

Facets of Political Inequality

Evidence from citizen consultations in Kampala

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Primary goal: measure and relate dimensions of political inequality

How can we best measure citizens' **degree of political power**?

How do gaps in **voice** (Coffe and Bolzendahl 2011; Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015) relate to **systemic responsiveness** (Gaikwad and Nellis 2018)? and ultimately **unequal outcomes**?

Assess linkages between 3 different dimensions of political inequality:

- **input**: inequality in intensity of participation
- **throughput**: inequality in the system's *responsiveness* to demands
- **output**: inequality in how much decisions favor specific individuals / groups

Strategy: Close analysis of Kampala's Citizen Charter process

In 2019 we were invited to support a set of consultations to provide input into the construction of a "City Charter" for Kampala.

The Charter was to outline:

- **principles and clear standards** of service provision
- **rights and responsibilities** of citizens and bureaucrats

We had a chance to observe:

- The creation of **an institution**
- The points of **disagreement** and how these were resolved



Theoretical framework

Simple model of political action

We start from a simple model: a *status quo* policy which multiple players try to influence.


Each player is characterized by π_i : how much their actions *would* shape outcomes (causal quantity).

Players choose optimal actions — which can vary in direction and magnitude—and we seek a Nash equilibrium

This gives:

- Equilibrium actions (input inequality)
- Social outcomes (outcome inequality)
- Patterns to backout influence (throughput inequality)

Model illustrated




Effort and welfare given ideals $x_1 = -.5, x_2 = +.5$.

- With throughput inequality, input equality and output equality cannot both be achieved simultaneously.
- Welfare gains for more powerful player are modest; but input increases can be large

Rationalization

This can be *rationalized* with a reversion point that favors player 1



Design

Overview

- Baseline
- Small-scale consultation meetings, of around 1-1.5 hours
 - Participants: 6-8 citizens recruited from the same village
 - Facilitated by KCCA officials, or *neutral* facilitators (trained enumerators)
 - Objective: collect input from citizens for construction of Charter
 - Decisions: made collectively by the group, and recorded by facilitator
- Decisions relayed to city
- City drafts charter
- Endline

Topics


Pre-identified set of topics | Vetted by KCCA | Plausibly contentious

- **Report budget:** At what levels should budgets be reported?
- **Channels of communication:** At what levels should KCCA engage with citizens?
- **Growth vs equality:** Should KCCA focus on growth or inequality?
- **Raising fees and taxes:** Should there be higher taxes for better services
- **Monitor Charter:** What level of oversight should there be?

Also: *Is KCCA going in the right direction?*



Baseline sampling




Every possible challenge

- Political instability: leadership changed 3 times
- 2020-21: Covid-19
- 2022: Ebola




But done




Results

Disagreement: citizens vs. KCCA




We also observe preference variation among citizens.

Disagreement: citizens vs. citizens




These differences are often significant but tend to be smaller in magnitude.

Input inequality in conventional participation



Gender: max. designates men. Luganda: max. designates native speakers.

Input inequality in consultations: times spoken




Throughput inequality: Elite influence

Strategy:

- Meeting facilitators are not *meant* to influence outcomes
- The random assignment of facilitators to meetings however lets us assess the extent to which they do
- Key approach: can we predict meeting outcomes based on the identity of the facilitators?

Throughput inequality: KCCA going in right direction?



Facilitators in general, and KCCA facilitators in particular, matter!

Variation both between facilitators and between types of facilitator


We find the same pattern for **4 of 5** substantive outcomes

Throughput inequality: Are they more influential in disadvantaged communities?

Is the influence of facilitators weakened when communities are more privileged?

