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18 changes: 18 additions & 0 deletions draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -597,6 +597,21 @@ A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (see Section 4.6.2 of
{{!TLS13}}).


## Rejecting 0-RTT

A server rejects 0-RTT by rejecting 0-RTT at the TLS layer. This results in
early exporter keys being unavailable, thereby preventing the use of 0-RTT for
QUIC.

A client that attempts 0-RTT MUST also consider 0-RTT to be rejected if it
receives a Retry or Version Negotiation packet.

When 0-RTT is rejected, all connection characteristics that the client assumed
might be incorrect. This includes the choice of application protocol, transport
parameters, and any application configuration. The client therefore MUST reset
the state of all streams, including application state bound to those streams.


## TLS Errors

Errors in the TLS connection SHOULD be signaled using TLS alerts on stream 0. A
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1377,6 +1392,9 @@ that 0-RTT data has been rejected.

A server MUST NOT use 0-RTT keys to protect packets.

If a server rejects 0-RTT, then the TLS stream will not include any TLS records
protected with 0-RTT keys.


## Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Frames {#pre-hs-protected}

Expand Down