fix: validate identity_key against member's keyring, not org owner's#871
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rohan-chaturvedi merged 1 commit intomainfrom May 4, 2026
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UpdateUserWrappedSecrets, RecoverAccountKeyring, and ChangeAccountPassword all compared the supplied identity_key to org.identity_key — the org owner's. Phase users each derive their own keyring from their own mnemonic, so this rejected every legitimate call from a non-owner member trying to rewrap their keyring (SSO recovery, password recovery, password change). Compare against org_member.identity_key instead. Update the docstrings and tests to reflect the corrected semantics.
nimish-ks
approved these changes
May 4, 2026
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Summary
Three mutations introduced by the auth refactor (#849) —
UpdateUserWrappedSecretsMutation,RecoverAccountKeyringMutation, andChangeAccountPasswordMutation— compared the user-suppliedidentity_keyagainstorg.identity_key. That column is the org owner's identity_key, set once at org creation. Every Phase user derives their own keyring from their own mnemonic, so for any non-owner member the suppliedidentity_keywon't matchorg.identity_keyand the mutation rejects the call as "Invalid recovery proof."This breaks production for non-owner members:
UpdateUserWrappedSecretsMutation)RecoverAccountKeyringMutation)ChangeAccountPasswordMutation)The intent of the check is "the new identity_key must match the one this member registered with", which is
org_member.identity_key. Owner-only orgs happen to work because the owner'sorg_member.identity_key == org.identity_key.Changes
backend/backend/graphene/mutations/organisation.py: in all three mutations, move theOrganisationMember.objects.get(...)lookup ahead of the validation and compare againstorg_member.identity_key. Update docstrings.backend/tests/test_auth_password.py: tests had been mockingorg.identity_keyto drive the (incorrect) check. Switch the mocks toorg_member.identity_keyand update the assert-not-called assertions affected by the lookup-order change.Test plan
pytest backend/tests/test_auth_password.pypasses (54/54)