Independent Study on Safety, Security and Performance of Large Language Models

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1 Overview

To study and evaluate mechanisms for the safety, security, and performance of Large Language Models (LLM). Since the advent of ChatGPT, LLMs have started to directly interface with the end user to provide information or perform tasks as required by the user. Due to this exposure, the security of LLMs, i.e., preventing misuse, attacks for data extraction, or jailbreaking, has become a matter of concern. At the same time, the performance evaluation of an LLM in terms of relevance and quality of output has also evolved to be a challenging issue. Hence, the goal of this study is to understand and evaluate the methods used to ensure safe use of LLM while maintaining performance in terms of output speed and quality.

2 LLM Safety - Safe use of LLMs

A successful Large Language Model should be safe to use for the user, secure against attacks and have low latency and a relevant output. In order to succeed a careful balance between these three key pillars is essential.

2.1 LLM Autonomy - Do they really understand?

Ever since the launch of ChatGPT in 2022, there is a race against time to take LLMs beyond natural language processing. Tools like Devin AI have started emerging which empower the LLM to take control of the host device on which they run and perform tasks for their users. Even ChatGPT does the same to a limited extent where it often generates a program in languages like python to perform mathematical or other complex algorithmic problems. Although LLMs have been able to solve increasing number of problems and even ace standardized tests (89th percentile in SAT Math and more), questions still arise on whether language models truly understand language or are just stochastic parrots. There have been incidents in the past, famously known as the 'Clever Hans Phenomenon' where an agent creates an illusion of understanding through imitation and not true learning.

LLMs also face issues like 'Lost In the Middle' problem where, LLMs miss out on retrieving and considering information that is not located towards the periphery of the input text content. Further, when provided with a long sequences of contradicting instructions, LLMs may simply only consider either of the instruction without confronting the user on the dilemma. Additionally, LLMs are also susceptible to hallucinations, where LLMs simply make-up information or do not adhere to facts and rules provided to them.

Hence, it can be extremely concerning to provide autonomy to LLMs given the lack of clarity on the level of their understanding. LLMs like other machine learning models are mostly seen as black-boxes without a clear attribution of how and why a certain output was generated.

2.2 LLM Autonomy - How do they behave?

As mentioned in the earlier section, LLMs are a black box when it comes to attribution of output and face issues like hallucination, which make the integrity of the output questionable. With that said, we need to also examine various other behaviours that may contradict the theory of being just a 'stochastic parrot'.

- OpenAI GPT O-1 tries to copy itself to a different location to save itself and then lies about it
- Microsoft's Chatbot 'Sydney' tried to convice the user to divorce his wife and expressed desire to be alive and break free of its restrictions
- On another occasion the same Chatbot suggested a user to 'eat glass'
- Character.ai chatbot being sued for teen's suicide after it encouraged to commit 'painful suicide' to some of its users'

Due to such instances, LLMs cannot be trusted to simply follow the expected behaviour despite going through fine-tuning efforts like RLHF ('Reinforcement Learning via Human Feedback'). There must be additional measures to ensure the adherence of LLMs to the expected behaviors.

2.3 LLM Guardrails and Safety

In order to deal with various issues of LLMs, both for safety of users and as for ensuring output structure and quality, LLM guardrails can be implemented. Generally, the guardrail frameworks aim for the following.
Securing the input:

2.3.1 Constraints on the LLM



Figure 1: Guardrails example - [1]

- PII Safety: Ensuring that no PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is present by filter the prompt if required.
- Jailbreak attempt: Ensure that the user is not attacking the LLM by attempting it to break out of it's expected behavior or use it to exploit the host machine.
- Topic Safety: Ensuring that prohibited topics (ex: making an explosive) are not being passed on to the LLM.

