## Testing Weakly Consistent Geo-Distributed Data-Storages and Applications

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#### ABSTRACT

Recent distributed systems have introduced various abstract concepts like *conflict-free replicated data types* (CRDTs), transaction, weak consistency and isolation level.

CRDTs like counters, registers, flags, and sets provide high availability and partition tolerance. They utilize nontrivial mechanisms to resolve the effects of concurrent updates to replicated data. Naturally these objects weaken their consistency guarantees to achieve availability and partition-tolerance, and various notions of *weak consistency* capture those guarantees.

Transactions simplify concurrent programming by enabling computations on shared data that are isolated from other concurrent computations and resilient to failures. Modern databases provide different consistency models or isolation level for transactions corresponding to different tradeoffs between consistency and availability.

This thesis studies the tractability of CRDT-consistency checking and transactional database checking for an insolation level. In both cases, to capture guarantees precisely, and facilitate symbolic reasoning, we propose novel logical characterizations. By developing novel reductions from propositional satisfiability problems, and novel consistency-checking algorithms, we discover both positive and negative results. We also demonstrate that tractability for hard cases can be redeemed if some parameter is bounded, usually the number of session or replicas in the network.

Lastly, this thesis presents MonkeyDB. a mock storage system for testing storage-backed applications. MonkeyDB supports a Key-Value interface as well as SQL queries under multiple isolation levels. It uses a logical specification of the isolation level to compute, on a read operation, the set of all possible return values. MonkeyDB then returns a value randomly from this set. We show that MonkeyDB provides good coverage of weak behaviors, which is complete in the limit. We test a variety of applications for assertions that fail only under weak isolation. MonkeyDB is able to break each of those assertions in a small number of attempts.

#### Acknowledgments

### Contents

1	Inte	Introduction					
	1.1	Confli	ct Free Replicated Data Types				
		1.1.1	State of the Art				
		1.1.2	Contribution				
	1.2	Transa	ctional Systems				
		1.2.1	State of the Art				
		1.2.2	Contribution				
	1.3	Applic	ations implemented on Distributed Datastores				
		1.3.1	State of the Art				
		1.3.2	Contribution				
2	Con	ISISTEN	CY OF CONFLICT-FREE REPLICATED DATA TYPES 7				
	2.1	Introd	uction				
	2.2	A Logi	ical Characterization of Replicated Data Types				
		2.2.1	Replicated Sets and Flags				
		2.2.2	Replicated Registers				
		2.2.3	Replicated Counters				
		2.2.4	Replicated Growable Array				
	2.3	Intract	ability for Registers, Sets, Flags, and Counters				
	2.4						
		2.4.1	Registers and Arrays				
		2.4.2	Replicated Counters				
		2.4.3	Sets and Flags				
		2.4.4	Correction				
	2.5	Related	d Work				
	2.6		usion				
3	Tra		ONAL CONSISTENCY 25				
	3.1	Introd	uction				
	3.2	Overview					
	3.3	Consis	tency Criteria				
		3.3.1	Histories				
		3.3.2	Axiomatic Framework				
	3.4	Check	ing Consistency Criteria				
	3.5		ing Consistency of Bounded-Width Histories				
		3.5.1	Checking Serializability				
		3.5.2	Reducing Prefix Consistency to Serializability				

#### Contents

		3.5.3 Reducing Snapshot Isolation to Serializability	<b>4</b> 7	
	3.6	Communication graphs	48	
	3.7	Experimental Evaluation	51	
	3.8	Related Work	55	
4	Аррі	PPLICATIONS IMPLEMENTED ON DISTRIBUTED DATASTORES		
	4.1	Introduction	57	
	4.2	Programming Language	61	
	4.3	Operational Semantics for $\mathcal{P}_{KV}$	61	
		4.3.1 Definition of the Operational Semantics	61	
		4.3.2 Correctness of the Operational Semantics	64	
	4.4	Compiling SQL to Key-Value API	65	
	4.5	Implementation	67	
		Evaluation: Microbenchmarks	69	
		4.6.1 Applications	69	
		4.6.2 Assertion Checking	70	
		4.6.3 Coverage	70	
	<b>4.</b> 7	Evaluation: OLTP Workloads	71	
	4.8	Testing SQL Database	74	
	4.9	Conclusion	75	
Bii	BLIOG	RAPHY	77	

# 1 Introduction

As *internet* grows to be cheaper and faster, distributed systems and applications are also becoming popular over past decades. Today they are the backbone of almost any online application like banking, shopping, ticketing, social networking etc.. As the popularity of these softwares increases, it is very important that these systems are reliable and secure.

Distributed systems are usually deployed over multiple locations connected through *internet*. There are multiple good reasons why an online application would need that. The users of the application may require data availability and fast response. Or, if some location goes offline, the other locations can still serve the users. Usually each distributed *nodes* maintains a replica of the global data. A user connects to the node *nearest* to them and that node serves their requests. This way the distributed system reduces responses time and distributes the workload to multiple nodes.

Distributed systems are the solution to a fast, concurrent, scalable online applications. But it actually offers a trade off. As we allow concurrent operations at multiple nodes, they still need to synchronize among them and maintain a meaningful or *consistent* global data. A global lock defeats the whole purpose of the distributed system, because taking a lock over a multiple distributed nodes means more communication over internet and slow response time.

Over the past few years, the community came up with many implementations *weakly-consistent* distributed system. They throw away strong consistent guarantees of the global data in favour of a scalable system. This is almost always alright. Because in most cases, the distributed applications do not really require strong guarantees over the data.

But these implementations are often not correctly reasoned. Many cases the guaranteed weak consistencies are explained in words and not formalized, which makes it difficult to reason about them. Also, often these systems promise a weak consistency on paper, but implements something else in practice. So it is very crucial, these systems are tested thoroughly against the consistency needs of an application.

This dissertation is an effort to give solutions to these problems. We first study *Conflict Free Replicated Data Type* or *CRDT*. CRDTs are popular data types like sets, flags, registers, but replicated and maintained at multiple nodes. Then we move on to *Transactional Systems* which allows to perform a set of operations isolated from other sets of operations. In both cases we reason about their consistency guarantees and provide algorithms to test their histories against the promised weak-consistency. Lastly, we study the correctness of applications implemented over distributed systems guaranteeing weak consistency level. We implement an artificial data storage, MonkeyDB, based on our previous formalization of consistency levels to simulate the possible abstraction of weak scenarios such as network partition, packet drops etc.. These applications can use MonkeyDB as a drop-in replacement to their backend databases to inject faults without any external control over network.

#### 1.1 CONFLICT FREE REPLICATED DATA TYPES

Replication is used in any distributed system. But to maintain a reliable replicated data, one has to maintain some level of consistency through clever synchronization techniques. The standard *strong consistency* approach is to find a linearization of the set of all global operations. But as CAP theorem shows, achieving strong consistency is not possible while maintaining availability and network partition.

When network delays are big and network partition is an issue, *eventual consistency* promises better performance and availability. An update gets executed at some replica but it may be sent to other replicas later as a delayed synchronization. Although updates eventually reaches to all replicas, these updates may be seen concurrently, even in different orders, by different replicas. If these concurrent updates are *conflicting*, they need to be resolved. This is not trivial because the resolved outcome need to be the *same* in all replicas such that the replicas do not diverge.

Conflict-free replicated data types (CRDTs) [87] efficiently resolve the effects of concurrent updates to replicated data. In figure 1.1, we demonstrate a CRDT, specifically an OR-Set. OR-Set implements a distributed Set with natural add(\_), remove(\_), contain(\_) operations. add(\_) and remove (\_) are the only update operations. Two updates are in conflict if they are trying to insert or remove a same element. As its CRDT based conflict-resolve technique, an add(\_) operation will always win among multiple conflicting updates. In figure 1.1, read() can seen as performing contain(\_) on a and b. In each replica  $r_i$ , everything seems fine when only add(\_) is happening. In  $r_1$ , after adding a and b and getting the update from  $r_2$ , the internal set contains both a and b. After performing remove(b), b gets remove from the set. Now, the update of add(b) from  $r_2$ reaches  $r_1$ . Since last remove(b) on  $r_1$  and add(b) from  $r_2$  are concurrent, meaning they are not causally related, they are in conflict. The OR-Set resolves them to the add(b), so b gets added in the set. Then the remove(a) from  $r_2$  reaches to  $r_1$ . Like before, the add(a) on  $r_1$  and remove(a) from  $r_2$  are in conflict. The OR-Set resolves them to the add(a) and ignores the <code>remove(b)</code> from  $r_2$ . So a and b both persists in the set. The same can be explained for  $r_2$ 's observation. It can be shown, this behavior is not linearizable. This behavior is not possible when strong guarantees are promised. Similarly, And-Set is a CRDT in which remove(\_) always wins among multiple conflicting updates.

Recent distributed systems have introduced variations of familiar abstract data types (ADTs) like counters, registers, flags, and sets, that provide high availability and partition tolerance. Naturally they weaken consistency guarantees to achieve availability and partition-tolerance, and various notions of *weak consistency* capture such guarantees [26, 29, 72, 90, 91]. Although, there are not much work to verify these implementations. We try to solve the problem using runtime-testing.

#### 1.1.1 State of the Art

The consistency models to specify these replicated data types. Many have considered consistency models applicable to CRDTs, including causal consistency [67], sequential consistency [66], linearizability [59], session consistency [90], eventual consistency [91], and happens-before consistency [72]. Burckhardt et al. [26, 29] propose a unifying framework to formalize these models. Many have also studied the complexity of verifying data-type agnostic notions of consistency, including serializability, sequential consistency and linearizability [6, 15, 20, 46, 54, 57, 80], as well as




Figure 1.1: A non-linearizable OR-Set execution

```
Payment(k):

x = read_balance()

...

update_balance(x - k)

// error -> rollback
```

Figure 1.2: Non-transactional execution

Figure 1.3: Transactional execution

causal consistency [21]. Bouajjani et al. [19, 42] consider the complexity for individual linearizable collection types. Others have developed effective consistency checking algorithms for sequential consistency [16, 27, 58, 84], serializability [36, 45, 46, 56], linearizability [28, 44, 70, 95], and even weaker notions like eventual consistency [22] and sequential happens-before consistency [41, 43].

#### 1.1.2 Contribution

In this work we study the tractability of CRDT consistency checking. In particular, we consider *runtime verification*: deciding whether a given execution of a CRDT is consistent with its ADT specification. This problem is particularly relevant as distributed-system testing tools like Jepsen [64] are appearing; without efficient, general consistency-checking algorithms, such tools could be limited to specialized classes of errors like node crashes.

Our study proceeds in three parts. First, to precisely characterize the consistency of various CRDTs, and facilitate symbolic reasoning, we develop novel logical characterizations to capture their guarantees. Second, we demonstrate the intractability of several replicated data types by reduction from propositional satisfiability (SAT) problems. Third, we develop tractable consistency-checking algorithms for individual data types and special cases: replicated growing arrays; multivalue and last-writer-wins registers, when each value is written only once; counters, when replicas are bounded; and sets and flags, when their sizes are also bounded.

#### 1.2 Transactional Systems

Transactions simplify concurrent programming by enabling multiple computations on shared data that are isolated from other concurrent computations and resilient to failures. In figure 1.2, we have two distributed nodes tries to perform a simple Payment code. If we allow the internal read and write operations to be interleaved, we can have a scenario where the reads happens first and then the write. This would allow a user to pay 200 euros spending only 100 euros from

their balance. So transactions are introduced to keep such critical code blocks to be performed in isolation. In figure 1.2, the same code is run under transactions and one of them throws error. Modern databases provide transactions in various forms corresponding to different tradeoffs between consistency and availability. The strongest level of consistency is achieved with *serializable* transactions [80] whose outcome in concurrent executions is the same as if the transactions were executed atomically in some order. Unfortunately, serializability carries a significant penalty on the availability of the system assuming, for instance, that the database is accessed over a network that can suffer from partitions or failures. For this reason, modern databases often provide weaker guarantees about transactions, formalized by weak consistency models, e.g., causal consistency [67] and snapshot isolation [13].

Implementations of large-scale databases providing transactions are difficult to build and test. For instance, distributed (replicated) databases must account for partial failures, where some components or the network can fail and produce incomplete results. Ensuring fault-tolerance relies on intricate protocols that are difficult to design and reason about. The black-box testing framework Jepsen [62] found a remarkably large number of subtle problems in many production distributed databases. <sup>1</sup>.

#### 1.2.1 State of the Art

Testing a transactional database raises two issues. First, deriving a suitable set of testing scenarios, e.g., faults to inject into the system and the set of transactions to be executed, and second, deriving efficient algorithms for checking whether a given execution satisfies the considered consistency model. The Jepsen framework aims to address the first issue by using randomization, e.g., introducing faults at random and choosing the operations in a transaction randomly. The effectiveness of this approach has been proved formally in recent work [79]. The second issue is, however, largely unexplored. Jepsen checks consistency in a rather ad-hoc way, focusing on specific classes of violations to a given consistency model, e.g., dirty reads (reading values from aborted transactions). This problem is challenging because the consistency specifications are non-trivial and they cannot be checked using, for instance, standard local assertions added to the client's code.

Besides serializability, the complexity of checking correctness of an execution w.r.t. some consistency model is unknown. Checking serializability has been shown to be NP-complete [80], and checking causal consistency in a *non-transactional* context is known to be polynomial time [21].

#### 1.2.2 Contribution

In this work, we try to fill this gap by investigating the complexity of this problem w.r.t. several consistency models and, in the case of NP-completeness, devising algorithms that are polynomial time assuming fixed bounds for certain parameters of the input executions, e.g., the number of sessions. We consider several consistency models that are the most prevalent in practice. *Read Committed* (RC) [13], *Read Atomic* (RA) [31], *Causal Consistency* (CC) [67], *Prefix Consistency* (PC) [30], *Snapshot Isolation* (SI) [13] and Serializability (SER).

We establish that checking whether an execution satisfies RC, RA, or CC is polynomial time, while the same problem is NP-complete for PC and SI. Moreover, in the case of the NP-complete

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://www.infoq.com/presentations/partitioning-comparison

consistency models (PC, SI, SER), we show that their verification problem becomes polynomial time provided that, roughly speaking, the number of sessions in the input executions is considered to be fixed (i.e., not counted for in the input size). In more detail, we establish that checking SER reduces to a search problem in a space that has polynomial size when the number of sessions is fixed. (This algorithm applies to arbitrary executions, but its complexity would be exponential in the number of sessions in general.) Then, we show that checking PC or SI can be reduced in polynomial time to checking SER using a transformation of executions that, roughly speaking, splits each transaction in two parts: one part containing all the reads, and one part containing all the writes (SI further requires adding some additional variables in order to deal with transactions writing on a common variable).

We provide an experimental evaluation of our algorithms on executions of CockroachDB [34], which claims to implement serializability [35] acknowledging however the possibility of anomalies, Galera [49], whose documentation contains contradicting claims about whether it implements snapshot isolation [50, 51], and AntidoteDB [7], which claims to implement causal consistency [8]. Our implementation reports violations of these criteria in all cases. The consistency violations we found for AntidoteDB are novel and have been confirmed by its developers. We show that our algorithms are efficient and scalable. In particular, we show that, although the asymptotic complexity of our algorithms is exponential in general (w.r.t. the number of sessions), the worst-case behavior is not exercised in practice.

#### 1.3 Applications implemented on Distributed Datastores

Modern applications require not just data reliability, but also high-throughput concurrent accesses. Applications concerning supply chains, banking, etc. use traditional relational databases for storing and processing data, whereas applications such as social networking software and ecommerce platforms use cloud-based storage systems (such as Azure CosmosDb [82], Amazon DynamoDb [38], Facebook TAO [23], etc.).

Providing high-throughput processing, unfortunately, comes at an unavoidable cost of weak-ening the guarantees offered to users. Concurrently-connected clients may end up observing different views of the same data. These "anomalies" can be prevented by using a strong *isolation level* such as *serializability*, which essentially offers a single view of the data. However, serializability requires expensive synchronization and incurs a high performance cost. As a consequence, most storage systems use weaker isolation levels, such as *Causal Consistency* [5, 67, 69], *Snapshot Isolation* [13], *Read Committed* [13], etc. for better performance. In a recent survey of database administrators [81], 86% of the participants responded that most or all of the transactions in their databases execute at read committed isolation level.

A weaker isolation level allows for more possible behaviors than stronger isolation levels. It is up to the developers then to ensure that their application can tolerate this larger set of behaviors. Unfortunately, weak isolation levels are hard to understand or reason about [3, 24] and resulting application bugs can cause loss of business [94].

#### 1.3.1 State of the Art

This work addresses the problem of *testing* code for correctness against weak behaviors: a developer should be able to write a test that runs their application and then asserts for correct behavior. The main difficulty today is getting coverage of weak behaviors during the test. If one runs the test against the actual production storage system, it is very likely to only result in serializable behaviors because of their optimized implementation. For instance, only 0.0004% of all reads performed on Facebook's TAO storage system were not serializable [71]. Emulators, offered by cloud providers for local development, on the other hand, do not support weaker isolation levels at all [9]. Another option, possible when the storage system is available open-source, is to set it up with a tool like Jepsen [62] to inject noise (bring down replicas or delay packets on the network). This approach is unable to provide good coverage at the level of client operations [85] (§4.7). Another line of work has focussed on finding anomalies by identifying non-serializable behavior (§4.8). Anomalies, however, do not always correspond to bugs [25, 52]; they may either not be important (e.g., gather statistics) or may already be handled in the application (e.g., checking and deleting duplicate items).

#### 1.3.2 Contribution

We present MonkeyDB, a mock in-memory storage system meant for testing correctness of storage-backed applications. MonkeyDB supports common APIs for accessing data (key-value updates, as well as SQL queries), making it an easy substitute for an actual storage system. MonkeyDB can be configured with one of several isolation levels.

MonkeyDB does not rely on stress generation, fault injection, or data replication. Rather, it works directly with a formalization of the given isolation level in order to compute allowed return values. The theory behind MonkeyDB builds on the axiomatic definitions of isolation levels introduced in chapter 3 [17]. These definitions use logical constraints (called *axioms*) to characterize the set of executions of a key-value store that conform to a particular isolation level (we discuss SQL queries later).

We consider a set of micro-benchmarks Twitter [93], Shopping Cart [89], Courseware [77], Treiber Stack [76] inspired from real-world applications (§4.6.1) and evaluate the number of test iterations required to fail an invalid assertion (§4.6.2). We also measure the *coverage* of weak behaviors provided by MonkeyDB (§4.6.3). Each of these applications were implemented based on their specifications described in prior work; they all use MonkeyDB as a library, via its KV interface.

We also extend our semantics to cover SQL queries as well, by compiling SQL queries down to transactions with multiple key-value reads/writes. Naturally, we considered OLTPBench [39], a popular benchmark suite of representative OLTP workloads for relational databases. We picked a subset of OLTPBench, including TPC-C, for which we had reasonable assertions. We showed using our technique, MonkeyDB was able to violate these assertion under weak isolation levels.

# 2 Consistency of Conflict-Free Replicated Data Types

#### 2.1 Introduction

Recent distributed systems have introduced variations of familiar abstract data types (ADTs) like counters, registers, flags, and sets, that provide high availability and partition tolerance. These *conflict-free replicated data types* (CRDTs) [87] efficiently resolve the effects of concurrent updates to replicated data. Naturally they weaken consistency guarantees to achieve availability and partition-tolerance, and various notions of *weak consistency* capture such guarantees [26, 29, 72, 90, 91].

In this work we study the tractability of CRDT consistency checking; Figure 2.1 summarizes our results. In particular, we consider *runtime verification*: deciding whether a given execution of a CRDT is consistent with its ADT specification. This problem is particularly relevant as distributed-system testing tools like Jepsen [64] are appearing; without efficient, general consistency-checking algorithms, such tools could be limited to specialized classes of errors like node crashes.

Our setting captures executions across a set of replicas as per-replica sequences of operations called *histories*. Roughly speaking, a history is *consistent* so long as each operation's return value can be justified according to the operations that its replica has observed so far. In the setting of CRDTs, the determination of a replica's observations is essentially an implementation choice: replicas are only obliged to observe their own operations, and the predecessors of those it has already observed. This relatively-weak constraint on replicas' observations makes the CRDT consistency checking problem unique.

Our study proceeds in three parts. First, to precisely characterize the consistency of various CRDTs, and facilitate symbolic reasoning, we develop novel logical characterizations to capture their guarantees. Our logical models are built on a notion of *abstract execution*, which relates the operations of a given history with three separate relations: a *read-from* relation, governing the observations from which a given operation constitutes its own return value; a *happens-before* relation, capturing the causal relationships among operations; and a *linearization* relation, capturing any necessary arbitration among non-commutative effects which are executed concurrently, e.g., following a *last-writer-wins* policy. Accordingly, we capture data type specifications with logical axioms interpreted over the read-from, happens-before, and linearization relations of abstract executions, reducing the consistency problem to: does there exist an abstract execution over the given history which satisfies the axioms of the given data type?

Second, we demonstrate the intractability of several replicated data types by reduction from propositional satisfiability (SAT) problems. In particular, we consider the 1-in-3 SAT problem [53], which asks for a truth assignment to the variables of a given set of clauses such that exactly one

Data Types	Complexity
Add-Wins Set, Remove-Wins Set	NP-complete
Enable-Wins Flag, Disable-Wins Flag	NP-complete
Sets & Flags — with bounded domains	PTIME
Last-Writer-Wins Register (LWW)	NP-complete
Multi-Value Register (MVR)	NP-complete
Registers – with unique values	PTIME
Replicated Counters	NP-complete
Counters – with bounded replicas	PTIME
Replicated Growable Array (RGA)	PTIME

Figure 2.1: The complexity of consistency checking for various replicated data types. We demonstrate intractability and tractability results in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.

literal per clause is assigned true. Our reductions essentially simulate the existential choice of a truth assignment with the existential choice of the read-from and happens-before relations of an abstract execution. For a given 1-in-3 SAT instance, we construct a history of replicas obeying carefully-tailored synchronization protocols, which is consistent exactly when the corresponding SAT instance is positive.

Third, we develop tractable consistency-checking algorithms for individual data types and special cases: replicated growing arrays; multi-value and last-writer-wins registers, when each value is written only once; counters, when replicas are bounded; and sets and flags, when their sizes are also bounded. While the algorithms for each case are tailored to the algebraic properties of the data types they handle, they essentially all function by constructing abstract executions incrementally, processing replicas' operations in prefix order.

The remainder of this article is organized around our three key contributions:

- 1. We develop novel logical characterizations of consistency for the replicated register, flag, set, counter, and array data types (§2.2);
- 2. We develop novel reductions from propositional satisfiability problems to consistency checking to demonstrate intractability for replicated flags, sets, counters, and registers (§2.3); and
- 3. We develop tractable consistency-checking algorithms for replicated growable arrays, registers, when written values are unique, counters, when replicas are bounded, and sets and flags, when their sizes are also bounded (§2.4–2.4.4).

Section 4.8 overviews related work, and Section 2.6 concludes.

#### 2.2 A Logical Characterization of Replicated Data Types

In this section we describe an axiomatic framework for defining the semantics of replicated data types. We consider a set of method names  $\mathbb{M}$ , and that each method  $m \in \mathbb{M}$  has a number of

arguments and a return value sampled from a data domain  $\mathbb{D}$ . We will use operation labels of the form  $\mathsf{m}(a) \stackrel{i}{\Rightarrow} b$  to represent the call of a method  $\mathsf{m} \in \mathbb{M}$ , with argument  $a \in \mathbb{D}$ , and resulting in the value  $b \in \mathbb{D}$ . Since there might be multiple calls to the same method with the same arguments and result, labels are tagged with a unique identifier i. We will ignore identifiers when unambiguous.

The interaction between a data type implementation and a client is represented by a *history*  $h = \langle \mathsf{Op}, \mathsf{ro} \rangle$  which consists of a set of operation labels  $\mathsf{Op}$  and a partial *replica order* ro ordering operations issued by the client on the same replica. Usually, ro is a union of sequences, each sequence representing the operations issued on the same replica, and the *width* of ro, i.e., the maximum number of mutually-unordered operations, gives the number of replicas in a given history.

