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[AutoPR- Security] Patch rpm-ostree for CVE-2026-33055, CVE-2026-33056 [MEDIUM] #16354

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Merged
kgodara912 merged 8 commits into from
Apr 27, 2026
Merged

[AutoPR- Security] Patch rpm-ostree for CVE-2026-33055, CVE-2026-33056 [MEDIUM] #16354

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356da76
Patch rpm-ostree for CVE-2026-33055
azurelinux-security Mar 30, 2026
a1abc70
Patch rpm-ostree for CVE-2026-33056
azurelinux-security Mar 30, 2026
5ac0e3b
Added changes to checksums
SumitJenaHCL Mar 31, 2026
7caee8e
Fixed ptests failure
SumitJenaHCL Mar 31, 2026
1c2de8b
Update patch for CVE-2026-33055
SumitJenaHCL Apr 22, 2026
be1247a
updated checksum
SumitJenaHCL Apr 22, 2026
0885df5
Updated Checksum
SumitJenaHCL Apr 22, 2026
cc69da9
Update checksums for toml file.
SumitJenaHCL Apr 22, 2026
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240 changes: 240 additions & 0 deletions SPECS/rpm-ostree/CVE-2026-33055.patch
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
From cc80cb086125efb7a0c7a1f615074406c4480af7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AllSpark <allspark@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 11:50:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] archive: Unconditionally honor PAX size (#441)

This synchronizes our behavior with most other tar parsers
(including astral-tokio-tar and Go archive/tar) ensuring
that we don't parse things differently.

The problem with parsing size in particular differently is
it's easy to craft a tar archive that appears completely differently
between two parsers. This is the case with e.g. crates.io where
astral-tokio-tar is used for validation server side, but cargo uses
the crate to upload.

With this, the two projects agree.

Signed-off-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Co-authored-by: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account <azurelinux-security@microsoft.com>
Upstream-reference: AI Backport of https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/de1a5870e603758f430073688691165f21a33946.patch
---
vendor/tar/.cargo-checksum.json | 2 +-
vendor/tar/Cargo.toml | 10 +++
vendor/tar/src/archive.rs | 9 +-
vendor/tar/tests/all.rs | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/vendor/tar/.cargo-checksum.json b/vendor/tar/.cargo-checksum.json
index 508f784e..1f3abaf5 100644
--- a/vendor/tar/.cargo-checksum.json
+++ b/vendor/tar/.cargo-checksum.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"files":{"Cargo.lock":"9872bf9e41b9cadee45b688c9537030a993ca49a266fc7859029d8c74810d1d5","Cargo.toml":"8353c71aa4d394efa7aaeac3004d0a16fd0c7124b7bd57ea91ba87a7b2015f15","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"378f5840b258e2779c39418f3f2d7b2ba96f1c7917dd6be0713f88305dbda397","README.md":"71079f1a0962c2cf288058f38d24735bddabd1427ac2dee72ec18cc5ae4bceed","examples/extract_file.rs":"dc487f6631d824175afc3ee33de99e80718a8ca3f9e57fddd7cac0a46c07d3ae","examples/list.rs":"36e412205eaffea8ab7f39be4173594b74e36acb369e091362b1975ee4a7a14b","examples/raw_list.rs":"0a735576ac354457d6d5a4d395d044fae99bf67a7c69960ca784a6f6a1743651