fix: escape user input in notification content templates

Discussion thread titles (and other user-controlled context fields —
replier_name, author_name, username) were interpolated raw into
notification.content via `str.format(**context)`. That output is
rendered with Django's `|safe` filter in digest_content.html, which
is included by both the email_digest and batched_email body
templates, so a `<style>` block in a thread title survived into
recipient inboxes as executable CSS on email open — enabling
open-tracking, content spoofing, and phishing.

Escape at the source: in `get_notification_content`, wrap every
context value with `django.utils.html.escape` before
`template.format(**context)`, exempting the two structural keys
(`p`, `strong`) that content_templates use as HTML tag names. This
defends every renderer of `notification.content` in one place.

This is the incomplete-patch companion of GHSA-4xv3-5j4x-q8g4
(CVE-2026-42857), which sanitized the post body via
`clean_thread_html_body()` but did not cover the title path.
Fixes GHSA-rv5w-f4r5-h77g.

(cherry picked from commit 08b719ce41bb369fa0cabbe8d0547124e64c8566)

Author: feanil

openedx/core/djangoapps/notifications/base_notification.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 """
 Base setup for Notification Apps and Types.
 """
+from django.utils.html import escape
 from django.utils.translation import gettext_lazy as _
 
 from .email_notifications import EmailCadence
@@ -11,6 +12,13 @@
 
 FILTER_AUDIT_EXPIRED_USERS_WITH_NO_ROLE = 'filter_audit_expired_users_with_no_role'
 
+# Context keys whose values are used as HTML tag names by content_templates
+# (e.g. `<{p}>...<{strong}>{post_title}</{strong}></{p}>`). These must NOT be
+# HTML-escaped before `template.format(**context)`; every other context value
+# must be, since it typically comes from user input (thread title, username,
+# etc.). See get_notification_content below.
+_STRUCTURAL_CONTEXT_KEYS = frozenset({'p', 'strong'})
+
 COURSE_NOTIFICATION_TYPES = {
     'new_comment_on_response': {
         'notification_app': 'discussion',
@@ -538,8 +546,16 @@ def get_notification_content(notification_type, context):
         context = context_function(context)
 
         if template:
-            # Handle grouped templates differently by modifying the context using a different function.
-            return template.format(**context)
+            # HTML-escape every context value except the structural tag-name
+            # keys, so that user-controlled input (post_title, replier_name,
+            # etc.) cannot inject `<style>` / `<script>` / other HTML into
+            # notification.content — which is rendered with `|safe` in the
+            # digest and batched email templates.
+            safe_context = {
+                key: value if key in _STRUCTURAL_CONTEXT_KEYS else escape(value)
+                for key, value in context.items()
+            }
+            return template.format(**safe_context)
 
     return ''
 

openedx/core/djangoapps/notifications/tests/test_base_notification.py

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 """
 Tests for base_notification
 """
+import pytest
+
 from common.djangoapps.student.tests.factories import UserFactory
 from openedx.core.djangoapps.notifications import base_notification, models
 from openedx.core.djangoapps.notifications.models import (
@@ -262,3 +264,40 @@ def test_validate_non_core_notification_types(self):
                 assert isinstance(notification_type[key], str)
             for key in bool_keys:
                 assert isinstance(notification_type[key], bool)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ('user_input', 'escaped'),
+    [
+        ('<style>body{background:red}</style>evil', '&lt;style&gt;body{background:red}&lt;/style&gt;evil'),
+        ('<script>alert(1)</script>', '&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;'),
+        ('AT&T "quoted"', 'AT&amp;T &quot;quoted&quot;'),
+    ],
+)
+def test_get_notification_content_escapes_user_input(user_input, escaped):
+    """
+    Regression test for GHSA-rv5w-f4r5-h77g: user-controlled context values
+    must be HTML-escaped before being interpolated into a content_template
+    via `str.format`. Structural context keys (`p`, `strong`) are exempt so
+    the template can still emit real <p>/<strong> tags.
+    """
+    context = {'replier_name': 'alice', 'post_title': user_input}
+    content = base_notification.get_notification_content('new_response', context)
+    assert '<style>' not in content
+    assert '<script>' not in content
+    assert escaped in content
+
+
+def test_get_notification_content_preserves_structural_tags():
+    """
+    Companion to test_get_notification_content_escapes_user_input: verify
+    that the structural `p` and `strong` keys still produce real HTML tags
+    after the escape pass, and that innocuous user input renders as plain
+    text alongside them.
+    """
+    context = {'replier_name': 'alice', 'post_title': 'Hello world'}
+    content = base_notification.get_notification_content('new_response', context)
+    assert '<p>' in content
+    assert '</p>' in content
+    assert '<strong>alice</strong>' in content
+    assert '<strong>Hello world</strong>' in content