To characterize the set of histories  $h = \langle \mathsf{Op}, \mathsf{ro} \rangle$  admitted by a certain replicated data type, we use *abstract executions*  $e = \langle \mathsf{rf}, \mathsf{hb}, \mathsf{lin} \rangle$ , which include:

- a read-from binary relation rf over operations in Op, which identifies the set of updates needed to "explain" a certain return value, e.g., a write operation explaining the return value of a read,
- a strict partial happens-before order hb, which includes ro and rf, representing the causality
  constraints in an execution, and
- a strict total *linearization* order lin, which includes hb, used to model conflict resolution
  policies based on timestamps.

In this work, we consider replicated data types which satisfy *causal consistency* [67], i.e., updates which are related by cause and effect relations are observed by all replicas in the same order. This follows from the fact that the happens-before order is constrained to be a partial order, and thus transitive (other forms of weak consistency don't pose this constraint). Some of the replicated data types we consider in this paper do *not* consider resolution policies based on timestamps and in those cases, the linearization order can be ignored.

A replicated data type is defined by a set of first-order axioms  $\Phi$  characterizing the relations in an abstract execution. A history h is admitted by a data type when there exists an abstract execution e such that  $\langle h, e \rangle \models \Phi$ . The satisfaction relation  $\models$  is defined as usual in first order logic. The admissibility problem is the problem of checking whether a history h is admitted by a given data type.

In the following, we define the replicated data types with respect to which we study the complexity of the admissibility problem. The axioms used to define them are listed in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. These axioms use the function symbols meth-od, arg-ument, and ret-urn interpreted over operation labels, whose semantics is self-explanatory.

#### 2.2.1 Replicated Sets and Flags

The Add-Wins Set and Remove-Wins Set [88] are two implementations of a replicated set with operations  $\operatorname{add}(x)$ ,  $\operatorname{remove}(x)$ , and  $\operatorname{contains}(x)$  for adding, removing, and checking membership of an element x. Although the meaning of these methods is self-evident from their names, the result of conflicting concurrent operations is not evident. When concurrent  $\operatorname{add}(x)$  and  $\operatorname{remove}(x)$  operations are delivered to a certain replica, the Add-Wins Set chooses to keep the element x in the

```
ReadFrom(R)
                                                                                                 RetvalSet(X, v, Y)
\forall o_1, o_2. \operatorname{rf}(o_1, o_2) \Rightarrow R(o_1, o_2)
                                                                                                 \forall o_1. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = X \wedge \mathsf{ret}(o_1) = v
                                                                                                  \Leftrightarrow \exists o_2. \, \mathsf{rf}(o_2, o_1) \land \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = Y
ReadFromMaximal(R)
                                                                                                               \wedge \arg(o_1) = \arg(o_2)
\forall o_1, o_2, o_3. \operatorname{rf}(o_1, o_2) \land R(o_3, o_2) \Rightarrow
                                                                                                 RETVALCOUNTER
\neg \mathsf{hb}(o_1, o_3) \lor \neg \mathsf{hb}(o_3, o_2)
                                                                                                 \forall o_1. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{read}
READALLMAXIMALS(R)
                                                                                                  \Rightarrow \mathsf{ret}(o_1) = |\{o_2 : \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{inc} \land \mathsf{rf}(o_2, o_1)\}|
\forall o_1, o_2. \, \mathsf{hb}(o_1, o_2) \land R(o_1, o_2)
                                                                                                  -|\{o_2: \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{dec} \land \mathsf{rf}(o_2, o_1)\}|
 \Rightarrow \exists o_3. \, \mathsf{hb}^*(o_1, o_3) \land \mathsf{rf}(o_3, o_2)
                                                                                                 LinLWW
CLOSEDRF(R)
                                                                                                 \forall o_1, o_2, o_3. \operatorname{rf}(o_1, o_2) \land \operatorname{meth}(o_3) = \operatorname{write}
\forall o_1, o_2, o_3. R(o_1, o_2) \land \mathsf{hb}(o_1, o_3)
                                                                                                  \wedge \arg_1(o_3) = \arg(o_2) \wedge \mathsf{hb}(o_3, o_2) \Rightarrow \lim(o_3, o_1)
 \wedge \operatorname{rf}(o_3, o_2) \Rightarrow \operatorname{rf}(o_1, o_2)
     RETVALREG
     \forall o_1, v.\mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{read} \land v \in \mathsf{ret}(o_1) \Rightarrow \exists !o_2.\mathsf{rf}(o_2, o_1) \land \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{write} \land \mathsf{arg}_2(o_2) = v
```

Figure 2.2: The axiomatic semantics of replicated data types. Quantified variables are implicitly distinct, and  $\exists ! o$  denotes the existence of a unique operation o.

set, so every subsequent invocation of contains(x) on this replica returns true, while the Remove-Wins Set makes the dual choice of removing x from the set.

The formal definition of their semantics uses abstract executions where the read-from relation associates sets of add(x) and remove(x) operations to contains(x) operations. Therefore, the predicate  $ReadOk(o_1, o_2)$  is defined by

$$\mathsf{meth}(o_1) \in \{\mathsf{add}, \mathsf{remove}\} \land \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{contains} \land \mathsf{arg}(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}(o_2)$$

and the Add-Wins Set is defined by the following set of axioms:

ReadFrom(ReadOk) 
$$\land$$
 ReadFromMaximal(ReadOk)  $\land$  ReadAllMaximals(ReadOk)  $\land$  RetvalSet(contains,  $true$ , add)

READFROMMAXIMAL says that every operation read by a contains(x) is maximal among its hbpredecessors that add or remove x while READALLMAXIMALS says that all such maximal hbpredecessors are read. The RETVALSET instantiation ensures that a contains(x) returns true iff it reads-from at least one add(x).

The definition of the Remove-Wins Set is similar, except for the parameters of RetvalSet, which become RetvalSet(contains, false, remove), i.e., a contains(x) returns false iff it readsfrom at least one remove(x).

The Enable-Wins Flag and Disable-Wins Flag are implementations of a set of flags with operations: enable(x), disable(x), and read(x), where enable(x) turns the flag x to true, disable(x) turns x to false, while read(x) returns the state of the flag x. Their semantics is similar to the

Add-Wins Set and Remove-Wins Set, respectively, where enable(x), disable(x), and read(x) play the role of add(x), remove(x), and contains(x), respectively. Their axioms are defined as above.

#### 2.2.2 Replicated Registers

We consider two variations of replicated registers called Multi-Value Register (MVR) and Last-Writer-Wins Register (LWW) [88] which maintain a set of registers and provide write(x,v) operations for writing a value v on a register x and read(x) operations for reading the content of a register x (the domain of values is kept unspecified since it is irrelevant). While a read(x) operation of MVR returns x the values written by concurrent writes which are maximal among its happens-before predecessors, therefore, leaving the responsibility for solving conflicts between concurrent writes to the client, a read(x) operation of LWW returns a single value chosen using a conflict-resolution policy based on timestamps. Each written value is associated to a timestamp, and a read operation returns the most recent value w.r.t. the timestamps. This order between timestamps is modeled using the linearization order of an abstract execution.

Therefore, the predicate ReadOk $(o_1, o_2)$  is defined by

```
\mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{write} \land \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{read} \land \mathsf{arg}_1(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}(o_2) \land \mathsf{arg}_2(o_1) \in \mathsf{ret}(o_2)
```

(we use  $\arg_1(o_1)$  to denote the first argument of a write operation, i.e., the register name, and  $\arg_2(o_1)$  to denote its second argument, i.e., the written value) and the MVR is defined by the following set of axioms:

$$ReadFrom(ReadOk) \land ReadFromMaximal(ReadOk) \land ReadAllMaximals(ReadOk) \land RetvalReg$$

where RetvalReg ensures that a read(x) operation reads from a write(x,v) operation, for each value v in the set of returned values  $^{1}$ .

LWW is obtained from the definition of MVR by replacing Readall Maximals with the axiom LinlwW which ensures that every write (x, ) operation which happens-before a read (x) operation is linearized before the write (x, ) operation from where the read (x) takes its value (when these two write operations are different). This definition of LWW is inspired by the "bad-pattern" characterization in [21], corresponding to their causal convergence criterion.

#### 2.2.3 Replicated Counters

The replicated counter datatype [88] maintains a set of counters interpreted as integers (the counters can become negative). This datatype provides operations inc(x) and dec(x) for incrementing and decrementing a counter x, and read(x) operations to read the value of the counter x. The semantics of the replicated counter is quite standard: a read(x) operation returns the value computed as the difference between the number of inc(x) operations and dec(x) operations among its happens-before predecessors. The axioms defined below will enforce the fact that a read(x) operation reads-from all its happens-before predecessors which are inc(x) or dec(x) operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For simplicity, we assume that every history contains a set of write operations writing the initial values of variables, which precede every other operation in replica order.

#### READFROMRGA

```
\forall o_2. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{addAfter} \Rightarrow \mathsf{arg}_1(o_2) = \circ \vee \\ \exists o_1. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{arg}_2(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}_1(o_2) \wedge \mathsf{rf}(o_1, o_2) \\ \wedge \, \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{remove} \Rightarrow \exists o_1. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{arg}_2(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}(o_2) \wedge \mathsf{rf}(o_1, o_2) \\ \wedge \, \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{read} \Rightarrow \forall v \in \mathsf{ret}(o_2) \, \exists o_1. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{arg}_2(o_1) = v \wedge \mathsf{rf}(o_1, o_2) \\ \underbrace{\mathsf{RETVALRGA}} \\ \forall o_1, o_2. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{read} \wedge \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{hb}(o_2, o_1) \wedge \mathsf{arg}_2(o_2) \not \in \mathsf{ret}(o_1) \\ \Rightarrow \exists o_3. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_3) = \mathsf{remove} \wedge \mathsf{arg}(o_3) = \mathsf{arg}_2(o_2) \wedge \mathsf{rf}(o_3, o_1) \\ \underbrace{\mathsf{LinRGA}} \\ \forall o_1, o_2. \, \big( \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{arg}_1(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}_1(o_2) \wedge \\ \exists o_3, o_4, o_5. \, \mathsf{meth}(o_3) = \mathsf{meth}(o_4) = \mathsf{addAfter} \wedge \mathsf{rf}^*_{\mathsf{addAfter}}(o_1, o_3) \wedge \mathsf{rf}^*_{\mathsf{addAfter}}(o_2, o_4) \wedge \\ \mathsf{meth}(o_5) = \mathsf{read} \wedge \mathsf{arg}_2(o_4) <_{o_5} \, \mathsf{arg}_2(o_3) \big) \Rightarrow \mathsf{lin}(o_1, o_2)
```

Figure 2.3: Axioms used to define the semantics of RGA.

Therefore, the predicate ReadOk $(o_1, o_2)$  is defined by

$$\mathsf{meth}(o_1) \in \{\mathsf{inc}, \mathsf{dec}\} \land \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{read} \land \mathsf{arg}(o_1) = \mathsf{arg}(o_2)$$

and the replicated counter is defined by the following set of axioms:

 $ReadFrom(ReadOk) \land ClosedRF(ReadOk) \land RetvalCounter.$ 

#### 2.2.4 Replicated Growable Array

The Replicated Growing Array (RGA) [86] is a replicated list used for text-editing applications. RGA supports three operations: addAfter(a,b) which adds the character b immediately after the occurrence of the character a assumed to be present in the list, remove(a) which removes a assumed to be present in the list, and read() which returns the list contents. It is assumed that a character is added at most once a. The conflicts between concurrent addAfter operations that add a character immediately after the same character is solved using timestamps (i.e., each added character is associated to a timestamp and the order between characters depends on the order between the corresponding timestamps), which in the axioms below are modeled by the linearization order.

Figure 2.3 lists the axioms defining RGA. READFROMRGA ensures that:

- every addAfter(a,b) operation reads-from the addAfter(\_,a) adding the character a, except when a = 0 which denotes the "root" element of the list<sup>3</sup>,
- every remove(a) operation reads-from the operation adding a, and
- every read operation returning a list containing a reads-from the operation addAfter(\_,a) adding a.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In a practical context, this can be enforced by tagging characters with replica identifiers and sequence numbers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This element is not returned by read operations.

Then, RetvalrGA ensures that a read operation  $o_1$  happening-after an operation adding a character a reads-from a remove(a) operation when a doesn't occur in the list returned by  $o_1$  (the history must contain a remove(a) operation because otherwise, a should have occurred in the list returned by the read).

Finally, LINRGA models the conflict resolution policy by constraining the linearization order between addAfter(a,\_) operations adding some character immediately after the same character a. As a particular case, LINRGA enforces that addAfter(a,b) is linearized before addAfter(a,c) when a read operation returns a list where c precedes b (addAfter(a,b) results in the list  $a \cdot b$  and applying addAfter(a,c) on  $a \cdot b$  results in the list  $a \cdot c \cdot b$ ). However, this is not sufficient: assume that the history contains the two operations addAfter(a,b) and addAfter(a,c) along with two operations remove(b) and addAfter(b,d). Then, a read operation returning the list  $a \cdot c \cdot d$  must enforce that addAfter(a,b) is linearized before addAfter(a,c) because this is the only order between these two operations that can lead to the result  $a \cdot c \cdot d$ , i.e., executing addAfter(a,b), addAfter(b,d), remove(b), addAfter(a,c) in this order. LinRGA deals with any scenario where arbitrarily-many characters can be removed from the list: rf\*\*
addAfter\* is the reflexive and transitive closure of the projection of rf on addAfter operations and a0, denotes the order between characters in the list returned by the read operation a1.

#### 2.3 Intractability for Registers, Sets, Flags, and Counters

In this section we demonstrate that checking the consistency is intractable for many widely-used data types. While this is not completely unexpected, since some related consistency-checking problems like sequential consistency are also intractable [54], this contrasts recent tractability results for checking strong consistency (i.e., linearizability) of common non-replicated data types like sets, maps, and queues [43]. In fact, in many cases we show that intractability even holds if the number of replicas is fixed.

Our proofs of intractability follow the general structure of Gibbons and Korach's proofs for the intractability of checking sequential consistency (SC) for atomic registers with read and write operations [54]. In particular, we reduce a specialized type of NP-hard propositional satisfiability (SAT) problem to checking whether histories are admitted by a given data type. While our construction borrows from Gibbons and Korach's, the adaptation from SC to CRDT consistency requires a significant extension to handle the consistency relaxation represented by abstract executions: rather than a direct sequencing of threads' operations, CRDT consistency requires the construction of three separate relations: read-from, happens-before, and linearization.

Technically, our reductions start from the 1-in-3 SAT problem [53]: given a propositional formula  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^{m} (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$  over variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$  with only positive literals, i.e.,  $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i \in \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ , does there exist an assignment to the variables such that exactly one of  $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i$  per clause is assigned true? The proofs of Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 reduce 1-in-3 SAT to CRDT consistency checking.

**Theorem 2.3.1.** The admissibility problem is NP-hard when the number of replicas is fixed for the following data types: Add-Wins Set, Remove-Wins Set, Enable-Wins Flag, Disable-Wins Flag, Multi-Value Register, and Last-Writer-Wins Register.

*Proof.* We demonstrate a reduction from the 1-in-3 SAT problem. For a given problem  $p = \bigwedge_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$  over variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ , we construct a 3-replica history  $h_p$  of the flag data type — either enable- or disable-wins — as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The encoding includes a flag variable  $x_j$  for each propositional variable  $x_j$ , along with a per-replica flag variable  $y_j$  used to implement synchronization barriers. Intuitively, executions of  $h_p$  proceed in m+1 rounds: the first round corresponds to the assignment of a truth valuation, while subsequent rounds check the validity of each clause given the assignment. The reductions to sets and registers are slight variations on this proof, in which the Read, Enable, and Disable operations are replaced with Contains, Add, and Remove, respectively, and Read and Writes of values 1 and 0, respectively. Now it suffices to show that the constructed history  $h_p$  is admitted if and only if the given problem p is satisfiable.

**Lemma 2.3.1.** 
$$p = \bigwedge_{i=1}^{m} (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$$
 is satisfied if and only if  $h_p$  is admissible

Since the flag data type does not constrain the linearization relation of its abstract executions, we regard only the read-from and happens-before components. The construction of  $h_p$  ensures the happens-before relations of its abstract executions:

- 1. do not interleave operations from different rounds. Each consecutive rounds are separated by the barriers in happens-before relations; and
- 2. at each round, only one replica, say replica i, can finish its Reads then finish its Enables/Disables, then (i+1)mode3 replica can finish its Reads and so on. And these Enables/Disables from one round are totally ordered between replicas by the happens-before relation.

In other words, replicas appear to execute atomically per round, in a round-robin fashion. Furthermore, since all operations in a given round happen before the operations of subsequent rounds, the values of flag variables are consistent across rounds — i.e., as read by the first replica to execute in a given round — and determined in the initial round either by conflict resolution — i.e., enable- or disable-wins — or by happens-before, in case conflict resolution would have been inconsistent with subsequent reads.

*Proof.* Only-if direction. When  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^1(\alpha_i\vee\beta_i\vee\gamma_i)$  is satisfied, that means, there exists an assignment for which all the first clause have exactly one literal set to true. First for all, to assign the corresponding values to  $x_i$ , we construct the hb such way that if  $x_i=false$  in the SAT formula, then we make  $Enable(x_i)$  in Replica 0 visible to  $Disable(x_i)$  in Replica 1, *i.e.*  $(Enable(x_i), Disable(x_i)) \in \text{hb}$ . This is make sure value of  $x_i$  is false after Barrier 1. Similarly we  $(Disable(x_i), Enable(x_i)) \in \text{hb}$  if  $x_i=true$  in SAT formula. Note this does not introduce any cycle in hb because  $x_i$ s are Enabled and Disabled in same order in Replica 0 and Replica 1.

Now at barrier i, we add all the Enable happens-before all the Read in hb. This also makes sure there is no cycle.

Now for each round i, if  $\alpha_i$  is true in clause i, then we make the round i of replica 0 happenbefore the round i of replica 1 in hb, then the round i of replica 1 happens-before the round i of replica 2 in hb. This makes the history admissible because, at first  $\alpha_1$  is true and  $\beta_1$  and  $\gamma_1$  are false. So the reads of round i in replica 0 goes ahead. Then the updates of round i in replica 0 make  $\alpha_1$  false and  $\beta_1$  true.  $\gamma_1$  stays false. So now, the reads of round i in replica 1 can go ahead.

	Replica 0	Replica 1	Replica 2
	Enable $(x_1)$	$Disable(x_1)$	
Round 0	Enable $(x_1)$ Enable $(x_n)$	Disable $(x_n)$	
Barrier 1	Enable $(y_0)$	Enable $(y_1)$	Enable $(y_2)$
	Read $(y_1) = true$	Read $(y_0) = true$	Read $(y_0) = true$
	Read $(y_2) = true$	Read $(y_2) = true$	Read $(y_1) = true$
Round 1	Read $(\alpha_1) = true$	Read $(\beta_1) = true$	Read $(\gamma_1) = true$
	Read $(\beta_1) = false$	Read $(\gamma_1) = false$	Read $(\alpha_1) = false$
	Read $(\gamma_1) = false$	Read $(\alpha_1) = false$	Read $(\beta_1) = false$
	Disable $(\alpha_1)$	Disable $(\beta_1)$	Disable $(\gamma_1)$
	Enable $(\beta_1)$	Enable $(\gamma_1)$	Enable $(\alpha_1)$
Barrier 2	Disable $(y_0)$	Disable $(y_1)$	Disable $(y_2)$
	Read $(y_1) = false$	Read $(y_0) = false$	Read $(y_0) = false$
	Read $(y_2) = false$	Read $(y_2) = false$	Read $(y_1) = false$
Round m	$\operatorname{Read}(\alpha_m) = true$	Read $(\beta_m) = true$	Read $(\gamma_m) = true$
	$\operatorname{Read}(\beta_m) = false$	Read $(\gamma_m) = false$	Read $(\alpha_m) = false$
	$\operatorname{Read}(\gamma_m) = false$	Read $(\alpha_m) = false$	Read $(\beta_m) = false$
	$\operatorname{Disable}(\alpha_m)$	Disable $(\beta_m)$	Disable $(\gamma_m)$
	$\operatorname{Enable}(\beta_m)$	Enable $(\gamma_m)$	Enable $(\alpha_m)$

Figure 2.4: The encoding of a 1-in-3 SAT problem  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$  over variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$  as a 3-replica history of a flag data type. Besides the flag variable  $x_j$  for each propositional variable  $x_j$ , the encoding adds per-replica variables  $y_j$  for synchronization barriers.

Similarly the happens before relation works between replica 1 and replica 2. So the sub-history till round i is admissible.

If  $\beta_i$  is true then the happens-order between replicas are is 1, 2 then 0 and  $\gamma_1$  is true, it is 2, 0 and then 1.

So we have a happens-before relation which admits each round and barrier, so the history is admissible.

Before we prove if-direction, we prove some lemmas for the properties of admissible history.

#### **Lemma 2.3.2.** The Reads of each barrier reads from the Enables or Disables of the same barrier.

*Proof.* We prove by induction on the number of each barrier. Base case. k=1. Note that only replica i Enables or Disables  $y_i$ . At barrier 1, if the  $\operatorname{Read}(y_j)=true$  at replica i is read from a barrier other than 1, then it must have read from barrier 3 at least. Because  $y_j$  is set to true at odd numbered barriers. Now at barrier 2 and replica j,  $\operatorname{Read}(y_i)=false$  reads from a Disable because replica j has  $\operatorname{Read}(y_i)=true$  at barrier 1. So at barrier 2 and replica j,  $\operatorname{Read}(y_i)=false$  can read from a Disable which is at even numbered barriers, at least from barrier 2.

So we found a cycle in happens-before order. Enable $(y_j)$  at barrier  $\geq 3$  and replica j happens-before  $\mathrm{Read}(y_j) = true$  at barrier 1 and replica i because of read-from. Then  $\mathrm{Read}(y_j) = true$  at barrier 1 and replica i happens-before  $\mathrm{Disable}(y_i)$  at barrier  $\geq 2$  and replica i. Then  $\mathrm{Disable}(y_i)$  at barrier  $\geq 2$  and replica i happens-before  $\mathrm{Read}(y_i) = false$  at barrier 2 and replica j because of read-form. Then  $\mathrm{Read}(y_i) = false$  at barrier 2 and replica j happens-before  $\mathrm{Enable}(y_j)$  at barrier  $\geq 3$  and replica j.

Inductive step. By induction hypothesis, barrier k always reads from barrier k itself. Now at  $\operatorname{Read}(y_j)$  of barrier (k+1), the history is visible upto the write of  $y_j$  from barrier k. Without loss of generality, let's assume, barrier k writes false value. Since barrier k writes true, the false reads of barrier (k+1) must read from a barrier strictly greater than k. Using the same logic from base case, we can find a cycle in the happens-before relation. The argument stays the similar when barrier k writes true value.

Lemma 2.3.2 ensures, all the operations from all replicas before barrier i are visible to each replica after barrier i.

#### **Lemma 2.3.3.** *Maximally first Reads of each round* $\leq 1$ *sees the same values of* $x_i$ .

*Proof.* We prove by induction on the number of rounds. But there is no base case. We will just show that at the round (i + 1) the maximally first Reads sees the the same assignments as the maximally first Reads of round i.

We will show at each round, the operations from each replica happen in a total order, that too one replica after another. Explicitly, for some some replica i, its operations happen first, then replica (i+1)mod2's operations happen, then replica (i+2)mod2's operations happen.

First of all, any the maximally first Read of each round sees exactly the same resolved values of  $x_i$  till last round because of lemma 2.3.2. We show, those Reads are reading from updates from same round. Reading from any later round is not possible, because that will introduce a cycle between current round and that later round in hb because of lemma 2.3.2.

Also, there exist one replica which does not read from other replicas. If replica p is reading from replica q, then replica q again can not read from replica p, cause it will create a cycle in hb between replica p and q. So replica q has to read from replica p. But then replica p will have to read from replica p, which creates a cycle between replica p, q and q.

