Dual Trace Communication Event Analysis

by

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B.Sc., Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautic, 2003 M.Sc., Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautic, 2006

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Dr. German. Supervisor Main, Supervisor (Department of Same As Candidate)

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ABSTRACT

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Grant Organization Name, for funding me with a Scholarship.

I believe I know the only cure, which is to make one's centre of life inside of one's self, not selfishly or excludingly, but with a kind of unassailable serenity-to decorate one's inner house so richly that one is content there, glad to welcome any one who wants to come and stay, but happy all the same in the hours when one is inevitably alone.

Edith Wharton

DEDICATION

Just hoping this is useful!

Introduction

Many network application vulnerabilities occur not just in one application, but in how they interact with other systems. These kinds of vulnerabilities can be difficult to analyze. Dual-trace analysis is one approach that helps the security engineers to detect the vulnerabilities in the interactive software. A dual-trace consist of two execution traces that are generated from two interacting applications. Each of these traces contains information including CPU instructions, register and memory changes of the running application. Communication information of the interacting applications is captured as the register or memory changes on their respective traced sides.

This work is focusing on helping reverse engineers for interacting software vulnerabilities detection. We first investigated and modeled four types of commonly used channels in Windows communication foundation in order to help the reverse engineers to understand the APIs, the scenarios and the assembly trace related perspectives of these channels. Then we built a tool prototype for the communication event locating and visualization of Dual-traces. Finally, we design an experiment to test our prototype and evaluate its practicality.

add an section to summarize the conclusion later

Methodology

The Methodology used for this work composed of 6 major steps. To make this work executable, 1)I defined the problem by understanding the requirement from our research partner DRDC. 2)I define the scope of this work to the common channels used in Windows Communication Foundation. After that, 3) I obtained the related background knowledge by literature and online documentation review. Then 4) I model the channels that in the scope of this work. Based on these channel models, 5) I built a tool prototype which can locate and present the communication events to the user. Finally, 6) I evaluate this prototype by running some example dual-traces on it.

2.1 Define the Problem

A dual-trace consist of two execution traces that are generated from two interacting applications. The main difference between single trace analysis and Dual-trace analysis is the later one has to analysis the communication events of the applications in the traces. A communication event in the dual-trace is defined as a successfully send and received message. There are four essential elements in this event: send function call, receive function call, the sent message in the sender's memory and the received message in the receiver's memory. It takes a experience engineer minutes or even hours to locate one event. It become a huge task for them to find out all the events in the dual-trace. To assist them, the major goal of this work is building a tool to help reverse engineers to locate the communication events in the assembly traces from both sides of the dual-trace and present them.

2.2 Define the Scope

There are many types of communication between applications. Only Named pipe, MQMS, HTTP, TCP/UDP socket are targeted in this work since they are the most widely used ones in windows server/client service and are the ones used in the popular Window Communication Foundation. The framework we built is extendable to other communication types.

2.3 Obtain Background Knowledge

To locate the communication event of both side of the traces, we need to investigate the communication methods to figure out how they looks like in the assembly level traces. We need to know how the functions for channel setup work as well as the functions for messages sending/receiving. The system functions we are looking for is in C++ level. We have to know the C++ function names, related parameters, return value and so on. In addition, to understanding what they looks like in the assembly level trace, we have to know the calling conventions in assembly, such registers/memory for parameters or return value.

2.4 Model the Channels

By understanding all the related function APIs, we modeled the communication channels. The model of each type of communication channel covers all the successful communication scenarios.

2.5 Build the Prototype

We build our prototype tool based on the developed models. The user should refer to the channel models to define the concerned communication type through the user interface we provide in the prototype tool. Defined communication type is later on used for locating the communication events in the dual-trace. However, not all scenarios of all models can be covered by our tools. For some scenarios, it is impossible to exactly locate all the communication event by program. The user has to have extra information to assist their analysis.