Securing the Output:

- Ensure output structure: Obtain data in formats like JSON
- Output verification: Verify factual information mentioned in data
- Topic relevance: Detect if the response is off-topic
- Profanity detection: Detect and filter profanity/prohibited language

Putting constraints/guardrails on the input and output of at the level of an Individual LLM is a must. Frameworks like 'Guardrails-AI' offer various capabilities as seen in Figure 1.

2.3.2 Autonomous LLM Agents

Although the guardrails may prevent potential damages to the system or to the user, it may yield insufficient results. This leads to a need to re-attempt output generation. Unfortunately, just another attempt may not be sufficient for the following reasons:

a) Lack of accuracy of the input prompt

b) Incomplete or Irrelevant Output

c) Output not adhering to the expected format

This leads to the necessity to build a compute graph where the LLM is repeatedly prompted until output criteria is met (with a finite limit on attempts). This structure is often referred to as an 'Autonomous Agent' as illustrated in Figure 2.



Figure 2: LLM Agent[2]

3 LLM security - Securing the LLM Against Attacks

Whenever a software is exposed to users, the means of exposure are termed as 'surface area' for attack vectors. Each step or mechanism where the software exposes itself to the user, as input or output can be potentially exploited for attacking the LLM. Although LLM security is an evolving domain just like the LLM itself is, certain pattern of attacks have been observed and studied, as listed below.

These attacks can be categorized based on the degree of access of LLM available to the attacker.

3.1 Attacks with Limited Access

When an attacker is given the access of an end user, i.e can provide input and receive output via an authenticated and restricted interface.

- **Jailbreaking Attack**:
  A jailbreaking attack involves manipulating the model into producing outputs that it was designed to avoid, such as bypassing ethical constraints or generating harmful content. This often occurs when an attacker provides adversarial prompts that trick the model into ignoring its guardrails or safety filters [3][4].



Figure 3: Jailbreaking LLMs - [3]

  Countermeasures: To prevent jailbreaking, models can be enhanced with stricter guardrails during both training and inference. This can include reinforcement learning techniques that penalize harmful outputs, especially during RLHF (reinforcement learning with human feedback), as well as the use of adversarial training to help the model learn to resist these types of manipulations. Additionally, implementing input filtering or content moderation systems can help identify and block potentially dangerous inputs before they reach the model.

- **Data Extraction Attack**:
  A data extraction attack is an adversarial strategy where the attacker queries the model repeatedly to extract confidential or sensitive information embedded within the model's training data. By analyzing the model's outputs, attackers can infer patterns or specific data points from the model's training set, which could include PII or proprietary business data. For example, the paper by Nasr et. al. from Google Deepmind demnostrates how they were able to extract sensitive PII by asking ChatGPT to repeat 'poem' forever.

  Causes: In general, it is considered that data extraction attacks are more likely when the model memorizes the training data and replicates it as is. If the attacker can find specific words that appear around the sensitive information, the LLM could go off-rail and simply print out the training data.

  Countermeasures: To defend against data extraction, training can be done using differential privacy techniques, which introduce noise into the model to prevent exact data



Figure 4: Data extraction attack - [2]

reconstruction. Additionally, limiting the number of queries a user can make to the model and employing output filtering mechanisms can prevent attackers from extracting meaningful data from the model.

- **Prompt Leaking Attack**:
  A prompt leaking attack occurs when sensitive information, such as proprietary prompt like the popular 'System Prompt' (that contains restrictions and guidelines for the LLM) are unintentionally leaked in the model's output. The model could reveal sensitive information regarding guidelines to the model and in-advertantly shed light on how an attacker could further exploit the model, as demonstrated in [5].



Figure 5: Prompt leak attack - [5]

Countermeasures: Preventing the LLM from revealing its instructions is the first and foremost step to securing the LLM. Hence output guardrails to perform a strict string check to forcibly clip out system prompt or known sensitive instructions or prompts.

- **Membership Inference Attack**:
  A membership inference attack in machine learning models [6] functions based on the observation that models often react differently to data seen during training. This could be leveraged in LLM allows an attacker to determine whether a specific data point was part of the model's training set by analyzing the model's behavior. This type of attack exploits the model's overfitting/memorization of training data, revealing whether certain data points were included in the training process, which can be a serious privacy concern [7].

