why GitHub hasn't enabled automatic detection of obfuscated code

[alexshescp]

🏷️ Discussion Type

Bug

💬 Feature/Topic Area

Code scanning

Discussion Details

For almost a year, I've been asking GitHub's administration and leadership to integrate a basic warning and prevention system for cyberattacks - something that would simply notify users when a repository contains obfuscated code or malware like elements. Just a single warning could significantly improve user safety. My first proposal (https://0trust0day.medium.com/github-and-the-new-era-of-cybersecurity-how-visual-signaling-can-protect-millions-of-developers-c5a57b9e5ea4) is now almost a year old, yet nothing has changed.

Today, I once again received a typical request to review a project through a GitHub repository (https://github.com/ADDPOP/ZeithFi - attention there is obfuscated malware), and once again it followed the exact same pattern: obfuscated code leading to a scheme designed to steal funds from cryptocurrency wallets.

I genuinely don't understand what makes such a basic integration so difficult. My team and I could build this kind of functionality in just one or two hours. So what is stopping GitHub? Or is there some hidden rationale for preserving this technique as part of the hacking landscape? That would be strange as well, considering there are countless other, far more effective attack methods available.

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[StefanosMarinos]

Would that really be possible in practice? Given how much legitimate software contains minified or obfuscated code, how would you distinguish malicious repositories without generating a large number of false positives?

[alexshescp]

We already know that many legitimate projects contain minified or obfuscated code, and that's perfectly fine.
The goal wouldn't be to block repositories but just label them as risk of malicious. It would simply be to display a clear notice that obfuscated code is present, allowing developers to make an informed decision before running or reviewing it. If they choose to proceed, they can take appropriate precautions, such as inspecting the code more carefully or running it in an isolated environment.
A warning is very different from a verdict. It improves transparency without preventing legitimate software from being distributed.

[StefanosMarinos]

I actually like the idea. If I saw a notice that a project contained heavily obfuscated code, I'd probably take a closer look before running it. My only concern is whether obfuscated code alone is enough to trigger a warning, because if too many legitimate projects are flagged, people might eventually start ignoring the warning. Maybe combining it with other suspicious indicators would make it more useful and help reduce false positives.

[alexshescp]

I completely agree that there is a risk of warning fatigue if every project with obfuscated code is flagged.

That said, I think the benefits still outweigh the drawbacks. First, AI-based analysis will continue to improve, making it increasingly practical to distinguish between benign obfuscation and code that exhibits genuinely suspicious characteristics. Second, even a simple warning serves as a useful reminder for developers to follow safer practices - running unfamiliar software in an isolated environment, using containers, virtual machines, GitHub Codespaces, or other sandboxed environments before trusting it.

Most importantly, it could reduce the likelihood of people exposing sensitive assets, such as cryptocurrency wallets, to malicious software. Even if a warning only causes someone to pause for a minute and think twice, that's already a meaningful improvement.

I often compare it to aviation: pilots don't complain that there are too many safety warnings - they rely on them. Modern software development increasingly requires the same mindset. Security shouldn't be treated as an afterthought; it should be part of the standard operating procedure whenever you're dealing with untrusted code.

[StefanosMarinos]

Thats a good point actually . I use GitHub a lot for security research and usually clone a lot of repositories, so I think something like this could actually be useful. Maybe GitHub could even assign a risk score based on what its AI finds in a repository instead of just showing a generic warning. That would give users a better idea of how cautious they should be.

[alexshescp]

Join to my team 0trust0day