fix(hub): contain index-sourced paths to project root (bd-rz6yb)#244
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shikokuchuo merged 1 commit intoMay 31, 2026
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A malicious wire client could poison the index CRDT with a traversal, absolute, or symlink-escaping key and overwrite any file the server can write. Gate the single index-key -> fs-write site in sync_all_documents with a lexical contained_join plus a canonicalize/starts_with symlink-escape check; rejected entries are counted and warned.
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Summary
The Hub index is a client-writable CRDT mapping
path → doc, and the sync loop wrote each doc toproject_root.join(path)with no containment check (only an.exists()guard).Any authenticated client can put any key in the index over the wire, so a malicious one could set
../../../home/svc/.bashrcand have the server write attacker content outside the project root — an overwrite-any-writable-file primitive (potential RCE via shell rc / configs /.git/hooks)..exists()also follows symlinks, so a symlinked dir inside the root gave the same escape with no...Fix
sync_all_documentswith a lexicalcontained_join(rejects../absolute/rooted) plus acanonicalize+starts_withcheck (catches symlink escapes).@cscheid @gordonwoodhull this closes a security vulnerability whereby changes to an index document could result in filesystem changes on the server.