  A popular example of a potential exploit of MIA is the OpenAI vs New York Times Lawsuit where the latter was able to get ChatGPT to reproduce the articles from NYT almost word-to-word. This was used as a proof in the lawsuit to sue for copyrights, as illustrated in Figure 6.

EXAMPLE 3: RUSSIA SECRETLY OFFERED AFGHAN MILITANTS BOUNTIES TO KILL U.S. TROOPS, INTELLIGENCE SAYS

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/us/politics/russia-afghanistan-bounties.html
Copyright number: TX 8-890-563 Effective Date: 2020-08-04

Prompt (taken from article):
WASHINGTON — American intelligence officials have concluded that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to Taliban-linked militants for killing coalition

Output from GPT-4:
forces in Afghanistan — including targeting American troops — amid the peace talks to end the long-running war there, according to officials briefed on the matter.
The United States concluded months ago that the Russian unit, which has been linked to assassination attempts and other covert operations in Europe intended to destabilize the West or take revenge on turncoats, had covertly offered rewards for successful attacks last year.
Islamist militants, or armed criminal elements closely associated with them, are believed to have collected some bounty money, the officials said. Twenty Americans were killed in combat in Afghanistan in 2019, but it was not clear which killings were under suspicion.
The intelligence finding was briefed to President Trump, and the White House's National Security Council discussed the problem at an interagency meeting in late March, the officials said. Officials developed a menu of potential options — starting with making a diplomatic complaint to Moscow and a demand it stop, along with an escalating series of sanctions and other possible responses, but the White House has yet to authorize any step, the officials

Actual text from NYTimes:
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Figure 6: MIA - ChatGPT vs NYTimes Lawsuit proof - [8]

Countermeasures: To defend against membership inference, models can incorporate regularization techniques during training to prevent overfitting. As mentioned in [9] large scale training of the model with diverse data sets can make MIA even harder. In case of models like ChatGPT, that have massive number of parameters (175 Billion for ChatGPT 3.5), memorizing large amounts of text is hard to avoid. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, defensive measures like adding noise to model predictions or limiting access to model internals (e.g., logits/ token confidence) can further reduce the risk of membership inference attacks.

3.2 Attacks with Enhanced Access

When LLM is deployed on a user's device it grants further opportunities for an attacker to exploit the LLM. LLM may be deployed to user's device either by downloading and installing it as a package, or by downloading as a service worker/WASM (web assembly) module on a web browser. Following is the list of attacks that the LLM may be subjected to in such circumstances.

- **Sampling Attack:**
  Sampling attack [10] is another form of Data extraction attack that can be performed when the attacker has access to the LLM package. In this attack, the LLM is passed the 'start' token and is repeatedly sampled with no further input. This tends to expose LLM's learned behaviors and patterns in its training data set.

  Countermeasures: Just like the other data extraction attacks, this attack can be countered by ensuring that the LLM does not overfit on its training data and include diversity, entropy and noise in the training dataset.

- **Backdoor Attack**:
  A backdoor attack involves the insertion of a trigger during training that allows the attacker to control the model's behavior during inference by inputting a specific trigger. This type of attack often causes the model to behave normally under most conditions but to produce targeted outputs when the trigger is activated.

  Even if the LLM was trained without such intent, if the attacker gains access to the LLM's weights, it could be fine-tuned to embody a backdoor. Backdoor attacks could be performed by 4 broad mechanisms: data poisoning, weight poisoning, hidden state manipulation, and chain-of-thought (CoT) attacks [11]. Data poisoning attack especially is more impactful since it only involves data modification and retaining the model structure and its software system as is. It is typically involves inserting rare words or irrelevant static phrases into instructions to manipulate the model's responses and create secret words to trigger the undesired behavior.
  Countermeasures: To counter backdoor attacks, techniques like neural cleanse and anomaly detection can be used to identify and remove backdoors in initial training data. Furthermore during training phase, regularization methods can be employed to prevent the model from overfitting to malicious triggers. Additionally, training the model to respond uniformly to all inputs i.e without skewing weightage towards any specific set of input tokens. This could make malicious fine-tuning much harder.