","examples/write.rs":"419ac3e4155035e32b52cd8e6ae987a2d99cf82f60abbfb315c2a2c4f8e8fd19","src/archive.rs":"85a0091e02690c62379137988cd9b2689009536a0b941f1ab0581db26e9ebce6","src/builder.rs":"2914f394d44c133557532bf5765fe63e0def30ec0b447f8f2bc620e932a2036a","src/entry.rs":"705016636f7fdcad4fe20d7d2672be2b94cc53bb05e47628f5212b89e17a40fe","src/entry_type.rs":"0786688729a96b4a3135b28d40b95c3d4feaad66b9574c490cbea14814ab975f","src/error.rs":"a20813fbc52f1f2e3a79654f62de6001759f6504a06acee5b0819d4865398587","src/header.rs":"fb2b1fa943c19635826b3f2becfb82527be7d08fdac115af840da3ff06152908","src/lib.rs":"5468e413205c907c367c35d28a528389103d68fd6a5b5979bbedba7c9e6b6c99","src/pax.rs":"54002e31151f9c50e02a3da26b3cacd1d3c9a3902daee008ab76d112cf5a2430","tests/all.rs":"567a05d54e369d22efe40f3507a26e21f7878b95bd05c811250b2c350761791b","tests/entry.rs":"c1411ee09da9edb659b508867f0960e804966dfd33801f4a7afaefda331479dd","tests/header/mod.rs":"02b05639f63c39a47559650c7209817bb60282deb4f679d5b001ed936343d9de"},"package":"4b55807c0344e1e6c04d7c965f5289c39a8d94ae23ed5c0b57aabac549f871c6"}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"files":{"Cargo.lock":"9872bf9e41b9cadee45b688c9537030a993ca49a266fc7859029d8c74810d1d5","Cargo.toml":"6000e6f99d39717fb9eb65ca1b03ad2b5499a4831a52d4b83f9a8c77e41368b3","LICENSE-APACHE":"a60eea817514531668d7e00765731449fe14d059d3249e0bc93b36de45f759f2","LICENSE-MIT":"378f5840b258e2779c39418f3f2d7b2ba96f1c7917dd6be0713f88305dbda397","README.md":"71079f1a0962c2cf288058f38d24735bddabd1427ac2dee72ec18cc5ae4bceed","examples/extract_file.rs":"dc487f6631d824175afc3ee33de99e80718a8ca3f9e57fddd7cac0a46c07d3ae","examples/list.rs":"36e412205eaffea8ab7f39be4173594b74e36acb369e091362b1975ee4a7a14b","examples/raw_list.rs":"0a735576ac354457d6d5a4d395d044fae99bf67a7c69960ca784a6f6a1743651","examples/write.rs":"419ac3e4155035e32b52cd8e6ae987a2d99cf82f60abbfb315c2a2c4f8e8fd19","src/archive.rs":"4100bd92149fdb2a331eb84810ac317f59ef2b81925011a9ea44e3fa5dea3dba","src/builder.rs":"2914f394d44c133557532bf5765fe63e0def30ec0b447f8f2bc620e932a2036a","src/entry.rs":"705016636f7fdcad4fe20d7d2672be2b94cc53bb05e47628f5212b89e17a40fe","src/entry_type.rs":"0786688729a96b4a3135b28d40b95c3d4feaad66b9574c490cbea14814ab975f","src/error.rs":"a20813fbc52f1f2e3a79654f62de6001759f6504a06acee5b0819d4865398587","src/header.rs":"fb2b1fa943c19635826b3f2becfb82527be7d08fdac115af840da3ff06152908","src/lib.rs":"5468e413205c907c367c35d28a528389103d68fd6a5b5979bbedba7c9e6b6c99","src/pax.rs":"54002e31151f9c50e02a3da26b3cacd1d3c9a3902daee008ab76d112cf5a2430","tests/all.rs":"2e23cb167407eb50acdec21f3693fcfa744be577a912b50466933251be404932","tests/entry.rs":"c1411ee09da9edb659b508867f0960e804966dfd33801f4a7afaefda331479dd","tests/header/mod.rs":"02b05639f63c39a47559650c7209817bb60282deb4f679d5b001ed936343d9de"},"package":"4b55807c0344e1e6c04d7c965f5289c39a8d94ae23ed5c0b57aabac549f871c6"}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/vendor/tar/Cargo.toml b/vendor/tar/Cargo.toml
index 23771b56..3606d283 100644
--- a/vendor/tar/Cargo.toml
+++ b/vendor/tar/Cargo.toml
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ version = "0.2.8"
[dev-dependencies.tempfile]
version = "3"

