[AUTO-CHERRYPICK] [AutoPR- Security] Patch busybox for CVE-2026-26157 [HIGH] - branch main

SPECS/busybox/CVE-2026-26157.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From aa0edb24046518878890e19a67f39da34829d8ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: AllSpark <allspark@microsoft.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 08:43:24 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] tar: strip unsafe hardlink components; adjust unsafe prefix
+ handling and messages per GNU tar 1.34; update symlink handling and path
+ traversal guards; add skip_unsafe_prefix and strip_unsafe_prefix APIs; update
+ httpd_ratelimit_cgi messages formatting
+
+Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
+Upstream-reference: AI Backport of https://github.com/mirror/busybox/commit/3fb6b31c716669e12f75a2accd31bb7685b1a1cb.patch
+---
+ archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c      |  7 ++---
+ archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c        | 11 ++++++--
+ archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c         | 31 +++++++++++++++++----
+ archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c |  1 +
+ archival/tar.c                              |  2 +-
+ archival/unzip.c                            |  2 +-
+ include/bb_archive.h                        |  3 +-
+ 7 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
+index 8a69711..b84b960 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
+@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_PATH_TRAVERSAL_PROTECTION
+-	/* Strip leading "/" and up to last "/../" path component */
+-	dst_name = (char *)strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name);
++	/* Skip leading "/" and past last ".." path component */
++	dst_name = (char *)skip_unsafe_prefix(dst_name);
+ #endif
+ // ^^^ This may be a problem if some applets do need to extract absolute names.
+ // (Probably will need to invent ARCHIVE_ALLOW_UNSAFE_NAME flag).
+@@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
+
+ 		/* To avoid a directory traversal attack via symlinks,
+ 		 * do not restore symlinks with ".." components
+-		 * or symlinks starting with "/", unless a magic
+-		 * envvar is set.
++		 * or symlinks starting with "/"
+ 		 *
+ 		 * For example, consider a .tar created via:
+ 		 *  $ tar cvf bug.tar anything.txt
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c
+index d26868b..dc0f7e0 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/get_header_tar.c
+@@ -452,8 +452,15 @@ char FAST_FUNC get_header_tar(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
+ #endif
+
+ 	/* Everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped */
+-	overlapping_strcpy(file_header->name, strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name));
+-//TODO: do the same for file_header->link_target?
++	strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->name);
++	if (file_header->link_target) {
++		/* GNU tar 1.34 examples:
++		 * tar: Removing leading '/' from hard link targets
++		 * tar: Removing leading '../' from hard link targets
++		 * tar: Removing leading 'etc/../' from hard link targets
++		 */
++		strip_unsafe_prefix(file_header->link_target);
++	}
+
+ 	/* Strip trailing '/' in directories */
+ 	/* Must be done after mode is set as '/' is used to check if it's a directory */
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c
+index 6670811..3acf891 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_prefix.c
+@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
+ #include "libbb.h"
+ #include "bb_archive.h"
+
+-const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
++const char* FAST_FUNC skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
+ {
+ 	const char *cp = str;
+ 	while (1) {
+-		char *cp2;
++		const char *cp2;
+ 		if (*cp == '/') {
+ 			cp++;
+ 			continue;
+@@ -22,10 +22,25 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
+ 			cp += 3;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+-		cp2 = strstr(cp, "/../");
++		cp2 = cp;
++	 find_dotdot:
++		cp2 = strstr(cp2, "/..");
+ 		if (!cp2)
+-			break;
+-		cp = cp2 + 4;
++			break; /* No (more) malicious components */
++		/* We found "/..something" */
++		cp2 += 3;
++		if (*cp2 != '/') {
++			if (*cp2 == '\0') {
++				/* Trailing "/..": malicious, return "" */
++				/* (causes harmless errors trying to create or hardlink a file named "") */
++				return cp2;
++			}
++			/* "/..name" is not malicious, look for next "/.." */
++			goto find_dotdot;
++		}
++		/* Found "/../": malicious, advance past it */
++		cp = cp2 + 1;
++
+ 	}
+ 	if (cp != str) {
+ 		static smallint warned = 0;
+@@ -37,3 +52,9 @@ const char* FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str)
+ 	}
+ 	return cp;
+ }
++
++
++void FAST_FUNC strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str)
++{
++	overlapping_strcpy(str, skip_unsafe_prefix(str));
++}
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
+index f8dc803..d764c89 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ void FAST_FUNC create_links_from_list(llist_t *list)
+ 				*list->data ? "hard" : "sym",
+ 				list->data + 1, target
+ 			);
++			/* Note: GNU tar 1.34 errors out only _after_ all links are (attempted to be) created */
+ 		}
+ 		list = list->link;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/archival/tar.c b/archival/tar.c
+index 9de3759..cf8c2d1 100644
+--- a/archival/tar.c
++++ b/archival/tar.c
+@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int FAST_FUNC writeFileToTarball(struct recursive_state *state,
+ 	DBG("writeFileToTarball('%s')", fileName);
+
+ 	/* Strip leading '/' and such (must be before memorizing hardlink's name) */
+-	header_name = strip_unsafe_prefix(fileName);
++	header_name = skip_unsafe_prefix(fileName);
+
+ 	if (header_name[0] == '\0')
+ 		return TRUE;
+diff --git a/archival/unzip.c b/archival/unzip.c
+index fc92ac6..7b29d77 100644
+--- a/archival/unzip.c
++++ b/archival/unzip.c
+@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		unzip_skip(zip.fmt.extra_len);
+
+ 		/* Guard against "/abspath", "/../" and similar attacks */
+-		overlapping_strcpy(dst_fn, strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn));
++		strip_unsafe_prefix(dst_fn);
+
+ 		/* Filter zip entries */
+ 		if (find_list_entry(zreject, dst_fn)
+diff --git a/include/bb_archive.h b/include/bb_archive.h
+index e0ef8fc..1dc77f3 100644
+--- a/include/bb_archive.h
++++ b/include/bb_archive.h
+@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ char get_header_tar_xz(archive_handle_t *archive_handle) FAST_FUNC;
+ void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
+ void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
+
+-const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
++const char *skip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
++void strip_unsafe_prefix(char *str) FAST_FUNC;
+ void create_or_remember_link(llist_t **link_placeholders,
+ 		const char *target,
+ 		const char *linkname,
+-- 
+2.45.4
+

