This library sits at the boundary between renderer and main process in Electron apps. It enforces nodeIntegration: false, contextIsolation: true, origin allowlists, and per-WebContents window ownership. A bypass here could mean a compromised renderer gains access it shouldn't have.

Please use GitHub Security Advisories to report privately. Do not open a public issue.

We'll acknowledge within 48 hours and aim to ship a fix within 14 days for high-severity issues.

Only the latest major version receives security patches.

In scope:

• Bypasses of allowedOrigins or __ELECTRON_WINDOW_ALLOWED_ORIGINS__
• Renderer-controllable webPreferences on child windows
• Cross-WebContents window control (ownership check bypass)
• IPC validation bypasses allowing disallowed props to reach BrowserWindow

Out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in Electron itself
• Misuse by the consuming app (e.g., setting allowedOrigins: ["*"])
• Denial of service within documented rate limits