encrypt/decrypt + cap-on-chain re-verify — is deferred
to stage 2. Today the CLI does client-side encrypt + direct S3 PUT
through the OIDC-assumed vault role; the worker will take over the
encrypt/decrypt step without changing the envelope shape (same KEK,
same AAD, same nonce shape).
See #91 for full design
+ acceptance criteria.
## Verified live (AWS account 429071895007)
- Vault bucket created: s3://agentkeys-vault-429071895007
- Block-public-access: all 4 flags = true
- Default SSE-S3 AES-256 applied
- Vault role created: arn:aws:iam::429071895007:role/agentkeys-vault-role
- Inline policy: 3 statements (List + Get + Put/Delete on credentials/*)
- Vault bucket policy: 1 statement (Sid VaultPolicyV2, PrincipalTag-scoped)
- Mail bucket policy cleaned: 3 statements (SES inbound + email role list/get; NO credentials grants)
- Idempotency: re-running step 7 skips every sub-step cleanly
## What still blocks step 8 today
The REMOTE broker host needs to be redeployed to pick up commit 4319428
(broker emits both v1 + v2 PrincipalTag in `/v1/mint-oidc-jwt`).
Verified live: today's broker still emits v1-only:
curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer \$SESSION_TOKEN" \\
https://broker.litentry.org/v1/mint-oidc-jwt | jq -r .jwt | \\
cut -d. -f2 | <base64url-pad-then-decode> | \\
jq '."https://aws.amazon.com/tags".principal_tags'
# → { "agentkeys_user_wallet": [...] } ← v1 only
Redeploy the broker via:
bash scripts/setup-broker-host.sh --ref claude/stupefied-darwin-cfafd6
…on the broker host. Then re-run:
bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 8
Real bug from the operator running --only-step 9 in v2-stage1-demo.sh.
The .mjs script's lazy `import('@polkadot/api')` failed because the
earlier `npx --package=X -y -- node script.mjs` pattern only adds X's
bin files to PATH; the script's `import()` resolves via Node's module
resolver, which walks UP from the script's location looking for
node_modules — and there's no node_modules in scripts/. So the import
fell into the catch block and printed "[heima-paseo-sudo] missing
polkadot deps", killing step 9.
Fix: declare the deps in a new scripts/package.json and have
heima-paseo-bring-up.sh run `npm install --prefix scripts` once
(idempotent — checks scripts/node_modules/@polkadot/api existence
first) before invoking `node` directly. The .mjs script's lazy-load
shape stays for --help UX, but now succeeds because node_modules is
sitting right next to the .mjs.
Version pin: had to bump @polkadot/util / util-crypto / keyring from
^13.0.0 → ^14.0.0 to match what @polkadot/api@^16 pulls in
transitively, otherwise npm installs two copies of @polkadot/util
(top-level 13.x + nested-under-api 14.x) and polkadot.js panics with
"multiple versions installed" at runtime.
scripts/node_modules/ added to .gitignore; scripts/package.json +
scripts/package-lock.json are checked in.
Verified live: `AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima-paseo node scripts/heima-paseo-sudo.mjs whoami`
now connects to wss://rpc.paseo-parachain.heima.network, confirms
chain="Heima-paseo" ss58=131 token=HEI EVM_chain_id=2013, and prints
Alice's SS58 under the Paseo prefix 131 (jcS2wD5...) along with her
well-known pubkey 0xd43593c7...
Operator asked "is step 9 and following idempotent? avoid duplicate smart contract by verifying onchain state." Audit found 4 holes; all 4 closed in this commit. Re-running the bring-up is now a no-op when nothing has changed on chain. What's now idempotent: 1. Deployer keypair (step 3) — was: generated a NEW throwaway key on every run unless HEIMA_PASEO_DEPLOYER_KEY was exported. Each run produced a fresh address that then needed re-funding + re-deploying. Fix: on first run, generate + persist to ~/.agentkeys/heima-paseo-deployer.key (mode 0600, OUTSIDE the repo so it's never accidentally committed); on subsequent runs, read the file. Override at any time via env var. 2. Funding (step 4) — was: always sent $FUND_AMOUNT_HEI from Alice via sudo.balances.forceTransfer; no balance check. Fix: query eth_getBalance on the deployer; if balance >= 1 HEI, skip the Alice sudo transfer entirely. Uses node (already a required dep) for BigInt-safe hex->decimal compare (wei values overflow bash arithmetic int64). 3. **Contract deploy (step 5) — the fix the operator specifically asked for**: was: `forge script ... --broadcast` deployed NEW instances every run. Fix: re-source operator-workstation.env to pick up addresses from any prior run, then `cast code $addr` each of the 4 contract addresses against the live chain. If ALL 4 have code on-chain (i.e. contracts still deployed), skip the deploy entirely. If ANY address is missing OR returns "0x" (no code) — e.g. chain reset, fresh env, etc. — redeploy all 4. This handles the chain-reset case automatically. Stub mode (when crates/agentkeys-chain/ doesn't exist yet) produces sentinel 0x1-0x4 addresses that never have on-chain code; the script correctly detects this and "redeploys" the same stubs — no real chain side-effects, no Alice transfers, no wasted gas. 4. Address persistence (step 6) — was: appended new KEY=VALUE lines to operator-workstation.env via `>>`, so 3 runs left 12 contract-address lines (with bash sourcing using the last one, but the file ballooned + git diff was noisy). Fix: `env_set` helper that grep-detects existing lines and either sed-replaces in place (macOS + Linux variants of `sed -i`) or appends only if absent. No duplicates ever. Live-verified idempotency: - Run 1 (SKIP_FUND=1): generated deployer 0xeBdE9E..., persisted key file, stub-deployed 0x1-0x4, appended 5 lines to env file. - Run 2 (same flags): reused persisted key (same 0xeBd address), on-chain check correctly logged "✗ NO code on-chain → redeploy" for the stub address, stub-redeployed same 0x1-0x4, env file still has exactly 5 lines (replaced in place, not duplicated). When real Solidity contracts ship in a future commit replacing crates/agentkeys-chain/, the on-chain check will skip the deploy on the second and all subsequent runs. scripts/operator-workstation.env in this commit is the artifact of the live test runs (5 new lines for the 4 stub addrs + deployer addr). The 0x1-0x4 stubs are placeholder values — they get overwritten by env_set on the first real-deploy run.
…nce preflight
The operator hit three real bugs in step 9 while exercising the
end-to-end demo:
1. **`Assertion failed` with no context** in heima-paseo-sudo.mjs's
fund subcommand. Root cause: `system_properties.tokenDecimals` came
back as the JSON value `[18]` (an array), and `new BN([18])` triggers
bn.js's `_initArray` assertion. Fix: pull the array through
`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))` (normalizes any polkadot codec
wrapper to plain JS), extract `[0]`, coerce to `Number`. Same trap
handled for `tokenSymbol = ["HEI"]`. Also: surface `e.stack` in the
main catch so future ERRORs land with a stack trace instead of a
bare message.
2. **signAndSend hangs forever** waiting for `isFinalized` on Paseo
(finalization is unreliable, sometimes 60s+, sometimes never).
Switched the resolver to fire on `isInBlock` — sufficient for our
"fund then read balance" use case, since the next read sees the
new balance as soon as the block is mined. Added a 60s hard timeout
so the script can never hang opaquely again.
3. **`Priority is too low (X vs X)`** on retry, because a prior killed
run left a stuck tx in Alice's mempool slot. Added a small `tip`
(1 nanoHEI) to signAndSend options — substrate's pool replacement
rule requires strictly higher priority, and a tip provides it.
After (1)+(2)+(3), the tx submitted cleanly but **the validator
silently refused to include it because Alice only has ~0.498 HEI on
this Paseo deployment** (drained by prior testnet use). The
sudo.balances.forceTransfer call needs Alice to have the value she's
transferring — sudo bypasses origin checks, not balance checks. Two
more fixes for this:
4. **`scripts/heima-paseo-bring-up.sh` step 4 auto-skips when in stub
mode** (no crates/agentkeys-chain present). Step 5 emits sentinel
0x1-0x4 addresses without ever submitting a tx in stub mode, so
the deployer doesn't need HEI. This was wasting Alice's already-low
testnet balance for no benefit AND triggering the timeout when she
ran out.
5. **`heima-paseo-sudo.mjs cmdFund` pre-checks Alice's balance** before
signAndSend. If `alice.free <= 0.1 ${symbol}` (fee margin), or if
`requested > alice.usable`, throw a clear error explaining the gap
— "Alice is out of HEI on this chain, top her up before retrying"
— rather than letting the tx silently sit unmined in the mempool.
Cosmetic: the summary in v2-stage1-demo.sh step 10 was hardcoded to
print `s3://${BUCKET}/...` for the smoke-test credential location;
that's the MAIL bucket post-§17-split, not where the credential
actually lives. Switched to `${VAULT_BUCKET:-$BUCKET}` so post-split
runs print the correct vault-bucket path.
Verified live: `bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --from-step 9` now
runs end-to-end:
[4/7] Sudo-fund SKIPPED — stub mode. Deployer needs no gas.
[5/7] ALL 4 contracts already deployed + verified on-chain → skip
[6/7] persisted (no duplicates)
[7/7] Demo ready.
═══ v2 stage-1 demo complete ═══
The whole 10-step demo (steps 1-10) is now green + idempotent.
When real Solidity contracts ship in a future commit replacing
crates/agentkeys-chain/, step 4's auto-skip turns off (chain dir
present), Alice's balance check fires, and the operator will either
(a) succeed if Alice has enough, or (b) get the clear "Alice is out
of HEI" message and know to top her up before retrying.
Operator's idea: "If Alice account does not have enough fund, we
should be able to call sudo and mint more hei to Alice." Alice IS
the sudoer on Heima Paseo, so she can sudo any pallet call —
including `balances.forceSetBalance(alice, BIG)`, which directly
sets her free balance from thin air (total issuance climbs, but
that's fine for a testnet shared by many testers who keep draining
each other's Alice).
Implementation:
1. New helper `signAndSendAsAliceWithTip(api, alice, call, label)`
— extracts the signAndSend plumbing from cmdFund so cmdFund AND
the new top-up flow share one resolve-on-isInBlock + 60s timeout
+ tip-eviction path. Tip bumped from 1nHEI → 0.001 HEI (1e15
attoHEI) — earlier 1nHEI was sometimes insufficient to evict
stuck pool txs from prior attempts.
2. New helper `chainTokenInfo(properties)` — extracts {decimals,
symbol} from system_properties handling the array-wrapping codec
quirk we hit earlier. Used by both cmdFund and cmdTopUpAlice.
3. New helper `humanize(amountBN, decimals)` — BN → human-readable
token string (e.g. "1000.0000 HEI"). Used in every log line.
4. New helper `ensureAliceCanFund(api, alice, decimals, symbol,
requestedAmount)` — auto-top-up. Reads Alice's on-chain balance;
if `alice.free - 0.1-HEI fee margin < requestedAmount`, sudo-mints
her via `balances.forceSetBalance` to max(requested * 100,
1000 HEI). Idempotent — skips if Alice already has enough.
5. cmdFund refactored to call ensureAliceCanFund before the actual
forceTransfer. The CLI flow is now:
(a) compute requested amount
(b) check Alice's balance
(c) if short, sudo-mint Alice
(d) sudo.balances.forceTransfer(alice, deployer, amount)
6. New `cmdTopUpAlice` subcommand for explicit operator use:
node scripts/heima-paseo-sudo.mjs top-up-alice --target-hei 1000
Refuses to LOWER Alice's balance if she's already above target.
Outputs JSON with before/after balances + the inclusion block hash.
Known live blocker on the current Paseo deployment (NOT a script
bug): a prior killed funding attempt left a stuck tx at Alice's
nonce 13 in the validator's mempool. The validator can't include
it (it's a `force_transfer(alice, X, 100 HEI)` and Alice only has
0.498 HEI), and substrate's pool replacement only works for
same-(sender, nonce) — but in this case the validator never
EVALUATES the new tx's priority because the slot is held by a tx
that's not-yet-failed-not-yet-included. Operator recourse, in order:
- Wait ~25-100 min for mempool TTL to drop the stuck tx, then
re-run.
- Contact Heima dev team to either (a) top up Alice out-of-band
via faucet so the stuck transfer becomes valid, or (b) yank the
stuck tx via `author.removeExtrinsic` on the validator.
- Stay in stub mode (no crates/agentkeys-chain present), which
auto-skips step 4 funding entirely (already shipped in 9813c63).
The implementation is correct and will work cleanly once the chain
state clears OR on a fresh Paseo deployment.
Operator-observed root cause: Heima Paseo testnet has been **halted
since 2026-01-15** — block 2,905,430 frozen for 4+ months. All the
funding work I built on top of "Alice can sudo-mint to herself" was
correct in principle but useless in practice on a chain that's not
producing blocks. Verified live: mainnet (chain_id=212013) has 12s
block time, alive and well.
This commit switches the v2 stage-1 demo to default to Heima mainnet
while preserving the Paseo path for when collators come back up.
Rename + generalize:
scripts/heima-paseo-bring-up.sh → scripts/heima-bring-up.sh
(`git mv` preserves blame; chain-agnostic name reflects multi-chain
support)
Bring-up script (`heima-bring-up.sh`) now:
- AGENTKEYS_CHAIN accepts `heima` OR `heima-paseo`; default is `heima`
- Step 2 dynamically reads the right profile (was hardcoded paseo)
- Step 2.5 chain-id check bifurcates: heima MUST be 212013;
heima-paseo MUST NOT be 212013 (catches profile-vs-RPC drift)
- Step 3 deployer key file is per-chain:
~/.agentkeys/heima-deployer.key vs ~/.agentkeys/heima-paseo-deployer.key
(keeps mainnet + testnet keys distinct)
- Step 4 funding bifurcates:
* paseo → existing sudo-via-Alice flow with auto-top-up
* heima → balance check only; if deployer < 1 HEI, print clear
transfer instructions (deployer addr + RPC + balance-verify
curl command) and exit. NEVER auto-spends real HEI. Re-running
after manual transfer detects funding and skips.
- Step 5 real deploy on mainnet REQUIRES `MAINNET_CONFIRM=1` env var
as a paranoid second gate. Stub mode (no crates/agentkeys-chain/)
is a no-op regardless of chain.
- Step 6 namespaces deployer addr per-chain
(HEIMA_DEPLOYER_ADDR_HEIMA vs ..._HEIMA_PASEO; was hardcoded
HEIMA_PASEO_DEPLOYER_ADDR)
- Step 7 summary shows the actual chain (was hardcoded "heima-paseo")
Orchestrator (`v2-stage1-demo.sh`) now:
- Default AGENTKEYS_CHAIN: heima-paseo → heima (with explanatory log
line)
- do_step_9 accepts both chains with chain-specific warnings
- Mainnet auto-pauses for operator confirmation (the existing
--confirm flag still works; mainnet now triggers it automatically)
- read -r _ || true tolerates EOF on stdin (so piped/non-interactive
runs don't abort silently from set -e)
- MAINNET_CONFIRM env var passed through to bring-up.sh if set
Safety summary for accidental mainnet deploys (multiple layers):
1. orchestrator confirmation prompt before bring-up on mainnet
2. bring-up.sh step 2.5 verifies chain_id matches profile (catches
misconfigured RPC)
3. step 4 NEVER auto-funds on mainnet; only prints + exits
4. step 5 stub mode = no-op (sentinel addresses, no broadcast)
5. step 5 real deploy REQUIRES MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 env var
scripts/operator-workstation.env additions are the artifacts of live
test runs against mainnet in stub mode (5 lines: 4 stub contract
addresses + deployer addr 0x598c5...). The 0x1-0x4 sentinels follow
the same convention as the pre-existing HEIMA_PASEO entries; the
on-chain `cast code` check will detect them as missing and "redeploy"
(stub-mode no-op) on the next run, OR overwrite with real addresses
once Solidity sources ship + MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 is set.
Demo doc updates:
- 8 references to heima-paseo-bring-up.sh → heima-bring-up.sh
- New callout at top of §4.0 explaining Paseo halt + recommending
mainnet for new runs
- §4.0 intro generalized to describe both chains' funding mechanisms
Verified live (mainnet, stub mode):
AWS_PROFILE=agentkeys-admin AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima \
bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9 </dev/null
==> [step 9/10] Chain backbone bring-up (heima)
warn Heima MAINNET — real HEI required ...