So there exists one replica, which reads the resolved values till last round. Since the Reads of that are successful, it ensures only one of  $\alpha_k$ ,  $\beta_k$ ,  $\gamma_k$  are true. Hence, the first true Reads at other replicas must read-from the updates at the same round. That totally orders the round. That is, if replica 0 was the first one to finish its reads,  $\operatorname{Read}(\beta_k) = true$  read-from  $\operatorname{Enable}(\beta_k)$  and  $\operatorname{Read}(\gamma_k) = true$  read-from  $\operatorname{Enable}(\gamma_k)$ . Since the updates are totally ordered and they only flips the boolean values of  $x_i$  twice, at the end of last update of the round, we get back the same assignment as the round started with.

Now we go back to our main lemma 2.3.1. We use the same assignment of  $x_i$ s at the first Reads of each round (they are the same by lemma ??) for the SAT formula.

Now we show that assignment satisfies the 1-in-3 SAT formula. Suppose, there is a clause i which does not have exactly one positive literal. If we look at round i, there is a replica which happens-before the other replicas. The Reads of that replica sees the same  $x_i$  assignment as the SAT assignment, yet they only see exactly one true value. Which contradicts our assumption that the assignment makes clause i unsatisfied.  $\Box$ 

We proved that this reduction from a NP-complete problem to our admissibility works. It is very easy to the size of the history is linear in the size of formula and can be computed in linear-time. Theorem 2.3.1 is proved.

16

Figure 2.5: The encoding of a 1-in-3 SAT problem  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$  over variables  $x_1,\ldots,x_n$  as the history of a counter over 2n+3 replicas. Besides the counter variables  $x_j$  encoding propositional variables  $x_j$ , the encoding adds a variable y encoding the number of initial increments and decrements, and a variable z to implement synchronization barriers.

Theorem 2.3.1 establishes intractability of consistency for the aforementioned sets, flags, and registers, independently from the number of replicas. In contrast, our proof of Theorem 2.3.2 for counter data types depends on the number of replicas, since our encoding requires two replicas per propositional variable. Intuitively, since counter increments and decrements are commutative, the initial round in the previous encoding would have fixed all counter values to zero. Instead, the next encoding isolates initial increments and decrements to independent replicas. The weaker result is indeed tight since checking counter consistency with a fixed number of replicas is polynomial time, as Section 2.4.2 demonstrates.

#### **Theorem 2.3.2.** The admissibility problem for the Counter data type is NP-hard.

We demonstrate a reduction from the 1-in-3 SAT problem. For a given problem  $p = \bigwedge_{i=1}^m (\alpha_i \vee \beta_i \vee \gamma_i)$  over variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ , we construct a history  $h_p$  of the counter data type over 2n+3 replicas, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.

Besides the differences imposed due to the commutativity of counter increments and decrements, our reduction follows the same strategy as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.1: the happens-before relation of  $h_p$ 's abstract executions order every pair of operations in distinct rounds (of

```
Input: A differentiated history h = \langle \mathsf{Op}, \mathsf{ro} \rangle and a datatype T.

Output: true iff h satisfies the axioms of T.

1 \mathsf{rf} \leftarrow \mathsf{ComputeRF}(h,\mathsf{READFROM}[T],\mathsf{RETVAL}[T]);
2 \mathsf{if} \mathsf{rf} = \bot \mathsf{then} \mathsf{return} false;
3 \mathsf{hb} \leftarrow (\mathsf{ro} \cup \mathsf{rf})^+;
4 \mathsf{if} \mathsf{hb} \mathsf{is} \mathsf{cyclic} or \langle h, \mathsf{rf}, \mathsf{hb} \rangle \not\models \mathsf{READFROMMAXIMAL}[T] \land \mathsf{READALLMAXIMALS}[T] \mathsf{then}
5 \mid \mathsf{return} false;
6 \mathsf{lin} \leftarrow \mathsf{hb};
7 \mathsf{lin} \leftarrow \mathsf{LinClosure}(\mathsf{hb},\mathsf{Lin}[T]);
8 \mathsf{if} \mathsf{lin} \mathsf{is} \mathsf{cyclic} \mathsf{then} \mathsf{return} false;
9 \mathsf{return} \mathsf{true};
```

**Algorithm 1:** Consistency checking for RGA, LWW, and MVR. Re...[T] refers to an axiom of T, or true when T lacks such an axiom. The relation  $R^+$  denotes the transitive closure of R.

Replicas 0–2), and every operation in a given (non-initial) round. As before, Replicas 0–2 appear to execute atomically per round, in a round-robin fashion, and counter variables are consistent across rounds. The key difference is that here abstract executions' happens-before relations only relate the operations of either Replica 2j+1 or 2j+2, for each  $j=1,\ldots,n$ , to operations in subsequent rounds: the other's operations are never observed by other replicas. Our encoding ensures that exactly one of each is observed by ensuring that the counter y is incremented exactly n times — and relying on the fact that every variable appears in some clause, so that a read that observed neither or both would yield the value zero, which is inconsistent with  $h_p$ . Otherwise, our reasoning follows the proof of Theorem 2.3.1, in which the read-from relation selects all increments and decrements of the same counter variable in happens-before order.

#### 2.4 Polynomial-Time Algorithms

#### 2.4.1 REGISTERS AND ARRAYS

We show that the problem of checking consistency is polynomial time for RGA, and even for LWW and MVR under the assumption that each value is written at most once, i.e., for each value v, the input history contains at most one write operation write(x,v). Histories satisfying this assumption are called *differentiated*. The latter is a restriction motivated by the fact that practical implementations of these datatypes are data-independent [96], i.e., their behavior doesn't depend on the concrete values read or written and any potential buggy behavior can be exposed in executions where each value is written at most once. Also, in a testing environment, this restriction can be enforced by tagging each value with a replica identifier and a sequence number.

In all three cases, the feature that enables polynomial time consistency checking is the fact that the read-from relation becomes fixed for a given history, i.e., if the history is consistent, then there exists exactly one read-from relation rf that satisfies the ReadFrom\_and Retval\_axioms, and rf can be derived syntactically from the operation labels (using those axioms). Then, our axiomatic characterizations enable a consistency checking algorithm which roughly, consists in instantiating those axioms in order to compute an abstract execution.

The consistency checking algorithm for RGA, LWW, and MVR is listed in Algorithm 1. It computes the three relations rf, hb, and lin of an abstract execution using the datatype's axioms.

```
Input: A history h = \langle \mathsf{Op}, \mathsf{ro} \rangle of RGA.
     Output: An rf satisfying ReadFromRGA \land RetvalRGA, if exists; \bot o/w
1 rf \leftarrow \{(o_1, o_2) : \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{addAfter}, \mathsf{meth}(o_2) \in \{\mathsf{addAfter}, \mathsf{remove}, \mathsf{read}\}, \mathsf{arg}_2(o_1) = \mathsf{addAfter}\}
        arg_1(o_2) \vee arg_2(o_1) \in ret(o_2);
2 if \langle h, \mathsf{rf} \rangle \not\models \mathsf{READFROMRGA} then return \bot;
3 while true do
              \mathsf{rf}_1 \leftarrow \emptyset;
              foreach o_1, o_2 \in \mathsf{Op} \ \mathsf{s.t.} \ \langle o_2, o_1 \rangle \in (\mathsf{rf} \cup \mathsf{ro})^+ \ \mathsf{and} \ \mathsf{meth}(o_1) = \mathsf{read} \ \mathsf{and} \ \mathsf{meth}(o_2) = \mathsf{add} \mathsf{After}
                 and arg_2(o_2) \not\in ret(o_1) do
                       if \exists o_3 \in \mathsf{Op} \ \mathsf{s.t.} \ \mathsf{meth}(o_3) = \mathsf{remove} \ \mathsf{and} \ \mathsf{arg}(o_3) = \mathsf{arg}_2(o_2) \ \mathsf{then}
                                \mathsf{rf}_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{rf}_1 \cup \{\langle o_3, o_1 \rangle\};
8
                               return ⊥;
              \textbf{if} \ \mathsf{rf}_1 \subseteq \mathsf{rf} \ \textbf{then break};
10
             else \mathsf{rf} \leftarrow \mathsf{rf} \cup \mathsf{rf}_1;
11
12 return rf;
```

**Algorithm 2:** The procedure ComputeRF for RGA.

The history is declared consistent iff there exist satisfying rf and hb relations, and the relations hb and lin computed this way are acyclic. The acyclicity requirement comes from the definition of abstract executions where hb and lin are required to be partial/total orders. While an abstract execution would require that lin is a total order, this algorithm computes a partial linearization order. However, any total order compatible with this partial linearization would satisfy the axioms of the datatype.

ComputeRF computes the read-from relation rf satisfying the READFROM\_and RETVAL\_axioms. In the case of LWW and MVR, it defines rf as the set of all pairs formed of write(x,v) and  $\mathsf{read}(x)$  operations where v belongs to the return value of the  $\mathsf{read}$ . By  $\mathsf{Retval}$ , each  $\mathsf{read}(x)$ operation must be associated to at least one write(x,\_) operation. Also, the fact that each value is written at most once implies that this rf relation is uniquely defined, e.g., for LWW, it is not possible to find two write operations that could be rf related to the same read operation. In general, if there exists no rf relation satisfying these axioms, then ComputeRF returns a distinguished value  $\perp$  to signal a consistency violation. Note that the computation of the read-from for LWW and MVR is quadratic time $^4$  since the constraints imposed by the axioms relate only to the operation labels, the methods they invoke or their arguments. The case of RGA is slightly more involved because the axiom RetvalRGA introduces more read-from constraints based on the happens-before order which includes ro and the rf itself. In this case, the computation of rf relies on a fixpoint computation, which converges in at most quadratic time (the maximal size of rf), described in Algorithm 2. Essentially, we use the axiom READFROMRGA to populate the readfrom relation and then, apply the axiom RETVALRGA iteratively, using the read-from constraints added in previous steps, until the computation converges.

After computing the read-from relation, our algorithm defines the happens-before relation hb as the transitive closure of ro union rf. This is sound because none of the axioms of these datatypes enforce new happens-before constraints, which are not already captured by ro and rf. Then, it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Assuming constant time lookup/insert operations (e.g., using hashmaps), this complexity is linear time.

checks whether the hb defined this way is acyclic and satisfies the datatype's axioms that constrain hb, i.e., READFROMMAXIMAL and READALLMAXIMALS (when they are present).

Finally, in the case of LWW and RGA, the algorithm computes a (partial) linearization order that satisfies the corresponding Lin\_axioms. Starting from an initial linearization order which is exactly the happens-before, it computes new constraints by instantiating the universally quantified axioms LinLWW and LinRGA. Since these axioms are not "recursive", i.e., they don't enforce linearization order constraints based on other linearization order constraints, a standard instantiation of these axioms is enough to compute a partial linearization order such that any extension to a total order satisfies the datatype's axioms.

#### **Theorem 2.4.1.** Algorithm 1 returns true iff the input history is consistent.

The following holds because Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time — the rank depends on the number of quantifiers in the datatype's axioms. Indeed, Algorithm 1 represents a least fixpoint computation which converges in at most a quadratic number of iterations (the maximal size of rf).

**Corollary 2.4.1.** The admissibility problem is polynomial time for RGA, and for LWW and MVR on differentiated histories.

#### 2.4.2 Replicated Counters

In this section, we show that checking consistency for the replicated counter datatype becomes polynomial time assuming the number of replicas in the input history is fixed (i.e., the width of the replica order ro is fixed). We present an algorithm which constructs a valid happens-before order (note that the semantics of the replicated counter doesn't constrain the linearization order) incrementally, following the replica order. At any time, the happens-before order is uniquely determined by a *prefix mapping* that associates to each replica a *prefix* of the history, i.e., a set of operations which is downward-closed w.r.t. replica order (i.e., if it contains an operation it contains all its ro predecessors). This models the fact that the replica order is included in the happens-before and therefore, if an operation  $o_1$  happens-before another operation  $o_2$ , then all the ro predecessors of  $o_1$  happen-before  $o_2$ . The happens-before order can be extended in two ways: (1) adding an operation issued on the replica i to the prefix of replica i, or (2) "merging" the prefix of a replica j to the prefix of a replica i (this models the delivery of an operation issued on replica j and all its happens-before predecessors to the replica i). Verifying that an extension of the happens-before is valid, i.e., that the return values of newly-added read operations satisfy the RETVALCOUNTER axiom, doesn't depend on the happens-before order between the operations in the prefix associated to some replica (it is enough to count the inc and dec operations in that prefix). Therefore, the algorithm can be seen as a search in the space of prefix mappings. If the number of replicas in the input history is fixed, then the number of possible prefix mappings is polynomial in the size of the history, which implies that the search can be done in polynomial time.

Let  $h=(\mathsf{Op},\mathsf{ro})$  be a history. To simplify the notations, we assume that the replica order is a union of sequences, each sequence representing the operations issued on the same replica. Therefore, each operation  $o\in \mathsf{Op}$  is associated with a replica identifier  $\mathsf{rep}(o)\in [1..n_h]$ , where  $n_h$  is the number of replicas in h.

A prefix of h is a set of operation  $\mathsf{Op}' \subseteq \mathsf{Op}$  such that all the ro predecessors of operations in  $\mathsf{Op}'$  are also in  $\mathsf{Op}'$ , i.e.,  $\forall o \in \mathsf{Op}$ . ro<sup>-1</sup>(o)  $\in \mathsf{Op}$ . Note that the union of two prefixes of h is

```
Input: History h = (Op, ro), prefix map m, and set seen of invalid prefix maps
   Output: true iff there exists read-from and happens-before relations rf and hb such that m \subseteq hb, and
               \langle h, \mathsf{rf}, \mathsf{hb} \rangle satisfies the counter axioms.
1 if m is complete then return true;
2 foreach replica i do
         foreach replica j \neq i do
              m' \leftarrow m[i \leftarrow m(i) \cup m(j)];
              if m' \not\in seen and checkCounter(h, m', seen) then
5
                return true;
6
               seen \leftarrow seen \cup \{m'\};
         if \exists o_1. ro<sup>1</sup>(last<sub>i</sub>(m), o_1) then
8
              if meth(o_1) = read and
                arg(o_1) = x \land ret(o_1) \neq |\{o \in m[i] | o = inc(x)\}| - |\{o \in m[i] | o = dec(x)\}|  then
                   return false:
10
11
               m' \leftarrow m[i \leftarrow m(i) \cup \{o_1\}];
               if m' \not\in seen \ and \ checkCounter(h, m', seen) \ then
12
13
               seen \leftarrow seen \cup \{m'\};
15 return false;
```

**Algorithm 3:** The procedure checkCounter, where ro<sup>1</sup> denotes immediate ro-successor, and  $f[a \leftarrow b]$  updates function f with mapping  $a \mapsto b$ .

also a prefix of h. The *last operation* of replica i in a prefix  $\mathsf{Op}'$  is the ro-maximal operation o with  $\mathsf{rep}(o) = i$  included in  $\mathsf{Op}'$ . A prefix  $\mathsf{Op}'$  is called *valid* if  $(\mathsf{Op}', \mathsf{ro}')$ , where  $\mathsf{ro}'$  is the projection of ro on  $\mathsf{Op}'$ , is admitted by the replicated counter.

A prefix map is a mapping m which associates a prefix of h to each replica  $i \in [1..n_h]$ . Intuitively, a prefix map defines for each replica i the set of operations which are "known" to i, i.e., happen-before the last operation of i in its prefix. Formally, a prefix map m is included in a happens-before relation hb, denoted by  $m \subseteq hb$ , if for each replica  $i \in [1..n_h]$ ,  $hb(o, o_i)$  for each operation in  $o \in m(i) \setminus \{o_i\}$ , where  $o_i$  is the last operation of i in m(i). We call  $o_i$  the last operation of i in m, and denoted it by  $last_i(m)$ . A prefix map m is valid if it associates a valid prefix to each replica, and complete if it associates the whole history h to each replica i.

Algorithm 3 lists our algorithm for checking consistency of replicated counter histories. It is defined as a recursive procedure checkCounter that searches for a sequence of valid extensions of a given prefix map (initially, this prefix map is empty) until it becomes complete. The axiom RetvalCounter is enforced whenever extending the prefix map with a new read operation (when the last operation of a replica *i* is "advanced" to a read operation). The following theorem states of the correctness of the algorithm.

**Theorem 2.4.2.** checkCounter( $h, \emptyset, \emptyset$ ) returns true iff the input history is consistent.

When the number of replicas is fixed, the number of prefix maps becomes polynomial in the size of the history. This follows from the fact that prefixes are uniquely defined by their ro-maximal operations, whose number is fixed.

**Corollary 2.4.2.** The admissibility problem for replicated counters is polynomial-time when the number of replicas is fixed.

#### 2.4.3 Sets and Flags

While Theorem 2.3.1 shows that the admissibility problem is NP-complete for replicated sets and flags even if the number of replicas is fixed, we show that this problem becomes polynomial time when additionally, the number of values added to the set, or the number of flags, is also fixed. Note that this doesn't limit the number of operations in the input history which can still be arbitrarily large. In the following, we focus on the Add-Wins Set, the other cases being very similar.

We propose an algorithm for checking consistency which is actually an extension of the one presented in Section 2.4.2 for replicated counters. The additional complexity in checking consistency for the Add-Wins Set comes from the validity of contains(x) return values which requires identifying the maximal predecessors in the happens-before relation that add or remove x (which are not necessarily the maximal hb-predecessors all-together). In the case of counters, it was enough just to count happens-before predecessors. Therefore, we extend the algorithm for replicated counters such that along with the prefix map, we also keep track of the hb-maximal add(x) and remove(x) operations for each element x and each replica x. When extending a prefix map with a contains operation, these hb-maximal operations (which define a witness for the read-from relation) are enough to verify the RetValset axiom. Extending the prefix of a replica with an add or remove operation (issued on the same replica), or by merging the prefix of another replica, may require an update of these hb-maximal predecessors.

When the number of replicas and elements are fixed, the number of read-from maps is polynomial in the size of the history — recall that the number of operations associated by a read-from map to a replica and set element is bounded by the number of replicas. Combined with the number of prefix maps being polynomial when the number of replicas is fixed, we obtain the following result.

**Theorem 2.4.3.** Checking whether a history is admitted by the Add-Wins Set, Remove-Wins Set, Enable-Wins Flag, or the Disable-Wins Flag is polynomial time provided that the number of replicas and elements/flags is fixed.

#### 2.4.4 Correction

The p-time algorithms for admissibility problem for replicated counter and sets, flags provided in subsection and respectively are incorrect.

Consider the history of a replicated counter given in figure 2.6. This execution will not be explored by the algorithm 3. This history has only one possible execution, presented in the figure.  $[\operatorname{Inc}(a)]_{r_1}$  must be propagate after  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=2]_{r_2}$  and before  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=3]_{r_2}$ . To simulate that, the algorithm must reach a prefix map which had  $[\operatorname{Inc}(a)]_{r_1}$  and  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=2]_{r_2}$  as the ro-maximal operations from each replica. But the same argument holds when  $[\operatorname{Inc}(a)]_{r_2}$  needs to propagate after  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=2]_{r_1}$  and before  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=3]_{r_1}$ . So the algorithm must reach another prefix map which had  $[\operatorname{Inc}(a)]_{r_2}$  and  $[\operatorname{Read}(a)=2]_{r_1}$  as the ro-maximal operations from each replica.

Now the algorithm always extends the maintained prefix map *i.e.* when successful, the valid extensions of the empty prefix map are related by inclusion. But these two prefix map are not *related* by inclusion. So no valid extensions of prefix map will see both of them together, and the algorithm will return unsuccessfully because  $\operatorname{Read}(a) = 3$  will be unsuccessful. We present a similar history for sets, flags or registers, and argue the same.




Figure 2.6: An admissible execution of replicated counter which will not be explored by algorithm 3




Figure 2.7: An admissible execution of replicated flags which will not be explored by algorithm proposed in subsection 2.4.4

We realized, to construct hb incrementally, we need to propagate the partial hb at future operations arbitrarily at each replica. Naively, this requires to maintain a prefix map at each Read operation. Although, the number of possible prefix map is polynomially bound for bounded number of replicas, maintaining n prefix maps at each Read where n is in the order of the size of the history, creates exponentially many possible states to explore.

We could not find any solution to our mistake. The complexity of the admissibility problem for Counters with bounded number of replica stays open.

#### 2.5 Related Work

Many have considered consistency models applicable to CRDTs, including causal consistency [67], sequential consistency [66], linearizability [59], session consistency [90], eventual consistency [91], and happens-before consistency [72]. Burckhardt et al. [26, 29] propose a unifying framework to formalize these models. Many have also studied the complexity of verifying data-type agnostic notions of consistency, including serializability, sequential consistency and linearizability [6, 15, 20, 46, 54, 57, 80], as well as causal consistency [21]. Our definition of the replicated LWW register corresponds to the notion of causal convergence in [21]. This work studies the complexity of the admissibility problem for the replicated LWW register. It shows that this problem is NP-complete in general and polynomial time when each value is written only once. Our NP-completeness result is stronger since it assumes a fixed number of replicas, and our algorithm for the case of unique values is more general and can be applied uniformly to MVR and RGA. While Bouajjani et al. [19, 42] consider the complexity for individual linearizable collection types, we are the first to establish (in)tractability of individual replicated data types. Others have developed effective consistency checking algorithms for sequential consistency [16, 27, 58, 84], serializability [36, 45, 46, 56], linearizability [28, 44, 70, 95], and even weaker notions like eventual consistency [22] and sequential

#### 2 Consistency of Conflict-Free Replicated Data Types

happens-before consistency [41, 43]. In contrast, we are the first to establish precise polynomial-time algorithms for runtime verification of replicated data types.

#### 2.6 Conclusion

By developing novel logical characterizations of replicated data types, reductions from propositional satisfiability checking, and tractable algorithms, we have established a frontier of tractability for checking consistency of replicated data types. As far as we are aware, our results are the first to characterize the asymptotic complexity consistency checking for CRDTs.

## 3 Transactional Consistency

#### 3.1 Introduction

Transactions simplify concurrent programming by enabling computations on shared data that are isolated from other concurrent computations and resilient to failures. Modern databases provide transactions in various forms corresponding to different tradeoffs between consistency and availability. The strongest level of consistency is achieved with *serializable* transactions [80] whose outcome in concurrent executions is the same as if the transactions were executed atomically in some order. Unfortunately, serializability carries a significant penalty on the availability of the system assuming, for instance, that the database is accessed over a network that can suffer from partitions or failures. For this reason, modern databases often provide weaker guarantees about transactions, formalized by weak consistency models, e.g., causal consistency [67] and snapshot isolation [13].

Implementations of large-scale databases providing transactions are difficult to build and test. For instance, distributed (replicated) databases must account for partial failures, where some components or the network can fail and produce incomplete results. Ensuring fault-tolerance relies on intricate protocols that are difficult to design and reason about. The black-box testing framework Jepsen [62] found a remarkably large number of subtle problems in many production distributed databases.

Testing a transactional database raises two issues: (1) deriving a suitable set of testing scenarios, e.g., faults to inject into the system and the set of transactions to be executed, and (2) deriving efficient algorithms for checking whether a given execution satisfies the considered consistency model. The Jepsen framework aims to address the first issue by using randomization, e.g., introducing faults at random and choosing the operations in a transaction randomly. The effectiveness of this approach has been proved formally in recent work [79]. The second issue is, however, largely unexplored. Jepsen checks consistency in a rather ad-hoc way, focusing on specific classes of violations to a given consistency model, e.g., dirty reads (reading values from aborted transactions). This problem is challenging because the consistency specifications are non-trivial and they cannot be checked using, for instance, standard local assertions added to the client's code.

Besides serializability, the complexity of checking correctness of an execution w.r.t. some consistency model is unknown. Checking serializability has been shown to be NP-complete [80], and checking causal consistency in a *non-transactional* context is known to be polynomial time [21]. In this work, we try to fill this gap by investigating the complexity of this problem w.r.t. several consistency models and, in the case of NP-completeness, devising algorithms that are polynomial time assuming fixed bounds for certain parameters of the input executions, e.g., the number of sessions.