2.6 Verify the Model and the Prototype Tool

Background

In this section, we introduce several background knowledge or information that related to this work. First we describe what is software security and how important it is as well as our previous approach to assist detection of software vulnerabilities by assembly level trace analysis. Second, we introduce the general assembly level trace format as well as some tracer to generate it. Third, we discuss how software interaction affect the behavior of the software and how they related to the software vulnerabilities. Then we talk about Windows Communication Foundation in which the communication channel type used are targeted by this work. Finally, we mention some important Windows function calling conventions without which you can not picture what the function calls look like in the assembly level.

3.1 Software security

The internet grow incredibly fast in the past few year. More and more computers are connected to it in order to get service or provide service. The internet as a powerful platform for people to share resource, meanwhile, introduce the risk to computers in the way that it enable the exploit of the vulnerability of the software running on it. Accordingly, the emphasize place on computer security particularly in the field of software vulnerabilities increase dramatically. It's important for software developers to build secure applications. Unfortunetely, this is usually very expensive and time consuming and somehow impossible in some cases. On the other hand, how to find issues in the built applications is more important and practical. However this is a complex process and require deep technical understanding in the perspetive of reverse

engineering[2].

3.2 Software Vulnerability Detection

A common approach to detect existing vulnerabilities is fuzzing testing, which record the execution trace while supplying the program with input data up to the crash and perform the analysis of the trace to find the root cause of the crash and decide if that is a vulnerability[1]. Execution trace can be capture in different level, for example object level and function level. But my research only focus on those that captured in instruction and memory reference level. There are two main reasons for analysis system-level traces. The first one is for analysis of the software provided by vendor whose source code are not available. The second one is that low level trace are more accurately reflect the instructions that are executed by multicore hardware[6].

Nonetheless, analysis and visualization of the enormous amount of execution information of a isolated software is complicated let alone the additional interactive information between applications. My first research goal is to develop a comprehensive method to analyse and visualize of massive execution traces of multiple interacting applications in order to assist vulnerabilities detection.

Moreover, in order to eliminate the laborious work for reverse engineer in the procedure of discovering vulnerability, I also aimed at develop a method or algorithm to auto detect suspicious vulnerabilities before the reverse engineer can take a more careful look on them.

3.3 Assembly Level Trace

There are many tools that can trace a running program in assembly instruction level. IDA pro [3] is a widely used tool in reverse engineering which can capture and analysis system level execution trace. Providing open plugin APIs, IDA pro allows plugin such as Codemap [5] to provide more sufficient features for "run-trace" visualization. However this trace events from IDA pro are stored in buffer. Depends on the size of your computer memory, it may not able to trace and analysis a big program for a long time. PIN[4] as a tool for instrumentation of programs, provides a rich API which allows you to implement your own tool for instruction trace and memory reference trace.

3.4 Software Interaction

Applications nowaday do not alway work isolately, many software appear as reticula collaborating systems connecting different modules in the network[?] which make the discovery of vulnerabilities even harder. The communication and interaction between modules affect the behaviour of the software. Without regarding to the synergy information, analysis of the isolated execution trace on a single computer is usually futile.

3.5 Windows Communication Foundation

We limited our research only on the communication types used in Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) for now. Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) is a framework for building service-oriented applications. Using WCF, developers can send data as asynchronous or asynchronous messages from one service endpoint to another. We are not going deep into the details of this framework but only mention the most common communication methods it supports in its messaging layer. The messaging layer in WCF is composed of channels. A channel is a component that processes a message in some protocol. There are two types of channels in WCF: transport channels and protocol channels. In this work we only care about transport channels. Transport channels read and write messages from the network. Examples of transports are named pipes, MSMQ, TCP/UDP or HTTP, all of which are involved in the scope of this work.

3.6 Assembly Calling Convention

Before we jumping into a specific communication channel, it is important to know some basic assembly calling convention. Calling Convention is different for operating system and the programming language. Since we are looking into the messaging methods being used in windows communication framework, and since our case study is running on a Microsoft* x64 system, we only list the Microsoft* x64 calling convention for interfacing with C/C++ style functions:

1. RCX, RDX, R8, R9 are used for integer and pointer arguments in that order left to right.

- 2. XMM0, 1, 2, and 3 are used for floating point arguments.
- 3. Additional arguments are pushed on the stack left to right. . . .
- 4. Parameters less than 64 bits long are not zero extended; the high bits contain garbage.
- 5. Integer return values (similar to x86) are returned in RAX if 64 bits or less.
- 6. Floating point return values are returned in XMM0.
- 7. Larger return values (structs) have space allocated on the stack by the caller, and RCX then contains a pointer to the return space when the callee is called. Register usage for integer parameters is then pushed one to the right. RAX returns this address to the caller.