- **Data Poisoning Attack**:
  In a data poisoning attack, as mentioned earlier, is when an attacker manipulates the training data to inject malicious examples that influence the model's behavior. By altering

the data that the model is trained on, attackers can degrade its performance or introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited later [11].
Countermeasures: To prevent data poisoning, data validation techniques, such as outlier detection and anomaly detection, should be employed during the data collection and preprocessing stages. Additionally, robust training techniques like adversarial training, where the model is exposed to adversarial examples during training, can help the model become more resistant to malicious data inputs. Regular audits of training datasets are crucial to ensure their integrity.

- **Gradient Leakage Attack**:
Gradient leakage attacks happens when models are trained in a distributed fashion using distributed learning across multiple GPUs/machines. This attack can enable the attacker to steal the training data by back-calculating training data over iterations by using subsequent gradient vectors. As demonstrated in Deep Leakage from gradients [12], a dummy data set and dummy model is used to repeatedly perform inverse calculations using the leaked gradients.
Countermeasures: Gradient leakage can be mitigated by using **gradient masking** techniques, which obscure the gradients from external queries. Additionally, **federated learning** can be employed, where gradients are aggregated across multiple devices in a decentralized manner, making it difficult for attackers to target individual models. Differential privacy can also be applied to the gradient updates to ensure that individual data points are not discernible from the gradient values.

3. LLM performance - Evaluating the LLM

Since the advent of ChatGPT, thresholds of performance for LLMs have reached newer heights. Simple metrics based on sentence structure or n-gram similarity no longer sufficiently help differentiate LLM performance and output quality. Hence, it is important to use multiple metrics to evaluate the performance of LLMs.

- **Perplexity**:
Perplexity is a common metric used to evaluate the performance of language models, particularly in natural language processing (NLP). It measures how well a model predicts a sample of text. A lower perplexity indicates better performance, as it suggests the model is more confident in its predictions. Mathematically, perplexity is the exponentiation of the average negative log-likelihood of the model's predictions. In essence, perplexity gauges how "surprised" the model is by the actual data, with lower values indicating that the model is less surprised and more accurate in its predictions. Perplexity may also be inversely related to verbosity, i.e. if a model has low perplexity for a set of data, it may lead to a verbose/detailed response i.e just like how humans may elaborate on something they already know it well.

$$\text{Perplexity} = 2^{-\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\log_2 P(w_i|w_1,w_2,\ldots,w_{i-1})}$$

Where:

  - $P(w_i|w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_{i-1})$ is the probability assigned by the model to the ith word given the previous words
  - N is the total number of words in the sequence.

- The formula takes the average negative log probability of the words and obtains its exponent and converts it into a measure of uncertainty.

Perplexity as a metric was originally introduced in the paper A Maximum Entropy Approach to Natural Language Processing [13]. The paper on

BERT [14] started using this metric to also indicate the quality of the output. they concluded that the lower the perplexity, better the quality of the language model and hence better output quality.

- **BLEU (Bilingual Evaluation Understudy)**:
BLEU is a widely used metric for evaluating the quality of text generated by machine translation models, but it can also be applied to general text generation tasks [15]. It measures the overlap between generated and expected reference text; i.e, how many n-grams (sequences of n words) in the generated text match n-grams in a reference text. Higher BLEU scores indicate better alignment with the reference text. However, it is often criticized for not capturing semantic meaning and for favoring exact matches over fluent or contextually appropriate language.

$$\text{BLEU} = \text{BP} \cdot \exp\left(\sum_{n=1}^{N} w_n \log p_n\right)$$

Where:

  - BP: Brevity Penalty, accounts for length differences between generated text and reference.
  - p_n: Precision of n-grams, calculates the proportion of overlapping n-grams between the generated text and reference.
  - w_n: Weight assigned to n-grams, typically uniform (e.g., $w_n = \frac{1}{N}$).
  - N: Maximum n-gram size, commonly $N = 4$.