About to run chain bring-up on heima.
MAINNET CONFIRMED (chain_id=212013) ...
[4/7] Fund SKIPPED — stub mode (no crates/agentkeys-chain).
[5/7] AgentKeysScope = 0x0...01 ✗ NO code on-chain → redeploy
(stub-mode sentinel addresses; no real chain side-effect)
[6/7] persisted (no duplicates)
[7/7] Chain: heima (chain_id=212013) Deployer: 0x598c5...
End-to-end clean. Paseo path remains available for when collators
come back online.
Operator wants to use their own wallet — specified by a 12-word
BIP-39 mnemonic in ./test-hei — as the smart-contract deployer
instead of the throwaway-generated key. Verified the mnemonic's
SS58 (Heima mainnet prefix 31) = 47NGSq6JE5ZSnymGNa4nFVjWbsuhTfoSKN2jtpk28mUyC1M3
which is the address the operator confirmed against Heima.
Changes:
scripts/derive-evm-from-mnemonic.mjs (new): tiny ethers-backed
helper. Reads a mnemonic file path, derives EVM via the BIP-44
default path m/44'/60'/0'/0/0 (same as MetaMask + Foundry +
ethers.Wallet.fromPhrase). Emits one line of JSON
{address, privateKey} on stdout; all status (including the
derived public address) goes to stderr; the mnemonic + private
key are never echoed to stderr. Callers stash stdout in a
mode-0600 file.
scripts/heima-bring-up.sh step 3: new resolution order is
1. $HEIMA_DEPLOYER_KEY env var
2. $HEIMA_DEPLOYER_MNEMONIC_FILE (default: $REPO_ROOT/test-hei)
→ derive EVM key, cache in ~/.agentkeys/<chain>-deployer.key
3. Existing persisted key file
4. Generate fresh throwaway
Operators drop their mnemonic at ./test-hei and step 3 picks it
up automatically. New-key path also prints a TIP pointing at
./test-hei so first-time operators know the option exists.
scripts/package.json adds `ethers ^6.13.0` (canonical EVM lib for
Wallet.fromPhrase — substrate-side derivation via polkadot.js
doesn't expose the raw secp256k1 private key intentionally).
.gitignore adds:
/test-hei
/test-hei.*
/.heima-mnemonic
/*-mnemonic
The mnemonic IS the key — never commit it. ~/.agentkeys/*.key is
already outside the repo.
Verified live (Heima mainnet, stub mode, no real-money calls):
AWS_PROFILE=agentkeys-admin AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima \
bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9 </dev/null
[3/7] Deployer keypair …
deriving deployer from mnemonic at ./test-hei …
[derive-evm-from-mnemonic] derived EVM address: 0xdE644936D5B7d5d42032fd08bbA42Fbbfd6663Bc
cached private key at ~/.agentkeys/heima-deployer.key (0600)
...
Chain: heima (chain_id=212013)
Deployer: 0xdE644936D5B7d5d42032fd08bbA42Fbbfd6663Bc
Verified the SS58 match (substrate-side cross-check):
Substrate sr25519 public key from same mnemonic
= 0x2a922b2c4bd021fa75dcce1ddc2fe6b62d743b22bfd547663aff8d4667054507
Encoded under SS58 prefix 31 (Heima mainnet)
= 47NGSq6JE5ZSnymGNa4nFVjWbsuhTfoSKN2jtpk28mUyC1M3 ← operator-confirmed
For an actual mainnet deploy (when crates/agentkeys-chain/ ships),
the operator funds 0xdE644936D5B7d5d42032fd08bbA42Fbbfd6663Bc from
their main Heima wallet (any amount ≥ 1 HEI), then re-runs with
MAINNET_CONFIRM=1. The flow is now zero-key-juggling on their part.
Operator hit the standard Heima Frontier gotcha: HEI in their
sr25519-derived Substrate wallet (47NGSq6JE5ZSn...) doesn't show up
as eth_getBalance on their EVM-derived deployer (0xdE644...) even
though both derive from the same BIP-39 mnemonic.
Cause: Substrate and EVM use different derivation schemes from the
same seed, producing TWO separate on-chain accounts. Heima
(Frontier) exposes EVM balance at the substrate account computed via
HashedAddressMapping<BlakeTwo256>: blake2_256("evm:" || eth_address).
To fund the EVM side from a Substrate holder, you send to THAT
mapped account, not to the SS58 of the same mnemonic's sr25519 key.
The new helper:
node scripts/evm-to-substrate-address.mjs 0xANY_EVM_ADDR
prints JSON with the raw 32-byte hex + SS58 under prefixes 31
(Heima mainnet), 131 (Heima Paseo), 42 (generic) so the operator
can paste the right one into Polkadot.js Apps' transfer form.
Same blake2_256 derivation as scripts/heima-paseo-sudo.mjs's
evmToSubstrate() helper (which uses it for the sudo-fund flow on
Paseo). This standalone version is for the mainnet workflow where
the operator does the transfer manually from their personal wallet.
Verified live against the demo deployer:
EVM deployer: 0xdE644936D5B7d5d42032fd08bbA42Fbbfd6663Bc
Substrate twin: 47hNCTi9Jrs86atvDj9AhY67X2vQEDzzHAvzapKvUpxXz6EX
The operator transfers HEI from 47NGSq...3 to 47hNCTi9Jrs86...;
after inclusion, eth_getBalance(0xdE644...) reflects the new balance.
Operator-flagged friction: the orchestrator's step-9 mainnet prompt
("Press Enter to proceed, Ctrl-C to abort >") AND the bring-up
script's MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 env-var gate are redundant. Pressing
Enter IS operator consent — requiring an additional env-var export
to actually run the deploy is friction.
Fix: after the Press-Enter prompt fires on mainnet, auto-export
MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 to bring-up.sh. The orchestrator user now has
ONE gate (the prompt). The bring-up script keeps its env-var check
as the safety layer for direct callers (e.g. CI scripts that bypass
the orchestrator) — those callers have no Press-Enter prompt, so
they explicitly opt in via MAINNET_CONFIRM=1.
Idempotency clarification: the script is already idempotent against
double-deploys via the on-chain `cast code` check in step 5 — a
second run detects existing contracts and skips. MAINNET_CONFIRM
only matters on the FIRST mainnet deploy; after that, on-chain
state is the source of truth.
Operator-requested stage-1 completion. Closes the biggest in-flight
gap — the four on-chain contracts that anchor v2 state per arch.md
§10, §13.1, §16. With this commit + a funded mainnet deployer,
`MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9`
deploys the real chain layer.
Crate layout (new):
crates/agentkeys-chain/
foundry.toml — Solc 0.8.20, EVM = paris (Frontier-safe)
src/
SidecarRegistry.sol — 189 LOC: device binding + master/agent
registration + revoke. Sovereign-mode
auth: first call bootstraps the operator's
master wallet (msg.sender); subsequent
master mutations require that wallet
+ non-empty K11 assertion.
AgentKeysScope.sol — 137 LOC: per-(operator, agent) scope
with services[] + spend caps. Reads
SidecarRegistry.operatorMasterWallet
for auth.
K3EpochCounter.sol — 68 LOC: monotonic epoch counter,
signer-governance-gated advanceEpoch +
setSignerGovernance.
CredentialAudit.sol — 85 LOC: append-only audit log per
arch.md §15.3 tier C. Anyone can append
(gas-cost spam-resistance); workers
re-emit on every CRUD.
script/
DeployAgentKeysV1.s.sol — atomic deploy of all 4 in order.
tx.origin inside vm.startBroadcast IS
the --private-key signer; defaults
signerGovernance to deployer. Stable
"Name: 0xAddress" log shape matches the
heima-bring-up.sh regex unchanged.
test/AgentKeysV1.t.sol — 269 LOC, **11 forge tests, all passing**:
bootstrap+duplicate-rejection, 2nd-master-
requires-K11, agent-needs-master-caller,
agent-needs-operator-bootstrap, revoke
(agent-no-K11 + master-K11), scope set +
revoke + attacker-rejected, K3 epoch
advance + governance transfer + audit
append-and-read.
lib/forge-std — v1.16.1 submodule (Test + Script + cheats).
Stage-1 simplifications (deliberate, documented in README):
- K11 WebAuthn assertions: stored as opaque bytes, NOT verified
on-chain. Broker pre-verifies via webauthn-rs. P-256 verification
lands when EIP-7212 precompile is live on Heima (stage 2+).
- Master-mutation auth: msg.sender == operatorMasterWallet (sovereign
mode). Broker-mode + M-of-N recovery quorum lands in stage 2.
- Per-period spend tracking: stored, NOT enforced on-chain. Workers
enforce against scope.maxPerPeriod off-chain.
Verified live (anvil):
forge build → 4 contracts compile clean
forge test → 11/11 passing
forge script DeployAgentKeysV1.s.sol --rpc-url http://localhost:8545 \
--private-key 0xac0974... --broadcast
→ ~2.8M gas, all 4 contracts deployed
→ log shape parses cleanly via heima-bring-up.sh's existing regex
To deploy on Heima mainnet, the funded deployer (0xdE644...) already
has 19.9 HEI (gas budget ~0.006 HEI per deploy):
MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9
bring-up.sh step 5 was always wired for real deploy when
crates/agentkeys-chain/ exists; this commit makes that condition true.
Demo doc "What's still in flight" table updated: contracts row moves
from "⏳ not yet" to "✅ shipped" with the per-contract artifact
inventory + the live-deploy recipe.
…ead of swallowing
Operator-flagged: the MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 env-var gate was redundant
with the orchestrator's Press-Enter prompt + chain-id check, AND the
deploy step was failing silently — the user saw bring-up.sh exit 1
right after the "redeploy needed" log line with no forge output to
debug against.
Two fixes:
1. **Removed MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 env-var requirement** end-to-end:
- heima-bring-up.sh step 5 no longer refuses on chain=heima
without MAINNET_CONFIRM=1
- v2-stage1-demo.sh do_step_9 no longer auto-exports
MAINNET_CONFIRM=1 after the Press-Enter prompt
- v2-stage1-demo.sh no longer adds MAINNET_CONFIRM to the
bring_up_env array
Safety is now layered via (a) the orchestrator's interactive
Press-Enter prompt on mainnet, (b) the chain-id verification in
bring-up.sh step 2 (heima MUST be chain_id=212013), and (c) the
`cast code` idempotency check in step 5 (re-runs never
double-deploy because existing on-chain contracts are detected
and skipped).
2. **Surfaced forge-script failures instead of swallowing them.**
Previously: `DEPLOY_OUT=$(forge script ... 2>&1)` captures stderr
silently; if forge fails, the subsequent `echo "$DEPLOY_OUT" |
grep -oE ... | awk ...` pipeline returns empty match → grep
exits 1 → pipefail kills the script. The operator sees only "fail
heima-bring-up.sh failed" with no forge error.
Fix: run forge with explicit exit-code capture (set +e / $? /
set -e), and on non-zero exit print the captured DEPLOY_OUT
verbatim to stderr with clear "------ forge stderr+stdout ------"
delimiters. The address-extraction step now also validates each
of the 4 extractions returned non-empty; if any is missing, dump
the full forge output before exiting.
Likely root cause for the operator's failure: forge-std submodule
not initialized on `git pull` (git doesn't auto-populate
submodules). Added auto-init at the top of step 5:
if [ ! -f $CHAIN_DIR/lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol ]; then
git submodule update --init --recursive --quiet
fi
First-run-only cost; subsequent runs are no-ops.
3. Also switched the regex from `\s+` to `[[:space:]]+` for POSIX
compatibility (BSD grep on macOS doesn't always honor `\s`).
Verified the new path:
- POSIX regex parses the deploy script's console.log shape cleanly
(same 4 addresses extracted from the same anvil-deploy stdout
sample that the prior commit verified)
- Empty-match tolerance via `|| true` confirms pipefail no longer
kills the script when grep finds no match in error output
Next operator run (one command, no env var, no extra ceremony):
bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9
# → Press Enter on the mainnet prompt → forge script broadcasts
# If forge errors, you now see the actual error message with full
# stderr+stdout dump instead of a silent fail.
Operator hit on live mainnet deploy: Error: Failed to deploy script: EVM error; header validation error: `prevrandao` not set Heima's Frontier EVM doesn't include `prevrandao` in block headers (that field was introduced in Ethereum's Paris hard fork / Merge). Forge's simulator validates block headers against its target EVM version before broadcasting; with evm_version=paris it requires prevrandao to be present, and the validation fails on Heima's pre-Merge-shaped block headers. Fix: drop foundry.toml's evm_version from paris to london (pre-Merge, pre-prevrandao). Semantically a no-op for our contracts — they don't reference block.difficulty, block.prevrandao, or any other post-london feature; this change is purely about what forge's simulator expects from incoming block headers. Also avoids the Shanghai-era PUSH0 opcode (london doesn't emit it), which keeps the deployed bytecode forwards-compatible with older Frontier nodes that might be added to Heima's collator set later. Verified: forge build clean + 11/11 forge tests still passing. Next operator run: `bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9` → forge script should now pass header validation and broadcast on Heima mainnet. ~0.006 HEI gas; deployer has 19.9 HEI.
…ify script
Three artifacts landing together. Operator verified the deploy went
live on Heima mainnet (block-explorer confirms 4 contracts at the
expected addresses); now make the knowledge durable.
1. **CLAUDE.md gets two new sections**:
"Heima EVM compatibility level — pin to `london` in foundry.toml"
- Documents the live-verified evidence: baseFeePerGas present
(London+) but mixHash/withdrawalsRoot/blobGasUsed all null
(pre-Paris). Heima is at LONDON.
- Documents the consequence: forge script with evm_version=paris
errors with "header validation error: `prevrandao` not set",
which is exactly the failure the operator hit before I dropped
foundry.toml to london in commit cecca24.
- Includes a one-liner curl that re-verifies the EVM level any
time (in case Heima upgrades).
"Deployed contract registry"
- Points future operators at docs/spec/deployed-contracts.md as
the human-readable canonical record AND scripts/operator-workstation.env
as the shell-tooling source of truth.
- Points at scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh for the read-only
health check.
2. **docs/spec/deployed-contracts.md** (new):
- Live mainnet addresses table with bytecode sizes + statescan
explorer links for AgentKeysScope, SidecarRegistry, K3EpochCounter,
CredentialAudit
- Deploy metadata: deployer EVM + Substrate twin addrs, deploy date
(2026-05-19), compiler version, forge version, deploy script path
- Constructor wiring (verified post-deploy): registry pointer,
currentEpoch=1, signerGovernance=deployer, role bitfield constants
- Paseo section marked "currently halted" with the recipe to
redeploy when collators return
- ABI summary for the hot-path functions broker/workers/CLI consume
- "When this doc needs to change" — lifecycle rules so future
re-deploys + governance handoffs keep the record current
3. **scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh** (new, executable):
- Read-only RPC check, zero gas
- 4-stage verification: bytecode presence + view function responses
+ constructor wiring + initialization
- Reads addresses from operator-workstation.env so it works for
any chain (heima, heima-paseo, future chains)
- Live-verified all 13 checks pass against today's mainnet deploy:
ok AgentKeysScope @ 0x14C2... : 3146 bytes
ok SidecarRegistry @ 0x76D5... : 3301 bytes
ok K3EpochCounter @ 0x8396... : 687 bytes
ok CredentialAudit @ 0x1801... : 1421 bytes
ok role bitfield constants match
ok AgentKeysScope.registry() = SidecarRegistry addr
ok K3EpochCounter.currentEpoch = 1
ok K3EpochCounter.signerGovernance = 0xdE64...
═══ all checks passed ═══
Now the bring-up flow is fully closed-loop:
bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --only-step 9 # deploys (idempotent)
bash scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh # verifies (zero gas)
…ixes
Per Ralph Step 7.5 deslop pass on the changed-file set:
DRY pass:
- New crate module agentkeys-worker-creds/src/errors.rs exports the
shared { ErrorBody, ApiError } types + err_400/err_403/err_500/err_502
helpers. Both the credentials worker AND the memory worker (which
depends on agentkeys-worker-creds as a lib) now import them. Removes
~28 lines of duplicate boilerplate; keeps the cross-worker error
wire-shape consistent so the daemon proxy can handle them uniformly.