We consider several consistency models that are the most prevalent in practice. The weakest of them,  $Read\ Committed\ (RC)\ [13]$ , requires that every value read in a transaction is written by a committed transaction.  $Read\ Atomic\ (RA)\ [31]$  requires that successive reads of the same variable in a transaction return the same value (also known as Repeatable Reads [13]), and that a transaction "sees" the values written by previous transactions in the same session. In general, we assume that transactions are organized in  $sessions\ [90]$ , an abstraction of the sequence of transactions performed during the execution of an application.  $Causal\ Consistency\ (CC)\ [67]$  requires that if a transaction  $t_1$  "affects" another transaction  $t_2$ , e.g.,  $t_1$  is ordered before  $t_2$  in the same session or  $t_2$  reads a value written by  $t_1$ , then these two transactions are observed by any other transaction in this order.  $Prefix\ Consistency\ (PC)\ [30]$  requires that there exists a total commit order between all the transactions such that each transaction observes a prefix of this sequence.  $Snapshot\ Isolation\ (SI)\ [13]$  further requires that two different transactions observe different prefixes if they both write to a common variable. Finally, we also provide new results concerning the problem of checking serializability (SER) that complement the known result about its NP-completeness.

The algorithmic issues we explore in this paper have led to a new specification framework for these consistency models that relies on the fact that the *write-read* relation in an execution (also known as *read-from*), relating reads with the transactions that wrote their value, can be defined effectively. The write-read relation can be extracted easily from executions where each value is written at most once (a variable can be written an arbitrary number of times). This can be easily enforced by tagging values with unique identifiers (e.g., a local counter that is incremented with every new write coupled with a client/session identifier)<sup>1</sup>. Since practical database implementations are data-independent [96], i.e., their behavior doesn't depend on the concrete values read or written in the transactions, any potential buggy behavior can be exposed in executions where each value is written at most once. Therefore, this assumption is without loss of generality.

Previous work [21, 29, 31] has formalized such consistency models using two auxiliary relations: a *visibility* relation defining for each transaction the set of transactions it observes, and a *commit order* defining the order in which transactions are committed to the "global" memory. An execution satisfying some consistency model is defined as the existence of a visibility relation and a commit order obeying certain axioms. In our case, the write-read relation derived from the execution plays the role of the visibility relation. This simplification allows us to state a series of axioms defining these consistency models, which have a common shape. Intuitively, they define lower bounds on the set of transactions  $t_1$  that *must* precede in commit order a transaction  $t_2$  that is read in the execution. Besides shedding a new light on the differences between these consistency models, these axioms are essential for the algorithmic issues we investigate afterwards.

We establish that checking whether an execution satisfies RC, RA, or CC is polynomial time, while the same problem is NP-complete for PC and SI. Moreover, in the case of the NP-complete consistency models (PC, SI, SER), we show that their verification problem becomes polynomial time provided that, roughly speaking, the number of sessions in the input executions is considered to be fixed (i.e., not counted for in the input size). In more detail, we establish that checking SER reduces to a search problem in a space that has polynomial size when the number of sessions is fixed. (This algorithm applies to arbitrary executions, but its complexity would be exponential in the number of sessions in general.) Then, we show that checking PC or SI can be reduced in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>This is also used in Jepsen, e.g., checking dirty reads in Galera [63].

polynomial time to checking SER using a transformation of executions that, roughly speaking, splits each transaction in two parts: one part containing all the reads, and one part containing all the writes (SI further requires adding some additional variables in order to deal with transactions writing on a common variable). We extend these results even further by relying on an abstraction of executions called *communication graphs* [33]. Roughly speaking, the vertices of a communication graph correspond to sessions, and the edges represent the fact that two sessions access (read or write) the same variable. We show that all these criteria are polynomial-time checkable provided that the *biconnected* components of the communication graph are of fixed size.

We provide an experimental evaluation of our algorithms on executions of CockroachDB [34], which claims to implement serializability [35] acknowledging however the possibility of anomalies, Galera [49], whose documentation contains contradicting claims about whether it implements snapshot isolation [50, 51], and AntidoteDB [7], which claims to implement causal consistency [8]. Our implementation reports violations of these criteria in all cases. The consistency violations we found for AntidoteDB are novel and have been confirmed by its developers. We show that our algorithms are efficient and scalable. In particular, we show that, although the asymptotic complexity of our algorithms is exponential in general (w.r.t. the number of sessions), the worst-case behavior is not exercised in practice.

To summarize, the contributions of this work are fourfold:

- We develop a new specification framework for describing common transactional-consistency criteria (§3.3);
- We show that checking RC, RA, and CC is polynomial time while checking PC and SI is NP-complete (§3.4);
- We show that PC, SI, and SER are polynomial-time checkable assuming that the communication graph of the input execution has fixed-size biconnected components (§3.5 and §3.6);
- We perform an empirical evaluation of our algorithms on executions generated by production databases (§3.7);

Combined, these contributions form an effective algorithmic framework for the verification of transactional-consistency models. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the asymptotic complexity for most of these consistency models, despite their prevalence in practice. Additional material can be found in [18].

#### 3.2 Overview

When a client sends a transactional request to a database, typically she receives an update to the request, *e.g.* for a write request, she may receive true or false representing whether the database was able to make the changes. To process that request, the database may need to do very complicated work - there can be parallel requests or the data may need to be replicated in different locations. But to a client's perspective, the database should simply behave in a way, as if all requests are committed to the database in a *meaningful* sequence which is *consistent* to what she saw.




Table 3.1: Anomalies in database applications

Whatever the clients saw, we call it a History. Given a history, we try to see if the database behaved in a way where the *commit sequence* is *consistent* to the History. We call a history and its possible commit sequence an Execution.

When we say, the execution is consistent, we mean, the commit sequence satisfies some *criteria* with the history. A programmer may want to have all the transactions to be committed in series - Serializability. But in practical, a programmer usually only need something weak, *e.g.* Read Committed, Snapshot Isolation - but it depends on what kind of behavior the programmer expects.

Let's look at some anomalies that can happen in database applications. Alice, Bob and Charles are in a Whatsapp group. Alice asks everyone to come at 8 o'clock. Bob sees it and replies, he will be late. But as illustracted in 3.1a, Charles cannot see Alice's message but sees Bob's message and thinks Bob is saying he will be late for nothing. This anomaly is called *Causality Violation*.

Even such anomalies can happen in bank operations. Say Alice and Bob are trying to send money to Charles. Alice sends \$15 and Bob sends \$20. But as illustrated in 3.1b, Alice's deposit is lost. This anomaly is called *Lost Update*.

Suppose Alice and Bob trying to book a cinema ticket. First Alice and Bob both publish they want to book a seat and check the response of other person so that they know they have a conflict. But as illustrated in 3.1c, they can't see each other's reponse and ends up booking the same seat. This anomaly is called *Long Fork*.

Consider Amazon is giving out cashback for purchases. But it has to also check sum of total cashback is not more than \$200 before giving away a cashback. Otherwise, it may end up giving away too much cashback to make profit. So if Alice and Bob both become eligible for a cashback, as illustrated in 3.1d, even if the total cashback value crosses the limit, the situation can let both of them have the cashback. This anomaly is called *Write Skew*.

Modern databases support different levels of consistency, allowing the programmer to modify the isolation level according to her concurrent and consistency need.




Figure 3.1: Examples of transactions used to justify our simplifying assumptions (each box represents a different transaction): (a) only the last written value is observable in other transactions, (b) reads following writes to the same variable return the last written value in the same transaction, and (c) values written in aborted transactions are not observable.

First we will formally define history. Then we will define some consistency axioms and criteria over history. Then we deduce the complexity classes to verify history against respective consistency criteria. We will see Serializability, Snapshot Isolation and Prefix consistency are in NP-Complete. Then we will show for fixed number of sessions, the respective problems are in NL complexity class.

#### 3.3 Consistency Criteria

#### 3.3.1 HISTORIES

We consider a transactional database storing a set of variables  $Var = \{x, y, \ldots\}$ . Clients interact with the database by issuing transactions formed of read and write operations. Assuming an unspecified set of values Val and a set of operation identifiers Old, we let

$$\mathsf{Op} = \{^{\mathsf{rd}}[i]xv, \mathsf{write}_i(x,v) : i \in \mathsf{Old}, x \in \mathsf{Var}, v \in \mathsf{Val}\}$$

be the set of operations reading a value v or writing a value v to a variable x. We omit operation identifiers when they are not important.

**Definition 3.3.1.** A transaction  $\langle O, po \rangle$  is a finite set of operations O along with a strict total order po on O, called program order.

We use  $t, t_1, t_2, \ldots$  to range over transactions. The set of read, resp., write, operations in a transaction t is denoted by reads(t), resp., writes(t). The extension to sets of transactions is defined as usual. Also, we say that a transaction t writes a variable x, denoted by t writes x, when write $_i(x,v) \in \text{writes}(t)$  for some i and v. Similarly, a transaction t reads a variable x when t reads t variable t when t reads t variable t variable t when t reads t variable t va

To simplify the exposition, we assume that each transaction t contains at most one write operation to each variable<sup>2</sup>, and that a read of a variable x cannot be preceded by a write to x in the same transaction<sup>3</sup>. If a transaction would contain multiple writes to the same variable, then only the last one should be visible to other transactions (w.r.t. any consistency criterion considered in practice). For instance, the read(x) in Figure 3.1a should not return 1 because this is not the last

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>That is, for every transaction t, and every  $\mathsf{write}(x,v)$ ,  $\mathsf{write}(y,v') \in \mathsf{writes}(t)$ , we have that  $x \neq y$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>That is, for every transaction  $t = \langle O, \mathsf{po} \rangle$ , if  $\mathsf{write}(x, v) \in \mathsf{writes}(t)$  and there exists  ${}^\mathsf{rd} x v \in \mathsf{reads}(t)$ , then we have that  $\langle {}^\mathsf{rd} x v, \mathsf{write}(x, v) \rangle \in \mathsf{po}$ 

value written to x by the other transaction. It can return the initial value or 2. Also, if a read would be preceded by a write to the same variable in the same transaction, then it should return a value written in the same transaction (i.e., the value written by the latest write to x in that transaction). For instance, the read(x) in Figure 3.1b can only return 2 (assuming that there are no other writes on x in the same transaction). These two properties can be verified easily (in a syntactic manner) on a given execution. Beyond these two properties, the various consistency criteria used in practice constrain only the last writes to each variable in each transaction and the reads that are not preceded by writes to the same variable in the same transaction.

Consistency criteria are formalized on an abstract view of an execution called *history*. A history includes only successful or committed transactions. In the context of databases, it is always assumed that the effect of aborted transactions should not be visible to other transactions, and therefore, they can be ignored. For instance, the read(x) in Figure 3.1c should not return the value 1 written by the aborted transaction. The transactions are ordered according to a (partial) *session order* 50 which represents ordering constraints imposed by the applications using the database. Most often, so is a union of sequences, each sequence being called a *session*. We assume that the history includes a *write-read* relation that identifies the transaction writing the value returned by each read in the execution. As mentioned before, such a relation can be extracted easily from executions where each value is written at most once. Since in practice, databases are data-independent [96], i.e., their behavior does not depend on the concrete values read or written in the transactions, any potential buggy behavior can be exposed in such executions.

**Definition 3.3.2.** A history  $\langle T, so, wr \rangle$  is a set of transactions T along with a strict partial order so called session order, and a relation  $wr \subseteq T \times reads(T)$  called write-read relation, s.t.

- the inverse of wr is a total function, and if  $(t, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv) \in \mathrm{wr}$ , then write  $(x, v) \in t$ , and
- so  $\cup$  wr is acyclic.

To simplify the technical exposition, we assume that every history includes a distinguished transaction writing the initial values of all variables. This transaction precedes all the other transactions in so. We use  $h, h_1, h_2, \ldots$  to range over histories.

We say that the read operation  ${}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv$  reads value v from variable x written by t when  $(t, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv) \in \mathsf{wr}$ . For a given variable x,  $\mathsf{wr}_x$  denotes the restriction of  $\mathsf{wr}$  to reads of variable x, i.e. ,  $\mathsf{wr}_x = \mathsf{wr} \cap (T \times \{{}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv \mid v \in \mathsf{Val}\})$ . Moreover, we extend the relations  $\mathsf{wr}$  and  $\mathsf{wr}_x$  to pairs of transactions as follows:  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}$ , resp.,  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x$ , iff there exists a read operation  ${}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv \in \mathsf{reads}(t_2)$  such that  $\langle t_1, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}$ , resp.,  $\langle t_1, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}xv \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x$ . We say that the transaction  $t_1$  is  $\mathsf{read}$  by the transaction  $t_2$  when  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}$ , and that it is  $\mathsf{read}$  when it is read by some transaction  $t_2$ .

#### 3.3.2 Axiomatic Framework

We describe an axiomatic framework to characterize the set of histories satisfying a certain consistency criterion. The overarching principle is to say that a history satisfies a certain criterion if there exists a strict total order on its transactions, called *commit order* and denoted by co, which extends the write-read relation and the session order, and which satisfies certain properties. These




Figure 3.2: Definitions of consistency axioms. The reflexive and transitive, resp., transitive, closure of a relation rel is denoted by  $rel^*$ , resp.,  $rel^+$ . Also,  $\circ$  denotes the composition of two relations, i.e.,  $rel_1 \circ rel_2 = \{\langle a,b \rangle | \exists c. \langle a,c \rangle \in rel_1 \land \langle c,b \rangle \in rel_2 \}$ .




Figure 3.3: Examples of histories used to explain the axioms in Figure 3.2. For readability, the wr relation is defined by the values written in comments with each read.

properties are expressed by a set of axioms that relate the commit order with the session-order and the write-read relation in the history.

The axioms we use have a uniform shape: they define mandatory co predecessors  $t_2$  of a transaction  $t_1$  that is read in the history. For instance, the criterion called Read Committed (RC) [13] requires that every value read in the history was written by a committed transaction, and also, that the reads in the same transaction are "monotonic" in the sense that they do not return values that are older, w.r.t. the commit order, than other values read in the past<sup>4</sup>. While the first condition holds for any history (because of the surjectivity of wr), the second condition is expressed by the axiom Read Committed in Figure 3.2a. This axiom states that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_2$ , the set of transactions  $t_2$  writing  $t_2$  and read previously in the same transaction must precede  $t_1$  in commit order. For instance, Figure 3.3a shows a history and a (partial) commit order that does not satisfy this axiom because read(x) returns the value written in a transaction "older" than the transaction read in the previous read(y). An example of a history and commit order satisfying this axiom is given in Figure 3.3b.

More precisely, the axioms are first-order formulas<sup>5</sup> of the following form:

$$\forall x, \forall t_1, t_2, \forall \alpha. \ t_1 \neq t_2 \land \langle t_1, \alpha \rangle \in \mathbf{wr}_x \land t_2 \text{ writes } x \land \phi(t_2, \alpha) \Rightarrow \langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$$

where  $\phi$  is a property relating  $t_2$  and  $\alpha$  (i.e., the read or the transaction reading from  $t_1$ ) that varies from one axiom to another. Intuitively, this axiom schema states the following: in order for  $\alpha$  to read specifically  $t_1$ 's write on x, it must be the case that every  $t_2$  that also writes x and satisfies  $\phi(t_2,\alpha)$  was committed before  $t_1$ . Note that in all cases we consider,  $\phi(t_2,\alpha)$  already ensures that  $t_2$  is committed before the read  $\alpha$ , so this axiom schema ensures that  $t_2$  is furthermore committed before  $t_1$ 's write.

The axioms used throughout the paper are given in Figure 3.2. The property  $\phi$  relates  $t_2$  and  $\alpha$  using the write-read relation and the session order in the history, and the commit order.

In the following, we explain the rest of the consistency criteria we consider and the axioms defining them. Read Atomic (RA) [31] is a strengthening of Read Committed defined by the axiom Read Atomic, which states that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_3$ , the set of wr or so predecessors of  $t_3$  writing x must precede  $t_1$  in commit order. The case of wr predecessors corresponds to the Repeatable Read criterion in [13], which requires that successive reads of the same variable in the same transaction return the same value, Figure 3.3b showing a violation, and also that every read of a variable x in a transaction t returns the value written by the maximal transaction t (w.r.t. the commit order) that is read by t, Figure 3.3d showing a violation (for any commit order between the transactions on the left, either read(x) or read(y) will return a value not written by the maximal transaction). The case of so predecessors corresponds to the "read-my-writes" guarantee [90] concerning sessions, which states that a transaction t must observe previous writes in the same session. For instance, read(y) returning 1 in Figure 3.3c shows that the last transaction on the right does not satisfy this guarantee: the transaction writing 1 to y was already visible to that session before it wrote 2 to y, and therefore the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>This monotonicity property corresponds to the fact that in the original formulation of Read Committed [13], every write is guarded by the acquisition of a lock on the written variable, that is held until the end of the transaction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>These formulas are interpreted on tuples  $\langle h, co \rangle$  of a history h and a commit order co on the transactions in h as usual.

,		
Consistency model	Axioms	
Read Committed (RC)	Read Committed	
Read Atomic (RA)	Read Atomic	
Causal consistency (CC)	Causal	
Prefix consistency (PC)	Prefix	
Snapshot isolation (SI)	$Prefix \wedge Conflict$	
SERIALIZABILITY (SER)	Serializability	

Table 3.2: Consistency model definitions

value 2 should have been read. Read Atomic requires that the so predecessor of the transaction reading y be ordered in co before the transaction writing 1 to y, which makes the union co  $\cup$  wr cyclic.

The following lemma shows that for histories satisfying Read Atomic, the inverse of  $wr_x$  extended to transactions is a total function.

**Lemma 3.3.1.** Let  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle$  be a history. If  $\langle h, \mathsf{co} \rangle$  satisfies Read Atomic, then for every transaction t and two reads  ${}^{\mathsf{rd}}[i_1]xv_1, {}^{\mathsf{rd}}[i_2]xv_2 \in \mathsf{reads}(t), {}^{\mathsf{wr}^{-1}}({}^{\mathsf{rd}}[i_1]xv_1) = {}^{\mathsf{wr}^{-1}}({}^{\mathsf{rd}}[i_2]xv_2)$  and  $v_1 = v_2$ .

*Proof.* Let  $\langle t_1, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}[i_1]xv_1 \rangle$ ,  $\langle t_2, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}[i_2]xv_2 \rangle \in \mathrm{wr}_x$ . Then  $t_1, t_2$  write to x. Let us assume by contradiction, that  $t_1 \neq t_2$ . By Read Atomic,  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathrm{co}$  because  $\langle t_1, {}^{\mathrm{rd}}[i_1]xv_1 \rangle \in \mathrm{wr}_x$  and  $t_2$  writes to x. Similarly, we can also show that  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathrm{co}$ . This contradicts the fact that co is a strict total order. Therefore,  $t_1 = t_2$ . We also have that  $v_1 = v_2$  because each transaction contains a single write to x.

Causal Consistency (CC) [67] is defined by the axiom Causal, which states that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_3$ , the set of  $(\mathbf{wr} \cup \mathbf{so})^+$  predecessors of  $t_3$  writing x must precede  $t_1$  in commit order  $((\mathbf{wr} \cup \mathbf{so})^+)$  is usually called the *causal* order). A violation of this axiom can be found in Figure 3.3e: the transaction  $t_2$  writing 2 to  $\times$  is a  $(\mathbf{wr} \cup \mathbf{so})^+$  predecessor of the transaction  $t_3$  reading 1 from  $\times$  because the transaction  $t_4$ , writing 1 to  $\times$ , reads  $\times$  from  $t_2$  and  $t_3$  reads  $\times$  from  $t_4$ . This implies that  $t_2$  should precede in commit order the transaction  $t_1$  writing 1 to  $\times$ , which again, is inconsistent with the write-read relation ( $t_2$  reads from  $t_1$ ).

Prefix consistency (PC) [30] is a strengthening of CC, which requires that every transaction observes a prefix of a commit order between all the transactions. With the intuition that the observed transactions are  $wr \cup so$  predecessors, the axiom Prefix defining PC, states that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_3$ , the set of  $co^*$  predecessors of transactions observed by  $t_3$  writing x must precede  $t_1$  in commit order (we use  $co^*$  to say that even the transactions observed by  $t_3$  must precede  $t_1$ ). This ensures the prefix property stated above. An example of a PC violation can be found in Figure 3.3f: the two transactions on the bottom read from the three transactions on the top, but any serialization of those three transactions will imply that one of the combinations x=1, y=2 or x=2, y=1 cannot be produced at the end of a prefix in this serialization.

SNAPSHOT ISOLATION (SI) [13] is a strengthening of PC that disallows two transactions to observe the same prefix of a commit order if they *conflict*, i.e., write to a common variable. It is defined by the conjunction of Prefix and another axiom called Conflict, which requires that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_3$ , the set of co\* predecessors writing x of transactions conflicting with  $t_3$  and before  $t_3$  in commit order, must precede  $t_1$  in commit order. Figure 3.3g shows a Conflict violation.

Finally, Serializability (SER) [80] is defined by the axiom with the same name, which requires that for any transaction  $t_1$  writing to a variable x that is read in a transaction  $t_3$ , the set of co predecessors of  $t_3$  writing x must precede  $t_1$  in commit order. This ensures that each transaction observes the effects of all the co predecessors. Figure 3.3h shows a Serializability violation.

The next lemma states the relationship between these axioms.

**Lemma 3.3.2.** The following entailments hold:

```
\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Causal} &\Rightarrow \mathsf{Read} \ \mathsf{Atomic} \Rightarrow \mathsf{Read} \ \mathsf{Committed} \\ \mathsf{Prefix} &\Rightarrow \mathsf{Causal} \\ \mathsf{Serializability} &\Rightarrow \mathsf{Prefix} \land \mathsf{Conflict} \end{aligned}
```

*Proof.* We will show the contrapositive of each implication:

• If  $\langle h, co \rangle$  does not satisfy Read Committed, then

```
\exists x, \exists t_1, t_2, \exists \alpha, \beta . \langle t_1, \alpha \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x \wedge t_2 \text{ writes } x \wedge \langle t_2, \beta \rangle \in \operatorname{wr} \wedge \langle \beta, \alpha \rangle \in \operatorname{po} \wedge \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}.
```

Let  $t_3$  the transaction containing  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . We have that  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}$ . But then we have  $t_1, t_2, t_3$  such that  $\langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x$  and  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}$  and  $t_2$  writes x. So by Read Atomic,  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}$ . This contradicts the fact that co is a strict total order. Therefore,  $\langle h, \operatorname{co} \rangle$  does not satisfy Read Atomic.

• If  $\langle h, co \rangle$  does not satisfy Read Atomic, then

$$\exists x, \exists t_1, t_2, t_3. \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathbf{wr_x} \land t_2 \text{ writes } x \land \langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \mathbf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so} \land \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}.$$

Then  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})^+$ . Then, by Causal, we have  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$ , which contradicts the fact that  $\mathsf{co}$  is a strict total order. Therefore,  $\langle h, \mathsf{co} \rangle$  does not satisfy Causal.

• If  $\langle h, co \rangle$  does not satisfy Causal, then

$$\exists x, \exists t_1, t_2, t_3. \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathbf{wr}_x \wedge t_2 \text{ writes } x \wedge \langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in (\mathbf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})^+ \wedge \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}.$$

But,  $(\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})^+ = (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})^* \circ (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so}) \subseteq \mathsf{co}^* \circ (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})$ . Therefore,  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}^* \circ (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})$ . Then, by Prefix, we have  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$ , which contradicts the fact that co is a strict total order. Therefore,  $\langle h, \mathsf{co} \rangle$  does not satisfy Prefix.




Figure 3.4: Applying the RA and CC checking algorithms.

• If  $\langle h, co \rangle$  does not satisfy Prefix or Conflict, then

$$\exists x, \exists t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4. \ \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_{\boldsymbol{x}} \wedge t_2 \text{ writes } x \ \wedge \langle t_2, t_4 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}^* \wedge \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}$$

and

- $-\langle t_4,t_3\rangle\in\operatorname{co}\wedge t_3$  writes  $y\wedge t_3$  writes y if it violates Conflict.
- $-\langle t_4,t_3\rangle\in (\mathsf{wr}\cup\mathsf{so})$  if it violates Prefix.

In both cases, we have that  $\langle t_4, t_3 \rangle \in \text{co.}$  Because co is transitive,  $\langle t_2, t_4 \rangle \in \text{co}^*$  and  $\langle t_4, t_3 \rangle \in \text{co}$  imply that  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \text{co.}$  Then by Serializability, we have  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \text{co.}$  which contradicts the fact that co is a strict total order. Therefore,  $\langle h, \text{co} \rangle$  does not satisfy Serializability.