+[dev-dependencies.astral-tokio-tar]
+version = "0.5"
+
+[dev-dependencies.tokio]
+version = "1"
+features = ["macros", "rt"]
+
+[dev-dependencies.tokio-stream]
+version = "0.1"
+
[features]
default = ["xattr"]
[target."cfg(unix)".dependencies.libc]
diff --git a/vendor/tar/src/archive.rs b/vendor/tar/src/archive.rs
index 1bed5124..221d1551 100644
--- a/vendor/tar/src/archive.rs
+++ b/vendor/tar/src/archive.rs
@@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ impl<'a> EntriesFields<'a> {

let file_pos = self.next;
let mut size = header.entry_size()?;
- if size == 0 {
- if let Some(pax_size) = pax_size {
- size = pax_size;
- }
+ // If this exists, it must override the header size. Disagreement among
+ // parsers allows construction of malicious archives that appear different
+ // when parsed.
+ if let Some(pax_size) = pax_size {
+ size = pax_size;
}
let ret = EntryFields {
size: size,
diff --git a/vendor/tar/tests/all.rs b/vendor/tar/tests/all.rs
index 11103bd6..f7cceaf2 100644
--- a/vendor/tar/tests/all.rs
+++ b/vendor/tar/tests/all.rs
@@ -1385,3 +1385,154 @@ fn header_size_overflow() {
err
);
}
+
+/// Build the PAX size smuggling archive described in the original report.
+///
+/// A PAX extended header declares `size=2048` for a regular file whose
+/// actual header size field is 8. A symlink entry is hidden inside the
+/// inflated region. A correct parser honours the PAX size and skips over
+/// the symlink; a buggy one reads only the header size and exposes it.
+fn build_pax_smuggle_archive() -> Vec<u8> {
+ const B: usize = 512;
+ const INFLATED: usize = 2048;
+ let end_of_archive = || std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(B * 2);
+
+ let mut ar: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+
+ // PAX extended header declaring size=2048 for the next entry.
+ let pax_rec = format!("13 size={INFLATED}\n");
+ let mut pax_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+ pax_hdr.set_path("./PaxHeaders/regular").unwrap();
+ pax_hdr.set_size(pax_rec.as_bytes().len() as u64);
+ pax_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::XHeader);
+ pax_hdr.set_cksum();
+ ar.extend_from_slice(pax_hdr.as_bytes());
+ ar.extend_from_slice(pax_rec.as_bytes());
+ ar.resize(ar.len().next_multiple_of(B), 0);
+
+ // Regular file whose header says size=8, but PAX says 2048.
+ let content = b"regular\n";
+ let mut file_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+ file_hdr.set_path("regular.txt").unwrap();
+ file_hdr.set_size(content.len() as u64);
+ file_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
+ file_hdr.set_cksum();
+ ar.extend_from_slice(file_hdr.as_bytes());
+ let mark = ar.len();
+ ar.extend_from_slice(content);
+ ar.resize(ar.len().next_multiple_of(B), 0);
+
+ // Smuggled symlink hidden in the inflated region.
+ let mut sym_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+ sym_hdr.set_path("smuggled").unwrap();
+ sym_hdr.set_size(0);
+ sym_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
+ sym_hdr.set_link_name("/etc/shadow").unwrap();
+ sym_hdr.set_cksum();
+ ar.extend_from_slice(sym_hdr.as_bytes());
+ ar.extend(end_of_archive());
+
+ // Pad to fill the inflated window.
+ let used = ar.len() - mark;
+ let pad = INFLATED.saturating_sub(used);
+ ar.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(pad.next_multiple_of(B)));
+
+ // End-of-archive.
+ ar.extend(end_of_archive());
+ ar
+}
+
+/// Regression test for PAX size smuggling.
+///
+/// A crafted archive uses a PAX extended header to declare a file size (2048)
+/// larger than the header's octal size field (8). Before the fix, `tar-rs`
+/// only applied the PAX size override when the header size was 0, so it would
+/// read the small header size, advance too little, and expose a symlink entry
+/// hidden in the "padding" area. After the fix, the PAX size unconditionally
+/// overrides the header size, causing the parser to skip over the smuggled
+/// symlink — matching the behavior of compliant parsers.
+#[test]
+fn pax_size_smuggled_symlink() {
+ let data = build_pax_smuggle_archive();
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@mayankfz mayankfz Apr 14, 2026

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where is this build_pax_smuggle_archive() defined ?
Could you please check the patch and update accordingly. Thanks

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@SumitJenaHCL SumitJenaHCL Apr 22, 2026

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Updated the patch.

+
+ let mut archive = Archive::new(random_cursor_reader(&data[..]));
+ let entries: Vec<_> = archive
+ .entries()
+ .unwrap()
+ .map(|e| {
+ let e = e.unwrap();
+ let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
+ let kind = e.header().entry_type();
+ let link = e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
+ (path, kind, link)
+ })
+ .collect();
+
+ // With the fix applied, only "regular.txt" should be visible.
+ // The smuggled symlink must NOT appear.
+ let expected: Vec<(PathBuf, EntryType, Option<PathBuf>)> =
+ vec![(PathBuf::from("regular.txt"), EntryType::Regular, None)];
+ assert_eq!(
+ entries, expected,
+ "smuggled symlink visible or unexpected entries\n\
+ got: {entries:?}"
+ );
+}
+
+/// Cross-validate that `tar` and `astral-tokio-tar` parse the PAX size
+/// smuggling archive identically, guarding against parsing differentials.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn pax_size_smuggle_matches_astral_tokio_tar() {
+ use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
+
+ let data = build_pax_smuggle_archive();
+
+ // Parse with sync tar.
+ let sync_entries: Vec<_> = {
+ let mut ar = Archive::new(&data[..]);
+ ar.entries()
+ .unwrap()
+ .map(|e| {
+ let e = e.unwrap();
+ let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
+ let kind = e.header().entry_type();
+ let link = e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
+ (path, kind, link)
+ })
+ .collect()
+ };
+
+ // Parse with async astral-tokio-tar.
+ let async_entries: Vec<_> = {
+ let mut ar = tokio_tar::Archive::new(&data[..]);
+ let mut entries = ar.entries().unwrap();
+ let mut result = Vec::new();
+ while let Some(e) = entries.next().await {
+ let e = e.unwrap();
+ let entry_type = e.header().entry_type();
+ result.push((
+ e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf(),
+ // Map through the raw byte so the two crates' EntryTypes compare.
+ EntryType::new(entry_type.as_byte()),
+ e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf()),
+ ));
+ }
+ result
+ };
+
+ // Assert exact expected content for both parsers independently,
+ // so we verify correctness — not just mutual agreement.
+ let expected: Vec<(PathBuf, EntryType, Option<PathBuf>)> =
+ vec![(PathBuf::from("regular.txt"), EntryType::Regular, None)];
+
+ assert_eq!(
+ sync_entries, expected,
+ "tar-rs produced unexpected entries (smuggled symlink visible?)\n\
+ got: {sync_entries:?}"
+ );
+ assert_eq!(
+ async_entries, expected,
+ "astral-tokio-tar produced unexpected entries (smuggled symlink visible?)\n\
+ got: {async_entries:?}"
+ );
+}
--
2.45.4

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