Channel Modeling

As defined before, a communication event in the dual-trace is defined as a successfully send and received message. In the assembly trace level, we have to be able to locate the send or receive function call/return in both side of the traces and then retrieve the message from the memory change recorded in the trace. To achieve this, we need to model the channels in order to picture all send/receive scenarios. We model four types of channel. They are Named pipes, MQMS, TCP/UDP socket and HTTP channels, all of which are the most fundamental ones in Windows communication framework. The modeling is simplified as much as possible to only get the enough information for the communication event locating.

4.1 Named Pipes Channel

A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. In here we only consider one server V.S one client dual-trace. One server to multiple clients scenario can always be divided into multiple server/client dual-traces. We call the end of the named pipe instance. An instance can be a server instance or a client instance. All instances of a named pipe share the same pipe name, but each instance has its own buffers and handles, and provides a separate conduit for client/server communication.

A named pipe server responsible for the creation of the pipe, while clients of the pipe can connect to the server after it created. The creation and connection of a named pipe will return the handle ID of that pipe. As we mention before, each instance has its own handles, so the returned handle IDs of the pipe creation function of the server

and pipe connection function from each client are different. These handler IDs will be used later on when messages are being sent or received to specify a pipe to which send.

4.1.1 Important Channel Parameters

There are many options for a named pipe. Some of them are critical in the perspective of the channel operations. In this sections we list those ones that are important and affect the strategy of the event locating.

Buffer Size

Both the server and client can read or write into the pipe. The pipe server and client can be on the same or different computers. Buffer sizes of server and client can be different. This affect the write/read operation. If the writer's buffer is larger than the reader's buffer and the writer write a message whose size is larger than the reader's buffer. The reader may need to read several times to get the whole message. However, the reader can only read content from a write on the other side of the pipe. This means that even the buffer of the reader is big enough to hold several message from the other side, one read operation will only read the content from one write operation of the other side. And the sequence of the message do not change from the writer side to the reader side. Figure 4.1 shows the operation scenarios of the write/read operation of the named pipe.

Blocking/Non-Blocking

The named pipe channel can be opened in blocking mode or non-blocking mode. In blocking mode, when the pipe handle is specified in the ReadFile, WriteFile, or ConnectNamedPipe function, the operations are not completed until there is data to read, all data is written, or a client is connected. In non-blocking mode, ReadFile, WriteFile, and ConnectNamedPipe always return immediately. The operation fail if the channel is not ready for read, write or connection. However, since in this work we only aimed at locating the successful communication, as long as the operations success, we can locate them no matter the pipe is in blocking or non-blocking mode.




Figure 4.1: write/read operation scenarios: Scenario 1. The written message can fit in the Reader's buffer. The order of the message going into the pipe is the same as the order going out of the pipe; Scenario 2. The written message size is larger than the Reader's buffer, so the read use multiple read operation to receive one message.

Synchronous/Asynchronous

Another critical option for named pipe channel is Synchronous/Asynchronous. In Synchronous mode, the ReadFile, WriteFile TracnsactNamedPipe and connectNamedPipe functions does not return until the operation it is performing is completed. That means we can retrieve the sent/receive message in the trace when the function return. When the channel is enable overlapped mode, the ReadFile, WriteFile TracnsactNamedPipe and connectNamedPipe functions perform asynchronously. In the asynchronous mode, ReadFile, WriteFile, TransactNamedPipe, and ConnectNamedPipe operations return immediately regardless if the operations are completed. And if the function call return ERROR_IO_PENDING, the calling thread then call the GetOverlappedResult function to determine the results. For the read operation, the message will be stored in the buffer indicated in the ReadFile function call when the read operation complete successfully.