**Definition 3.3.3.** Given a set of axioms X defining a criterion C like in Table 3.2, a history  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle$  satisfies C iff there exists a strict total order  $\mathsf{co}$  such that  $\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so} \subseteq \mathsf{co}$  and  $\langle h, \mathsf{co} \rangle$  satisfies X.

Definition 3.3.3 and Lemma 3.3.2 imply that each consistency criterion in Table 3.2 is stronger than its predecessors (reading them from top to bottom), e.g., CC is stronger than RA and RC. This relation is known to be strict [31], e.g., RA is not stronger than CC.

# 3.4 CHECKING CONSISTENCY CRITERIA

This section establishes the complexity of checking the different consistency criteria in Table 3.2 for a given history. More precisely, we show that READ COMMITTED, READ ATOMIC, and CAUSAL CONSISTENCY can be checked in polynomial time while the problem of checking the rest of the criteria is NP-complete.

Intuitively, the polynomial time results are based on the fact that the axioms defining those consistency criteria do not contain the commit order (co) on the left-hand side of the entailment. Therefore, proving the existence of a commit order satisfying those axioms can be done using a saturation procedure that builds a "partial" commit order based on instantiating the axioms on the write-read relation and the session order in the given history. Since the commit order must be an extension of the write-read relation and the session order, it contains those two relations

```
Input: A history h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle
Output: true iff h satisfies Causal consistency

1 if \mathsf{so} \cup \mathsf{wr} is cyclic then

2 | return false;

3 \mathsf{co} \leftarrow \mathsf{so} \cup \mathsf{wr};

4 foreach x \in \mathsf{vars}(h) do

5 | foreach t_1 \neq t_2 \in T s.t. t_1 and t_2 write x do

6 | if \exists t_3 . \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x \wedge \langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in (\mathsf{so} \cup \mathsf{wr})^+ then

7 | \mathsf{co} \leftarrow \mathsf{co} \cup \{\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle\};

8 if \mathsf{co} is cyclic then

9 | return false;

10 else

11 | return true;
```

Algorithm 4: Checking Causal Consistency.

from the beginning. This saturation procedure stops when the order constraints derived this way become cyclic. For instance, let us consider applying such a procedure corresponding to RA on the histories in Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b. Applying the axiom in Figure 3.2b on the first history, since the transaction on the right reads 2 from y, we get that its  $\operatorname{wr}_x$  predecessor (i.e., the first transaction on the left) must precede the transaction writing 2 to y in commit order (the red edge). This holds because the  $\operatorname{wr}_x$  predecessor writes on y. Similarly, since the same transaction reads 1 from x, we get that its  $\operatorname{wr}_y$  predecessor must precede the transaction writing 1 to x in commit order (the blue edge). This already implies a cyclic commit order, and therefore, this history does not satisfy RA. On the other hand, for the history in Figure 3.4b, all the axiom instantiations are vacuous, i.e., the left part of the entailment is false, and therefore, it satisfies RA. Checking CC on the history in Figure 3.4c requires a single saturation step: since the transaction on the bottom right reads 1 from x, its  $\operatorname{wr}_x \circ \operatorname{wr}_y$  predecessor that writes on x (the transaction on the bottom left) must precede in commit order the transaction writing 1 to x. Since this is already inconsistent with the session order, we get that this history violates CC.

Algorithm 4 lists our procedure for checking CC. As explained above, co is initially set to  $50 \cup wr$ , and then, it is saturated with other ordering constraints implied by non-vacuous instantiations of the axiom Causal (where the left-hand side of the implication evaluates to true). The algorithms concerning RC and RA are defined in a similar way by essentially changing the test at line 6 so that it corresponds to the left-hand side of the implication in the corresponding axiom. Algorithm 4 can be rewritten as a Datalog program containing straightforward Datalog rules for computing transitive closures and relation composition, and a rule of the form<sup>6</sup>

$$\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathsf{co} : t_1 \neq t_2, \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x, \langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in (\mathsf{so} \cup \mathsf{wr})^+$$

to represent the Causal axiom. The following is a consequence of the fact that these algorithms run in polynomial time (or equivalently, the corresponding Datalog programs can be evaluated in polynomial time over a database that contains the wr and so relations in a given history).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>We write Datalog rules using a standard notation head:- body where head is a relational atom (written as  $\langle a,b\rangle\in R$  where a,b are elements and R a binary relation) and body is a list of relational atoms.




Figure 3.5: Sub-histories included in  $h_{\varphi}$  for each literal  $\lambda_{ij}$  and variable  $x_k$ .

**Theorem 3.4.1.** For any criterion  $C \in \{\text{Read Committed}, \text{Read Atomic}, \text{Causal consistency}\}$ , the problem of checking whether a given history satisfies C is polynomial time.

On the other hand, checking PC, SI, and SER is NP-complete in general. We show this using a reduction from boolean satisfiability (SAT) that covers uniformly all the three cases. In the case of SER, it provides a new proof of the NP-completeness result by [80], which uses a reduction from the so-called *non-circular* SAT and which cannot be extended to PC and SI.

**Theorem 3.4.2.** For any criterion  $C \in \{\text{Prefix Consistency}, \text{Snapshot Isolation}, \text{Serializability}\}$  the problem of checking whether a given history satisfies C is NP-complete.

*Proof.* Given a history, any of these three criteria can be checked by guessing a total commit order on its transactions and verifying whether it satisfies the corresponding axioms. This shows that the problem is in NP.

To show NP-hardness, we define a reduction from boolean satisfiability. Therefore, let  $\varphi = D_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge D_m$  be a CNF formula over the boolean variables  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$  where each  $D_i$  is a disjunctive clause with  $m_i$  literals. Let  $\lambda_{ij}$  denote the j-th literal of  $D_i$ .

We construct a history  $h_{\varphi}$  such that  $\varphi$  is satisfiable if and only if  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies PC, SI, or SER. Since SER  $\Rightarrow$  SI  $\Rightarrow$  PC, we show that (1) if  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies PC, then  $\varphi$  is satisfiable, and (2) if  $\varphi$  is satisfiable, then  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies SER.

Construction of  $h_{\varphi}$  The main idea of the construction is to represent truth values of each of the variables and literals in  $\varphi$  with the polarity of the commit order between corresponding transaction pairs. For each variable  $x_k$ ,  $h_{\varphi}$  contains a pair of transactions  $a_k$  and  $b_k$ , and for each literal  $\lambda_{ij}$ ,  $h_{\varphi}$  contains a set of transactions  $w_{ij}$ ,  $y_{ij}$  and  $z_{ij}^{7}$ . We want to have that  $x_k$  is false if and only if  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co}$ , and  $\lambda_{ij}$  is false if and only if  $\langle y_{ij}, z_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co}$  (the transaction  $w_{ij}$  is used to "synchronize" the truth value of the literals with that of the variables, which is explained later).

The history  $h_{\varphi}$  should ensure that the co ordering constraints corresponding to an assignment that falsifies the formula (*i.e.* one of its clauses) form a cycle. To achieve that, we add all pairs  $\langle z_{ij}, y_{i,(j+1)\%m_i} \rangle$  in the session order so. An unsatisfied clause  $D_i$ , *i.e.* every  $\lambda_{ij}$  is false, leads to a cycle of the form  $y_{i1} \stackrel{\text{co}}{\longrightarrow} z_{i1} \stackrel{\text{so}}{\longrightarrow} y_{i2} \stackrel{\text{co}}{\longrightarrow} z_{i2} \cdots z_{im_i} \stackrel{\text{so}}{\longrightarrow} y_{i1}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>We assume that the transactions  $a_k$  and  $b_k$  associated to a variable  $x_k$  are distinct and different from the transactions associated to another variable  $x_{k'} \neq x_k$  or to a literal  $\lambda_{ij}$ . Similarly, for the transactions  $w_{ij}$ ,  $y_{ij}$  and  $z_{ij}$  associated to a literal  $\lambda_{ij}$ .

The most complicated part of the construction is to ensure some consistency between the truth value of the literals and the truth value of the variables, e.g.,  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$  is true iff  $x_k$  is true, for at least one literal  $\lambda_{ij}$  interpreted as true in every clause  $D_i$  (if such a literal exists). Figure 3.5a shows the sub-history associated to a positive literal  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$  while Figure 3.5b shows the case of a negative literal  $\lambda_{ij} = \neg x_k$ . For a positive literal  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$  (Figure 3.5a), (1) we enrich session order with the pairs  $\langle y_{ij}, a_k \rangle$  and  $\langle b_k, w_{ij} \rangle$ , (2) we include writes to a variable  $v_{ij}$  in the transactions  $y_{ij}$  and  $z_{ij}$ , and (3) we make  $w_{ij}$  read from  $z_{ij}$ , i.e.  $\langle z_{ij}, w_{ij} \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_{v_{ij}}$ . The case of a negative literal is similar, switching the roles of  $a_k$  and  $b_k$ .

PC for  $h_{\varphi}$  implies satisfiability of  $\varphi$  — If  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies PC, then there exists a total commit order co between the transactions described above, which together with  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies Prefix. We show that the assignment of the variables  $x_k$  explained above (defined by the co order between  $a_k$  and  $b_k$ , for each k) satisfies the formula  $\varphi$ . For each clause  $D_i$ , the so constraints between the transactions  $y_{ij}$ ,  $z_{ij}$  with  $1 \leq j \leq m_i$  imply that there exist some  $z_{ij}$  that is committed before its corresponding  $y_{ij}$ . These two transactions are included in the sub-history corresponding to the literal  $\lambda_{ij}$  (Figure 3.5a or Figure 3.5b depending on the polarity of the literal).

The definition of this sub-history ensures that the interpretation to true of the literal  $\lambda_{ij}$  (given by the order in co between  $z_{ij}$  and  $y_{ij}$ ) is consistent with the assignment of the variable it contains (defined by the co order between  $a_k$ ,  $b_k$ ). More precisely, it ensures that if the co goes upwards on the left-hand side ( $\langle z_{ij}, y_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co}$ ) like in this case, then it must also go upwards on the right-hand side ( $\langle b_k, a_k \rangle \in \text{co}$  in the case of a positive literal, and  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co}$  in the case of a negative literal) to satisfy Prefix. For instance, if  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$  is a positive literal and we assume by contradiction that  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co}$ , then  $\langle y_{ij}, w_{ij} \rangle \in \text{so} \circ \text{co} \circ \text{so}$ . Therefore, for every commit order co such that  $\langle h_{\varphi}, \text{co} \rangle$  satisfies Prefix,  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co}$  implies  $\langle y_{ij}, z_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co}$ , which contradicts the hypothesis. Indeed, if  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co}$ , instantiating the Prefix axiom where  $y_{ij}$  plays the role of  $t_2$ ,  $z_{ij}$  plays the role of  $t_1$ , and  $w_{ij}$  plays the role of  $t_3$ , we obtain that  $\langle y_{ij}, z_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co}$ .

Therefore, the assignment of the variables  $x_k$  leads to at least one literal interpreted to true in each clause  $D_i$ , and the formula  $\varphi$  is satisfiable.

Satisfiability of  $\varphi$  implies SER for  $h_{\varphi}$  Let  $\gamma$  be a satisfying assignment for  $\varphi$ . Also, let co' be a binary relation that includes so and wr such that if  $\gamma(x_k) = false$ , then  $\langle a_k, b_k \rangle \in \text{co'}$ ,  $\langle y_{ij}, z_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co'}$  for each  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$ , and  $\langle z_{ij}, y_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co'}$  for each  $\lambda_{ij} = \neg x_k$ , and if  $\gamma(x_k) = true$ , then  $\langle b_k, a_k \rangle \in \text{co'}$ ,  $\langle z_{ij}, y_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co'}$  for each  $\lambda_{ij} = x_k$ , and  $\langle y_{ij}, z_{ij} \rangle \in \text{co'}$  for each  $\lambda_{ij} = \neg x_k$ . Looking at the sub-histories corresponding to literals  $\lambda_{ij}$  (Figure 3.5a or Figure 3.5b), co' goes in the same direction (upwards or downwards) on both sides.

Note that co' is acyclic: no cycle can contain  $w_{ij}$  because  $w_{ij}$  has no "outgoing" dependency (i.e. co' contains no pair with  $w_{ij}$  as a first component), there is no cycle including some pair of transactions  $a_k$ ,  $b_k$  and some pair  $y_{ij}$ ,  $z_{ij}$  because there is no way to reach  $y_{ij}$  or  $z_{ij}$  from  $a_k$  or  $b_k$ , there is no cycle including only transactions  $a_k$  and  $b_k$  because  $a_{k_1}$  and  $b_{k_1}$  are not related to  $a_{k_2}$  and  $b_{k_2}$ , for  $k_1 \neq k_2$ , there is no cycle including transactions  $y_{i_1,j_1}$ ,  $z_{i_1,j_1}$  and  $y_{i_2,j_2}$ ,  $z_{i_2,j_2}$  for  $i_1 \neq i_2$  since these are disconnected as well, and finally, there is no cycle including only transactions  $y_{ij}$  and  $z_{ij}$ , for a fixed i, because  $\varphi$  is satisfiable. It can be proved easily that the acyclic relation co' can be extended to a total commit order co which together with  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies the Serializability axiom. Therefore,  $h_{\varphi}$  satisfies SER.




Figure 3.6: Applying the serializability checking algorithm checkSER (Algorithm 5) on the serializable history on the left. The right part pictures a search for valid extensions of serializable prefixes, represented by their boundaries. The red arrow means that the search is blocked (the prefix at the target is not a valid extension), while blue arrows mean that the search continues.

# 3.5 CHECKING CONSISTENCY OF BOUNDED-WIDTH HISTORIES

In this section, we show that checking prefix consistency, snapshot isolation, and serializability becomes polynomial time under the assumption that the *width* of the given history, i.e., the maximum number of mutually-unordered transactions w.r.t. the session order, is bounded by a fixed constant. If we consider the standard case where the session order is a union of transaction sequences (modulo the fictitious transaction writing the initial values), i.e., a set of sessions, then the width of the history is the number of sessions. We start by presenting an algorithm for checking serializability that is polynomial time when the width is bounded by a fixed constant. In general, the asymptotic complexity of this algorithm is exponential in the width of the history, but this worst-case behavior is not exercised in practice as shown in Section 3.7. Then, we prove that checking prefix consistency and snapshot isolation can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of checking serializability.

# 3.5.1 CHECKING SERIALIZABILITY

We present an algorithm for checking serializability of a given history which constructs a valid commit order (satisfying Serialization), if any, by "linearizing" transactions one by one in an order consistent with the session order. At any time, the set of already linearized transactions is uniquely determined by an antichain of the session order (i.e., a set of mutually-unordered transactions w.r.t. so), and the next transaction to linearize is chosen among the immediate so successors of the transactions in this antichain. The crux of the algorithm is that the next transaction to linearize can be chosen such that it does not produce violations of Serialization in a way that does not depend on the order between the already linearized transactions. Therefore, the algorithm can be seen as a search in the space of so antichains. If the width of the history is bounded (by a fixed constant), then the number of possible so antichains is polynomial in the size of the history, which implies that the search can be done in polynomial time.

A prefix of a history  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle$  is a set of transactions  $T' \subseteq T$  such that all the so predecessors of transactions in T' are also in T', i.e.,  $\forall t \in T$ .  $\mathsf{so}^{-1}(t) \in T$ . A prefix T' is uniquely determined by the set of transactions in T' that are maximal w.r.t. so. This set of transactions forms an *antichain* of so, i.e., any two elements in this set are incomparable w.r.t. so. Given an

antichain  $\{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$  of so, we say that  $\{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$  is the *boundary* of the prefix  $T' = \{t : \exists i. \langle t, t_i \rangle \in \text{so } \forall t = t_i\}$ . For instance, given the history in Figure 3.6a, the set of transactions  $\{t_0, t_1, t_2\}$  is a prefix with boundary  $\{t_1, t_2\}$  (the latter is an antichain of the session order).

A prefix T' of a history h is called *serializable* iff there exists a *partial* commit order co on the transactions in h such that the following hold:

- co does not contradict the session order and the write-read relation in h, i.e., wr  $\cup$  so  $\cup$  co is acyclic,
- co is a total order on transactions in T',
- co orders transactions in T' before transactions in  $T \setminus T'$ , i.e.,  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \text{co}$  for every  $t_1 \in T'$  and  $t_2 \in T \setminus T'$ ,
- co does not order any two transactions  $t_1, t_2 \notin T'$
- the history h along with the commit order co satisfies the axiom defining serializability, i.e.,  $\langle h, co \rangle \models Serialization$ .

For the history in Figure 3.6a, the prefix  $\{t_0, t_1, t_2\}$  is serializable since there exists a partial commit order co that orders  $t_0$ ,  $t_1$ ,  $t_2$  in this order, and both  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  before  $t_3$  and  $t_4$ . The axiom Serialization is satisfied trivially, since the prefix contains a single transaction writing x and all the transactions outside of the prefix do not read x.

A prefix  $T' \uplus \{t\}$  of h is called a *valid extension*<sup>8</sup> of a serializable prefix T' of h, denoted by  $T' \rhd T' \uplus \{t\}$  if:

- t does not read from a transaction outside of T', i.e., for every  $t' \in T \setminus T'$ ,  $\langle t', t \rangle \notin wr$ , and
- for every variable x written by t, there exists no transaction  $t_2 \neq t$  outside of T' that reads a value of x written by a transaction  $t_1$  in T', i.e., for every x written by t and every  $t_1 \in T'$  and  $t_2 \in T \setminus (T' \uplus \{t\}), \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \not \in \mathsf{wr}$ .

For the history in Figure 3.6a, we have  $\{t_0, t_1\} \rhd \{t_0, t_1\} \uplus \{t_2\}$  because  $t_2$  reads from  $t_0$  and it does not write any variable. On the other hand  $\{t_0, t_1\} \not \rhd \{t_0, t_1\} \uplus \{t_3\}$  because  $t_3$  writes x and the transaction  $t_2$ , outside of this prefix, reads from the transaction  $t_0$  included in the prefix.

Let  $\triangleright^*$  denote the reflexive and transitive closure of  $\triangleright$ .

The following lemma is essential in proving that iterative valid extensions of the initial empty prefix can be used to show that a given history is serializable.

**Lemma 3.5.1.** For a serializable prefix T' of a history h, a prefix  $T' \uplus \{t\}$  is serializable if it is a valid extension of T'.

*Proof.* Let co' be the partial commit order for T' which satisfies the serializable prefix conditions. We extend co' to a partial order co =  $\operatorname{co'} \cup \{\langle t, t' \rangle | t' \not\in T' \uplus \{t'\}\}$ . We show that  $\langle h, \operatorname{co} \rangle \models$  Serialization. The other conditions for  $T' \uplus \{t\}$  being a serializable prefix are satisfied trivially by co.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>We assume that  $t \notin T'$  which is implied by the use of the disjoint union  $\uplus$ .

```
Input: A history h = (T, so, wr), a serializable prefix T' of h

Output: true iff T' \rhd^* h

1 if T' = T then
2 | return true;
3 foreach t \not\in T' s.t. \forall t' \not\in T'. \langle t', t \rangle \not\in wr \cup so do
4 | if T' \not\triangleright T' \uplus \{t\} then
5 | continue;
6 | if T' \uplus \{t\} \not\in seen \land checkSER(h, T' \uplus \{t\}) then
7 | return true;
8 | seen \leftarrow seen \cup \{(T' \uplus \{t\})\};
9 return false;
```

**Algorithm 5:** The algorithm checkSER for checking serializabilty. seen is a global variable storing a set of prefixes of h (which are not serializable). It is initialized as the empty set.

Assume by contradiction that  $\langle h, \mathsf{co} \rangle$  does not satisfy the axiom Serialization. Then, there exists  $t_1, t_2, t_3, x \in \mathsf{vars}(h)$  s.t.  $\langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x$  and  $t_2$  writes on x and  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle, \langle t_2, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$ . Since  $\langle h, \mathsf{co'} \rangle$  satisfies this axiom, at least one of these two co ordering constraints are of the form  $\langle t, t' \rangle$  where  $t' \not\in T' \uplus \{t\}$ :

- the case  $t_1 = t$  and  $t_2 \notin T' \uplus \{t\}$  is not possible because co' contains no pair of the form  $\langle t', \_ \rangle \in \mathsf{co'}$  with  $t' \notin T'$  (recall that  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle$  should be also included in co).
- If  $t_2 = t$  then,  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \text{co'}$  and  $\langle t_2, t_3 \rangle$  for some  $t_3 \notin T' \uplus \{t\}$ . But, by the definition of valid extension, for all variables x written by t, there exists no transaction  $t_3 \notin T' \uplus \{t\}$  such that it reads x from  $t_1 \in T'$ . Therefore, this is also a contradiction.

Algorithm 5 lists our algorithm for checking serializability. It is defined as a recursive procedure that searches for a sequence of valid extensions of a given prefix (initially, this prefix is empty) until covering the whole history. Figure 3.6b pictures this search on the history in Figure 3.6a. The right branch (containing blue edges) contains only valid extensions and it reaches a prefix that includes all the transactions in the history.

# **Theorem 3.5.1.** A history h is serializable iff checkSER $(h, \emptyset)$ returns true.

*Proof.* The "if" direction is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.5.1. For the reverse, assume that  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle$  is serializable with a (total) commit order  $\mathsf{co}$ . Let  $\mathsf{co}_i$  be the set of transactions in the prefix of  $\mathsf{co}$  of length i. Since  $\mathsf{co}$  is consistent with  $\mathsf{so}$ , we have that  $\mathsf{co}_i$  is a prefix of h, for any i. We show by induction that  $\mathsf{co}_{i+1}$  is a valid extension of  $\mathsf{co}_i$ . The base case is trivial. For the induction step, let t be the last transaction in the prefix of  $\mathsf{co}$  of length i+1. Then,

- t cannot read from a transaction outside of  $co_i$  because co is consistent with the write-read relation wr,
- also, for every variable x written by t, there exists no transaction  $t_2 \neq t$  outside of  $co_i$  that reads a value of x written by a transaction  $t_1 \in co_i$ . Otherwise,  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in wr_x$ ,  $\langle t, t_2 \rangle \in co$ , and  $\langle t_1, t \rangle \in co$  which implies that  $\langle h, co \rangle$  does not satisfy Serializability.

This implies that checkSER $(h, \emptyset)$  returns true.

Algorithm 5 enumerates prefixes of the given history h, each prefix being uniquely determined by an antichain of h containing the so-maximal transactions in that prefix. By definition, the size of each antichain of a history h is smaller than the width of h. Therefore, the number of possible antichains (prefixes) of a history h is  $O(\operatorname{size}(h)^{\operatorname{width}(h)})$  where  $\operatorname{size}(h)$ , resp., width(h), is the number of transactions, resp., the width, of h. Since the valid extension property can be checked in quadratic time, the asymptotic time complexity of the algorithm defined by checkSER is upper bounded by  $O(\operatorname{size}(h)^{\operatorname{width}(h)} \cdot \operatorname{size}(h)^3)$ . The following corollary is a direct consequence of these observations.

**Corollary 3.5.1.** For an arbitrary but fixed constant  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , the problem of checking serializability for histories of width at most k is polynomial time.

# 3.5.2 Reducing Prefix Consistency to Serializability

We describe a polynomial time reduction of checking prefix consistency of bounded-width histories to the analogous problem for serializability. Intuitively, as opposed to serializability, prefix consistency allows that two transactions read the same snapshot of the database and commit together even if they write on the same variable. Based on this observation, given a history h for which we want to check prefix consistency, we define a new history  $h_{R|W}$  where each transaction t is split into a transaction performing all the reads in t and another transaction performing all the writes in t (the history  $h_{R|W}$  retains all the session order and write-read dependencies of h). We show that if the set of read and write transactions obtained this way can be shown to be serializable, then the original history satisfies prefix consistency, and vice-versa. For instance, Figure 3.7 shows this transformation on the two histories in Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7c, which represent typical anomalies known as "long fork" and "lost update", respectively. The former is not admitted by PC while the latter is admitted. It can be easily seen that the transformed history corresponding to the "long fork" anomaly is not serializable while the one corresponding to "lost update" is serializable. We show that this transformation leads to a history of the same width, which by Corollary 3.5.1, implies that checking prefix consistency of bounded-width histories is polynomial time.