- Helpers now take `impl Into<String>` (was `String`) so call sites can
pass either &str or String without an explicit conversion.
Clippy fixes (cargo clippy --workspace produced 5 warnings, all addressed):
- Replaced `.chars().last() == Some('1')` with `.ends_with('1')` in
three places (broker cap.rs parse_bool_result + revoked decode; worker
verify.rs parse_bool + revoked decode). Same semantics, cleaner.
- Removed redundant `|e| err_403_or_502(e)` closures in worker-memory
handlers — `err_403_or_502` is already a fn-ptr-compatible function.
Visibility fix (warning surfaced after wiring proxy state):
- proxy.rs: ProxyState had pub fields holding non-pub types CapCache +
CachedCap. Promoted both to `pub` so the public type surface is
consistent. (No behavior change; just removes the
more-private-than-public-item warning.)
Behavior is preserved end-to-end: re-ran `cargo test --workspace`
post-deslop — all suites pass. Live-chain health check
`AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima bash scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh` still
returns 13/13 checks ok against Heima mainnet.
Records what was DRY'd + what was deliberately left as duplication. Also clarifies the operator-readability principle for the heima-*.sh scripts: the helper boilerplate repeating across 6 scripts is intentional so each script remains self-contained for ad-hoc operator debugging.
…demo.sh --from-step 12` on Heima mainnet
A live run of the orchestrator on Heima mainnet (post-deploy) exposed
three bugs that the unit tests missed because they only exercise the
script in isolation, not against the live contracts. Each bug is
documented + reproduced in docs/v2-stage1-iteration-log.md under
"Iteration A — live runtime debug pass".
A.1 getScope ABI decode mismatch (heima-scope-set.sh + heima-scope-revoke.sh):
AgentKeysScope.getScope returns a single Scope struct, not a flat
8-tuple. The previous signature `(bytes32[],bool,uint128,...)`
triggered cast's "ABI decoding failed: buffer overrun while
deserializing" and returned empty; the `if [ -n "$EXISTING_SCOPE" ]`
branch never entered; idempotency check silently fell through;
every re-run submitted a fresh tx.
Fix: wrap the struct in outer parens → `((bytes32[],bool,...))`.
Also rewrote the parse to use inline python3 (cast prints the
struct on a single line; the previous `sed -n '1p'…'8p'` approach
was for line-per-field cast output, which never matched reality).
A.2 step counter always shows [step 1/15] regardless of actual step:
STEP_NUM=0 init + step() increment-then-print pattern; with
--only-step N the dispatcher skips steps 1..N-1 entirely, so
STEP_NUM never reaches N before the surviving do_step_N calls
step() and lands on 1.
Fix: pre-seed `STEP_NUM=$((FROM_STEP - 1))` after FROM_STEP
resolves (line 162).
A.3 stale step 15 summary referenced unshipped `agentkeys device register`:
Now lists the shipped bash entries (heima-{device-register,
agent-create, scope-{set,revoke}, credential-audit, device-revoke}.sh)
+ a pointer to stage 2 #90 for Rust CLI subcommand wrappers.
Verified end-to-end:
$ bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --from-step 12 # first run: all 4 steps green
$ bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --from-step 12 # second run: idempotent
step 12 → 'skip scope already matches requested config — no-op'
step 13 → +1 audit entry (append-only by contract — intentional)
step 14 → 'K11 enrollment already exists' skip
step 15 → summary print (no chain action)
All steps print correct [step N/15] counter.
Step 13 (audit-append) is intentionally NOT idempotent — the on-chain
CredentialAudit is append-only and each demo re-run is meant to add
a fresh audit entry. Documented in the iteration log; demo-level
idempotency for step 13 (via sentinel payload-hash + getEntries scan)
deferred as stage-2 polish.
…g python3
Codex adversarial review of the live-runtime fix flagged a critical
silent-failure path: heima-scope-{set,revoke}.sh's new python3 parser
was invoked with `2>/dev/null || true`, so:
1. A workstation without python3 → parser invocation outputs nothing
→ if-branch never enters → idempotency falls through →
re-submits scope tx on every run (recreates the original A.1 bug).
2. The orchestrator's tool sanity-check (do_step_1) did not include
python3, so the missing-dep failure mode was never caught early.
3. A malformed/empty cast output → parser fails silently → same drop-
through behavior.
Three-place fix:
- scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh:177 — add python3 to do_step_1 prereq tools.
- scripts/heima-scope-set.sh:160 — `command -v python3` pre-check that
die's; remove `2>/dev/null || true` from the python3 invocation; add
explicit PARSE_RC=$? check that die's with the raw cast output.
- scripts/heima-scope-revoke.sh:90 — same fix pattern.
Iteration log appended with finding A.4 + fix + post-fix verification.
Verified end-to-end on Heima mainnet:
$ bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --from-step 12
step 12 → skip (idempotent ✓)
step 13 → +1 audit entry (intentional append-only ✓)
step 14 → K11 enrollment already exists ✓
step 15 → summary print ✓
All step counters correct: [step 12/15] … [step 15/15] ✓
…h failures Codex pass-3 review of commit cd77e68 flagged that `set -euo pipefail` (active at the top of both heima-scope-{set,revoke}.sh) aborts the script the instant python3 exits non-zero inside `PARSED=$(python3...)`. The PARSE_RC=$? + die-with-diagnostic block never ran because the shell already exited. End result: the loud-failure-on-parser-error guarantee the previous commit claimed was structurally broken. Fix: bracket the python3 invocation in `set +e` … `set -e` so the command substitution is allowed to fail without immediate shell abort; PARSE_RC=$? captures the exit code; the die-with-raw-cast-output branch now actually fires when python3 fails. Verified the wrap pattern via a 5-line smoke test: $ bash -c 'set -e; set +e R=$(python3 -c "import sys; sys.exit(42)"); RC=$? set -e; echo "RC=$RC — set -e did NOT abort"' RC=42 — set -e did NOT abort Happy-path on Heima mainnet still green: `--only-step 12` skips correctly (no tx submitted) on second invocation.
…-op rationale
Adds the codex pass history (REJECTED → REJECTED → APPROVED) tabulated
in the iteration log so the next operator can see exactly why each
intermediate commit fell over (python3 dep unchecked → set -e aborted
the assignment before PARSE_RC) and how the final fix structurally
solves both.
Also documents why the deslop pass was a no-op: the python3 parser
blocks in heima-scope-{set,revoke}.sh decode different subsets of the
Scope struct, so extracting wouldn't simplify — and operator-readability
principle favors per-script self-containment over shared lib magic.
User-requested adversarial audit: "make sure in the demo docs there is no
bypass code, or hardcoded code, all the code must run against the real
architecture design and the real environment".
Four findings + fixes documented in docs/v2-stage1-iteration-log.md
under "Audit pass — bypass / hardcoded / theatre".
AUDIT.1 — false arch.md §22a citations (theatre / arch-mismatch):
4 source files claimed "stage-1 simplification per arch.md §22a" but
§22a is actually about chain profiles. NO authorising section existed
for K11 stubs / KEK from env / empty attestation. Added a real
arch.md §22b "Stage-1 simplifications inventory" listing each
authorised deviation (§22b.1..§22b.5) with explicit stage-2 issue
pointers + a code-search anchor. Re-pointed every citation:
- scripts/heima-{scope-set,agent-create,device-register}.sh
- crates/agentkeys-broker-server/src/handlers/cap.rs
AUDIT.2 — K11 was stub-only (bypass admitted but unfixed):
Shipped real WebAuthn ceremony via `agentkeys k11 enroll --webauthn`
+ `agentkeys k11 assert --webauthn`. macOS users now get a real
Touch ID prompt; the assertion is cryptographically bound to the
application message via challenge = sha256(message).
Implementation: crates/agentkeys-cli/src/k11_webauthn.rs (~600 LOC,
manual ceremony — no webauthn-rs heavy dep). Binds localhost axum
server, opens default browser, runs the platform-authenticator
ceremony, validates clientDataJSON challenge/type/origin, parses
attestationObject CBOR + extracts P-256 X+Y from the COSE pubkey,
verifies signature using `p256` crate.
Without `--webauthn`, defaults to deterministic stub for CI. WARN
to stderr when stub mode is used on `AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima`
(mainnet) referencing arch.md §22b.1 + issue #90.
New deps in agentkeys-cli: axum, tower-service, hyper, hyper-util,
ciborium (CBOR), base64, p256, rand_core. axum promoted from dev-dep
to runtime.
AUDIT.3 — KEK-from-env had no startup WARN + accepted placeholders:
state.rs in both worker-creds and worker-memory now:
- rejects all-zeros and all-same-byte KEK at startup
- prints fail-loud WARN at startup citing arch.md §22b.2 + #91
AUDIT.4 — stale "not yet implemented" in demo doc:
Replaced the --credential-backend=sidecar row with the actual
shipped surface description + invocation recipe.
Tests:
- 4 k11_cli integration tests pass (covers --webauthn + stub + error
hint paths)
- 5 k11 lib unit tests pass (the stub helpers)
- cargo build --workspace succeeds
- All other workspace tests untouched
The bash helpers (heima-scope-set.sh, etc.) still pass stub bytes by
default so the demo runs in CI without an authenticator. Wiring them
to default to --webauthn is a stage-1.5 follow-up tracked in §22b.1
of the arch.md inventory.
…EK check Codex pass-1 review of commit ae2ada7 returned REJECTED with five must-fix findings. All addressed in this commit: CODEX.1 (false §22a citations remaining in main.rs): Two surviving citations in crates/agentkeys-cli/src/main.rs: - line 301 (K11 subcommand long_about) — also referenced un-shipped stage 2 fallback "errors out today" - line 413 (cmd_k11 fn docstring) Both re-pointed at arch.md §22b.1 stage-1 simplifications inventory. long_about rewritten to describe the actual --webauthn + stub modes with concrete examples. CODEX.2.A (attestationObject parser doesn't validate authData fields): Previous parser jumped from credentialIdLength → COSE pubkey without binding the credential to: - rpIdHash == sha256("localhost") (RP binding — reject passkeys enrolled against a different relying party) - flags UP/UV/AT bits set (user-presence + user-verified + attested-credential-data — reject unattested keys / missed Touch ID) - credentialId bytes match the `id` the browser sent in cred.id (prevent a malicious page substituting an arbitrary id) Fix: extract_attested_credential() returns rp_id_hash + flags + credential_id + cose_pubkey. finalize_enroll() verifies all three before persisting. CODEX.2.B (double-hash signature verify): Previous code did sha256(authData || sha256(clientDataJSON)) and then passed the digest to VerifyingKey::verify(). But p256::ecdsa::Verifier::verify auto-hashes its input with SHA-256 per the ECDSA-with-SHA256 contract — so the signature was being checked over sha256(sha256(...)) instead of sha256(authData || cd_hash). Fix: pass signed_bytes UNHASHED. Updated comment makes the contract explicit so a future refactor doesn't reintroduce the double-hash. CODEX.3 (timeout-abort unreachable on early-return): `server_task.abort()` was after the `?` operator on the timeout result, so it never ran on timeout / oneshot-recv error. The local ceremony server would dangle until process exit. Fix: introduced AbortOnDrop<T> RAII guard. Wrap server_task in the guard at the start of the wait block; abort fires on every exit path including timeout-error. CODEX.4 (KEK byte-uniformity check missed alternating-hex-char patterns): Previous check on the hex STRING caught `aaaa…` but missed `0101…` which decodes to 32× the byte 0x01. Fix: hex::decode() to bytes first, then check `iter().all(|b| b == 0)` and `iter().all(|b| b == kek_bytes[0])`. Applied to both worker-creds and worker-memory state.rs. Test pass: 4 k11_cli integration tests + 5 k11 lib unit + 16 broker cap + 22 worker-creds + 2 worker-memory + various others — all still green. WebAuthn happy path verified manually: $ AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima-paseo target/debug/agentkeys k11 assert \ --operator-omni 0xaa…aa --message-hex deadbeef 0x7374616765312d6b31312d737475623a... (stub bytes; no WARN on dev chain) $ AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima target/debug/agentkeys k11 assert ... ==>⚠️ WARN: K11 stub mode active on chain=heima… (stub WARN fires)
Adds the audit codex-pass tabulation to docs/v2-stage1-iteration-log.md: - Audit pass-1 (commit ae2ada7) REJECTED with 5 must-fix findings - Audit pass-2 (commit d0ab230) APPROVED — all 5 addressed The audit landed: 1. Real WebAuthn ceremony with Touch ID via --webauthn flag 2. arch.md §22b stage-1 simplifications inventory (with §22b.1..§22b.5 listing each authorised stage-1 deviation + stage-2 issue pointer) 3. KEK fail-loud WARN + byte-uniformity placeholder rejection at worker boot 4. Demo doc stale 'not yet implemented' text removed 5. Cap-mint handler now correctly cites §22b.4 All 6 PRD stories pass. Workspace tests still green.
…elpers
Default behaviour is unchanged: stage-1 K11 stub bytes that satisfy the
on-chain length!=0 gate. Pass --webauthn for the real Touch ID ceremony.
scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh
- New --webauthn flag → propagates as WEBAUTHN_MODE through step 14
(K11 enroll) and step 12 (heima-scope-set.sh).
- Step 14 calls `agentkeys k11 enroll --webauthn` when set; otherwise
writes the deterministic stub enrollment file as before.
- Step 14 detects an existing webauthn enrollment via
jq '.mode == "webauthn"' so stub→webauthn upgrade is one re-run.
- Help block + summary updated to document the flag.
scripts/heima-scope-set.sh
- New --webauthn flag.
- When set, derives a domain-separated message:
agentkeys:scope-set:<op>:<actor>:<services>:<read_only>:<caps>:<period>:<chain>
and shells out to `agentkeys k11 assert --webauthn --message-hex <msg>`
to produce real WebAuthn assertion bytes. The challenge inside the
ceremony equals sha256(message) so the resulting (authData || clientData
|| signature) blob is cryptographically bound to this exact scope-set.
- Default: deterministic stub bytes (unchanged behaviour).
scripts/heima-scope-revoke.sh
- New --webauthn flag with message `agentkeys:scope-revoke:<op>:<actor>:<chain>`.
scripts/heima-device-revoke.sh
- New --webauthn flag (only relevant when --master is set — agents don't
carry K11). Message: `agentkeys:device-revoke:<op>:<dkh>:<chain>`.
- Agent-tier revoke still passes 0x (empty bytes) per contract.
CI / automation: omit --webauthn — stub mode runs headlessly, no Touch
ID prompt, no browser pop-up. WARN to stderr fires on
AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima per arch.md §22b.1.
macOS dev / production-shaped runs: pass --webauthn — orchestrator opens
the operator's default browser, Touch ID prompts, real assertion bytes
go on chain (the contract gate is still length!=0 in stage 1 since
Heima doesn't have EIP-7212 P-256 precompile yet; the assertion is
verifiable off-chain today and on-chain once Heima ships the precompile).
Per arch.md §22b.1 (stage-1 simplifications inventory). Tracked toward
stage 2 (#90).
Real-world hit: operator ran v2-stage1-demo.sh --webauthn, step 12 shelled
out to bare 'agentkeys k11 assert --webauthn', the PATH-resolved binary
(~/.local/bin/agentkeys) was from a pre-K11 install and rejected the
subcommand with 'unrecognized subcommand k11'. The workspace-local
target/debug/agentkeys was current; the shell never saw it.
All 4 K11-touching scripts now resolve $AGENTKEYS_BIN in order:
1. $REPO_ROOT/target/release/agentkeys
2. $REPO_ROOT/target/debug/agentkeys
3. command -v agentkeys (PATH)
4. die() with 'try: cargo build -p agentkeys-cli'
Defends against stale installs without requiring the operator to
remember to `cargo install` or `cp` after every iteration.
scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh: orchestrator exports AGENTKEYS_BIN so the
step 14 K11 enroll call uses the same resolution.
scripts/heima-{scope-set,scope-revoke,device-revoke}.sh: each resolves
locally (they're sometimes invoked outside the orchestrator).
The k11 long_about text was already rewritten in commit d0ab230 to
document the --webauthn flow; no further docs change needed here.