4.1.2 Function Calls That Consist A Communication Event In The Dual-Trace

As we talk in the parameters section, Synchrounous and Asychronous mode affect the functions used to complete the send and receive operation as well as the operation of the functions. In the follow subsections, we will list the related functions for the

named pipe channel for both synchronous mode and asynchronous mode. The create channel functions for both modes are the same but with different input parameters. The functions for send and receive message are also the same for both case. However, the operation of the send and receive functions are different for different mode. In addition, extra functions are being called to check the status of message sending or receiving in asynchronous mode.

Synchronous

We list all the functions that needed to locate an messaging event in a dual-trace in Table 4.1 for synchronous named pipe. The Channel Create Functions indicate how the channel being created in server and client sides, and they are different. The file name is an input parameter for CreateNamedPipe and CreateFile function. The client and server of the same pipe use the same file name. This is an important parameter to identify the pipe between the server and client in the traces. The File name is stored in the RCX register when the function is being called. The file handle is a integer return value from the CreateNamedPipe and CreateFile functions call. It will be stored in RAX register when the function return. This handle will be used as the identifier of a pipe in the client or server later on. The handle is different for server and each client even they connected to the same pipe. The send or receive message functions are the same in server and client. the file handle generated when the channel created are stored in register RCX when the WriteFile and ReadFile functions are being called. RDX holds the address of the buffer for message send or receive. The actual size of the message being sent or received are store in R9 when the function return.

Table 4.1: Functions for communication type definition of synchronous named pipe

Operations	Server		Client	
Operations	Function	Parameters	Function	Parameters
Channel	CreateNamed-	RAX: File Handler	CreateFile	RAX: File Handler
Create	Pipe	RCX: File Name		RCX: File Name
Мана	WriteFile	RCX: File Handle	WriteFile	RCX: File Handle
Message Send		RDX: Buffer Address		RDX: Buffer Address
Sena		R9: Message Length		R9: Message Length
Мана		RAX: File Handle		RCX: File Handle
Message Receive	ReadFile	RDX: Buffer Address	ReadFile	RDX: Buffer Address
Receive		R9: Message Length		R9: Message Length

Asynchronous

The functions used in Asynchronous mode for create channel, send and receive message are the same as those used in synchronous mode. However, the ReadFile and WriteFile functions run asynchronously when the channel is asynchronous. This means the function will return immediately, even if the operation has not been completed. If the operation is complete when the function returns, the return value indicates the success or failure of the operation. Otherwise the functions return zero and GetLastError returns ERROR_IO_PENDING. In this case, the calling thread must wait until the operation has finished. The calling thread must then call the GetOverlappedResult function to determine the results. This means besides looking for ReadFile and WriteFile function calls in the traces, the GetOverlappedResult function should be checked in the traces to get the full result of the ReadFile or WriteFile operations. There are two scenarios of the successful communication in the dual-trace for asynchronous mode. The first one is exactly the same as synchronous situation. The second one involves the functions listed in Table 4.2. In the later one, Read operation searching is bit more complicated, since ReadFile function has to be located first to get the buffer address, and then GetOverlappedResult function return should be search for the message retrieval from the memory.

Table 4.2: Functions for additional communication type definition of asynchronous named pipe

Operations	Server		Client	
Operations	Function	Parameters	Function	Parameters
Channel	CreateNamed-	RAX: File Handler	CreateFile	RAX: File Handle
Create	Pipe	RCX: File Name		RCX: File Name
Модаомо	WriteFile	RCX: File Handle		RCX: File Handle
Message Send		RDX: Buffer Address	WriteFile	RDX: Buffer Address
Send		R9: Message Length		R9: Message Length
Maggaga	ReadFile	RAX: File Handle	ReadFile	RCX: File Handle
Message Receive		RDX: Buffer Address		RDX: Buffer Address
Receive		R9: Message Length		R9: Message Length
Status	GetOver-	RCX: File Handler	GetOver-	RCX: File Handler
Check	lappedResult	R8: Message Length	lappedResult	R8: Message Length

- 4.2 MQMS Channel
- 4.2.1 Synchronous
- 4.2.2 Asynchronous
- 4.3 TCP/UDP Socket Channel
- 4.4 HTTP Channel

Prototype

In this section we discuss the design of the prototype of dual-trace analysis. This prototype consist of three main components: user interface for defining the communication type, algorithm of locating the communication events in the dual-trace, user interface and strategy to navigate the located events to the sender and receiver traces. We provide the background information of the design of each component as well as their detail design in each corresponding subsection.