Thus, given a history  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{wr}, \mathsf{so} \rangle$ , we define the history  $h_{R|W} = \langle T', \mathsf{wr}', \mathsf{so}' \rangle$  as follows:

- T' contains a transaction  $R_t$ , called a *read* transaction, and a transaction  $W_t$ , called a *write* transaction, for each transaction t in the original history, i.e.,  $T' = \{R_t | t \in T\} \cup \{W_t | t \in T\}$
- the write transaction  $W_t$  writes exactly the same set of variables as t, i.e., for each variable x,  $W_t$  writes to x iff t writes to x.
- the read transaction  $R_t$  reads exactly the same values and the same variables as t, i.e., for each variable x,  $\mathbf{wr_x}' = \{\langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_2} \rangle | \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathbf{wr_x} \}$




Figure 3.7: Reducing PC to SER. Initially, the value of every variable is 0.

 the session order between the read and the write transactions corresponds to that of the original transactions and read transactions precede their write counterparts, i.e.,

$$\mathsf{so}' = \{ \langle R_t, W_t \rangle | t \in T \} \cup \{ \langle R_{t_1}, R_{t_2} \rangle, \langle R_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle, \langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_2} \rangle, \langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle | \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{so} \}$$

The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of the definitions.

**Lemma 3.5.2.** The histories h and  $h_{R|W}$  have the same width.

Next, we show that  $h_{R|W}$  is serializable if h is prefix consistent. Formally, we show that

$$\forall co. \exists co'. \langle h, co \rangle \models \mathsf{Prefix} \Rightarrow \langle h_{R|W}, co' \rangle \models \mathsf{Serializability}$$

Thus, let co be a commit (total) order on transactions of h which together with h satisfies the prefix consistency axiom. We define two *partial* commit orders  $\operatorname{co'}_1$  and  $\operatorname{co'}_2$ ,  $\operatorname{co'}_2$  a strengthening of  $\operatorname{co'}_1$ , which we prove that they are acyclic and that any linearization  $\operatorname{co'}$  of  $\operatorname{co'}_2$  is a valid witness for  $h_{R|W}$  satisfying serializability.

Thus, let  $co'_1$  be a partial commit order on transactions of  $h_{R|W}$  defined as follows:

$$\mathsf{co}_1' = \{\langle R_t, W_t \rangle | t \in T\} \cup \{\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle | \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}\} \cup \{\langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_2} \rangle | \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so}\}$$

We show that if  $co'_1$  were to be cyclic, then it contains a minimal cycle with one read transaction, and at least one but at most two write transactions. Then, we show that such cycles cannot exist.

# **Lemma 3.5.3.** The relation $co'_1$ is acyclic.

PROOF. We first show that if  $co'_1$  were to be cyclic, then it contains a minimal cycle with one read transaction, and at least one but at most two write transactions. Then, we show that such cycles cannot exist. Therefore, let us assume that  $co'_1$  is cyclic. Then,

- Since  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1'$  implies  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$ , for every  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , a cycle in  $\mathsf{co}_1'$  cannot contain only write transactions. Otherwise, it will imply a cycle in the original commit order  $\mathsf{co}$ . Therefore, a cycle in  $\mathsf{co}_1'$  must contain at least one read transaction.
- Assume that a cycle in  $co'_1$  contains two write transactions  $W_{t_1}$  and  $W_{t_2}$  which are not consecutive, like in Figure 3.8. Since either  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in co'_1$  or  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in co'_1$ ,




Figure 3.8: Cycles with non-consecutive write transactions.

there exists a smaller cycle in  $\operatorname{co}_1'$  where these two write transactions are consecutive. If  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1'$ , then  $\operatorname{co}_1'$  contains the smaller cycle on the lower part of the original cycle (Figure 3.8a), and if  $\langle W_{t_2}, W_{t_1} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1'$ , then  $\operatorname{co}_1'$  contains the cycle on the upper part of the original cycle (Figure 3.8b). Thus, all the write transactions in a minimal cycle of  $\operatorname{co}_1'$  must be consecutive.

- If a minimal cycle were to contain three write transactions, then all of them cannot be consecutive unless they all three form a cycle, which is not possible. So a minimal cycle contains at most two write transactions.
- Since co<sub>1</sub> contains no direct relation between read transactions, it cannot contain a cycle
  with two consecutive read transactions, or only read transactions.

This shows that a minimal cycle of  $co'_1$  would include a read transaction and a write transaction, and at most one more write transaction. We prove that such cycles are however impossible:

- if the cycle is of size 2, then it contains two transactions  $W_{t_1}$  and  $R_{t_2}$  such that  $\langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_2} \rangle \in \text{co}_1'$  and  $\langle R_{t_2}, W_{t_1} \rangle \in \text{co}_1'$ . Since all the  $\langle R_{\_}, W_{\_} \rangle$  dependencies in  $\text{co}_1'$  are of the form  $\langle R_t, W_t \rangle$ , it follows that  $t_1 = t_2$ . Then, we have  $\langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_1} \rangle \in \text{co}_1'$  which implies  $\langle t_1, t_1 \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$ , a contradiction.
- if the cycle is of size 3, then it contains three transactions  $W_{t_1}$ ,  $W_{t_2}$ , and  $R_{t_3}$  such that  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1'$ ,  $\langle W_{t_2}, R_{t_3} \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1'$ , and  $\langle R_{t_3}, W_{t_1} \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1'$ . Using a similar argument as in the previous case,  $\langle R_{t_3}, W_{t_1} \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1'$  implies  $t_3 = t_1$ . Therefore,  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}$  and  $\langle t_2, t_1 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so}$ , which contradicts the fact that  $\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so} \subseteq \mathsf{co}$ .

We define a strengthening of  $co_1'$  where intuitively, we add all the dependencies from read transactions  $t_3$  to write transactions  $t_2$  that "overwrite" values read by  $t_3$ . Formally,  $co_2' = co_1' \cup RW(co_1')$  where

$$\mathsf{RW}(\mathsf{co}_1') = \{ \langle t_3, t_2 \rangle | \exists x \in \mathsf{vars}(h). \ \exists t_1 \in T'. \ \langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \mathsf{wr}_x', \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \mathsf{co}_1', t_2 \ \mathsf{writes} \ x \}$$

It can be shown that any cycle in  ${\rm co}_2'$  would correspond to a Prefix violation in the original history. Therefore,

**Lemma 3.5.4.** The relation  $co_2'$  is acyclic.




Figure 3.9: Cycles in  $co'_2$  correspond to Prefix violations: (a) Minimal cycle in  $co'_2$ , (b) Prefix violation in  $\langle h, co \rangle$ .

*Proof.* Assume that  $co'_2$  is cyclic. Any minimal cycle in  $co'_2$  still satisfies the properties of minimal cycles of  $co'_1$  proved in Lemma 3.5.3 (because all write transactions are still totally ordered and  $co'_2$  doesn't relate directly read transactions). So, a minimal cycle in  $co'_2$  contains a read transaction and a write transaction, and at most one more write transaction.

Since  $\operatorname{Co}_1'$  is acyclic, a cycle in  $\operatorname{Co}_2'$ , and in particular a minimal one, must necessarily contain a dependency from  $\operatorname{RW}(\operatorname{co}_1')$ . Note that a minimal cycle cannot contain two such dependencies since this would imply that it contains two non-consecutive write transactions. The red edges in Figure 3.9a show a minimal cycle of  $\operatorname{co}_2'$  satisfying all the properties mentioned above. This cycle contains a dependency  $\langle R_{t_3}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \operatorname{RW}(\operatorname{co}_1')$  which implies the existence of a write transaction  $W_{t_1}$  in  $h_{R|W}$  s.t.  $\langle W_{t_1}, R_{t_3} \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x'$  and  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1'$  and  $W_{t_1}, W_{t_2}$  write on x (these dependencies are represented by the black edges in Figure 3.9a). The relations between these transactions of  $h_{R|W}$  imply that the corresponding transactions of h are related as shown in Figure 3.9b:  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_2} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1'$  and  $\langle W_{t_2}, W_{t_4} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1''$  imply  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}$  and  $\langle t_2, t_4 \rangle \in \operatorname{co}^*$ , respectively,  $\langle W_{t_1}, W_{t_3} \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x'$  implies  $\langle t_1, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x$ , and  $\langle W_{t_4}, R_{t_3} \rangle \in \operatorname{co}_1'$  implies  $\langle t_4, t_3 \rangle \in \operatorname{wr} \cup \operatorname{so}$ . This implies that  $\langle h, \operatorname{co} \rangle$  doesn't satisfy the Prefix axiom, a contradiction.

# **Lemma 3.5.5.** If a history h satisfies prefix consistency, then $h_{R|W}$ is serializable.

*Proof.* Let co' be any total order consistent with  $\operatorname{co}_2'$ . Assume by contradiction that  $\langle h_{R|W},\operatorname{co}' \rangle$  doesn't satisfy Serializability. Then, there exist  $t_1',t_2',t_3' \in T'$  such that  $\langle t_1',t_2' \rangle, \langle t_2',t_3' \rangle \in \operatorname{co}'$  and  $t_1',t_2'$  write on some variable x and  $\langle t_1',t_3' \rangle \in \operatorname{wr}_x'$ . But then  $t_1',t_2'$  are write transactions and  $\operatorname{co}_1'$  must contain  $\langle t_1',t_2' \rangle$ . Therefore,  $\operatorname{RW}(\operatorname{co}_1')$  and  $\operatorname{co}_2'$  should contain  $\langle t_3',t_2' \rangle$ , a contradiction with  $\operatorname{co}'$  being consistent with  $\operatorname{co}_2'$ .

Finally, it can be proved that any linearization co' of co'<sub>2</sub> satisfies Serializability (together with  $h_{R|W}$ ). Moreover, it can also be shown that the serializability of  $h_{R|W}$  implies that h satisfies PC. Therefore,

**Theorem 3.5.2.** A history h satisfies prefix consistency iff  $h_{R|W}$  is serializable.

PROOF. The "only-if" direction is proven by Lemma 3.5.5. For the reverse, we show that

$$\forall co'. \exists co. \langle h_{R|W}, co' \rangle \models Serializability \Rightarrow \langle h, co \rangle \models Prefix$$

Thus, let co' be a commit (total) order on transactions of  $h_{R|W}$  which together with  $h_{R|W}$  satisfies the serializability axiom. Let co be a commit order on transactions of h defined by co




Figure 3.10: Prefix violations correspond to cycles in co': (a) Prefix violation in  $\langle h, co \rangle$ , (b) Cycle in co'.

 $\{\langle t_1,t_2 \rangle | \langle W_{t_1},W_{t_2} \rangle \in \text{co}' \}$  (co is clearly a total order). If co were not to be consistent with  $\text{wr} \cup \text{so}$ , then there would exist transactions  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  such that  $\langle t_1,t_2 \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$  and  $\langle t_2,t_1 \rangle \in \text{co}$ , which would imply that  $\langle W_{t_1},R_{t_2} \rangle, \langle R_{t_2},W_{t_2} \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$  and  $\langle W_{t_2},W_{t_1} \rangle \in \text{co}'$ , which violates the acylicity of co'. We show that  $\langle h,\text{co} \rangle$  satisfies Prefix. Assume by contradiction that there exists a Prefix violation between  $t_1,t_2,t_3,t_4$  (shown in Figure 3.10a), i.e., for some  $x \in \text{vars}(h), \langle t_1,t_3 \rangle \in \text{wr}_x$  and  $t_2$  writes  $x,\langle t_1,t_2 \rangle \in \text{co}, \langle t_2,t_4 \rangle \in \text{co}^*$  and  $\langle t_4,t_3 \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$ . Then, the corresponding transactions  $W_{t_1},W_{t_2},W_{t_4},R_{t_3}$  in  $h_{R|W}$  would be related as follows:  $\langle W_{t_1},W_{t_2} \rangle \in \text{co}'$  and  $\langle W_{t_1},R_{t_3} \rangle \in \text{wr}_x'$  because  $\langle t_1,t_3 \rangle \in \text{wr}_x$  and  $\langle t_1,t_2 \rangle \in \text{co}$ . Since co' satisfies Serializability, then  $\langle R_{t_3},W_{t_2} \rangle \in \text{co}'$ . But  $\langle t_2,t_4 \rangle \in \text{co}^*$  and  $\langle t_4,t_3 \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$  imply that  $\langle W_{t_2},W_{t_4} \rangle \in \text{co}'^*$  and  $\langle W_{t_4},R_{t_3} \rangle \in \text{wr}' \cup \text{so}'$ , which show that co' is cyclic (the red cycle in Figure 3.10b), a contradiction.

Since the history  $h_{R|W}$  can be constructed in linear time, Lemma 3.5.2, Theorem 3.5.2, and Corollary 3.5.1 imply the following result.

**Corollary 3.5.2.** For an arbitrary but fixed constant  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , the problem of checking prefix consistency for histories of width at most k is polynomial time.

# 3.5.3 Reducing Snapshot Isolation to Serializability

We extend the reduction of prefix consistency to serializability to the case of snapshot isolation. Compared to prefix consistency, snapshot isolation disallows transactions that read the same snapshot of the database to commit together if they write on a common variable (stated by the Conflict axiom). More precisely, for any pair of transactions  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  writing to a common variable,  $t_1$  must observe the effects of  $t_2$  or vice-versa. We refine the definition of  $h_{R|W}$  such that any "serialization" (i.e.., commit order satisfying Serializability) disallows that the read transactions corresponding to two such transactions are ordered both before their write counterparts. We do this by introducing auxiliary variables that are read or written by these transactions. For instance, Figure 3.11 shows this transformation on the two histories in Figure 3.11a and Figure 3.11c, which represent the anomalies known as "lost update" and "write skew", respectively. The former is not admitted by SI while the latter is admitted. Concerning "lost update", the read counterpart of the transaction on the left writes to a variable x12 that is read by its write counterpart, but also written by the write counterpart of the other transaction. This forbids that the latter is serialized in between the read and write counterparts of the transaction on the left. A similar scenario is imposed on the transaction on the right, which makes that the transformed history is not seri-




Figure 3.11: Reducing SI to SER.

alizable. Concerning the "write skew" anomaly, the transformed history is exactly as for the PC reduction since the two transactions don't write on a common variable. It is clearly serializable.

For a history  $h=\langle T, \operatorname{wr}, \operatorname{so} \rangle$ , the history  $h_{R|W}^c=\langle T', \operatorname{wr}', \operatorname{so}' \rangle$  is defined as  $h_{R|W}$  with the following additional construction: for every two transactions  $t_1$  and  $t_2 \in T$  that write on a common variable,

- $R_{t_1}$  and  $W_{t_2}$  (resp.,  $R_{t_2}$  and  $W_{t_1}$ ) write on a variable  $x_{1,2}$  (resp.,  $x_{2,1}$ ),
- the write transaction of  $t_i$  reads  $x_{i,j}$  from the read transaction of  $t_i$ , for all  $i \neq j \in \{1,2\}$ , i.e.,  $\operatorname{wr}_{x_{1,2}} = \{\langle R_{t_1}, W_{t_1} \rangle\}$  and  $\operatorname{wr}_{x_{2,1}} = \{\langle R_{t_2}, W_{t_2} \rangle\}$ .

Note that  $h_{R|W}$  and  $h_{R|W}^c$  have the same width (the session order is defined exactly in the same way), which implies, by Lemma 3.5.2, that h and  $h_{R|W}^c$  have the same width.

The following result can be proved using similar reasoning as in the case of prefix consistency.

**Theorem 3.5.3.** A history h satisfies snapshot isolation iff  $h_{R|W}^c$  is serializable.

Note that  $h_{R|W}^c$  and h have the same width, and that  $h_{R|W}^c$  can be constructed in linear time. Therefore, Theorem 3.5.3, and Corollary 3.5.1 imply the following result.

**Corollary 3.5.3.** For an arbitrary but fixed constant  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , the problem of checking snapshot isolation for histories of width at most k is polynomial time.

# 3.6 Communication graphs

In this section, we present an extension of the polynomial time results for PC, SI, and SER, which allows to handle histories where the sharing of variables between different sessions is *sparse*. For the results in this section, we take the simplifying assumption that the session order is a union of transaction sequences (modulo the fictitious transaction writing the initial values), i.e., each transaction sequence corresponding to the standard notion of *session*<sup>9</sup>. We represent the sharing of variables between different sessions using an undirected graph called a *communication graph*. For instance, the communication graph of the history in Figure 3.12a is given in Figure 3.12b. For readability, the edges are marked with the variables accessed by the two sessions.

We show that the problem of checking PC, SI, or SER is polynomial time when the size of every *biconnected* component of the communication graph is bounded by a fixed constant. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The results can be extended to arbitrary session orders by considering maximal transaction sequences in session order instead of sessions.




Figure 3.12: A history and its communication graph.

is stronger than the results in Section 3.5 because the number of biconnected components can be arbitrarily large which means that the total number of sessions is unbounded. In general, we prove that the time complexity of these consistency criteria is exponential only in the maximum size of such a biconnected component, and not the whole number of sessions.

An undirected graph is biconnected if it is connected and if any one vertex were to be removed, the graph will remain connected, and a biconnected component of a graph G is a maximal biconnected subgraph of G. Figure 3.12b shows the decomposition in biconnected components of a communication graph. This graph contains 5 sessions while every biconnected component is of size at most 3. Intuitively, if a history h is a violation to some consistency criterion  $C \in \{PC, SI, SER\}$ , then there exists a projection of h on sessions from the *same* biconnected component which is also a violation to C (the reverse is trivially true). Therefore, checking any of these criteria can be done in isolation for each biconnected component (more precisely, on sub-histories that contain only sessions in the same biconnected component). Actually, this decomposition argument works even for RC, RA, and CC. For instance, in the case of the history in Figure 3.12a, any consistency criterion can be checked looking in isolation at three sub-histories: a sub-history with  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , a sub-history with  $S_2$ ,  $S_3$ , and  $S_4$ , and a sub-history with  $S_4$  and  $S_5$ .

Formally, a communication graph of a history h is an undirected graph  $\mathsf{Comm}(h) = (V, E)$  where the set of vertices V is the set of sessions  $t_0$  in  $t_0$ , and  $t_0$ , and  $t_0$  if the sessions  $t_0$  and  $t_0$  respectively, such that  $t_0$  and  $t_0$  read or write a common variable  $t_0$ .

We begin with a technical lemma showing that *minimal* paths of certain form in the graph representing a history h and a relation co (on the transactions of h) lie within a single biconnected component of the underlying communication graph. This is used to show that any consistency violation can be exposed by looking at a single biconnected component at a time. The graph representing a history h and a relation co on the transactions of h is denoted by  $G(h, co)^{11}$ .

Given a graph G(h, co) and a relation r on its vertices, a term over the relations so, wr, and co, e.g.,  $(wr \cup so)^+$ , a path of the form r (or an r-path) is a sequence of edges representing so, wr, or co dependencies as specified by the term r, e.g., a sequence of wr or so dependencies.

**Lemma 3.6.1.** Let  $B_1, ..., B_n$  be the biconnected components of  $\mathsf{Comm}(h)$  for a history  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{wr}, \mathsf{so} \rangle$ . For each  $B_i$ , let  $\mathsf{co}_i$  be a total order on the transactions of  $B_i^{12}$  extending the session order  $\mathsf{so}$  on the

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 10}{\rm The}$  transaction writing the initial values is considered as a distinguished session.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The nodes of G(h, co) correspond to transactions in h and the edges connect pairs of transactions in so, wr, or co.

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$ That is, transactions that are included in the sessions in  $B_i$ .




Figure 3.13: Minimal paths between transactions in the same biconnected component.

transactions of  $B_i$ . Also, let  $co = \bigcup_i co_i$ . Then, for every term  $r \in \{co^+, (wr \cup so)^+\}$ , any minimal r-path in the graph G(h, co) between two transactions from the same biconnected component includes only transactions of that biconnected component.

PROOF. We consider the case  $r=\operatorname{co}^+$ . Consider a  $minimal \operatorname{co}^+$ -path  $\pi=t_0,\ldots,t_n$  between two transactions  $t_0$  and  $t_n$  from the same biconnected component B of  $\operatorname{Comm}(h)$  (i.e., from sessions in B). Assume by contradiction, that  $\pi$  traverses multiple biconnected components. We define a path  $\pi_s=v_0,\ldots,v_m$  between sessions, i.e., vertices of  $\operatorname{Comm}(h)$ , which contains an edge  $(v_j,v_{j+1})$  iff  $\pi$  contains an edge  $(t_i,t_{i+1})$  with  $t_i$  a transaction of session  $v_j$  and  $t_{i+1}$  a transaction of session  $v_{j+1}\neq v_j$ . Since any graph decomposes to a forest of biconnected components, this path must necessarily leave and enter some biconnected component  $B_1$  to and from the same biconnected component  $B_2$ , i.e.,  $\pi_s$  must contain two vertices  $v_{j_1}$  and  $v_{j_2}$  in  $B_1$  such that the successor  $v_{j_1+1}$  of  $v_{j_1}$  and the predecessor  $v_{j_2-1}$  of  $v_{j_2}$  are from  $B_2$ . Let  $t_1,t_2,t_3,t_4$  be the transactions in the path  $\pi$  corresponding to  $v_{j_1},v_{j_2},v_{j_1+1}$ , and  $v_{j_2-1}$ , respectively. Now, since any two biconnected components share at most one vertex, it follows that  $t_3$  and  $t_4$  are from the same session and

- if  $\langle t_3, t_4 \rangle \in$  so, then there exists a shorter path between  $t_0$  and  $t_1$  that uses the so relation between  $\langle t_3, t_4 \rangle$  (we recall that so  $\subseteq \bigcup_i \operatorname{co}_i$ ) instead of the transactions in  $B_2$ , pictured in Figure 3.13a, which is a contradiction to the minimality of  $\pi$ ,
- if  $\langle t_4, t_3 \rangle \in \text{so}$ , then, we have a cycle in  $\bigcup_i \text{co}_i \cup \text{so}$ , pictured in Figure 3.13b, which is also a contradiction.

The case  $r = (wr \cup so)^+$  can be proved in a similar manner since the reasoning outlined in Figure 3.13 reduces to short-circuiting a path using a single so edge (and so is included in  $(wr \cup so)^+$ ).

Now we prove our final claim. For a history  $h=(T,\mathsf{so},\mathsf{wr})$  and biconnected component B of  $\mathsf{Comm}(h)$ , the projection of h over transactions in sessions of B is denoted by  $h\downarrow B$ , i.e.,  $h\downarrow B=(T',\mathsf{so}',\mathsf{wr}')$  where T' is the set of transactions in sessions of B,  $\mathsf{so}'$  and  $\mathsf{wr}'$  are the projections of  $\mathsf{so}$  and  $\mathsf{wr}$ , respectively, on T'.

**Theorem 3.6.1.** For any criterion  $C \in \{RA, RC, CC, PC, SI, SER\}$ , a history h satisfies C iff for every biconnected component B of Comm(h),  $h \downarrow B$  satisfies C.

*Proof.* The "only-if" direction is obvious. For the "if" direction, we first consider the cases  $C \in \{RA, RC, CC, SER\}$ . The proof concerning PC and SI is based on the reduction to SER outlined in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3, respectively, and it is given afterwards. Let  $B_1, \ldots, B_n$  be the biconnected components of Comm(h).

Let  $C \in \{\text{RA}, \text{RC}, \text{CC}, \text{SER}\}$ , and let  $\text{co}_i$  be the commit order that witnesses that  $h \downarrow B_i$  satisfies C, for each  $1 \leq i \leq n$ . The union  $\bigcup_i \text{co}_i$  is acyclic since otherwise, any minimal cycle would be a minimal path between transactions of the same biconnected component  $B_j$ , and, by Lemma 3.6.1, it will include only transactions of  $B_j$  which is a contradiction to  $\text{co}_j$  being a total order. We show that any linearization co of  $\bigcup_i \text{co}_i$  along with h satisfies the axioms of C. The axioms defining RA, RC, CC, and SER involve transactions that write or read a common variable, which implies that they belong to the same biconnected component (we refer to the transactions  $t_1, t_2$ , and  $t_3$  in Figure 3.2). Furthermore, by Lemma 3.6.1, minimal paths witnessing the dependencies in those axioms, e.g.,  $(\text{wr} \cup \text{so})^+$  for CC, are also formed of transactions included in the same biconnected component. Therefore, co satisfies any of those axioms provided that each  $\text{co}_i$  does.

