fix: harden GitHub Actions against supply chain attacks#17
Conversation
This hardens the repository against supply chain attacks like the aquasecurity/trivy-action compromise (2026-03-19). Changes: - Pin all GitHub Actions to immutable commit SHAs - Add/update Dependabot configuration for github-actions ecosystem Ref: netresearch/ofelia#535 Signed-off-by: Sebastian Mendel <info@sebastianmendel.de>
Summary of ChangesHello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request significantly enhances the security posture of the project's CI/CD workflows by implementing measures to mitigate supply chain attacks on GitHub Actions. It ensures that all GitHub Actions are referenced by immutable commit SHAs, preventing malicious alterations through tag or branch force-pushes, and introduces automated dependency management for these actions. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request introduces Dependabot configuration to automatically update GitHub Actions, which is a great step towards hardening the CI/CD pipeline against supply chain attacks. My review focuses on refining this configuration. I've suggested splitting the Dependabot groups for GitHub Actions into major and non-major updates. This will help separate potentially breaking changes from routine updates, making the update process smoother and more manageable.
Summary
Context
On 2026-03-19,
aquasecurity/trivy-actionwas compromised via a tag force-push attack that exfiltrated secrets from CI runners. SHA-pinning prevents this class of attack entirely.The netresearch org now enforces
sha_pinning_required=true— workflows using tag/branch references will fail.Ref: netresearch/ofelia#535
Test plan