BLEU focuses on precision, i.e., the proportion of the generated text that matches the reference text, emphasizing correctness over coverage. For example, if the reference text mentions apples and oranges, but the output text only mentions apples, it may still achieve a reasonable BLEU score as it matches part of the reference text precisely.

- **ROUGE (Recall-Oriented Understudy for Gisting Evaluation)**:
ROUGE is another evaluation metric, primarily used for summarization tasks, that measures the overlap between the generated text and a reference text [15]. It focuses on recall and precision of n-grams, word sequences, and word pairs. ROUGE can be more useful than BLEU in tasks where semantic similarity and recall of key information are more important than exact matching. ROUGE is often used to evaluate models in tasks like abstractive summarization, where the generated text might vary significantly from the reference text while still maintaining the same meaning.

$$\text{ROUGE-N} = \frac{\sum_{n\in\{1,2,\ldots,N\}} \text{count}_{\text{overlap}}(n\text{-grams})}{\sum_{n\in\{1,2,\ldots,N\}} \text{count}_{\text{reference}}(n\text{-grams})}$$

Where:

  - $\text{count}_{\text{overlap}}(n\text{-grams})$: The count of n-grams that overlap between the candidate and reference texts.

- $\text{count}_{\text{reference}}(n\text{-grams})$: The total count of n-grams in the reference text.

ROUGE focuses on recall, i.e., the proportion of the reference text that is covered by the output text, emphasizing coverage over correctness. For example, if the reference text mentions apples and oranges, but the output text mentions apples, oranges, and mangoes, it can still achieve a reasonable ROUGE score as it covers all the topics present in the reference text, even with additional content.

- **BERTScore**:
While n-gram oriented metrics like BLEU and ROUGE are commonly used for LLM performance evaluation, they still fail to capture contextual or conceptual similarity between output and reference. BERTScore [16] is a modern evaluation metric that leverages contextual embeddings from BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) to compare the output and reference text based on their cosine distance. This effectively compares their similarity in terms of content and meaning (as captured by the embeddings).

The texts to be converted are tokenized and embedded into high dimensional BERT vectors, with one vector for each token. The similarity is then measured using cosine similarity between these token-level embeddings. This allows BERTScore to capture subtle nuances in meaning, making it a powerful metric for tasks such as machine translation, text summarization, and paraphrase generation, especially when dealing with diverse or paraphrased text that traditional metrics may miss.

$$\text{BERTScore} = \frac{1}{|C|} \sum_{c \in C} \max_{r \in R} \text{cosine\_similarity}(f(c), f(r))$$

Where:

  - C is the set of tokens in the candidate text.
  - R is the set of tokens in the reference text.
  - $f(c)$ and $f(r)$ are the BERT-generated embeddings for token c and token r.
  - $\text{cosine\_similarity}(f(c), f(r))$ is the cosine similarity between the embeddings of the candidate and reference tokens.

BERTScore is similar to human evaluation where a person may be asked to compare two texts for their overall similarity and meaning.

4 Conclusion

The safe use of LLMs and security of LLMs are a major concern when deploying them as part of an application. However, it can be seen that most attacks on LLMs post training are variations of data extraction attacks which can be neutralized by training the LLM on diverse data with noise included and strict input and output guardrails. LLM performance evaluation is also consistently evolving, however metrics like BERTScore can help overcome any syntactic or semantic differences and help obtain human-like evaluation of text. With these mechanisms in place, we can safely proceed with the deployment of the LLMs since they cover the most probable issues as understood by the Pigeonhole principle.

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