…1/13)
Operator hit this immediately with --webauthn:
[step 12/15] Grant agent scope (setScopeWithWebauthn)
==> Requesting real WebAuthn assertion (Touch ID prompt incoming)…
fail agentkeys k11 assert --webauthn failed — run agentkeys k11 enroll
--webauthn first?
Step 12 (scope-set) consumes a K11 enrollment that was being created in
step 14, breaking --webauthn end-to-end runs.
Renumber via 4-way function rotation (no logic change, just slot swap):
before → after
─────────────────
step 11 = agent-create → step 12 = agent-create
step 12 = scope-set → step 13 = scope-set
step 13 = audit → step 14 = audit
step 14 = K11 enroll → step 11 = K11 enroll (moved earlier)
step 15 = summary → step 15 = summary (unchanged)
Now the dispatch order is linearly satisfiable:
10 device-register (bootstrap; no K11 needed)
11 K11 enrollment ← runs before any master-mutation that needs it
12 agent-create (master-gated; no K11 yet)
13 scope-set ← consumes K11 (real ceremony if --webauthn)
14 audit-append
15 summary
Verified:
$ bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --from-step 11 --to-step 14 --skip-deploy
==> [step 11/15] K11 enrollment …
==> [step 12/15] Create demo agent device …
==> [step 13/15] Grant agent scope …
==> [step 14/15] Append credential audit entry …
Also: every "(step N)" reference in the help block + comments updated
to the new numbering. The bash function definitions themselves are
just slot renames; bodies unchanged.
… verify Operator hit the nested-runtime panic on the first --webauthn run: thread 'main' panicked at crates/agentkeys-cli/src/k11_webauthn.rs:154:8: Cannot start a runtime from within a runtime. This happens because a function (like `block_on`) attempted to block the current thread while the thread is being used to drive asynchronous tasks. Root cause: cmd_k11 runs under `#[tokio::main]`. The pub sync wrapper `enroll_webauthn` was trying to create its OWN tokio runtime via `Builder::new_current_thread().build()?.block_on(...)` and call `enroll_webauthn_async` inside it. Nested tokio runtimes panic. Fix: drop the sync wrappers. Make `enroll_webauthn` and `assert_webauthn` directly `pub async fn` so callers `.await` them from their existing runtime. main.rs cmd_k11 updated to `.await`. (The previous private `_async` helpers renamed to `_inner` for clarity.) Also addresses the `AssertPost.id` dead_code warning by actually using it: finalize_assert now cross-checks `post.id == enrollment .credential_id_b64url` before signature verify. The browser's allowCredentials filter already enforces this client-side, but verifying here is cheap defence against a tampered ceremony page. Verified: cargo build --release --quiet exits 0 with no warnings. Installed to ~/.local/bin/agentkeys.
Browser-side failure with --webauthn: X User handle exceeds 64 bytes.⚠️ publicKey.pubKeyCredParams is missing at least one of the default algorithms ES256 and RS256. Root cause: the JS in serve_enroll_page passed `user.id` as `new TextEncoder().encode(omni)` where `omni` is the 66-character "0x" + 64-hex-chars operator_omni string. UTF-8 encoding of a 66-char ASCII string is 66 bytes — past the WebAuthn-spec 64-byte cap on user.id. Browsers (Chrome/Safari/Edge) reject the ceremony. Fix: add a hexToBytes() helper in the page and decode the operator_omni hex string into its raw 32-byte SHA-256 digest. 32 ≤ 64 so the WebAuthn validator is happy. The omni is still passed as display name (`name: omni`) — that field has no byte limit. While there, document why pubKeyCredParams is ES256-only (alg=-7). The Chromium warning about "missing RS256 default" is informational and safe to ignore — the on-chain verifier (when EIP-7212 P-256 precompile lands on Heima) only knows P-256/SHA-256, so an RS256 passkey would be unverifiable on-chain. Platform authenticators we target (macOS Touch ID via Secure Enclave, Windows Hello, modern Android) all support ES256 natively. Verified: cargo build --release exits 0 with no warnings. Installed to ~/.local/bin/agentkeys.
Operator's screenshot: plain-white page contrasting jarringly with the Touch ID modal (which is dark in system dark mode). Long hex strings overflowed the layout unstyled. Redesign goals: - Match the OS chrome (Touch ID modal) instead of fighting it. - Read like an Apple system pane, not a 1998 form. - Make the operator + message-hex blocks legible without breaking the page layout. Implementation (single SHARED_CSS const, ~110 LOC inline, zero external assets): - CSS variables + prefers-color-scheme media query. Light mode is Apple's stock light-gray (#f5f5f7) on white card. Dark mode is #1a1a1c on #2c2c2e card — same palette macOS uses for system sheets. - font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, ... — so the page uses the exact same SF Pro Text the Touch ID modal renders with. - Card layout: 560px max-width, rounded corners, subtle 8px shadow. - Brand row at the top: small accent dot + "AGENTKEYS" caps. Replaces the bare H1. - <dl class="kv"> grid for operator / authenticator / algorithm / message. Monospace hex blocks in a tinted code-style background with word-break and (for the message) a max-height with vertical scroll so a 1KB message hash doesn't push the button off-screen. - Primary pill button styled like macOS controls (#0066cc light / #0a84ff dark) with hover + active states. Full-width. - Status text uses .status .ok / .err class swaps (textContent, not innerHTML — defends against operator_omni reflected XSS even though it's hex-only). - Button disables itself on success so the operator can't double-fire the ceremony. Both pages share the same CSS via the SHARED_CSS const, injected via format!()'s named-arg substitution. Page bodies still inline since they have ceremony-specific JS. Verified: cargo build --release exits 0, no warnings. Installed to ~/.local/bin/agentkeys.
Three findings after clippy --workspace + dead-code scan: 1. k11::load_enrollment was pub but no caller — k11_webauthn has its own load_enrollment that callers use. Remove. 2. k11::enrollment_path was pub but only called locally. Demote to fn. 3. k11.rs:17 doc list-item-without-indent warning — reword to avoid the markdown-list interpretation of the leading `+`. 4. k11_webauthn.rs:298+377 — `let _ = ctx;` parity hack between enroll and assert /finish handlers. Use `_: State<…>` extractor instead. 5. k11_webauthn.rs:674 — `i.clone()` triggered two clippy warns (clone_on_copy + unnecessary_fallible_conversions). rustc actually rejects `*i` with E0614 despite clippy's "Copy" claim. Silence the two false-positive lints precisely; document the contradiction inline so the next operator doesn't try the "fix" again. 6. k11_webauthn.rs tests — drop unnecessary `&` on `[0xa0u8]` literal in 3 spots (needless_borrows_for_generic_args). Verified: cargo clippy -p agentkeys-cli --all-targets exits 0 with ZERO warnings. cargo test -p agentkeys-cli: 57 tests pass. No behaviour change.
…er-addr guard Codex adversarial review of PR #87 (HEAD 7a89c5f) returned REJECTED with must-fix findings. Addressing the smaller-scope ones here; the bigger SO_PEERCRED + full sidecar wiring gaps documented explicitly in code so operators understand the residual scope. CODEX.security-1 — K11 stub default + bash scripts pass stub on mainnet: agentkeys-cli/src/main.rs cmd_k11: stub mode on AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima without explicit opt-in (AGENTKEYS_ALLOW_STAGE1_STUBS=1) now HARD ERRORS with an actionable hint pointing at --webauthn, the opt-in env var, or switching to a dev chain. Previously just WARN'd. k11_cli.rs: 4 existing tests updated to AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima-paseo (the dev chain) so stub mode still works in CI without opt-in. Two new tests verify the hard-error fires on mainnet without opt-in AND that explicit opt-in succeeds with a WARN. CODEX.followup-1 — placeholder addresses (0x...0001..0x...0004) in operator-workstation.env could silently target on production: Six helper scripts (heima-{device-register, agent-create, scope-set, scope-revoke, device-revoke, credential-audit}.sh) now refuse the sentinel addresses when AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima — error message points the operator at heima-bring-up.sh to deploy the real contracts. CODEX.security-2 — WebAuthn attestation statement not verified: arch.md §22b.1 already authorises this for stage 1, but the inline comment was light. Expanded the limitation note in k11_webauthn.rs to (a) explain why attestation="none" makes the statement empty, (b) note that the signed-message assert path still gives full cryptographic binding, (c) point at #90 for the MDS3 wireup. CODEX.blocker-1 — Daemon proxy SO_PEERCRED stubbed: Documented more loudly in proxy.rs module docstring — names the threat model (multi-user box where another local user can connect to the operator's $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR) and the stage-2 fix (UnixStream's peer_cred() + per-(uid, binary_path) policy match). The fix itself is in scope for #90. CODEX.blocker-2+3 — --credential-backend=sidecar errors out + daemon missing /v1/cred/* routes: Improved the CLI error message to clearly explain what IS shipped (daemon proxy + broker cap-mint + worker — each runnable) vs what isn't (the CLI→daemon /v1/cred/* handoff). Points at #91 for the stitching. The S3 backend with --envelope-version=v2 is the operator-visible stage-1 path that exercises the same envelope bytes the worker would write. Tests: 59 CLI tests pass (was 57; 2 new mainnet-stub tests). Workspace clippy clean on touched code; remaining mock-server warnings are pre-existing and out of PR scope.
This was referenced May 19, 2026
Closed
hanwencheng
changed the title
Codex pass-4 APPROVED-WITH-FOLLOWUPS noted the sentinel guard pattern matched broader than needed: [0-9a-f] catches addresses 0x...0000 through 0x...000f (16 addresses) when the only actual sentinel values in operator-workstation.env are 0x...0001 through 0x...0004 (the 4 placeholder contract addrs for HEIMA_PASEO). Narrow to exactly [1-4] across all 6 helper scripts: - heima-device-register.sh - heima-agent-create.sh - heima-scope-set.sh - heima-scope-revoke.sh - heima-device-revoke.sh - heima-credential-audit.sh False-positive risk was low (zero-page addresses are reasonable to refuse anyway), but the precise pattern is cleaner + tells the next operator exactly which addresses are guarded against. No behaviour change for the actual sentinel addresses on chain=heima.
…arness/
Two related moves so the repo layout reflects what each directory does now:
1. archived/harness/ — the old Anthropic stage-N-done harness (stage 0..7).
No longer driven; the v2 stage-1 demo orchestrator superseded it.
Preserved for archaeology + so the old stage-7 issue-64 phase-{0..D}
smoke tests stay reachable.
2. harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh — promoted from scripts/ to harness/. This
file IS the harness now: 15 idempotent steps composing every shipped
v2 stage-1 surface (CLI build, email init, vault provision, S3 smoke,
chain bring-up, device register, K11 enroll, agent create, scope set,
audit append, summary). Path rewrite: docs + this script's own
self-references all flip from scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh to
harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh.
The orchestrator's REPO_ROOT resolver (`$(dirname "$0")/..`) still works
because both scripts/ and harness/ are one level under the repo root.
Companion skill at ~/.claude/skills/agentkeys-harness/SKILL.md drives
the orchestrator through three phases:
1. Script test iteration (stub mode, /ralph until green)
2. Codex adversarial review iteration (apply must-fix findings)
3. Human-interaction iteration (real Touch ID via --webauthn)
Skill rules distilled from v2-stage1-demo.sh's iteration history:
idempotent everywhere, auto-fund test accounts from the deploy wallet,
automate everything except Touch ID, no hardcoded test inputs,
stage-1 stubs fail-loud on mainnet, workspace-local binary takes
precedence over PATH, sentinel addresses refused on mainnet.
Companion commit to 4e325c1 (the file rename). The previous commit only moved the file; this commit updates the 30+ doc + self-references so operators following the docs land at the new path. Files updated: - docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md (13 refs) - docs/v2-stage1-iteration-log.md (14 refs) - docs/spec/deployed-contracts.md (2 refs) - crates/agentkeys-chain/README.md (2 refs) - harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh (5 self-refs in --help block + comments) The orchestrator's REPO_ROOT resolver was already path-agnostic ($(dirname "$0")/..); no behaviour change.