- For *communication channels with citizens* we see:
 - Effects of facilitators are **eliminated** in privileged communities
 - Facilitator preferences drive meeting outcome more in disadvantaged communities
- Similar dynamic, though faint, for a second topic; little evidence for remaining three topics

Output inequality: Advantaged more likely to get favored outcome?



$$Match_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * advantaged + \beta_2 * attended + \beta_3 * advantaged * attended + \epsilon_i$$
24/32

An ultimate outcome: subjective welfare

We also asked participants if they were happy with outcomes on each decision (scaled 0/50/100).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Constant	89.98*** (0.88)	89.08*** (1.03)	94.93*** (0.94)	92.31*** (0.76)	93.22*** (0.73)	91.63*** (0.63)
Led by KCCA	2.49* (1.16)					
Outcome matches preferences		3.00** (0.98)				
Time speaking			-1.15*** (0.26)			
Male				-1.86* (0.92)		
Wealth					-1.96*** (0.58)	
Deemed influential						-3.00* (1.46)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Num. obs.	6093	4506	6093	6078	5769	6093
RMSE	24.38	24.77	24.35	24.41	24.30	24.39
N Clusters	188	188	188	188	188	188

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

- Suggests KCCA assignment not producing adverse effect
- And reassuringly some evidence of more satisfaction when outcomes match preferences

Conclusions

High level outcomes


Fairly clear answers:

- Local Consultations (greatest agreement)
- Budget disaggregation to local level
- Equity before growth
- External oversight
- Maintain current tax/service structure (weakest agreement)

Did it **matter**?

- We think so:
- Results and report used by KCCA to develop draft which is (still!) before the city council
- The draft Charter contains key endorsed principles from this process

Charter



MESSAGE FROM THE LORD MAYOR

I am pleased to present the Kampala Capital City Citizens Charter a social contract between KCCA, the City residents.

The key objectives of the Service Charter are:

- a) to increase accountability;
- b) set a framework for the effective monitoring and evaluation of performance at all KCCA service delivery units.

KCCA recognizes the potential benefits of using the Charter as a tool to drive change towards a more customer focused approach throughout the service delivery levels. The Charter will go a long way to increase KCCA's efficiency, effectiveness and use of the scarce resources.

This Charter is linked to the Kampala Capital City Strategic Plan and will be operationalized through the Annual Budgeting process.

It specifies the standards for the delivery of services and clearly sets out feedback and a complaint handling mechanism.

I appeal to all City residents and stakeholder to use this Charter as a tool to improve service delivery in Kampala City.

It is my sincere hope that when the commitments and standards of this client charter are fully implemented, there will significant improvement in the service delivery system in Kampala City.



Erias Lukwago

His Worship the Lord Mayor

Charter

Draft principles reflect consultations quite well:

Kampala Charter Principles

1. Kampala residents can expect **equal treatment** from KCCA irrespective of their nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion, wealth or status.
2. Kampala residents can expect to have **a voice** in KCCA decisions that affect them.
3. Kampala residents can expect KCCA to deliver quality services to the city in ways that **reduce disparities** between different parts of the city.
4. Kampala residents have **a right to information on the activities and expenditures** of KCCA including, to the extent possible, expenditures targeted at local levels.

KCCA is committed to upholding specific standards of service delivery including:

Not yet through council



What do we learn about political inequality: Consultative process

Some relatively good news for a consultative process. Nuanced results on understandings of influence.

Running explanation: Egalitarian process partly *offset* inequalities in power and inputs.

Rethink

- A mistake to infer inequality in outcomes from inequality in inputs, or inequality in responsiveness from inequality in inputs.
- A mistake to infer inequality in outputs from inequality in throughput.

Scope condition:

- *Non distributive* nature of this setting very important: scope for free riding
- *Institutional flatness* could limit each type of inequality

Next stage:

- assess whether *taking part* mattered for willingness to demand services

References

References

- Coffe, Hilde, and Catherine Bolzendahl. 2011. "Gender Gaps in Political Participation Across Sub-Saharan African Nations." *Social Indicators Research* 102 (2): 245–64.
- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2018. "Do Politicians Discriminate Against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India." Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley. http://cpd.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Nellis_{\}_CPC.pdf.
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