5.0.1 User Defined Communication Type

In our design, we don't specify any predefined communication type but give the user ability to do that. By the user interface implemented, the user can defined their own communication type. This give the flexibility to the user to define what they are looking for. Each communication type consist of 4 system function calls. They are channel create/open in sender and receiver sides, sender's send message function and receiver's receive message function. By indicating the channel create/open functions in both sender and receiver sides, the tool can acquire the channel's identifiers. Later on the tool can match the send and received messages within a specific channel. The send and receive functions are used to located the event happened in the traces. The messages sent and received are reconstructed from the memory state when the send and receive functions are called and returned. The detail of the match algorithm will be discuss later.

Function Calls in the Traces

The called functions' name can be inspected by search of the symbolic name in the executable binary or any DLLs which used by the program at the time when it is traced. This functionality exists in the current Atlantis. By importing the DLLs and execution executable binary, Atlantis can list all called functions for the users in the Functions view. From this list, users can chose the interested functions and generate their interested communication type. In Figure 5.1 there is an action item "Add to Communication type" in the right click menu of the function entry. Figure 5.2 shows the dialogue for entering the information for the adding function. As this figure shows, users can get the existing communication type list in the drop down menu. They can choose to add the current function to an exist communication type or they can add it to a new communication type by entering a new name. For the channel create/open function, the register holding the address of channel's name as input and the register holding the handle identification of the channel as output are required. For the send/receive function, the register holding the address of the send/receiver buffer, the register holding the length of the sending/receiving message and the register holding the channel's identification are required. As there are 4 functions for each communication type users have to repeat this add function to communication type action for 4 times to generate one communication type.

Communication Type Data Structure

The defined communication type will be stored in a xml file. The list below shows the data structure of one communication type.




Figure 5.1: Add function to a Communication type from Functions View




Figure 5.2: Dialog to input information for a function adding to a communication type

Communication Type View

A new view named Communication Types view is for the user defined communication types. All user defined communication type are stored in the .xml file and listed in communication type view when it's opened as shown in Figure 5.3. User

can change the name of a communication type, remove an existing communication type or searching of the match message occurrences of selected communication type by selecting action item in the right click menu of an communication type entry. The matched messages are listed in the result window of the view. By clicking the entry of the search result, user can navigate to it's sender or receiver's corresponding instruction line as shown in Figure 5.4. Message content in the memory view will be shown as well.




Figure 5.3: New View: Communication Type View




Figure 5.4: Right Click menu to navigate to send and receive event in the traces

5.0.2 Communication Event Searching

The communication event consists of the send message event in the sender side and receive message event in the receiver side. The communication event searching algorithm can be divided into three main steps: 1. search all channel create/open event in the sender and receiver side, save the handle id and corresponding channel name. 2. Search all message send and receive event in sender and receiver sides. 3. Matching the send/receive messages pair based on the channel names and message contents.

Record opened Channel

In this step the algorithm is supposed to search all the open channel both in the sender and receiver side. The found created channels are recorded in a map. The key of the map is the handler id of the channel and the value is the channel name. A channel in the sender and receiver sides will have different handler id but same channel name.

Search send and receive Message

All send message and receive message function calls will be found out in the trace. When a send function hit, the memory state of the hit instruction line will be reconstructed, and the message content can be get from the memory with the send message buffer address. When a receive function hit, the return line of that function is needed for getting the message content. The memory state of the function return line is reconstructed and the message content can be get from the reconstructed memory state with the receive message buffer address.

Matching the send/receive messages pair

After the created channel and send/receive message are found out in the sender and receiver side, a matching algorithm is used to match the send/receive message pairs.