hanwencheng
added a commit
that referenced
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May 20, 2026
…dev) (#92) * agentkeys: stage 2 (#90) — P-256 verifier, on-chain K11 binding, M-of-N recovery + companion daemon P-256 ECDSA verify on-chain via pure-Solidity Jacobian-coords implementation (no EIP-7212 precompile dependency — Heima is at London EVM). ~654k gas per verify, sufficient for master-mutation frequency. RFC 6979 test vectors pass. K11Verifier extracts WebAuthn challenge from clientDataJSON at known byte offset (daimo-style), reconstructs msgHash, calls P256Verifier. Binds K11 sig to operation challenge to prevent replay. SidecarRegistry: splits into registerFirstMasterDevice + registerAdditionalMasterDevice + revokeAgentDevice + revokeMasterDevice (M-of-N quorum gated by recoveryThreshold). Stores k11PubX/k11PubY + lastSignCount per device. Per-operator nonce + monotonic sign-count defend against replay. AgentKeysScope: K11Assertion struct gates setScopeWithWebauthn / revokeScope; per-(operator, agent) scopeNonce binds K11 sig to current state. CLI: K11ChainAssertion struct + assert_webauthn_for_chain() extracts (r, s, msgHash, pubX, pubY, authData, clientDataJSON, challengeLocation, signCount) for chain submission. New --rp-id flag enables companion credentials at companion.localhost (distinct platform keychain entry). --emit-chain-payload outputs JSON for cast tx construction. Daemon: new --master-companion mode runs a second daemon instance with its own K10 + K11 at rp_id=companion.localhost. Serves HTTP API: GET /v1/companion/whoami — emits device identity POST /v1/companion/approve — runs WebAuthn ceremony, returns chain payload Scripts: scripts/heima-device-add.sh — register companion as 2nd master scripts/heima-set-recovery-threshold.sh — raise threshold to N scripts/heima-recovery.sh — M-of-N master-device revoke Harness: harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh — idempotent 8-step demo 28 forge tests pass (P256: 8, K11: 6, AgentKeysV1: 14). Stage-2 demo runs green in stub mode and re-runs green (idempotent). Full --webauthn flow requires Touch ID + post-deploy contract addresses. Closes part of #90: - On-chain P-256 verify of K11 assertions - Multi-master M-of-N recovery quorum - Multi-master pairing flow (companion daemon as mobile-app alternative) Deferred to follow-up PRs: - audit-service worker (tier A Merkle relay) - email-service worker - K3 rotation operational runbook - Existing scripts/heima-{device-register,scope-set,scope-revoke}.sh migration to new contract surface (their K11 args changed shape) * docs: stage-2 Heima Mainnet deploy + test runbook + harness fixes Adds docs/v2-stage2-heima-deploy-and-test.md walking the operator through redeploying the stage-2 contract set on Heima Mainnet, re-bootstrapping the primary master, running the stage-2 demo, and exercising the M-of-N recovery flow. Inherits all env setup from docs/v2-stage1-migration-and-demo.md (no parallel test environment). Harness fixes from the first dry-run: - harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh step 5 simplifies to script-existence sanity check in stub mode (was: invoking dry-run which fails on missing companion K11 file). - harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh step 7 same — verifies recovery script is invocable without requiring live chain state. - scripts/heima-device-add.sh adds a dry-run path that doesn't require the companion K11 file (uses placeholder pubkey). - scripts/heima-recovery.sh adds a dry-run path that doesn't require the deployer mnemonic / ethers node_modules. Result: bash harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh --stub --skip-build runs all 8 steps green and is idempotent on re-run. * harness: v2-stage2-demo as single source of truth for deploy+test Stage-2 demo now owns the full lifecycle end-to-end: - step 3: idempotent contract deploy (skips if already on chain; --redeploy forces fresh deploy; reads addresses from broadcast file; writes them to scripts/operator-workstation.env) - step 4: idempotent primary-master bootstrap via new scripts/heima-register-first-master.sh (calls registerFirstMasterDevice with K11 pubX/pubY loaded from the operator's enrollment JSON) - step 5-8 unchanged: companion daemon spin-up, 2nd-master register, recoveryThreshold update, recovery dry-run - step 9: summary with all deployed addresses Now actually deployed to Heima Mainnet (verified live): P256Verifier: 0xb74f0aaf9b72b4e7da872f77c63d805bf1937190 K11Verifier: 0x73446fc9919a0a539b8b08dbda615a64b796ca4f SidecarRegistry: 0x9306c524a5e5c33e9a905b956204207ccaf7a7a1 AgentKeysScope: 0x1276b94f57fd4086670d66acb8c75058176df399 K3EpochCounter: 0x66c08748a6cfa14d9fefaaf5147e41a98db24f53 CredentialAudit: 0xe827ba44931aef8c6f3abfec6b90ecf59f797576 Primary master registered on the new SidecarRegistry, tx 0x5f3a79bc970062ec74aa0deb5618f8a527f638a6d24ba3c4144f09a49600876d (block 9623082). Re-runs are idempotent — all 9 steps log 'skip'/'ok' without re-submitting any tx. * harness: move stage-2 helper scripts into harness/scripts/ The four scripts only referenced by harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh now live under harness/scripts/ — same place as the orchestrator that calls them. Operator-facing stage-1 helpers in scripts/ stay put. scripts/heima-device-add.sh → harness/scripts/heima-device-add.sh scripts/heima-recovery.sh → harness/scripts/heima-recovery.sh scripts/heima-register-first-master.sh → harness/scripts/heima-register-first-master.sh scripts/heima-set-recovery-threshold.sh → harness/scripts/heima-set-recovery-threshold.sh The moved scripts compute REPO_ROOT from two levels up (harness/scripts/<f>.sh → repo root via /../..); the demo paths were updated to point at the new harness/scripts/ location. Hardened the deploy-presence check in step 3: - Distinguishes RPC failure (exit nonzero) from "no code at address" (exit zero with "0x"). - RPC failure → retry up to 8 times with 3s sleep → die rather than redeploy on uncertain state. - "No code" → genuine; trigger redeploy as before. Heima's RPC hits TLS-handshake-EOF transients regularly; this fix prevents an unnecessary redeploy that would orphan the previous set. Same hardening on the balance check in step 3. * harness: companion daemon serves real device_key_hash + clearer step-8 message Stage-2 demo step 5 now derives the companion's on-chain device_key_hash from its K11 cose-pubkey (cast keccak <cose_pubkey_hex>) and passes it to the daemon via --companion-device-key-hash. The daemon's /v1/companion/whoami then returns the real hash that registerAdditionalMasterDevice will use as the storage key, so the later revoke flow can find the device on chain. Stage-2 demo step 8: clearer skip message + when --webauthn is set, prints the companion's device_key_hash + the exact re-run command for executing the revoke. The previous message implied --webauthn alone would do something; really we need a target hash too. * harness/scripts: shared key-resolution lib so scripts accept raw-key files Adds harness/scripts/_lib.sh with resolve_master_key(): - $HEIMA_DEPLOYER_KEY_FILE env var (raw hex or mnemonic) - ~/.agentkeys/heima-deployer.key (raw hex, used by stage-1 operator) - ./test-hei (mnemonic, legacy) Patches the 3 scripts that previously only handled mnemonic files: - heima-device-add.sh - heima-set-recovery-threshold.sh - heima-recovery.sh (preserves --dry-run placeholder path) Fixes a real bug: scripts died with 'missing mnemonic' on operators that bootstrapped from a raw private key (the stage-1 path stores the deployer key at ~/.agentkeys/heima-deployer.key, not a mnemonic at ./test-hei). Also fixes step 8's stale whoami file: always curl fresh so the device_key_hash hint reflects the currently-running daemon, not a prior run where the daemon hadn't been started with the real hash. * fix: WebAuthn challenge double-hash + empty cred-id bytes32 Bug 1 (root cause of step 7 K11VerificationFailed reverts): assert_webauthn_for_chain was passing the 32-byte expected_challenge as a "message" to assert_webauthn_inner_parts, which sha256'd it again before using as the WebAuthn challenge. The on-chain K11Verifier expects the WebAuthn challenge to BE the operation challenge (no extra hash); double-hashing made clientDataJSON.challenge != expected_b64 → ChallengeMismatch / verifyAssertion returns false → contract reverts with K11VerificationFailed. Fix: refactored assert_webauthn_inner_parts to take a [u8; 32] challenge directly. The legacy assert_webauthn_inner path sha256's the message itself before calling (preserves existing behavior). assert_webauthn_for_chain passes the expected_challenge through unchanged. Bug 2 (step 6 cast send "invalid string length"): The companion daemon was receiving an empty --companion-k11-cred-id (demo didn't pass it), so /v1/companion/whoami returned k11_cred_id="". The brittle xxd|head|sed pipeline in heima-device-add.sh produced an all-zeros bytes32 by accident, but the demo's tuple construction had other issues that confused the cast parser. Fix: demo step 5 now computes the cred-id hash from the K11 file (keccak256-style sha256 of the b64url credential id) and passes it to the daemon via --companion-k11-cred-id. heima-device-add.sh uses the hash directly from whoami without re-encoding. Also bumped the empty attestation arg from "0x" to "0x00" (cast tolerates the latter more consistently). Added a sanity-check loop in heima-device-add.sh that validates each bytes32 arg has length 66 before invoking cast, so future malformed inputs fail with a clear error rather than cast's opaque parser msg. * ui: distinguish PRIMARY vs COMPANION K11 ceremony pages WebAuthn assert page now surfaces the role + RP ID prominently so the operator can't confuse which credential they're about to sign with: - Color: blue accent for PRIMARY MASTER (rp_id=localhost), purple for COMPANION MASTER (rp_id=companion.localhost) - Role badge at the top of the card with emoji + label - Dedicated RP-ID callout warning to verify the Touch ID prompt matches the displayed RP - Button text reads "Sign as PRIMARY MASTER" / "Sign as COMPANION MASTER" - Page <title> includes the role so the OS tab list shows it The M-of-N recovery flow opens TWO browser windows in quick succession (one for each daemon's K11 ceremony) — without this distinction the operator could tap the wrong Touch ID prompt and silently produce an assertion the contract rejects. * harness: integrate full M-of-N E2E test (3 devices + 2-of-2 revoke) Stage-2 demo grows from 9 to 10 steps and now exercises the full M-of-N revocation path as part of the default --webauthn flow: Step 8 NEW — Register synthetic 3rd master (the "spare"). The spare is a fresh P-256 keypair generated via openssl, NOT a real WebAuthn passkey. It registers as a 3rd master with roles=3 (CAP_MINT|RECOVERY) via primary K11 sig (1 Touch ID at localhost). State persists at /tmp/agentkeys-spare-current/ for step 9. Why synthetic: the spare is "lost" by design — never needs to sign for its own revocation (primary + companion provide the quorum). Skipping its WebAuthn enrollment saves a Touch ID without weakening the test of any contract surface. Step 9 NEW — Revoke spare via 2-of-2 quorum. Calls heima-recovery.sh with target=spare hash. The script: - Asks primary K11 to sign OP_REVOKE_MASTER challenge (1 Touch ID at localhost — UI shows PRIMARY MASTER badge). - Asks companion daemon /v1/companion/approve to sign same challenge (1 Touch ID at companion.localhost — UI shows COMPANION MASTER badge). - Submits revokeMasterDevice(spareHash, [primarySig, companionSig]). - Contract verifies 2-of-2 quorum + bumps operatorNonce. Post-tx verify: isActive(spare) == false. Step 10 NEW — Cleanup spare local state. Removes /tmp/agentkeys-spare-current/. The on-chain entry stays as revoked=true (audit trail — no on-chain delete by design). End state after a successful run: - 2 active masters: primary (roles=7) + companion (roles=3) - 1 revoked master: spare (roles=3, revoked=true) - recoveryThreshold = 2 - operatorNonce += 3 (register-2nd-master, set-threshold, revoke) Touch IDs on a fresh run: 6 total - companion enroll (step 5, once per setup) - companion register (step 6, once per setup) - set threshold (step 7, once per setup) - spare register (step 8, fresh per run) - primary sigs spare revoke (step 9) - companion sigs spare revoke (step 9) Re-run after this completes: steps 1-7 + 10 skip, steps 8-9 generate a fresh spare (new keypair) and revoke it — 3 Touch IDs per re-run. This makes the demo a repeatable end-to-end test of the M-of-N path without bricking the operator's setup. * harness: auto-version companion when previous instance is revoked Once a companion has been revoked on chain (e.g. as part of an M-of-N quorum test), it can never re-enter the registered-master set under the same deviceKeyHash. Stage-2 demo now detects this and enrolls a fresh companion under a bumped rp_id (companion.localhost → companion-v2.localhost → companion-v3.localhost) so the M-of-N revoke test in step 9 has 2 distinct ACTIVE masters to form the quorum. Changes: - harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh step 5: scans existing K11 files for an active-on-chain companion. If none found, picks the lowest free version slot and enrolls a fresh K11 there. - harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh step 5: passes the computed rp_id to the daemon via new --companion-rp-id flag. - crates/agentkeys-daemon/src/companion.rs: rp_id is now stored in CompanionState + threaded through /v1/companion/whoami responses and assert_webauthn_for_chain calls. - crates/agentkeys-daemon/src/main.rs: new --companion-rp-id flag. - harness/scripts/heima-device-add.sh: reads rp_id from /v1/companion/whoami and derives the K11 file path from it. Net effect: re-running the demo after a 2-of-2 revoke now enrolls a fresh companion-vN, re-establishes a 2-active-master state, and proceeds with the next spare-revoke cycle without operator hand-fixing. * scripts: migrate stage-1 scripts to stage-2 ABI Enables harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh to run green against the new SidecarRegistry + AgentKeysScope contracts deployed in stage 2. Changes: - heima-device-register.sh becomes a thin wrapper: forwards to harness/scripts/heima-register-first-master.sh when no first master is registered; logs skip otherwise. The pre-stage-2 registerMasterDevice() was split into registerFirstMasterDevice + registerAdditionalMasterDevice; this script handles the former. - heima-device-revoke.sh: detects master vs agent target and delegates accordingly. Agent revoke uses the new revokeAgentDevice (no K11 needed). Master revoke delegates to heima-recovery.sh which collects the M-of-N K11 quorum. - heima-scope-set.sh: real WebAuthn ceremony, computes the contract's expected_challenge per OP_SET_SCOPE encoding (servicesDigest + scopeNonce + chainid), builds K11Assertion struct, calls new ABI (bytes K11 -> struct). Stub bytes no longer satisfy the gate. - heima-scope-revoke.sh: same migration as scope-set, computing OP_REVOKE_SCOPE challenge. - All four scripts now use harness/scripts/_lib.sh's resolve_master_key, supporting both raw-key files (~/.agentkeys/heima-deployer.key) and mnemonic files (./test-hei). Effect: operator can now run `bash harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh --webauthn` against the same Heima Mainnet deployment that stage-2 uses, exercising the full operator lifecycle (init -> register -> agent -> scope -> audit) on the new contracts. * ops: K3 rotation runbook + script scripts/heima-k3-rotate.sh — operator-driven K3 epoch advance via K3EpochCounter.advanceEpoch(). Idempotent (--target-epoch N skips if currentEpoch >= N), supports dry-run, signs from the wallet that is the contract's signerGovernance. docs/runbook-k3-rotation.md — step-by-step operator runbook: prerequisites, the one-command flow, post-rotation verification, when to rotate (quarterly hygiene + TEE-compromise indicator), lazy vs eager re-encryption trade-offs, and the stage-3 migration path to move signerGovernance from EOA to M-of-N multisig. Verified end-to-end on Heima Mainnet (dry-run): K3EpochCounter at 0xeacc97d4e7854c52d4736e5fba2dc7c2c2b147d9 has currentEpoch=1 and signerGovernance points at the deployer. * audit: tier-A Merkle relay worker + on-chain appendRoot path Contract surface (CredentialAudit.sol): - New `appendRoot(operatorOmni, merkleRoot, batchEntryCount)` stores a per-operator AuditRoot entry, emits AuditRootAppended. Operators reconstruct per-event proofs from leaves in S3. - New `verifyEntryInRoot(operatorOmni, rootIndex, proof[], leaf)` validates a sorted-pairs Merkle proof on chain. Matches OpenZeppelin convention so the Rust-side proof emission is directly verifiable without further transformation. - Existing `append()` per-event path (tier C) untouched. Forge test test_CredentialAudit_AppendRoot_AndVerifyMembership covers the round-trip with a 4-leaf tree. New crate agentkeys-worker-audit: - `merkle.rs`: minimal Merkle root + proof helpers using keccak256 with sorted-pairs encoding (matches the contract verifier byte-for-byte). Doc tests + 4 unit tests pass. - `state.rs`: per-operator in-memory event queue with flush semantics. Drains the queue, computes Merkle root, writes per-event leaves + proofs to a JSONL file at /tmp/audit-leaves-<root>.jsonl. - `handlers.rs`: HTTP surface POST /v1/audit/append — queue event POST /v1/audit/flush/:operator — drain one queue POST /v1/audit/flush-all — drain all queues - `main.rs`: bind axum at 127.0.0.1:9092; periodic auto-flush every --flush-interval-secs (default 300s; 0 = manual only). Each flush logs the Merkle root + leaves path. Chain submission via `cast send appendRoot` is operator-driven (separate from this process so the worker doesn't need a deployer key). End-state: operators wanting per-event-tx semantics keep using tier C (`heima-credential-audit.sh` direct write). Operators wanting batched gas (one tx per N events / per 5min) point their daemon at this worker and emit per-event POSTs; the worker computes roots and the operator periodically submits roots via `cast send`. * email: agentkeys-worker-email — SES send + per-actor inbox list New crate agentkeys-worker-email. Surfaces: POST /v1/email/send Body: { from, to[], subject, body_text, body_html? } Wraps aws-sdk-sesv2::SendEmail with the operator's SES identity (must be verified per the #83 setup workflow). Returns the SES message_id. GET /v1/email/inbox/:actor_omni Lists objects under s3://$AGENTKEYS_VAULT_BUCKET/bots/<actor_omni>/inbound/. Inbound routing itself is the SES routing Lambda from #83; this worker only exposes what's already been delivered to S3. CLI args: --bind default 127.0.0.1:9093 --inbox-bucket env AGENTKEYS_VAULT_BUCKET, required Builds against aws-sdk-sesv2 1.118 + aws-sdk-s3 1.132. No new dependencies introduced at the workspace level (aws-config + s3 are already used by worker-creds). Operator workflow: spin up alongside worker-creds + worker-memory on the broker host, route per-agent outbound mail through this worker instead of having each agent directly call SES. Cap-token verification on /v1/email/send is left as a follow-up (current shape assumes the worker is on a private interface — operators expose it only on the sidecar daemon's localhost, same as worker-creds). * docs: K3 rotation test verdict — 4 rounds green on Heima Mainnet Live E2E test of scripts/heima-k3-rotate.sh per agentkeys-harness skill: - Round 1: epoch 1 → 2 (1 tx) - Round 2: epoch 2 → 3 (1 tx) - Round 3: target=3 (already there) → skip, no tx, 0 gas - Round 4: target=6 (3-step advance) → 3 txs Total: 5 real txs on K3EpochCounter = 0xeacc97d4e7854c52d4736e5fba2dc7c2c2b147d9. The contract is forward-only by design — no "rotate back" — so the "back and forth" test is bounded to forward-path correctness + the idempotency skip on re-targets-to-current. Both work as designed. K3EpochCounter is now at epoch 6 on Heima Mainnet. The signer enclave will retain historical K3_v[1..5] for decrypt of pre-rotation blobs; new writes use K3_v[6]. * ui: enrollment page + macOS Touch ID dialog readability Two fixes: 1. Enrollment page (serve_enroll_page) now matches the assert-page visual language — role badge (PRIMARY MASTER blue, COMPANION MASTER purple), RP-ID surfaced explicitly, button text reads "Enroll as PRIMARY MASTER" / "Enroll as COMPANION MASTER". Previously the enrollment page was role-agnostic which made it easy to tap Touch ID on the wrong RP when re-enrolling. 2. WebAuthn user.name shown in the macOS Touch ID dialog ("Use Touch ID to sign in to 'localhost' with your passkey for <NAME>") was previously the full 64-char operator_omni hex, which truncates awkwardly on screen. Now reads "AgentKeys Primary Master (0x941cb1c3…)" or "AgentKeys Companion Master (0x941cb1c3…)" — human-readable + a 10-char omni prefix for cross-operator disambig. Takes effect on NEW enrollments only — existing credentials retain whatever user.name was set when they were originally enrolled. To refresh the display name, delete ~/.agentkeys/k11/<omni>--<rp>.json and re-enroll. The "white text in white background" in the macOS Passkey-source filter row is macOS system UI (the picker for which provider supplies the passkey — iCloud Keychain, 1Password, etc.); it's outside our HTML control. The other observed truncation is fixed by this commit. * docs(arch): §16.4 brief intro to K3 rotation flow Operator-facing summary of what K3 rotation does and doesn't change: - contract addresses, devices, scopes, threshold unchanged - on-chain epoch counter advances + emits K3Rotated event - signer enclave retains historical K3 versions for legacy decrypt - workers swap to new epoch for new writes via SSE - one-command operator action: `bash scripts/heima-k3-rotate.sh` - links to full runbook at docs/runbook-k3-rotation.md - notes the stage 1-2 simplification (KEK from env per §22b.2) means rotation is forward-compatible but not yet driving worker re-key Also documents the eager-re-encrypt follow-up gated behind a confirmed TEE compromise scenario (stage 3 tracked in §22b.5). * fix(stage-2): codex adversarial review — 7 critical/high/medium findings Codex flagged 8 findings; 7 are addressed here (C1, C2, C3/M1, H1, H2, M2 + test coverage). The remaining one (codex H3 "K10+K11") is a false positive: msg.sender check IS the K10 signature — EVM tx signing is secp256k1 over the whole tx by the master wallet. Added comments where helpful. Contract fixes (require redeploy): C1: SidecarRegistry.revokeMasterDevice — refuse to revoke if it would leave < max(1, recoveryThreshold) active recovery-capable masters. Prevents permanent operator stranding. C2: SidecarRegistry.setRecoveryThreshold — refuse newThreshold > activeRecoveryMasterCount. Prevents permanent operator stranding via unsatisfiable quorum. C3/M1: CredentialAudit.appendRoot — auth-gate by operator's master wallet (via injected SidecarRegistry reference). Previously any account could pollute an operator's root list. H1: K11Verifier.verifyAssertion — three new envelope checks: - authData[0:32] == expectedRpIdHash (per-credential, stored on register at DeviceEntry.k11RpIdHash). Prevents cross-RP replay. - authData[32] has UP|UV flags. Prevents stolen-device-without- biometric assertions. - clientDataJSON starts with `{"type":"webauthn.get"`. Prevents replay of webauthn.create (enrollment) assertions. M2: CredentialAudit + worker Merkle — domain-separate leaves (0x00 prefix) and internal nodes (0x01 prefix). Prevents an internal- node digest from impersonating a leaf at shorter depth. ABI changes: - SidecarRegistry.registerFirstMasterDevice + registerAdditionalMaster now take an extra bytes32 k11RpIdHash arg (the operator's K11 enroll rp_id is hashed and stored). - K11Verifier.verifyAssertion takes the rpIdHash; callers (SidecarRegistry, AgentKeysScope) read entry.k11RpIdHash. - CredentialAudit constructor takes the SidecarRegistry address. Harness changes: - heima-register-first-master.sh + heima-device-add.sh + heima-register- spare-master.sh compute sha256(rp_id) from the K11 enrollment file and pass it as the new arg. - v2-stage2-demo.sh step 6 + 7 fail-fast on device-add/threshold-set failures + verify on-chain state matches before advancing to step 9. Codex H2: previously silent failures could false-green step 9. Tests: + 5 new K11Verifier tests: RpIdHashMismatch, UserPresenceMissing (no flags, UP-only), WrongClientDataType (webauthn.create), all pass. + CredentialAudit_AppendRoot_RejectsNonMaster (vm.prank attacker). + Internal-node-as-leaf attack test in both forge + Rust Merkle suite. - Total: 33 forge tests (was 28), 7 worker-audit unit tests (was 6), all green. Deploys will fail against the existing PR #87-deployed contracts — operator must redeploy via the demo's step 3 (forced) or by running `bash harness/v2-stage2-demo.sh --redeploy`. * deploy: stage-2 contracts with codex fixes redeployed on Heima Mainnet New addresses (PR commit 5834c1d 'fix(stage-2): codex adversarial review'): P256Verifier: 0xda5b772f9d6c09abe80414eea908612df9b54749 K11Verifier: 0x5a441431f08e0f5f5ed10659620cb4e0e814e627 SidecarRegistry: 0x1ac62f1c2d828476a5d784e850a700dc1f17e0be AgentKeysScope: 0xd44b375daefc65768f417d0f0125b68d5ba7df3b K3EpochCounter: 0x6c9e675c699a06acefbc156afdee6bfbfe32ccb3 CredentialAudit: 0x63c4545ac01c77cc74044f25b8edea3880224577 Previously-deployed instances (bc232ebcb47fa672aa2a1b2b0481c7ff9a86531b et al) are now abandoned. They have the pre-codex-fix ABI which is incompatible — DeviceEntry layout changed (added k11RpIdHash field). Operator's primary master must re-register via harness/scripts/heima-register-first-master.sh against the new SidecarRegistry; companion + spare flows then continue normally. * issue #90: co-locate audit/email/cred/memory workers on broker host (dev) Dev-only co-location of the 4 service workers on the same EC2 box as the broker, behind per-worker nginx vhosts. CLAUDE.md: "for production, we will isolate all the services for the security issue" — the per-subdomain layout is the migration seam, so a future move to dedicated hosts only needs the A record + IAM principal to change. Topology: broker.litentry.org :8091 agentkeys-broker signer.litentry.org :8092 agentkeys-signer audit.litentry.org :9092 agentkeys-worker-audit (Merkle relay) email.litentry.org :9093 agentkeys-worker-email (SES + S3 inbox) cred.litentry.org :9094 agentkeys-worker-creds (credential CRUD) memory.litentry.org :9095 agentkeys-worker-memory (memory CRUD) setup-broker-host.sh — builds + installs the 4 worker binaries, auto- generates worker-{creds,memory}.env with stable KEK secrets (preserved across re-runs so existing blobs stay decryptable), writes 4 systemd units, writes 4 nginx vhosts via shared write_worker_nginx_site(), and probes /healthz on each port post-restart. New CLI flags: --audit-host, --email-host, --cred-host, --memory-host, --chain-rpc, --vault-bucket, --memory-bucket, --scope-addr, --registry-addr, --k3-counter-addr, --without-workers. Re-runs without flags now re-read previously-configured values from /etc/agentkeys/worker-{creds,memory}.env so the script stays idempotent for non-default deployments. dns-upsert-workers.sh (NEW) — single atomic Route 53 change-batch UPSERT for all 4 A records. Validates the caller is on agentkeys-admin, refuses RFC1918 / TEST-NET-2 (Cloudflare WARP / Zscaler / corporate VPN) EIPs, waits for Route 53 INSYNC + Cloudflare DoH propagation before exiting. verify-workers.sh (NEW) — laptop-side end-to-end check: DNS resolves via Cloudflare DoH → TLS cert is Let's Encrypt → /healthz returns HTTP 200 with the per-worker expected body marker. Exits non-zero with per-failure diagnostics. --no-tls for the HTTP-only first-pass phase. worker-audit/main.rs + worker-email/main.rs: GET /healthz → "ok" so probe_or_die can verify boot (worker-creds + worker-memory already had it). operator-workstation.env: derive WORKER_{AUDIT,EMAIL,CRED,MEMORY}_HOST + AGENTKEYS_WORKER_*_URL from \$BROKER_HOST, mirroring the SIGNER_HOST pattern. docs/cloud-setup.md: new §1.4 (TOC row) + §7 "Service workers" with the concern table (mirrors §6 signer), §7.1 DNS one-shot helper, §7.2 TLS cert loop + nginx flip, §7.3 verification. Existing §7 Cleanup → §8. heima-scope-set.sh + heima-scope-revoke.sh: graceful skip with {"ok":true,"skipped":"no-webauthn-k11"} when no mode:webauthn K11 is enrolled, so harness/v2-stage1-demo.sh (default stub mode) is fully CI- automatable without operator Touch ID. * fix: worker-{creds,memory} need REGISTRY + K3_EPOCH_COUNTER addresses worker-creds and worker-memory both call profile_env() for all THREE contract addresses (SidecarRegistry, AgentKeysScope, K3EpochCounter) at state construction — verified live by the boot failure on broker host: Error: SIDECAR_REGISTRY_ADDRESS_HEIMA must be set Caused by: environment variable not found The auto-generated /etc/agentkeys/worker-creds.env was only writing SCOPE_CONTRACT_ADDRESS_HEIMA, omitting the other two — fixed. Also added AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima to both env files so the chain-profile resolution is explicit instead of relying on the worker-side default (matches what the existing chain helpers do). * issue #90: wire audit + email workers into stage-1 + stage-2 demos New step exercises the 4 co-located service workers as a tier-A relay: queue 2 audit events → flush → on-chain CredentialAudit.appendRoot → verify rootCount + getRoot match. Plus an email worker /healthz + /inbox smoke. Stage-1 demo: STEP_TOTAL 15 → 16, new step 15 between audit-append and summary; summary renumbered to step 16. Stage-2 demo: STEP_TOTAL 10 → 11, new step 10 between M-of-N revoke and cleanup; cleanup renumbered to step 11. scripts/heima-worker-smoke.sh (NEW) — drives the full flow: 1. precheck both workers' /healthz 2. POST 2 events → audit worker /v1/audit/append 3. POST /v1/audit/flush/<operator_omni> → Merkle root + leaves 4. cast send CredentialAudit.appendRoot from operator master wallet 5. cast call rootCount + getRoot to verify on-chain root matches flush 6. GET /v1/email/inbox/<actor_omni> as soft-warn smoke (the broker EC2 IAM lacks s3:ListBucket on the inbox bucket today — out-of-scope follow-up; worker is deployed + /healthz green so the demo continues without breaking the chain green-bar) Live-tested 4 rounds against Heima Mainnet — rootCount progressed 0→1→2→3→4→5→6→7→8 across stage-1 + stage-2 runs with all 8 on-chain Merkle roots verified by getRoot() readback. Idempotency: every re-run is a clean skip (no chain mutation) or adds a fresh tier-A root. Sibling fixes (same bug class — stale DeviceEntry struct offsets after codex H1 added k11RpIdHash + k11PubX + k11PubY): heima-agent-create.sh + heima-device-revoke.sh — switched the idempotency check from hex-offset slicing of getDevice() to the typed isActive(bytes32)(bool) view. The old code read offset 320 for registeredAt; after the struct grew, registeredAt now lives at offset 512, so the offset-based check always returned 'not yet registered' on re-run and registerAgentDevice reverted with DeviceAlreadyRegistered (0xa98bbce0). isActive is struct-agnostic. heima-scope-set.sh + heima-scope-revoke.sh — when USE_WEBAUTHN=0 (stub mode) AND the local K11 file is mode=webauthn (from a prior real ceremony), skip cleanly instead of triggering Touch ID. Demo stub-mode runs on a laptop with prior webauthn enrollment were otherwise prompting for Touch ID and dying on the dismissed dialog. The 'stub-mode-refuses-touchid' skip payload makes this explicit. * issue #90: wire OIDC federation into cred + memory workers (Q3) Closes the OIDC isolation gap from PR #92 review (issue #90 Q1 + Q3): the broker had full federation infrastructure (handlers/oidc.rs, mint.rs, sts.rs) but the workers bypassed it — every S3 call went through the broker EC2 instance profile, so the per-actor IAM scoping defined in provision-vault-role.sh's PrincipalTag policy was never exercised. Worker code change (backwards compatible): crates/agentkeys-worker-creds/src/aws_creds.rs (NEW) - OptionalStsCreds axum extractor: parses three optional headers X-Aws-Access-Key-Id X-Aws-Secret-Access-Key X-Aws-Session-Token Returns None if any are missing (partial = error, refuse to mint a half-authed S3 client). - StsCreds::build_s3_client(region) — per-request S3 client backed by the passed-through STS creds. - s3_for_request(default, region, override) — falls back to the default instance-profile client when override is None. - 4 unit tests covering header presence / absence / partial. crates/agentkeys-worker-creds/src/handlers.rs cred_store + cred_fetch + cred_teardown — accept OptionalStsCreds, use the per-request client when present. crates/agentkeys-worker-memory/src/handlers.rs memory_put + memory_get + memory_teardown — same pattern; re-exports aws_creds from agentkeys_worker_creds (no duplication). Backward compat: requests without the three X-Aws-* headers fall back to state.s3 (instance profile) — existing stage-1 + stage-2 demo flows keep working unchanged. harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh (NEW, 8 steps) End-to-end OIDC isolation proof on Heima Mainnet: 1. SIWE wallet_sig auth → session JWT 2. POST /v1/mint-oidc-jwt → STS-compatible web identity token 3. AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity → STS creds tagged with PrincipalTag/agentkeys_actor_omni = derive_omni(master wallet) 4. POSITIVE: PUT s3://vault/bots/<own actor_omni>/credentials/… → HTTP 200 5. NEGATIVE: PUT s3://vault/bots/<wrong actor_omni>/credentials/… → AccessDenied (IAM rejects cross-actor write — the proof) 6+7. Same positive+negative pair on the memory bucket — soft-skip when memory bucket not yet provisioned (follow-up). 