We now consider the case where  $C=\mathrm{PC}$ . Assume that each  $B_i$  satisfies PC. Based on the reduction in Section 3.5.2, h satisfies PC iff  $h_{R|W}$  satisfies SER. Moreover, since  $h_{R|W}$  is obtained from h by splitting each transaction t into a read transaction  $R_t$  and a write transaction  $W_t$  while keeping all session order dependencies, each session in h corresponds to a session in  $h_{R|W}$  that reads or writes exactly the same set of variables. Therefore,  $\mathrm{Comm}(h)$  is isomorphic to  $\mathrm{Comm}(h_{R|W})$ . Since  $B_i$  satisfies PC, we get that the corresponding biconnected component  $B_i'$  of  $\mathrm{Comm}(h_{R|W})$  satisfies SER, for every i. Therefore,  $h_{R|W}$  satisfies SER, which implies that h satisfies PC. The case of SI is proved in a similar way using the reduction to the serializability of  $h_{R|W}^c$  presented in Section 3.5.3 (note that two transactions of  $h_{R|W}^c$  may read or write an additional common variable only if they were writing a common variable in the original history and therefore,  $\mathrm{Comm}(h)$  is still isomorphic to  $\mathrm{Comm}(h_{R|W}^c)$ ).

Since the decomposition of a graph into biconnected components can be done in linear time, Theorem 3.6.1 implies that any of the criteria PC, SI, or SER can be checked in time  $O(\operatorname{size}(h)^{\operatorname{bi-size}(h)} \cdot \operatorname{size}(h)^3 \cdot \operatorname{bi-nb}(h))$  where  $\operatorname{bi-size}(h)$  and  $\operatorname{bi-nb}(h)$  are the maximum size of a biconnected component in  $\operatorname{Comm}(h)$  and the number of biconnected components of  $\operatorname{Comm}(h)$ , respectively. The following corollary is a direct consequence of this observation.

**Corollary 3.6.1.** For an arbitrary but fixed constant  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and any criterion  $C \in \{PC, SI, SER\}$ , the problem of checking if a history h satisfies C is polynomial time, provided that the size of every biconnected component of Comm(h) is bounded by k.

# 3.7 Experimental Evaluation

To demonstrate the practical value of the theory developed in the previous sections, we argue that our algorithms:

- are efficient and scalable,
- enable an effective testing framework allowing to expose consistency violations in production databases.




Figure 3.14: Scalability of our algorithm for checking Serializability (Algorithm 5) with comparison to a SAT encoding. The x-axis represents the varying parameter while the y-axis represents the wall-clock time in logarithmic scale. The circular, resp., triangular, dots represent wall-clock times of our algorithm, resp., the SAT encoding. The red, green, and blue dots represent invalid, valid and resource-exhausted instances, respectively.

We focus on three of the criteria introduced in Section 3.3: serializability which is NP-complete in general and polynomial time when the number of sessions is considered to be a constant, snapshot isolation which can be reduced in linear time to serializability, and causal consistency which is polynomial time in general. As benchmark, we consider histories extracted from three distributed databases: CockroachDB [34], Galera [49], and AntidoteDB [7]. Following the approach in Jepsen [62], histories are generated with random clients. For the experiments described hereafter, the randomization process is parametrized by: (1) the number of sessions (#sess), (2) the number of transactions per session (#trs), (3) the number of operations per transaction (#ops), and (4) an upper bound on the number of used variables (#vars)<sup>13</sup>. For any valuation of these parameters, half of the histories generated with CockroachDB and Galera are restricted such that the sets of variables written by any two sessions are disjoint (the sets of read variables are not constrained). This restriction is used to increase the frequency of valid histories.

In a first experiment, we investigated the efficiency of our serializability-checking algorithm (Algorithm 5) and we compared its performance with a direct SAT encoding<sup>14</sup> of the serializability definition in Section 3.3 (we used MiniSAT [40] to solve the SAT queries). We used histories

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>We ensure that every value is written at most once.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For each ordered pair of transactions  $t_1, t_2$  we add two propositional variables representing  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in (\text{wr} \cup \text{so})^+$  and  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in (\text{co}, \text{respectively})$ . Then we generate clauses corresponding to: (1) singleton clauses defining the relation  $\text{wr} \cup \text{so}$  (extracted from the input history), (2)  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in \text{wr} \cup \text{so}$  implies  $\langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \in (\text{co}, (3))$  co being a total order, and (4) the axioms corresponding to the considered consistency model. This is an optimization that does not encode wr and so separately, which is sound because of the shape of our axioms (and because these relations are fixed apriori).




Figure 3.15: Scalability of our algorithms for checking SNAPSHOT ISOLATION (Section 3.5.3) and CAUSAL CONSISTENCY (Algorithm 4) with comparison to a SAT encoding. The x-axis represents the varying parameter while the y-axis represents the wall-clock time in logarithmic scale. The circular, resp., triangular, dots represent wall-clock times of our algorithm, resp., the SAT encoding. The red, green, and blue dots represent invalid, valid and resource-exhausted instances, respectively.

extracted from CockroachDB which claims to implement serializability, acknowledging however the possibility of anomalies [35]. The sessions of a history are uniformly distributed among 3 nodes of a single cluster. To evaluate scalability, we fix a reference set of parameter values: #sess=6, **#trs**=30, **#ops**=20, and **#vars** =  $60 \times$  **#sess**, and vary only one parameter at a time. For instance, the number of sessions varies from 3 to 15 in increments of 3. We consider 100 histories for each combination of parameter values. The experimental data is reported in Figure 3.14. Our algorithm scales well even when increasing the number of sessions, which is not guaranteed by its worst-case complexity (in general, this is exponential in the number of sessions). Also, our algorithm is at least two orders of magnitude more efficient than the SAT encoding. While the performance of SAT solvers is known to be heavily affected by the specific encoding of the problem, we strove to make the SAT formula as succinct as possible and optimize its construction. We have fixed a 10 minutes timeout, a limit of 10GB of memory, and a limit of 10GB on the files containing the formulas to be passed to the SAT solver. The blue dots represent resource-exhausted instances. The SAT encoding reaches the file limit for 148 out of 200 histories with at least 12 sessions (Figure 3.14a) and for 50 out of 100 histories with 60 transactions per session (Figure 3.14b), the other parameters being fixed as explained above.

We have found a large number of violations, whose frequency increases with the number of sessions, transactions per session, or operations per transaction, and decreases when allowing more variables. This is expected since increasing any of the former parameters increases the chance of interference between different transactions while increasing the latter has the opposite effect. The second and third column of Table 3.3 give a more precise account of the kind of violations we found by identifying for each criterion X, the number of histories that violate X but no other criterion weaker than X, e.g., there is only one violation to SI that satisfies PC.

The second experiment measures the scalability of the SI checking algorithm obtained by applying the reduction to SER described in Section 3.5.3 followed by the SER checking algorithm in Algorithm 5, and its performance compared to a SAT encoding of SI. Actually, the reduction to SER is performed on-the-fly, while traversing the history and checking for serializability (of the transformed history). The SAT encoding follows the same principles as in the case of seri-

Witteen by any two sessions are disjoint.						
	Serializability checking		Snapshot Isolation checking			
Weakest	CockroachDB	CockroachDB	Galera	Galera		
criterion violated	(disjoint writes)	(no constraints)	(disjoint writes)	(no constraints)		
Read Committed			19	50		
Read Atomic	180	547	91	139		
Causal Consistency	339	382	88	43		
Prefix Consistency	2	7				
Snapshot Isolation		1		1		
Serializability	25					
Total number of violations	546/1000	937/1000	198/250	233/250		

Table 3.3: Violation statistics. The "disjoint writes" columns refer to histories where the set of variables written by any two sessions are disjoint.

alizability. We focus on its behavior when increasing the number of sessions (varying the other parameters leads to similar results). As benchmark, we used the same CockroachDB histories as in Figure 3.14a and a number of histories extracted from Galera<sup>15</sup> whose documentation contains contradicting claims about whether it implements snapshot isolation [50, 51]. We use 100 histories per combination of parameter values as in the previous experiment. The results are reported in Figure 3.15a and Figure 3.15b. We observe the same behavior as in the case of SER. In particular, the SAT encoding reaches the file limit for 150 out of 200 histories with at least 12 sessions in the case of the CockroachDB histories, and for 162 out of 300 histories with at least 9 sessions in the case of the Galera histories. The last two columns in Table 3.3 classify the set of violations depending on the weakest criterion that they violate.

We also evaluated the performance of the CC checking algorithm in Section 3.4 when increasing the number of sessions, on histories extracted from AntidoteDB, which claims to implement causal consistency [8]. The results are reported in Figure 3.15c. In this case, the SAT encoding reaches the file limit for 150 out of 300 histories with at least 9 sessions. All the histories considered in this experiment are valid. However, when experimenting with other parameter values, we have found several violations. The smallest parameter values for which we found violations were 3 sessions, 14 transactions per session, 14 operations per transaction, and 5 variables. The violations we found are also violations of Read Atomic. For instance, one of the violations contains two transactions  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , each of them writing to two variables  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , and another transaction  $t_3$  that reads  $t_1$  from  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  from  $t_2$  ( $t_1$  and  $t_2$  are from different sessions while  $t_3$  is an so successor of  $t_1$  in the same session). These violations are novel and they were confirmed by the developers of AntidoteDB.

The refinement of the algorithms above based on communication graphs, described in Section 3.6, did not have a significant impact on their performance. The histories we generated contained few biconnected components (many histories contained just a single biconnected component) which we believe is due to our proof of concept deployment of these databases on a single machine that did not allow to experiment with very large number of sessions and variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>In order to increase the frequency of valid histories, all sessions are executed on a single node.

# 3.8 Related Work

[31] give the first formalization of the criteria we consider in this paper, using the specification methodology of [29]. This formalization uses two auxiliary relations, a *visibility* relation which represents the fact that a transaction "observes" the effects of another transaction and a *commit order*, also called arbitration order, like in our case. Executions are abstracted using a notion of history that includes only a session order and the adherence to some consistency criterion is defined as the existence of a visibility relation and a commit order satisfying certain axioms. Motivated by practical goals, our histories include a write-read relation, which enables more uniform and in our opinion, more intuitive, axioms to characterize consistency criteria. Our formalizations are however equivalent with those of [31] (a formal proof of this equivalence is presented in the extended version of this paper [18]). Moreover, [31] do not investigate algorithmic issues as in our paper.

[80] showed that checking serializability of an execution is NP-complete. Moreover, it identifies a stronger criterion called *conflict serializability* which is polynomial-time checkable. Conflict serializability assumes that histories are given as sequences of operations and requires that the commit order be consistent with a *conflict-order* between transactions defined based on this sequence (roughly, a transaction  $t_1$  is before a transaction  $t_2$  in the conflict order if it accesses some variable x before  $t_2$  does). This result is not applicable to distributed databases where deriving such a sequence between operations submitted to different nodes in a network is impossible.

[21] showed that checking several variations of causal consistency on executions of a *non-transactional* distributed database is polynomial time (they also assume that every value is written at most once). Assuming singleton transactions, our notion of CC corresponds to the causal convergence criterion in [21]. Therefore, our result concerning CC can be seen as an extension of this result concerning causal convergence to transactions.

There are some works that investigated the problem of checking consistency criteria like sequential consistency and linearizability in the case of shared-memory systems. [54] showed that checking linearizability of the single-value register type is NP-complete in general, but polynomial time for executions where every value is written at most once. Using a reduction from serializability, they showed that checking sequential consistency is NP-complete even when every value is written at most once. [42] extended the result concerning linearizability to a series of abstract data types called collections, that includes stacks, queues, key-value maps, etc. Sequential consistency reduces to serializability for histories with singleton transactions (i.e., formed of a single read or write operation). Therefore, our polynomial-time result for checking serializability of bounded-width histories (Corollary 3.5.1) implies that checking sequential consistency of histories with a bounded number of threads is polynomial time. The latter result has been established independently by [2].

The notion of *communication graph* is inspired by the work of [33], which investigates partial-order reduction (POR) techniques for multi-threaded programs. In general, the goal of partial-order reduction [48] is to avoid exploring executions which are equivalent w.r.t. some suitable notion of equivalence, e.g., Mazurkiewicz trace equivalence [73]. They use the acyclicity of communication graphs to define a class of programs for which their POR technique is optimal. The algorithmic issues they explore are different than ours and they don't investigate biconnected components of this graph as in our results.

# 4 Applications implemented on Distributed Datastores

# 4.1 Introduction

Data storage is no longer about writing data to a single disk with a single point of access. Modern applications require not just data reliability, but also high-throughput concurrent accesses. Applications concerning supply chains, banking, etc. use traditional relational databases for storing and processing data, whereas applications such as social networking software and e-commerce platforms use cloud-based storage systems (such as Azure CosmosDb [82], Amazon DynamoDb [38], Facebook TAO [23], etc.). We use the term *storage system* in this paper to refer to any such database system/service.

Providing high-throughput processing, unfortunately, comes at an unavoidable cost of weak-ening the guarantees offered to users. Concurrently-connected clients may end up observing different views of the same data. These "anomalies" can be prevented by using a strong *isolation level* such as *serializability*, which essentially offers a single view of the data. However, serializability requires expensive synchronization and incurs a high performance cost. As a consequence, most storage systems use weaker isolation levels, such as *Causal Consistency* [5, 67, 69], *Snapshot Isolation* [13], *Read Committed* [13], etc. for better performance. In a recent survey of database administrators [81], 86% of the participants responded that most or all of the transactions in their databases execute at read committed isolation level.

A weaker isolation level allows for more possible behaviors than stronger isolation levels. It is up to the developers then to ensure that their application can tolerate this larger set of behaviors. Unfortunately, weak isolation levels are hard to understand or reason about [3, 24] and resulting application bugs can cause loss of business [94]. Consider a simple shopping cart application that stores a per-client shopping cart in a key-value store (key is the client ID and value is a multiset of items). Figure 4.1 shows procedures for adding an item to the cart (AddItem) and deleting all instances of an item from the cart (DeleteItem). Each procedure executes in a transaction, represented by the calls to Begin and Commit. Suppose that initially, a user u has a single instance of item I in their cart. Then the user connects to the application via two different sessions (for instance, via two browser windows), adds I in one session (AddItem(I, u)) and deletes I in the other session (DeleteItem(I, u)). With serializability, the cart can either be left in the state  $\{I\}$ (delete happened first, followed by the add) or  $\emptyset$  (delete happened second). However, with causal consistency (or read committed), it is possible that with two sequential reads of the shopping cart, the cart is empty in the first read (signaling that the delete has succeeded), but there are twoinstances of I in the second read! Such anomalies, of deleted items reappearing, have been noted in previous work [38].

```
// Append item to cart
                                        // Fetch cart and delete item
AddItem(item i, userId) {
                                       DeleteItem(item i. userId) {
  Begin()
                                          Begin()
  key = "cart:" + userId
                                          key = "cart:" + userId
  cart = read(key)
                                           cart = read(key)
  cart.append(i)
                                           cart.remove(i)
  write(key, cart)
                                           write(key, cart)
  Commit()
                                           Commit()
                                         3
              Initial state
              \mathsf{write}(\mathsf{cart} : u, \{ .. I .. \})
                                       DeleteItem
      cart: u\{..I..\}
                                 ^{\mathrm{l}}cart:u\{..I..\}
                                                             ^{\mathrm{rd}}cart:u\{\ldots\}
        po 🖡
                                    po↓
\mathsf{write}(\mathsf{cart} : u, \{...I, I...\})
                             write(cart: u, \{....\})
                                                                 so.
                                                            ^{\text{rd}}cart:u\{..I,I.\}
```

Figure 4.1: A simple shopping cart service.

Testing storage-based applications This paper addresses the problem of *testing* code for correctness against weak behaviors: a developer should be able to write a test that runs their application and then asserts for correct behavior. The main difficulty today is getting coverage of weak behaviors during the test. If one runs the test against the actual production storage system, it is very likely to only result in serializable behaviors because of their optimized implementation. For instance, only 0.0004% of all reads performed on Facebook's TAO storage system were not serializable [71]. Emulators, offered by cloud providers for local development, on the other hand, do not support weaker isolation levels at all [9]. Another option, possible when the storage system is available open-source, is to set it up with a tool like Jepsen [62] to inject noise (bring down replicas or delay packets on the network). This approach is unable to provide good coverage at the level of client operations [85] (§4.7). Another line of work has focussed on finding anomalies by identifying non-serializable behavior (§4.8). Anomalies, however, do not always correspond to bugs [25, 52]; they may either not be important (e.g., gather statistics) or may already be handled in the application (e.g., checking and deleting duplicate items).

We present MonkeyDB, a mock in-memory storage system meant for testing correctness of storage-backed applications. MonkeyDB supports common APIs for accessing data (key-value updates, as well as SQL queries), making it an easy substitute for an actual storage system. MonkeyDB can be configured with one of several isolation levels. On a read operation, MonkeyDB computes the set of all possible return values allowed under the chosen isolation level, and randomly returns one of them. The developer can then simply execute their test multiple times to get coverage of possible weak behaviors. For the program in Figure 4.1, if we write a test asserting that two sequential reads cannot return empty-cart followed by  $\{I,I\}$ , then it takes only 20 runs of the test (on average) to fail the assert. In contrast, the test does not fail when using MySQL with read committed, even after 100k runs.

Design of MonkeyDB MonkeyDB does not rely on stress generation, fault injection, or data replication. Rather, it works directly with a formalization of the given isolation level in order to compute allowed return values.

The theory behind MonkeyDB builds on the axiomatic definitions of isolation levels introduced by Biswas et al. [17]. These definitions use logical constraints (called *axioms*) to characterize the set of executions of a key-value store that conform to a particular isolation level (we discuss SQL queries later). These constraints refer to a specific set of relations between events/transactions in an execution that describe control-flow or data-flow dependencies: a program order pobetween events in the same transaction, a session order 50 between transactions in the same session<sup>1</sup>, and a write-read wr (read-from) relation that associates each read event with a transaction that writes the value returned by the read. These relations along with the events (also called, operations) in an execution are called a *history*. The history corresponding to the shopping cart anomaly explained above is given on the bottom of Figure 4.1. Read operations include the read value, and boxes group events from the same transaction. A history describes only the interaction with the key-value store, omitting application side events (e.g., computing the value to be written to a key).

MonkeyDB implements a *centralized* operational semantics for key-value stores, which is based on these axiomatic definitions. Transactions are executed *serially*, one after another, the concurrency being simulated during the handling of read events. This semantics maintains a history that contains all the past events (from all transactions/sessions), and write events are simply added to the history. The value returned by a read event is established based on a non-deterministic choice of a write-read dependency (concerning this read event) that satisfies the axioms of the considered isolation level. Depending on the weakness of the isolation level, this makes it possible to return values written in arbitrarily "old" transactions, and simulate any concurrent behavior. For instance, the history in Figure 4.1 can be obtained by executing AddItem, DeleteItem, and then the two reads (serially). The read in DeleteItem can take its value from the initial state and "ignore" the previously executed AddItem, because the obtained history validates the axioms of causal consistency (or read committed). The same happens for the two later reads in the same session, the first one being able to read from DeleteItem and the second one from AddItem.

We formally prove that this semantics does indeed simulate any concurrent behavior, by showing that it is equivalent to a semantics where transactions are allowed to interleave. In comparison with concrete implementations, this semantics makes it possible to handle a wide range of isolation levels in a uniform way. It only has two sources of non-determinism: the order in which entire transactions are submitted, and the choice of write-read dependencies in read events. This enable better coverage of possible behaviors, the penalty in performance not being an issue in safety testing workloads which are usually small (see our evaluation).

We also extend our semantics to cover SQL queries as well, by compiling SQL queries down to transactions with multiple key-value reads/writes. A table in a relational database is represented using a set of primary key values (identifying uniquely the set of rows) and a set of keys, one for each cell in the table. The set of primary key values is represented using a set of Boolean key-value pairs that simulate its characteristic function (adding or removing an element corresponds to updating one of these keys to true or false). Then, SQL queries are compiled to read or write accesses to the keys representing a table. For instance, a SELECT query that retrieves the set of rows in a table that satisfy a WHERE condition is compiled to (1) reading Boolean keys to identify the primary key values of the rows contained in the table, (2) reading keys that represent columns used in the WHERE condition, and (3) reading all the keys that represent cells in a row satisfying

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>A session is a sequential interface to the storage system. It corresponds to what is also called a connection.

```
k \in \mathsf{Keys} \quad x \in \mathsf{Vars} \quad tab \in \mathbb{T} \quad \vec{c}, \vec{c_1}, \vec{c_2} \in \mathbb{C}^* \mathsf{Prog} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Sess} \mid \mathsf{Sess} \mid \mathsf{Prog} \mathsf{Sess} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Trans} \mid \mathsf{Trans}; \mathsf{Sess} \mathsf{Trans} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{begin}; \mathsf{Body}; \mathsf{commit} \mathsf{Body} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Instr} \mid \mathsf{Instr}; \mathsf{Body} \mathsf{Instr} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{Instr} \mathsf{KV} \mid \mathsf{InstrSQL} \mid x := e \mid \mathsf{if}(\phi(\vec{x})) \{\mathsf{Instr}\} \mathsf{InstrKV} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} x := \mathsf{read}(k) \mid \mathsf{write}(k, x) \mathsf{InstrSQL} \overset{\mathsf{def}}{=} \mathsf{SELECT} \vec{c_1} \mathsf{AS} x \mathsf{FROM} tab \mathsf{ WHERE} \phi(\vec{c_2}) \mid \mathsf{INSERT} \mathsf{INTO} tab \mathsf{ VALUES} \vec{x} \mid \mathsf{DELETE} \mathsf{FROM} tab \mathsf{ WHERE} \phi(\vec{c_2}) \mathsf{UPDATE} tab \mathsf{SET} \vec{c_1} = \vec{x} \mathsf{ WHERE} \phi(\vec{c_2})
```

Figure 4.2: Program syntax. The set of all keys is denoted by Keys, Vars denotes the set of local variables,  $\mathbb T$  the set of table names, and  $\mathbb C$  the set of column names. We use  $\phi$  to denote Boolean expressions, and e to denote expressions interpreted as values. We use  $\vec{\cdot}$  to denote vectors of elements.

the WHERE condition. This rewriting contains the minimal set of accesses to the cells of a table that are needed to ensure the conventional specification of SQL. It makes it possible to "export" formalizations of key-value store isolation levels to SQL transactions.

# CONTRIBUTIONS This paper makes the following contributions:

- We define an operational semantics for key-value stores under various isolation levels, which simulates all concurrent behaviors with executions where transactions execute serially (§4.3) and which is based on the axiomatic definitions in [17] (and outlined in §3.3),
- We broaden the scope of the key-value store semantics to SQL transactions using a compiler that rewrites SQL queries to key-value accesses (§4.4),
- The operational semantics and the SQL compiler are implemented in a tool called MonkeyDB (§4.5). It randomly resolves possible choices to provide coverage of weak behaviors.
   It supports both a key-value interface as well as SQL, making it readily compatible with any storage-backed application.
- We present an evaluation of MonkeyDB on several applications, showcasing its superior coverage of weak behaviors as well as bug-finding abilities (§4.6, §4.7).<sup>2</sup>

# 4.2 Programming Language

Figure 4.2 lists the definition of two simple programming languages that we use to represent applications running on top of Key-Value or SQL stores, respectively. A program is a set of *sessions* running in parallel, each session being composed of a sequence of *transactions*. Each transaction is delimited by begin and commit instructions<sup>3</sup>, and its body contains instructions that access the store, and manipulate a set of local variables Vars ranged over using  $x, y, \ldots$ 

In case of a program running on top of a Key-Value store, the instructions can be reading the value of a key and storing it to a local variable x ( $x := \mathtt{read}(k)$ ), writing the value of a local variable x to a key (write(k, x)), or an assignment to a local variable x. The set of values of keys or local variables is denoted by Vals. Assignments to local variables use expressions interpreted as values whose syntax is left unspecified. Each of these instructions can be guarded by a Boolean condition  $\phi(\vec{x})$  over a set of local variables  $\vec{x}$  (their syntax is not important). Other constructs like while loops can be defined in a similar way. Let  $\mathcal{P}_{KV}$  denote the set of programs where a transaction body can contain only such instructions.

