[BUG] CSRF vulnerability in GodObjectProfile — GET requests mutate state

[rbmathis]

Summary

The GodObjectProfile action mutates state via GET query parameters, enabling CSRF attacks.

Steps to reproduce

1. Navigate to /Home/GodObjectProfile
2. Observe anchor links like <a href="?action=update&field=Name&value=UpdatedName">\
3. Embed that URL on an external page
4. When a logged-in user visits the external page, their profile data is mutated without consent

Expected behavior

State-changing operations should only be possible via POST requests with anti-forgery tokens. GET requests should be read-only.

Actual behavior

GET requests with query parameters (?action=update&field=Name&value=...) mutate application state. Any external site can trigger these mutations by embedding the URL.

Relevant logs/stack traces

N/A — no error produced; the vulnerability is silent.

Environment

.NET 9, all browsers, all OS

Impact

• Blocking

Additional context

Files affected: \Controllers/HomeController.cs, \Views/Home/GodObjectProfile.cshtml\

Fix required:

• Convert state-changing operations to POST requests
• Add [HttpPost]\ and [ValidateAntiForgeryToken]\ attributes
• Use form submissions instead of anchor links for mutations
• Ensure GET requests are read-only

[github-actions]

🤖 Issue triage (plan):

Difficulty: difficult
Reasoning: Broader scope or complex keywords

Next steps:

• Draft detailed design/plan in the issue
• Identify dependencies, secrets, and test strategy

[github-actions]

🏷️ Pipeline — Triage Stage

Agent: triage
Timestamp: 2026-05-05T19:07:00Z

Classification

Field	Value
Type	security
Difficulty	difficult
Priority	critical
Scope	Controllers, Views, Security

Agent Assignment

Agents needed: security, backend, frontend, testing, docs
Execution order: Step 1: security, backend, frontend (parallel) → Step 2: testing → Step 3: docs

Thinking

This is a clear CSRF security vulnerability in Controllers/HomeController.cs and Views/Home/GodObjectProfile.cshtml. GET requests are mutating state via query parameters, which allows cross-site request forgery. The fix requires converting mutations to POST with [HttpPost] + [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes and replacing anchor links with form submissions. This is security-critical — marked critical priority and difficult since it touches controller logic, view rendering, and requires anti-forgery token wiring throughout the affected flow.

Next

Advancing to Plan stage. The planner will decompose this into implementation tasks.

Generated by Pipeline — Triage for issue #89 · ● 110.6K · ◷

[github-actions]

📊 Pipeline State

{
  "pipeline": "sdlc",
  "stage": "route",
  "status": "completed",
  "classification": {
    "type": "security",
    "difficulty": "difficult",
    "priority": "critical",
    "scope_areas": ["Controllers", "Views", "Security"]
  },
  "agents_assigned": ["security", "backend", "frontend", "testing", "docs"],
  "execution_order": [["security", "backend", "frontend"], ["testing"], ["docs"]],
  "next": "plan",
  "timestamp": "2026-05-05T19:07:00Z"
}

Generated by Pipeline — Triage for issue #89 · ● 110.6K · ◷

[rbmathis]

Closing — retesting with cascading fix (PAT for add-labels).