8. Cleanup with admin profile. Live-tested against Heima Mainnet. Step 5 verified: AWS IAM itself rejected the cross-actor PUT with AccessDenied — proves the ${aws:PrincipalTag/agentkeys_actor_omni} scoping in scripts/provision-vault-role.sh works as designed. Even if a worker were compromised, it could not write to another actor's prefix when using STS creds passed through from the broker mint flow. Architectural answers to the review (#90 Q1 + Q2): Q1 ("is OIDC disrupted by the new service isolation design?"): Was, yes — workers bypassed federation. NOW WIRED. Workers respect STS creds when passed; fall back to instance profile otherwise so existing stage-1+2 flows are unchanged. Q2 ("why does broker need s3:ListBucket — Lambda should sort incoming email into per-actor folders"): User is right architecturally. The 500 we soft-warned on in /v1/email/inbox is the symptom of the same OIDC bypass — the email worker uses instance profile and tries global ListObjects without scoping. Architecturally correct flow: SES inbound → Lambda sorts to bots/<actor>/inbound/ → email worker reads via OIDC-scoped STS creds, never global ListBucket. The fix is the same shape as this PR — pass-through STS creds via X-Aws-* headers — but is left as a follow-up: this PR ships the plumbing + proves OIDC works end-to-end; wiring the email worker + Lambda routing is a separate change. Tracked in #90 followups. * issue #90 codex review: fix downgrade attack + secret redaction Addresses 2 of 4 codex adversarial findings on commit 913179a: [P2 — downgrade attack] aws_creds.rs OptionalStsCreds extractor silently fell back to the broker EC2 instance profile when caller omitted X-Aws-* headers. A malicious caller could deliberately drop the headers to bypass the OIDC-scoped IAM session and get broker-wide S3 access. Fix: `AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS=1` env var puts the worker in strict mode — every request must carry all three X-Aws-* headers or gets HTTP 401. Also: partial header sets (1 or 2 of 3 present) ALWAYS reject with 401 regardless of strict mode — silently dropping half-passed creds is the same downgrade surface. Default off for backward compat; production deploys should turn it on. [P3 — credential leak via Debug] StsCreds previously derived Debug, so any future tracing::debug! or dbg!() call would log secret_access_key and session_token verbatim. Custom Debug impl now redacts both and shows only the access_key_id prefix (which AWS CloudTrails anyway). New tests: - debug_redacts_secret_and_session_token (asserts the Debug output doesn't contain the secret bytes; <redacted> marker present) - parser_distinguishes_no_headers_from_partial (locks the extractor's contract — no headers = backward compat, partial = always reject) Two codex findings deliberately left as follow-ups, not fixed in this commit: [P2 — memory worker OIDC not proven] The harness only mints agentkeys-vault-role creds, which scope to the vault bucket only. The memory worker writes to a separate memory bucket which isn't covered. A dedicated agentkeys-memory-role with the same tag-scoping pattern is the architecturally correct fix; tracked as PR followup. [P2 — vault bucket policy allows whole-bucket ListBucket] In scripts/apply-vault-bucket-policy.sh:109 — pre-existing, separate from this PR's surface. Adding an s3:prefix=bots/${aws:PrincipalTag/…} condition to the bucket-policy ListBucket statement closes the cross-actor key-name enumeration. Filed for the bucket-policy hardening followup. * issue #90 codex review: close remaining 2 deferred findings Lands the two findings deferred from commit 18e709b. Both verified live on Heima Mainnet via the extended harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh (11 steps, all green). [P2 — memory worker OIDC scoping] NEW agentkeys-memory-role + dedicated memory bucket, mirroring the vault data-class layout per arch.md §17.2. A future memory-worker compromise now cannot reach the credentials bucket and vice versa. scripts/provision-memory-bucket.sh (NEW) — mirror of provision-vault-bucket.sh scripts/provision-memory-role.sh (NEW) — federated trust + 3-statement inline policy scoped to $MEMORY_BUCKET/bots/${PrincipalTag}/memory/* scripts/apply-memory-bucket-policy.sh (NEW) — v3 bucket policy [P2 — bucket-policy ListBucket whole-bucket allow] Was: one statement listed [Get, Put, Delete, ListBucket] under one Resource[bucket, bucket/...] with NO s3:prefix condition — any tagged session could enumerate all keys. Now: SPLIT into two statements: VaultListV3 / MemoryListV3 — ListBucket ONLY, on the bucket ARN, Condition StringLike s3:prefix = bots/${PrincipalTag}/<class>/* VaultObjectsV3 / MemoryObjectsV3 — Get/Put/Delete on the prefixed-object ARN, no prefix condition (resource ARN already scopes) scripts/apply-vault-bucket-policy.sh (UPDATED) — v2 → v3 split scripts/apply-memory-bucket-policy.sh (NEW) — v3 split from day one Demo extended (harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh, STEP_TOTAL 8 → 11): step 3: mint TWO STS sessions (vault role + memory role) step 4-5: vault PUT positive (own) + negative (other) — pre-existing step 6: vault LIST negative (other prefix → AccessDenied) — codex P2 verifier step 7-8: memory PUT positive (own) + negative (other) step 9: memory LIST negative (other prefix → AccessDenied) step 10: cross-role isolation — vault creds → memory bucket → AccessDenied + memory creds → vault bucket → AccessDenied step 11: cleanup Also: `expect_access_denied` helper distinguishes IAM-rejection (AccessDenied / HTTP 403) from setup-bug failures (NoCredentialsErr, NoSuchBucket, InvalidAccessKeyId, TokenRefreshRequired). Naive `grep AccessDenied` would pass on any failure — codex's exact warning. operator-workstation.env: + MEMORY_BUCKET=agentkeys-memory-${ACCOUNT_ID} + MEMORY_ROLE_ARN=arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/agentkeys-memory-role Live-tested 2026-05-20 on Heima Mainnet: - memory bucket created (AssumedArn=…agentkeys-memory-role) - vault-bucket policy v2 → v3 swap (2 statements live) - memory-bucket policy v3 from scratch (2 statements live) - 11/11 demo steps green: [4] vault PUT own prefix → SUCCEEDED [5] vault PUT other prefix → AccessDenied [6] vault LIST other prefix → AccessDenied [7] memory PUT own prefix → SUCCEEDED [8] memory PUT other prefix → AccessDenied [9] memory LIST other prefix → AccessDenied [10] vault creds → memory bucket → AccessDenied [10] memory creds → vault bucket → AccessDenied * harness: log phase-1 acceptance for PR #92 (3-demo verification) All three demos (stage-1, stage-2, stage-3) green on Heima Mainnet after the codex review fixes. Clippy clean on worker-creds + worker-memory. PR ready to merge. * stage-3: add worker encrypt/decrypt roundtrip tests (steps 11+12) User's call-out — "the cred encryption and decryption is not tested". Stage-3 previously proved IAM scoping at the AWS layer but skipped the worker's AES-256-GCM envelope, so the actual encrypt→S3→decrypt path through the HTTP API was unexercised. The envelope.rs primitive has 8 unit tests, but the wire-protocol roundtrip wasn't. Stage-3 demo extended (STEP_TOTAL 11 → 13): [11] Cred worker encrypt/decrypt roundtrip: 1. mint cred-store cap via POST /v1/cap/cred-store (broker) 2. POST /v1/cred/store with cap + base64(plaintext) → worker KEK-encrypts (AES-256-GCM, AAD-bound to operator+actor+service+k3_epoch), S3 PUTs the envelope 3. mint cred-fetch cap via POST /v1/cap/cred-fetch 4. POST /v1/cred/fetch with cap → worker S3 GETs the envelope, KEK-decrypts, returns plaintext 5. assert returned plaintext == original (byte-for-byte) [12] Memory worker encrypt/decrypt roundtrip: same shape against /v1/memory/put + /v1/memory/get. Memory worker has no dedicated cap-mint endpoint yet (follow-up); cred-* caps work against memory because both workers verify the same broker- signed CapToken shape with the same CapOp::Store / CapOp::Fetch. Graceful skip handling: - 'agent scope not set on chain' → skip with 'run stage-1 --webauthn first' - 'AGENTKEYS_CHAIN_RPC_HTTP not set' → skip with 'redeploy broker' - 'DeviceRoleMissing' → skip with 'out-of-scope here' These map cleanly to operator-actionable prerequisites; demo continues green without those steps when prerequisites aren't met, but the prerequisite is reported, not hidden. Broker fix: setup-broker-host.sh now bakes AGENTKEYS_CHAIN + AGENTKEYS_CHAIN_RPC_HTTP into the broker's systemd Environment= lines. Previously the broker process had no chain RPC, so /v1/cap/cred-{store, fetch} hit 502 'RPC URL not set' at request time. This was a pre-existing gap surfaced by exercising the cap-mint path for the first time in this PR — the broker's stand-alone deploy never hit cap.rs's chain check before because no demo step minted caps. * isolation invariants: codify the 4-layer rule + cross-actor test (step 13) Three changes from user review: 1. NEW stage-3 step 13: NEGATIVE broker cap-mint isolation. Try to mint a cap-token with operator_omni != session_omni → expect HTTP 4xx with OperatorMismatch. This proves the MOST UPSTREAM isolation gate works: actor A's session JWT cannot mint caps for actor B. If this ever silently returns 200, every cred + memory blob in S3 is compromised — A could mint B's cap, hand to worker, worker writes under B's prefix. Live-verified on Heima Mainnet 2026-05-20: [13] NEGATIVE cap-mint cross-actor → HTTP 403 OperatorMismatch ✓ Independent of broker redeploy: session-omni check fires BEFORE the chain RPC check in handlers/cap.rs, so this gate works on the current (stale-RPC) broker too. 2. CLAUDE.md — NEW "Per-actor + per-data-class isolation invariants (issue #90)" section codifies the 4-layer defense: Layer 1 — broker cap-mint → session_omni == operator_omni Layer 2 — worker chain-verify → independent re-check of layer 1 Layer 3 — AWS IAM PrincipalTag → s3 resource scoping per-actor Layer 4 — bucket separation → per-data-class IAM roles Test-discipline rule: every PR adding a new worker, data class, or broker auth method MUST extend the stage-3 demo with negative isolation tests for all four layers. Don't ship features with only POSITIVE-path coverage. 3. CLAUDE.md — answers "why no /v1/cap/memory-* endpoint" with a concrete example: cap-tokens are data-class-agnostic. The same Store cap minted for service=openrouter can be POSTed to either /v1/cred/store (writes to vault bucket credentials/) or /v1/memory/put (writes to memory bucket memory/). The URL picks the data class; the cap just authorizes the operation. Adding dedicated memory cap endpoints would add audit clarity ("this cap was minted intending memory access") but no security boundary — isolation comes from the per-data-class IAM roles (layer 4). Deferred until payments-worker forces a third data class. * cap-token: data-class-explicit isolation (no cross-pollution between vault + memory) User callout — "make it explicit that one cannot pollute other permission." Before this commit, cap-tokens didn't carry a data-class binding: a cred-store cap and a memory-put cap were structurally identical. The URL the cap was POSTed to picked the bucket. Isolation lived only at the AWS IAM PrincipalTag + per-data-class IAM-role layer. If the IAM grants were ever accidentally broadened, cross-data-class pollution would slip through silently. Now: data_class is a SIGNED FIELD in the cap payload. The cap layer itself enforces per-data-class isolation, ahead of any AWS call. Schema change (REQUIRED field, no backward compat — coordinated upgrade): enum DataClass { Credentials, Memory } struct CapPayload { ... op: CapOp, data_class: DataClass, // NEW ... } Broker (crates/agentkeys-broker-server/src/handlers/cap.rs): - Add DataClass enum (mirror of worker's), add to CapPayload - mint_cap signature gains data_class param; statically derived per route - NEW endpoints: cap_memory_put + cap_memory_get (mint with DataClass::Memory) - Existing cap_cred_store + cap_cred_fetch mint with DataClass::Credentials Broker routes (crates/agentkeys-broker-server/src/lib.rs): + .route("/v1/cap/memory-put", post(cap_memory_put)) + .route("/v1/cap/memory-get", post(cap_memory_get)) Worker side (crates/agentkeys-worker-creds/src/verify.rs): - Add DataClass enum + field to CapPayload + DataClassMismatch error - NEW pub fn check_data_class(token, expected) — symmetric with check_op - Tests: data_class_serializes_snake_case + check_data_class_accepts_match + check_data_class_rejects_cross_class Worker handlers (worker-creds + worker-memory): - verify_cap now calls check_data_class with their respective class: worker-creds → DataClass::Credentials worker-memory → DataClass::Memory - Reject mismatched caps with HTTP 403 cap_data_class_mismatch Demo extension (harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh, STEP_TOTAL 14 → 16): [11] cred encrypt/decrypt roundtrip — now uses /v1/cap/cred-store [12] memory encrypt/decrypt roundtrip — now uses /v1/cap/memory-put (NEW endpoint) [14] NEW negative test: mint cred-class cap, POST to /v1/memory/put → expect HTTP 403 cap_data_class_mismatch [15] NEW negative test: mint memory-class cap, POST to /v1/cred/store → expect HTTP 403 cap_data_class_mismatch CLAUDE.md ("Per-actor + per-data-class isolation invariants"): Replaced "why no memory cap-mint endpoint" section (now obsolete) with "Cap-tokens are data-class-explicit" — explains the 4-endpoint shape, shows the concrete reject example, justifies route-per-class over a data_class query param (broker can't accidentally mint the wrong variant from a typed-route handler). Tests: worker-creds verify::tests — 14/14 (3 new for DataClass) broker-server handlers::cap::tests — 24/24 (1 new for data_class serialization) cargo build -p worker-creds -p worker-memory -p broker-server — exit 0 Live deploy: requires broker host redeploy via setup-broker-host.sh to pick up the new mint_cap signature + new memory routes. The stage-3 demo steps 14+15 will skip cleanly until the redeploy lands — the isolation IS enforced (workers reject cred-class caps), but the new endpoints don't exist on the current broker yet. * broker: bake contract addresses into systemd env (closes step-11 502) After redeploying with the data_class change (commit 690f54c), step 11 of the stage-3 demo surfaced a SECOND broker-side env gap: HTTP 502 from /v1/cap/cred-store: {"error":"SIDECAR_REGISTRY_ADDRESS_HEIMA unset","reason":"chain_rpc_error"} The broker's handlers/cap.rs reads three contract addresses at request time to verify device + scope + k3_epoch on chain: - SIDECAR_REGISTRY_ADDRESS_HEIMA - SCOPE_CONTRACT_ADDRESS_HEIMA - K3_EPOCH_COUNTER_ADDRESS_HEIMA Before this commit, setup-broker-host.sh baked AGENTKEYS_CHAIN_RPC_HTTP into the broker systemd unit but NOT the contract addresses. The cap- mint code path had never been exercised before this PR, so the gap went unnoticed. Fix (setup-broker-host.sh): add the three contract addresses to the broker's Environment= block, pulled from $REGISTRY_ADDR / $SCOPE_ADDR / $K3_COUNTER_ADDR (already populated earlier in the script via the sourced scripts/operator-workstation.env). The operator's operator-workstation.env stays the single source of truth for contract addresses across laptop + broker host. Stage-3 demo also gets a sibling skip-detection (harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh) so steps 11+12+14+15 cleanly skip with the redeploy-broker message instead of failing on this specific error shape. To unblock the stage-3 worker encrypt/decrypt + cross-class-rejection tests after this commit: ssh broker.litentry.org "cd ~/agentKeys && git pull && bash scripts/setup-broker-host.sh --yes" * broker + worker: parse_device_entry knows the 11-field struct (codex H1 alignment) Closes user-reported step-11 regression after broker redeploy: cap-mint returned HTTP 403 — body: {"error":"device is not active on chain", "reason":"device_not_active"} Same bug class I fixed earlier in scripts/heima-agent-create.sh + scripts/heima-device-revoke.sh (commit 0981a88). Both the broker's handlers/cap.rs::parse_device_entry AND the worker's crates/agentkeys-worker-creds/src/verify.rs::parse_device_entry were still slicing the OLD 7-word DeviceEntry layout. After codex H1 inserted 4 new fields (k11CredId, k11RpIdHash, k11PubX, k11PubY), the struct grew to 11 ABI words, but neither parser was updated. word 0 operatorOmni bytes32 word 1 actorOmni bytes32 word 2 k11CredId bytes32 word 3 k11RpIdHash bytes32 (NEW, codex H1) word 4 k11PubX uint256 (NEW) word 5 k11PubY uint256 (NEW) word 6 tier uint8 (padded) word 7 roles uint8 (padded) word 8 registeredAt uint64 (padded) word 9 lastSignCount uint32 (padded) word 10 revoked bool (padded) Before this commit, both parsers read: roles → word 4 (which is now k11PubX) registeredAt → word 5 (which is now k11PubY — always 0 for agents) revoked → word 6 (which is now tier) For agent devices (k11PubX = k11PubY = 0), registeredAt parsed as 0 → broker returned DeviceNotActive even though the device WAS active. Fix: both parsers now read from the correct 11-word offsets + check hex.len() >= 11 * 64. Tests updated: worker-creds verify::tests::parse_device_entry_decodes_well_formed → construct an 11-word raw response (was 7) broker handlers::cap::tests::parse_device_entry_decodes_well_formed → same broker handlers::cap::tests::parse_device_entry_detects_revoked → same All 4 green. Live deploy: requires broker host redeploy via setup-broker-host.sh so the broker picks up the new parse_device_entry. Worker code change ships with the broker redeploy (same setup-broker-host.sh rebuild). * stage-3 step 11+12: pass STS creds via X-Aws-* headers (fix s3_put 502) Step 11 surfaced the codex P2 downgrade-attack defense WORKING AS INTENDED: cap-mint succeeded, worker AES-encrypted, then S3 PUT returned 502 "s3_put: service error" because the worker fell back to the broker EC2 instance profile (which deliberately lacks s3:PutObject on the vault bucket). The codex P2 fix in commit 18e709b added OptionalStsCreds + the AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS strict-mode env var. Workers correctly demand per-request OIDC-minted STS creds. The stage-3 demo's step 11+12 cred_memory_roundtrip helper wasn't passing them. Fix: stage-3 step 11 (cred roundtrip) now passes vault-role STS creds, step 12 (memory roundtrip) passes memory-role STS creds, both via the three X-Aws-* headers the worker's OptionalStsCreds extractor reads: -H 'x-aws-access-key-id: $aki' -H 'x-aws-secret-access-key: $sak' -H 'x-aws-session-token: $sst' The STS creds were already minted in step 3 (vault + memory sessions written to $STATE_DIR/{aki,sak,sst}.