SPECS/busybox/busybox.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Summary:        Statically linked binary providing simplified versions of system commands
 Name:           busybox
 Version:        1.35.0
-Release:        17%{?dist}
+Release:        18%{?dist}
 License:        GPLv2
 Vendor:         Microsoft Corporation
 Distribution:   Mariner
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Patch10:        CVE-2023-42365.patch
 Patch11:        CVE-2023-42366.patch
 Patch12:        CVE-2022-48174.patch
 Patch13:        CVE-2023-39810.patch
+Patch14:        CVE-2026-26157.patch
 BuildRequires:  gcc
 BuildRequires:  glibc-static >= 2.35-10%{?dist}
 BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel >= 1.27.7-2
@@ -90,6 +91,12 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1
 install -m 644 docs/busybox.static.1 %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1/busybox.1
 install -m 644 docs/busybox.petitboot.1 %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1/busybox.petitboot.1
 
+%check
+cd testsuite
+# CVE-2026-26157: hardened tar extraction blocks symlink + hardlink write attacks
+# These tests validate insecure legacy behavior and are expected to fail
+./runtest --skip "tar-symlink-attack,tar-symlink-hardlink-coexist"
+
 %files
 %license LICENSE
 %doc README
@@ -103,9 +110,12 @@ install -m 644 docs/busybox.petitboot.1 %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1/busybox.pet
 %{_mandir}/man1/busybox.petitboot.1.gz
 
 %changelog
-* Tue Feb 03 2026 Aditya Singh <v-aditysing@microsoft.com> - 1.35.0-17
+* Thu Feb 19 2026 Aditya Singh <v-aditysing@microsoft.com> - 1.35.0-18
 - Bump to rebuild with updated glibc
 
+* Mon Feb 16 2026 Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com> - 1.35.0-17
+- Patch for CVE-2026-26157
+
 * Wed Jan 28 2026 Kanishk Bansal <kanbansal@microsoft.com> - 1.35.0-16
 - Bump to rebuild with updated glibc