Matching Event Data Structure

The matching event is stored in cache when the tool is running. Only the most recent search result is cached currently. If users need the previous result, they need to apply the search again. The matching Event consist of two sub-events, one is message send event while the other is message receive event. Both of these two sub-events are object of BfvFileMessageMatch. BfvFileMessageMatch is an Java class extends org.eclipse.search.internal.ui.text.FileMatch. FileMatch class containing the information needed to navigate to the trace file editor. In order to show the corresponding send/receive message in the memory view, the target memory address storing the message content is set in BfvFileMessageMatch. Two more elements: message and channel name are also set in BfvFileMessageMatch which are listed in the search result.

5.0.3 Matching Event Visualization and Navigation

The right click menu of an entry in the search result list has two action items: Go To Line of Message Sender and Go To Line of Message Receiver. Both of the action items allow users to navigate to the trace Instruction view. When the user click on these items, it will navigate to the corresponding trace sender or receiver trace instruction view. Meanwhile the memory view jumps to the target address of the message buffer, and the memory state is reconstructed so that the message content in that buffer will be shown in the memory view.

Experiments

The case we used to test this prototype contains one named pipe synchronous channel between a server and a client. Client send a message to the server and server reply another message to the client.

6.0.1 Test and Verification Design

The test cases are designed to find all the messages from client to server and all the messages from server to client. Two end to end test cases are designed for both scenarios.

In each test case, there are three test steps: 1. define the communication type by adding channel creating functions and message send/receive functions of server and client sides. 2. search for the events of the defined communication type. 3. for the occurrence of the events, navigate to the trace instruction and memory view.

Verification points are specified for each step as: 1. verify the communication types with their functions are listed in the communication view. 2. verify the message events in the dual-trace can be found and listed in the search result view. 3. verify the navigation from the result entry to the instruction view of sender trace and receiver trace.

6.0.2 Result

We used the dual-trace provided by DRDC and follow the experiment and verification design to conduct this test. Figure 6.1 shows that the user defined clientsend and serversend communication types are shown in the communication type view as well

as the functions consist of the communication types. Figure 6.3 shows the search result of clientsend communication type, while Figure 6.3 shows the search result of the serversend communication type. By clicking the Go To Line of Message Sender and Go To Line of Message Receiver action items, instruction view and memory view updated correctly. Figure 6.4 shows the server was sending out a message: This is an answer.




Figure 6.1: Defined clientsend and serversend communication types in Communication View




Figure 6.2: the search result of clientsend communication type




Figure 6.3: the search result of the serversend communication type




Figure 6.4: instruction view and memory view updated correctly

Evaluation, Analysis and Comparisons

Conclusions

8.1 Limitations

In this section, we specify the limitations of the current prototype and the reasons for them.

8.1.1 Event Status: Success or Fail

In current prototype, we only consider the success cases. For the Fail case, since the message was not successfully sent or received, there are high chance that they are not existed in the memory of the trace. From the assembly level trace, if the message was not traced in the memory, there is no way to match the sent/received message pair in the trace analysis.

8.1.2 Match Events Distinguishing

Distinguishing is considered when multiple clients connecting to the same server. Each connection is considered as an instance. In the server side all this instances have the same pipe name but different handler ID. However in the assembly trace level there is no way to match a client with it instance handler ID. In consequence, if the same content messages are being sent/received by different clients, when the user want to match the message pair between a client and the server, there is no way to distinguish the correct one from the assembly trace level. As a result, our tool will list all the matched content message event, regardless if it's from the interested client. The user can distinguish the correct ones for this client, if they have extra

information.

8.1.3 Match Events Ordering

Ordering is considered when multiple messages with exactly the same content being send/receive between the client and server. If the channel is synchronous, the order of the event is always consist with the order they happen in both the sender and receive sides. However for the asynchronous channel, there are chance that the sent messages in the sender side's trace are out of order with the received messages in the received side's trace. Unfortunately, There is no way in the assembly level trace to match the exactly ones. As a result, our tool can only order the event based on the order they happen in the traces.

8.1.4 Buffer Sizes Of Sender and Receiver Mismatch

In current prototype, we only consider the success cases. For the Fail case, since the message was not successfully sent or received, there are high chance that they are not existed in the memory of the trace. From the assembly level trace, if the message was not traced in the memory, there is no way to match the sent/received message pair in the trace analysis.

Appendix A

Additional Information

Bibliography

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