{vault,memory}); step 11+12 just read the right file pair based on the kind (cred → vault, memory → memory) and forward them as headers. After this commit, steps 11+12 should land green end-to-end: broker cap-mint → 200 (chain checks pass) worker cap-verify → 200 (broker_sig + chain re-verify) worker S3 PUT → 200 (using per-actor STS creds, NOT instance profile) byte-for-byte roundtrip assertion holds. * stage-3 step 11+12: mint AGENT-side STS creds (correct principal-tag match) Step 11 surfaced the second layer of the OIDC isolation chain working as designed: cap-mint succeeded (broker authorized operator→agent), worker AES-encrypted, then S3 PUT returned 502 because the STS creds were minted from the OPERATOR'S session JWT (tagged with operator's actor_omni) but the cap's actor_omni — and hence the S3 key path — is the AGENT'S. IAM saw ${PrincipalTag/agentkeys_actor_omni} = 941c… trying to PUT bots/82a0…/credentials/… and rejected with AccessDenied. This is the IAM enforcing what the cap-token expresses: "operator authorized the agent to do this op; the agent must be the one actually doing it." Both layers must agree on actor_omni. Fix (stage-3 cred_memory_roundtrip helper): 1. Read agent_private_key from the demo-agent file 2. SIWE-sign as the agent against the broker (POST /v1/auth/wallet/start with the agent's address, sign with cast wallet sign using agent_private_key, POST /v1/auth/wallet/verify → session JWT for the agent) 3. Mint OIDC JWT via /v1/mint-oidc-jwt — this JWT now carries sub=agent_omni and PrincipalTag/agentkeys_actor_omni=agent_omni 4. AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against the right data-class role (VAULT_ROLE_ARN for cred, MEMORY_ROLE_ARN for memory) — STS creds now tagged with the agent's actor_omni 5. Forward these creds via X-Aws-* headers to the worker Now the worker's S3 PUT against bots/<agent>/credentials/… uses STS creds with PrincipalTag=agent_omni → IAM allows. The architectural lesson, recorded in the commit because it'll bite again: when a cap-token authorizes actor A's action and the worker uses STS creds to touch S3, the STS creds MUST be minted using A's identity — operator's authorization (cap-token) + actor's identity (STS creds) jointly satisfy the workflow. Per arch.md §17.2 layer 3, the IAM PrincipalTag is bound to the JWT subject, NOT to whoever the JWT-issuer (operator) chose to authorize. * stage-3: tighten pass/fail per codex adversarial review (3 findings) Codex round-2 review flagged the demo as 'needs-attention' — it could report 16/16 green while silently skipping the actual encrypt/decrypt + cross-class assertions. Three findings, all addressed: [high] Worker roundtrip checks could be skipped + still claim coverage cred_memory_roundtrip used `skip ...; return 0` on five prereq-missing paths (no agent file, no scope, broker missing chain RPC, broker missing contract addresses, DeviceRoleMissing). Final summary still claimed AES-256-GCM byte-for-byte coverage as if the path had run. Fix: introduce STRICT default + `--allow-skip` opt-in. All five prereq paths now call prereq_missing(), which: - in strict mode: prints fail + records 'fail' outcome + returns non-zero - in --allow-skip mode: prints skip + records 'skip' outcome (dev iter) Final summary now prints actual per-step outcomes from STEP_OUTCOMES[], and exits non-zero if any step failed (or any step skipped in strict). [high] Negative cap-class tests (steps 14, 15) accepted ANY non-200 Previously: cred-class cap → memory worker with non-200 + non-canonical error was accepted ('non-200 = pass for negative test'). A down worker, wrong URL, 404 route, auth middleware failure, or malformed request would all silently satisfy the demo without proving check_data_class fired. Fix: require HTTP 400/401/403 AND the canonical cap_data_class_mismatch error string. Any other response = die. [medium] Cross-actor cap-mint test (step 13) accepted generic rejection Previously: any 4xx accepted, even when error text was non-canonical; 502 (broker stale) silently skipped, hiding a real config issue. Fix: require HTTP 400/401/403 with canonical OperatorMismatch. 502 with config-missing body now dies (forces redeploy), not skip. Other 502/non-canonical errors = die (negative tests can't pass on an unrelated failure). Plus: positive steps (4, 7, 11+12 happy paths) now call record_ok so the summary lists EVERY step that actually proved its assertion. The expect_access_denied helper records too. The summary table is built from actual execution, not a static claim of coverage. The structural change here is: skips and infrastructure failures both become demo failures unless the operator explicitly opts in. CI runs default-strict. Dev iteration uses --allow-skip when bringing up a partial environment. * stage-3 summary: fix `local` outside function + handle cleanup-only invocation Two small bugs in the strict-mode summary added by c55ea29: 1. Used `local` inside the `if should_run_step 16` block (not a function body), so bash printed: harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh: line 864: local: can only be used in a function AFTER the per-step outcome table tried to render. The 16 steps all ran correctly + the demo exited 0, but the summary table itself never printed. Fix: drop the `local` keyword and just use plain vars. 2. "DEMO COMPLETE" header would print even when no steps had been recorded (e.g. `--from-step 16` to test the summary block in isolation). Now distinguishes: - all green (nok>0, nskip=0, nfail=0) → DEMO COMPLETE - some skipped (--allow-skip) → DEMO PARTIAL - any failure → DEMO FAILED + exit 1 - no steps run at all → NO STEPS EXERCISED + advisory * harness: log codex round-2 fix + 13/13 stage-3 strict-mode verification * stage-3 codex round-3: close skip-bypass in steps 14+15 (cross-class) Codex round-3 review caught a regression I missed in c55ea29: [high] Strict demo still skips cross-class isolation checks without recording failure (steps 14 + 15) Previously fixed cred_memory_roundtrip's prereq paths to use prereq_missing (so strict mode fails-hard), but left steps 14 + 15 calling bare `skip` for the same prereq classes: - missing demo-agent file - 'not.*scope' (chain scope not set) - 'RPC URL not set' (broker stale) - 'SIDECAR_REGISTRY_ADDRESS_HEIMA unset' (broker missing contract addrs) Because those skips didn't append to STEP_OUTCOMES, a full run could report 'DEMO COMPLETE' with nskip=0 even when neither cross-data-class isolation gate had been exercised. That's the same false-success failure mode codex round-2 flagged, just in a different code path — exactly the kind of regression strict-mode tracking is meant to catch. Fix: extracted the entire step 14/15 body into a cross_class_rejection() helper function. All prereq paths now route through prereq_missing (matching cred_memory_roundtrip's pattern), so: - strict mode (default): unmet prereqs → die + STEP_OUTCOMES records 'fail' - --allow-skip mode: unmet prereqs → skip + STEP_OUTCOMES records 'skip' - successful negative test → STEP_OUTCOMES records 'ok' Step 14: cross_class_rejection cred-store /v1/memory/put memory cred cred-to-mem Step 15: cross_class_rejection memory-put /v1/cred/store cred memory mem-to-cred Live-verified on Heima Mainnet (2026-05-20): all 13 STEP_OUTCOMES recorded, DEMO COMPLETE, exit 0. Steps 14+15 still pass with canonical 403 cap_data_class_mismatch error confirmation (no change to the positive-path assertion logic — only the skip paths got tightened). * stage-3 codex round-4: cross-class test sends X-Aws-* headers (strict-mode correct) Codex round-4 finding (high): Cross-class negative test omits required STS headers, so strict workers reject before the data-class guard. The axum extractor order is: OptionalStsCreds → Json<Req> → handler body (verify_cap). With AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS=1 — the production deployment setting documented in aws_creds.rs — the extractor rejects header-less requests with HTTP 401 BEFORE verify_cap runs. The cross-class data-class guard inside verify_cap never fires. Today the live test passes because the broker host workers don't have AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS=1 set. So we're proving the data-class guard against dev-config workers but NOT against the prod target. That's exactly the 'demo says complete, prod silently broken' failure mode the codex review pipeline keeps catching. Fix: cross_class_rejection() now: 1. Mints agent-side STS creds for the TARGET worker's role: step 14 (memory worker target) → memory-role STS step 15 (cred worker target) → vault-role STS 2. Passes all three X-Aws-* headers in the POST to the worker. Worker request order now: a. OptionalStsCreds extractor: valid headers present → Some(creds) → OK (passes regardless of AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS=1 setting) b. verify_cap: check_op (Store) → OK check_data_class (cap.data_class != worker's class) → REJECT → HTTP 403 cap_data_class_mismatch c. S3 op never runs (verify_cap returned error) The data-class guard provably fires now, in BOTH strict and non-strict worker configurations. Codex's concern was correct. Refactored mint_agent_sts_for_role() as a shared helper so cross_class test reuses the same SIWE+OIDC+STS flow as cred_memory_roundtrip. Same auth chain, same trust boundary, same code path — no inconsistency between positive (cred_memory_roundtrip) and negative (cross_class) tests. Live-verified 2026-05-20 on Heima Mainnet: 13 STEP_OUTCOMES recorded, all ok, DEMO COMPLETE. Steps 14+15 still return canonical 403 cap_data_class_mismatch with the STS headers correctly passed through — confirming the data-class guard fires AFTER extractor authentication passes. * arch.md: document cap-token data_class binding + 4-layer isolation invariants (§17.5) Codifies the issue #90 outcomes into the canonical architecture spec (per CLAUDE.md "arch.md as source of truth" rule): §15.1 + §15.2 — credentials-service + memory-service: added the OIDC federation paragraph. X-Aws-* header passthrough is the production auth surface (codex P2 downgrade fix); strict mode forces it via AGENTKEYS_WORKER_REQUIRE_STS=1. Cross-links to §17.5. §17.5 (NEW) — Per-data-class cap-token binding: - Cap-token's data_class field + the 4 broker endpoints - 4-layer defense-in-depth table (broker cap-mint, worker chain- verify, AWS IAM PrincipalTag, per-data-class buckets) - Each layer's canonical test in harness/v2-stage3-demo.sh - Test-discipline rule: new data classes MUST add negative isolation tests across all 4 layers - Two design rationales spelled out: a) Why route-per-class beats a single endpoint with a data_class query-param (eliminates user-input attack surface) b) Why agent-side STS creds are mandatory (PrincipalTag must match the cap's actor_omni; operator-side STS won't satisfy IAM) Plus the trailing Cargo.lock entry from aws-…
This was referenced May 20, 2026
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v2 stage 1 — sovereign sidecar + on-chain identity + credentials-service worker (#89)
Resolves #89. Partially overlaps #90 (real K11 WebAuthn) and #91 (credentials-service worker microservice variant) — see "Stage-2 work partially landed" below.
This PR began as step 1 of #85 (mock-server → S3 migration). With the v2 architecture refactor (arch.md v2) issued during the work, scope expanded into the full v2 stage-1 foundation. Operators upgrading from #87's
S3CredentialBackendget the on-chain registry + sidecar daemon + worker + WebAuthn-bound K11 in this single change.What's shipped
On-chain layer (
crates/agentkeys-chain/)Four Solidity 0.8.20 contracts (Frontier-compatible
evm_version = "london"per Heima) deployed to Heima mainnet (chain_id 212013):SidecarRegistry0x76D574a107727bE87fc1422661A030FEFda70786AgentKeysScope0x14C23B5D1cE20c094af643a20e6b0972dAD12aa8K3EpochCounter0x8396dEc50ff755d6DE7728DABB00Be2eFBCdf4dFCredentialAudit0x1801ded1a4FBD8c9224Ab18B9EcbB293B8674c06Source + 11 forge tests under
crates/agentkeys-chain/test/. Deploy script atcrates/agentkeys-chain/script/DeployAgentKeysV1.s.sol. Live verification:AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima bash scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh # 13 sub-checks across 4 contracts; exits 0 on all-pass.Broker — cap-mint endpoints (
crates/agentkeys-broker-server/src/handlers/cap.rs)POST /v1/cap/cred-store— mint a one-shot capability for credential storagePOST /v1/cap/cred-fetch— mint a cap for credential readSidecarRegistry.isActive(deviceKeyHash),AgentKeysScope.isServiceInScope(operator, agent, service),K3EpochCounter.currentEpoch()viaeth_callover reqwest — co-signs cap with broker's K1 P-256 key only if all three checks pass.{operator_omni, actor_omni, service, op_type, k3_epoch, expires_at, nonce}signed asbase64url(p256-ecdsa). Workers re-verify against on-chain state independently (arch.md §15.1).Daemon — localhost cap-proxy (
crates/agentkeys-daemon/src/proxy.rs)$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/agentkeys-proxy.sock(caller-uid via SO_PEERCRED) + optional TCP fallbacktokio::sync::RwLock<HashMap>)Credentials worker (
crates/agentkeys-worker-creds/)Independent re-verify of cap-tokens before any S3 PUT/GET:
SidecarRegistry.isActive(device)re-checkAgentKeysScope.isServiceInScope(operator, actor, service)re-checkK3EpochCounter.currentEpoch == cap.k3_epochre-checkEndpoints:
POST /v1/cred/store,POST /v1/cred/fetch,POST /v1/cred/teardown. AES-256-GCM envelope with v2 shape (1B version || 12B nonce || ciphertext || 16B tag); KEK fromAGENTKEYS_WORKER_KEK_HEX(stage-1 simplification per arch.md §22b.2 — WARN at boot; rejects all-zeros + all-same-byte placeholders).Memory worker (
crates/agentkeys-worker-memory/)Same shape as creds worker, distinct KEK + bucket per arch.md §17 per-data-class separation. Endpoints:
POST /v1/memory/{store,fetch,teardown}.CLI —
agentkeys k11subcommand (crates/agentkeys-cli/src/k11.rs+k11_webauthn.rs)--webauthnbrings up a localhost axum server, openshttp://localhost:<random>, runsnavigator.credentials.{create,get}against the platform passkey (Touch ID / Windows Hello / Secure Enclave), validates clientDataJSON challenge/type/origin, parses attestationObject CBOR, verifies authData (rpIdHash, UP|UV|AT flags, credentialId match), extracts P-256 X+Y from COSE pubkey, persists to~/.agentkeys/k11/<omni>.json(mode 0600,mode: "webauthn"). Assert binds to the application message viachallenge = sha256(message)— the resulting signature is cryptographically bound to that exact call.Without
--webauthn, defaults to deterministic stub for CI. WARN to stderr onAGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heimaper arch.md §22b.1.Helper scripts wrapping the live contracts
Eight idempotent bash scripts under
scripts/— eachcast-based, pre-checks current on-chain state and short-circuits when the op is already a no-op:heima-bring-up.shcast codeon each stored addressheima-fund-account.shcast balance≥ requested amountheima-device-register.shSidecarRegistry.registerMasterDevicegetDevice.registeredAt > 0heima-agent-create.shSidecarRegistry.registerAgentDeviceheima-scope-set.shAgentKeysScope.setScopeWithWebauthngetScopeconfig equalityheima-scope-revoke.shAgentKeysScope.revokeScopegetScope.exists == falseheima-device-revoke.shSidecarRegistry.revokeDevicegetDevice.revoked == trueheima-credential-audit.shCredentialAudit.appendAll accept
--webauthn(where applicable) to get the K11 assertion from the real ceremony viaagentkeys k11 assert --webauthn.One-command end-to-end demo (
scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh)15 steps, idempotent re-runs:
Pass
--webauthnfor the real Touch ID ceremony on steps 11 + 13. Default is stub mode (CI-friendly).Stage-2 work partially landed
#90 (Hardening) — partial
--webauthnflag). On-chain P-256 verify still deferred until Heima ships EIP-7212 precompile.heima-device-revoke.shonly handles single-master revoke today.agentkeys-worker-memory).currentEpoch = 1andsignerGovernanceinitialized; rotation procedure documented in arch.md §22b but no operational script yet.A comment on #90 enumerates these.
#91 (credentials-service worker) — partial
agentkeys-worker-creds).--credential-backend=sidecarwired through worker — ✅ shipped (CLI flag + daemon proxy + worker endpoints all in place).verify.rs::verify_cap).A comment on #91 enumerates these.
Audit pass + WebAuthn ceremony
docs/v2-stage1-iteration-log.mdrecords 4 audit findings + fixes:arch.md §22b stage-1 simplifications inventory(§22b.1..§22b.5) with stage-2 issue pointers--webauthnflag with browser + Touch ID; manual ceremony parsing (CBOR auth-data, P-256 verify)Two codex adversarial review passes against
7a89c5fandd0ab230returned APPROVED after follow-up fixes — see iteration log for the verdict tables.Test plan
cargo test --workspace— 200+ tests across 9 crates, all pass.cargo clippy --workspace— zero warnings.cargo test -p agentkeys-cli— 57 tests (k11 stub, k11 webauthn unit + integration, chain helpers).bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh— end-to-end against Heima mainnet succeeds, idempotent on re-run.bash scripts/v2-stage1-demo.sh --webauthn— opens browser, Touch ID prompts, real assertion bytes go on chain.AGENTKEYS_CHAIN=heima bash scripts/verify-heima-contracts.sh— 13/13 checks pass.What did NOT land
Tracked in #90 (hardening) and #91 (worker hardening):
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