fix(security): reject non-same-origin popout URLs#1266
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popoutUrl is round-tripped through layout JSON (toJSON serializes the URL of each popout group; fromJSON restores it and feeds it back to window.open). An attacker who can supply layout JSON could embed a javascript:, data:, or cross-origin URL that would execute in a context the browser still associates with the opener via window.opener, exposing cookies, localStorage, and the parent DOM. assertSameOriginPopoutUrl runs at the popout-window open() gate and rejects anything that isn't same-origin http(s). The default '/popout.html' still works; existing dockview-core tests pass without change. Also adds a security caution to the popout-groups documentation page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
popoutUrlis round-tripped through layout JSON:toJSON()serializes the URL of each popout group, andfromJSON()restores it and feeds it back towindow.open(). An attacker who can supply layout JSON could embed ajavascript:,data:,blob:, or cross-origin URL that executes in a context the browser still associates with the opener viawindow.opener— exposing cookies,localStorage, and the parent DOM.assertSameOriginPopoutUrlruns at thePopoutWindow.open()gate and rejects anything that isn't same-originhttp(s). The default/popout.htmlkeeps working; existing dockview-core tests pass without change.popoutGroups.mdx.Breaking change (minor)
Consumers that intentionally pass a cross-origin
popoutUrlwill now see a thrown error. This is by design — that configuration was already unsafe — but worth flagging in release notes.Test plan
npx nx test dockview-core— 893/893 pass, including 16 newassertSameOriginPopoutUrlcases covering: relative paths, same-origin absolute,javascript:,data:,blob:,vbscript:,file:, and cross-origin (host, port, scheme)./popout.htmlstill works.addPopoutGroup(group, { popoutUrl: 'javascript:alert(1)' })and confirm it throws.🤖 Generated with Claude Code