For programs running on top of SQL stores, the instructions include simplified versions of standard SQL instructions and assignments to local variables. These programs run in the context of a *database schema* which is a (partial) function  $\mathcal{S}:\mathbb{T} \to 2^{\mathbb{C}}$  mapping table names in  $\mathbb{T}$  to sets of column names in  $\mathbb{C}$ . The SQL store is an *instance* of a database schema  $\mathcal{S}$ , i.e., a function  $\mathcal{D}:$  dom $(\mathcal{S}) \to 2^{\mathbb{R}}$  mapping each table tab in the domain of  $\mathcal{S}$  to a set of *rows* of tab, i.e., functions  $r:\mathcal{S}(tab) \to \mathsf{Vals}$ . We use  $\mathbb{R}$  to denote the set of all rows. The SELECT instruction retrieves the columns  $\vec{c_1}$  from the set of rows of tab that satisfy  $\phi(\vec{c_2})$  ( $\vec{c_2}$  denotes the set of columns used in this Boolean expression), and stores them into a variable x. INSERT adds a new row to tab with values  $\vec{x}$ , and DELETE deletes all rows from tab that satisfy a condition  $\phi(\vec{c})$ . The UPDATE instruction assigns the columns  $\vec{c_1}$  of all rows of tab that satisfy  $\phi(\vec{c_2})$  with values in  $\vec{x}$ . Let  $\mathcal{P}_{SQL}$  denote the set of programs where a transaction body can contain only such instructions.

# 4.3 Operational Semantics for $\mathcal{P}_{KV}$

We define a small-step operational semantics for Key-Value store programs, which is parametrized by an isolation level I. Transactions are executed *serially* one after another, and the values returned by read operations are decided using the axiomatic definition of I. The semantics maintains a history of previously executed operations, and the value returned by a read is chosen non-deterministically as long as extending the current history with the corresponding write-read dependency satisfies the axioms of I. We show that this semantics is sound and complete for any natural isolation level I, i.e., it generates precisely the same set of histories as a *baseline* semantics where transactions can interleave arbitrarily and the read operations can return arbitrary values as long as they can be proved to be correct at the end of the execution.

### 4.3.1 Definition of the Operational Semantics

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Source code of our benchmarks is available as supplementary material.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>For simplicity, we assume that all the transactions in the program commit. Aborted transactions can be ignored when reasoning about safety because their effects should be invisible to other transactions.

# 4 Applications implemented on Distributed Datastores




Figure 4.3: The Causal semantics on the program in (a), assuming that the transaction on the left is scheduled first.

We use the program in Figure 4.3a to give an overview of our semantics, assuming Causal Consistency. This program has two concurrent transactions whose reads can both return the initial value 0, which is not possible under Serializability.

Our semantics executes transactions in their entirety one after another (without interleaving them), maintaining a history that contains all the executed operations. We assume that the transaction on the left executes first. Initially, the history contains a fictitious transaction log that writes the initial value 0 to all keys, and that will precede all the transaction logs created during the execution in session order.

Executing a write instruction consists in simply appending the corresponding write operation to the log of the current transaction. For instance, executing the first write (and begin) in our example results in adding a transaction log that contains a write operation (see Figure 4.3b). The execution continues with the read instruction from the same transaction, and it cannot switch to the other transaction.

The execution of a read instruction consists in choosing non-deterministically a write-read dependency that validates Causal when added to the current history. In our example, executing  $read(k_2)$  results in adding a write-read dependency from the transaction log writing initial values, which determines the return value of the read (see Figure 4.3c). This choice makes the obtained history satisfy Causal.

The second transaction executes in a similar manner. When executing its read instruction, the chosen write-read dependency is again related to the transaction log writing initial values (see Figure 4.3d). This choice is valid under Causal. Since a read must not read from the preceding transaction, this semantics is able to simulate all the "anomalies" of a weak isolation level (this execution being an example).

Formally, the operational semantics is defined as a transition relation  $\Rightarrow_I$  between *configurations*, which are defined as tuples containing the following:

- history h storing the operations executed in the past,
- identifier *j* of the current session,
- local variable valuation  $\gamma$  for the current transaction,

$$\begin{split} & t \text{ fresh } \quad \mathsf{P}(j) = \mathsf{begin}; \mathsf{Body}; \mathsf{commit}; \mathsf{S} \\ \hline h_{-,-,-}\epsilon, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h \oplus_j \langle t, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle, j, \emptyset, \mathsf{Body}, \mathsf{P}[j \mapsto \mathsf{S}] \\ \\ & \frac{\varphi(\vec{x})[x \mapsto \gamma(x) : x \in \vec{x}] \text{ true}}{h, j, \gamma, \text{ if } (\phi(\vec{x})) \{\mathsf{Instr}\}; \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{Instr}; \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{\mathsf{IF-FALSE}}{h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{if} (\phi(\vec{x})) \{\mathsf{Instr}\}; \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{\mathsf{WRITE}}{h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{if} (\phi(\vec{x})) \{\mathsf{Instr}\}; \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{\mathsf{V} = \gamma(x) \quad i \text{ fresh}}{h, j, \gamma, \mathsf{write}(k, x); \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h \oplus_j \mathsf{write}_i(k, v), j, \gamma, \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{\mathsf{READ-LOCAL}}{h, j, \gamma, x := \mathsf{read}(k); \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h \oplus_j \mathsf{rd}[i]kv, j, \gamma[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{h = (T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr})}{h, j, \gamma, x := \mathsf{read}(k); \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h \oplus_j \mathsf{rd}[i]kv, j, \gamma[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \}} \\ & \frac{t \text{ fresh}}{h' = (h \oplus_j \mathsf{rd}[i]kv) \oplus \mathsf{wr}(t', \mathsf{rd}[i]kv) \quad h' \text{ satisfies } I}}{h, j, \gamma, x := \mathsf{read}(k); \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow_I h', j, \gamma[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{P}} \end{aligned}$$

Figure 4.4: Operational semantics for  $\mathcal{P}_{KV}$  programs under isolation level I. For a function  $f:A \rightharpoonup B$ ,  $f[a \mapsto b]$  denotes the function  $f':A \rightharpoonup B$  defined by f'(c)=f(c), for every  $c \neq a$  in the domain of f, and f'(a)=b.

- code B that remains to be executed from the current transaction, and
- sessions/transactions P that remain to be executed from the original program.

For readability, we define a program as a partial function  $P: SessId \rightarrow Sess$  that associates session identifiers in SessId with concrete code as defined in Figure 4.2 (i.e., sequences of transactions). Similarly, the session order so in a history is defined as a partial function so: SessId  $\rightarrow$  Tlogs\* that associates session identifiers with sequences of transaction logs. Two transaction logs are ordered by so if one occurs before the other in some sequence so(j) with  $j \in SessId$ .

Before presenting the definition of  $\Rightarrow_I$ , we introduce some notation. Let h be a history that contains a representation of so as above. We use  $h \oplus_j \langle t, O, \mathsf{po} \rangle$  to denote a history where  $\langle t, O, \mathsf{po} \rangle$  is appended to  $\mathsf{so}(j)$ . Also, for an operation  $o, h \oplus_j o$  is the history obtained from h by adding o to the last transaction log in  $\mathsf{so}(j)$  and as a last operation in the program order of this log (i.e., if  $\mathsf{so}(j) = \sigma; \langle t, O, \mathsf{po} \rangle$ , then the session order  $\mathsf{so}'$  of  $h \oplus_j o$  is defined by  $\mathsf{so}'(k) = \mathsf{so}(k)$  for all  $k \neq j$  and  $\mathsf{so}(j) = \sigma; \langle t, O \cup o, \mathsf{po} \cup \{(o', o) : o' \in O\} \rangle$ ). Finally, for a history  $h = \langle T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr} \rangle, h \oplus \mathsf{wr}(t, o)$  is the history obtained from h by adding (t, o) to the write-read relation.

Figure 4.4 lists the rules defining  $\Rightarrow_I$ . The SPAWN rule starts a new transaction, provided that there is no other live transaction (B =  $\epsilon$ ). It adds an empty transaction log to the history and

```
\frac{t \text{ fresh } \quad \mathsf{P}(j) = \mathsf{begin}; \mathsf{Body}; \mathsf{commit}; \mathsf{S} \quad \vec{\mathsf{B}}(j) = \epsilon}{h, \vec{\gamma}, \vec{\mathsf{B}}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow h \oplus_j \langle t, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle, \vec{\gamma}[j \mapsto \emptyset], \vec{\mathsf{B}}[j \mapsto \mathsf{Body}], \mathsf{P}[j \mapsto \mathsf{S}]} READ-EXTERN* \vec{\mathsf{B}}(j) = x := \mathsf{read}(k); \mathsf{B} \qquad h = (T, \mathsf{so}, \mathsf{wr}) \qquad t \text{ is the id of the last transaction log in } \mathsf{so}(j) write (k, v) \in \mathsf{writes}(t') with t' \in \mathsf{compTrans}(h, \vec{\mathsf{B}}) and t \neq t' i \text{ fresh } \qquad h' = (h \oplus_j \text{ }^{\mathsf{rd}}[i]kv) \oplus \mathsf{wr}(t', \text{ }^{\mathsf{rd}}[i]kv) h, \vec{\gamma}, \vec{\mathsf{B}}, \mathsf{P} \Rightarrow h', \vec{\gamma}[(j, x) \mapsto v], \vec{\mathsf{B}}[j \mapsto \mathsf{B}], \mathsf{P}
```

Figure 4.5: A baseline operational semantics for  $\mathcal{P}_{KV}$  programs. Above, compTrans $(h, \vec{B})$  denotes the set of transaction logs in h that excludes those corresponding to live transactions, i.e., transaction logs  $t'' \in T$  such that t'' is the last transaction log in some  $\mathsf{so}(j')$  and  $\vec{B}(j') \neq \epsilon$ .

schedules the body of the transaction. IF-TRUE and IF-FALSE check the truth value of a Boolean condition of an if conditional. WRITE corresponds to a write instruction and consists in simply adding a write operation to the current history. READ-LOCAL and READ-EXTERN concern read instructions. READ-LOCAL handles the case where the read follows a write on the same key k in the same transaction: the read returns the value written by the last write on k in the current transaction. Otherwise, READ-EXTERN corresponds to reading a value written in another transaction t' (t is the id of the log of the current transaction). The transaction t' is chosen non-deterministically as long as extending the current history with the write-read dependency associated to this choice leads to a history that still satisfies I.

An *initial* configuration for program P contains the program P along with a history  $h = \langle \{t_0\}, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$ , where  $t_0$  is a transaction log containing only writes that write the initial values of all keys, and empty current transaction code (B =  $\epsilon$ ). An execution of a program P under an isolation level I is a sequence of configurations  $c_0c_1\ldots c_n$  where  $c_0$  is an initial configuration for P, and  $c_m \Rightarrow_I c_{m+1}$ , for every  $0 \leq m < n$ . We say that  $c_n$  is I-reachable from  $c_0$ . The history of such an execution is the history h in the last configuration  $c_n$ . A configuration is called *final* if it contains the empty program (P =  $\emptyset$ ). Let hist $_I$ (P) denote the set of all histories of an execution of P under I that ends in a final configuration.

# 4.3.2 Correctness of the Operational Semantics

We define the correctness of  $\Rightarrow_I$  in relation to a *baseline* semantics where transactions can interleave arbitrarily, and the values returned by read operations are only constrained to come from committed transactions. This semantics is represented by a transition relation  $\Rightarrow$ , which is defined by a set of rules that are analogous to  $\Rightarrow_I$ . Since it allows transactions to interleave, a configuration contains a history h, the sessions/transactions P that remain to be executed, and:

- a valuation map  $\vec{\gamma}$  that records local variable values in the current transaction of each session ( $\vec{\gamma}$  associates identifiers of sessions that have live transactions with valuations of local variables),
- a map  $\vec{B}$  that stores the code of each live transaction (associating session identifiers with code).

Figure 4.5 lists some rules defining  $\Rightarrow$  (the others can be defined in a similar manner). SPAWN\* starts a new transaction in a session j provided that this session has no live transaction ( $\vec{\mathsf{B}}(j) = \epsilon$ ). Compared to SPAWN in Figure 4.4, this rule allows unfinished transactions in other sessions. READ-EXTERN\* does not check conformance to I, but it allows a read to only return a value written in a completed (committed) transaction. In this work, we consider only isolation levels satisfying this constraint. Executions, initial and final configurations are defined as in the case of  $\Rightarrow_I$ . The history of an execution is still defined as the history in the last configuration. Let hist\*(P) denote the set of all histories of an execution of P w.r.t.  $\Rightarrow$  that ends in a final configuration.

Practical isolation levels satisfy a "prefix-closure" property saying that if the axioms of I are satisfied by a pair  $\langle h_2, \mathsf{co}_2 \rangle$ , then they are also satisfied by every *prefix* of  $\langle h_2, \mathsf{co}_2 \rangle$ . A prefix of  $\langle h_2, \mathsf{co}_2 \rangle$  contains a prefix of the sequence of transactions in  $h_2$  when ordered according to  $\mathsf{co}_2$ , and the last transaction log in this prefix is possibly incomplete. In general, this prefix-closure property holds for isolation levels I that are defined by axioms as in (??), provided that the property  $\phi(t_2,\alpha)$  is *monotonic*, i.e., the set of models in the context of a pair  $\langle h_2,\mathsf{co}_2 \rangle$  is a *superset* of the set of models in the context of a prefix  $\langle h_1,\mathsf{co}_1 \rangle$  of  $\langle h_2,\mathsf{co}_2 \rangle$ . For instance, the property  $\phi$  in the axiom defining Causal is  $(t_2,\alpha) \in (\mathsf{wr} \cup \mathsf{so})^+$ , which is clearly monotonic. In general, standard isolation levels are defined using a property  $\alpha$  of the form  $(t_2,\alpha) \in R$  where R is an expression built from the relations po, so, wr, and co using (reflexive and) transitive closure and composition of relations [17]. Such properties are monotonic in general (they would not be if those expressions would use the negation/complement of a relation). An axiom as in (??) is called *monotonic* when the property  $\phi$  is monotonic.

The following theorem shows that  $hist_I(P)$  is precisely the set of histories under the baseline semantics, which satisfy I (the validity of the reads is checked at the end of an execution), provided that the axioms of I are monotonic.

**Theorem 4.3.1.** For any isolation level I defined by a set of monotonic axioms,  $hist_I(P) = \{h \in hist_*(P) : h \text{ satisfies } I\}.$ 

The  $\subseteq$  direction follows mostly from the fact that  $\Rightarrow_I$  is more constrained than  $\Rightarrow$ . For the opposite direction, given a history h that satisfies I, i.e., there exists a commit order co such that  $\langle h, \operatorname{co} \rangle$  satisfies the axioms of I, we can show that there exists an execution under  $\Rightarrow_I$  with history h, where transactions execute serially in the order defined by co. The prefix closure property is used to prove that READ-EXTERN transitions are enabled (these transitions get executed with a prefix of h). See the supplementary material for more details.

It can also be shown that  $\Rightarrow_I$  is *deadlock-free* for every natural isolation level (e.g., Read Committed, Causal Consistency, Snapshot Isolation, and Serializability), i.e., every read can return some value satisfying the axioms of I at the time when it is executed (independently of previous choices).

# 4.4 Compiling SQL to Key-Value API

We define an operational semantics for SQL programs (in  $\mathcal{P}_{SQL}$ ) based on a compiler that rewrites SQL queries to Key-Value read and write instructions. For presentation reasons, we use an intermediate representation where each table of a database instance is represented using a *set* variable

	A	-	$A = \{1, 2, 3\}$
Id	Name	City	
1	Alice	Paris	A.1.Id: 1, A.1.Name: Alice, A.1.City: Paris
2	Bob	Bangalore	A.2.Id: 2, A.2.Name: Bob, A.2.City: Bangalore
3	Charles	Bucharest	A.3.Id: 3, A.3.Name: Charles, A.3.City: Bucharest

Figure 4.6: Representing tables with set variables and key-value pairs. We write a key-value pair as key:value.

that stores values of the primary key<sup>4</sup> (identifying uniquely the rows in the table) and a set of key-value pairs, one for each cell in the table. In a second step, we define a rewriting of the API used to manipulate set variables into Key-Value read and write instructions.

Intermediate Representation Let  $\mathcal{S}: \mathbb{T} \to 2^{\mathbb{C}}$  be a database schema (recall that  $\mathbb{T}$  and  $\mathbb{C}$  are the set of table names and column names, resp.). For each table tab, let tab.pkey be the name of the primary key column. We represent an instance  $\mathcal{D}: \mathsf{dom}(\mathcal{S}) \to 2^{\mathbb{R}}$  using:

- for each table tab, a set variable tab (with the same name) that contains the primary key value r(tab.pkey) of every row  $r \in \mathcal{D}(tab)$ ,
- for each row  $r \in \mathcal{D}(tab)$  with primary key value pkeyVal = r(tab.pkey), and each column  $c \in \mathcal{S}(tab)$ , a key tab.pkeyVal.c associated with the value r(c).

**Example 4.4.1.** The table A on the left of Figure 4.6, where the primary key is defined by the Id column, is represented using a set variable A storing the set of values in the column Id, and one key-value pair for each cell in the table.

Figure 4.7 lists our rewriting of SQL queries over a database instance  $\mathcal{D}$  to programs that manipulate the set variables and key-value pairs described above. This rewriting contains the minimal set of accesses to the cells of a table that are needed to implement an SQL query according to its conventional specification. To manipulate set variables, we use add and remove for adding and removing elements, respectively (returning true or false when the element is already present or deleted from the set, respectively), and elements that returns all of the elements in the input set<sup>5</sup>.

SELECT, DELETE, and UPDATE start by reading the contents of the set variable storing primary key values and then, for every row, the columns in  $\vec{c_2}$  needed to check the Boolean condition  $\phi$  (the keys corresponding to these columns). For every row satisfying this Boolean condition, SELECT continues by reading the keys associated to the columns that need to be returned, DELETE removes the primary key value associated to this row from the set tab, and UPDATE writes to the keys corresponding to the columns that need to be updated. In the case of UPDATE, we assume that the values of the variables in  $\vec{x}$  are obtained from a valuation  $\gamma$  (this valuation would be maintained by the operational semantics of the underlying Key-Value store). INSERT adds a new primary key value to the set variable tab (the call to add checks whether this value is unique) and then writes to the keys representing columns of this new row.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>For simplicity, we assume that primary keys correspond to a single column in the table.

 $<sup>{}^5</sup>$ add(s,e) and remove(s,e) add and remove the element e from s, respectively. elements(s) returns the content of s.

#### SELECT/DELETE/UPDATE

```
rows := elements(tab)  
for ( let pkeyVal of rows ) {  
    for ( let c of \vec{c_2} ) {  
        val[c] := read(tab.pkeyVal.c)  
    if ( \phi[c \mapsto val[c] : c \in \vec{c_2}] true )  
       // SELECT \vec{c_1} AS x FROM tab WHERE \phi(\vec{c_2})  
    for ( let c of \vec{c_1} )  
       out[c] := read(tab.pkeyVal.c)  
    x := x \cup out  
    // DELETE FROM tab WHERE \phi(\vec{c_2})  
    remove(tab, pkeyVal);  
    // UPDATE tab SET \vec{c_1} = \vec{x} WHERE \phi(\vec{c_2})  
    for ( let c of \vec{c_1} )  
       write( tab.pkeyVal.c, \gamma(\vec{x}[c]) )
```

#### INSERT INTO tab VALUES $\vec{x}$

```
\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{pkeyVal} \ := \ \gamma(\vec{x}[\mathsf{0}]) \\ & \text{if ( add(tab,\mathsf{pkeyVal)}) } \ \{ \\ & \text{for ( let c of } \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{tab}) \ ) \ \{ \\ & \text{write( tab.\mathsf{pkeyVal.c,} } \ \gamma(\vec{x}[\mathsf{c}]) \ ) \end{aligned}
```

Figure 4.7: Compiling SQL queries to the intermediate representation. Above,  $\gamma$  is a valuation of local variables. Also, in the case of INSERT, we assume that the first element of  $\vec{x}$  represents the value of the primary key.

```
\begin{split} & \mathsf{add}(tab, pkeyVal) \colon & \mathsf{elements}(tab) \colon \\ & \mathsf{if} \ (\mathsf{read}(tab.\mathsf{has}.pkeyVal)) & \mathsf{ret} := \emptyset \\ & \mathsf{return} \ \mathsf{false}; & \mathsf{for} \ (\ \mathsf{let} \ pkeyVal \ \mathsf{of} \ \mathsf{Vals} \ ) \\ & \mathsf{return} \ \mathsf{true}; & \mathsf{ret} := \mathsf{ret} \ \cup \ \{pkeyVal\} \\ & \mathsf{return} \ \mathsf{ret}; \end{split}
```

Figure 4.8: Manipulating set variables using key-value pairs.

Manipulating Set Variables Based on the standard representation of a set using its characteristic function, we implement each set variable tab using a set of keys tab.has.pkey Val, one for each value  $pkey Val \in Val$ s. These keys are associated with Boolean values, indicating whether pkey Val is contained in tab. In a concrete implementation, this set of keys need not be fixed apriori, but can grow during the execution with every new instance of an INSERT. Figure 4.8 lists the implementations of add/elements, which are self-explanatory (remove is analogous).

#### 4.5 Implementation

We implemented MonkeyDB<sup>6</sup> to support an interface common to most storage systems. Operations can be either key-value (KV) updates (to access data as a KV map) or SQL queries (to access data as a relational database). MonkeyDB supports transactions as well; a transaction can include

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>We plan to make MonkeyDB available open-source soon.




Figure 4.9: Architecture of MonkeyDB

multiple operations. Figure 4.9 shows the architecture of MonkeyDB. A client can connect to MonkeyDB over a TCP connection, as is standard for SQL databases<sup>7</sup>. This offers a plug-and-play experience when using standard frameworks such as JDBC [83]. Client applications can also use MonkeyDB as a library in order to directly invoke the storage APIs, or interact with it via HTTP requests, with JSON payloads.

MonkeyDB contains a SQL-To-KV compiler that parses an input query<sup>8</sup>, builds its Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and then applies the rewriting steps described in Section 4.4 to produce an equivalent sequence of KV API calls (read() and write()). It uses a hashing routine (hash) to generate unique keys corresponding to each cell in a table. For instance, in order to insert a value v for a column c in a particular row with primary key value pkeyVal, of a table tab, we invoke write(hash(tab, pkeyVal, c), v). We currently support only a subset of the standard SQL operators. For instance, nested queries or join operators are unsupported; these can be added in the future with more engineering effort.

MonkeyDB schedules transactions from different sessions one after the other using a single global lock. Internally, it maintains execution state as a history consisting of a set of transaction logs, write-read relations and a partial session order (as discussed in §??). On a read(), MonkeyDB first collects a set of possible writes present in transaction log that can potentially form write-read (read-from) relationships, and then invokes the consistency checker (Figure 4.9) to confirm validity under the chosen isolation level. Finally, it randomly returns one of the values associated with valid writes. A user can optionally instruct MonkeyDB to only select from the set of *latest* valid write per session. This option helps limit weak behaviors for certain reads.

The implementation of our consistency checker is based on prior work [17]. It maintains the write-read relation as a graph, and detects cycles (isolation-level violations) using DFS traversals on the graph. The consistency checker is an independent and pluggable module: we have one for Read Committed and one for Causal Consistency, and more can be added in the future.

 $<sup>^7</sup>$ We support the MySQL client-server protocol using https://github.com/jonhoo/msql-srv.

 $<sup>^8\</sup>mathrm{We}$   $\mathrm{use}$  <code>https://github.com/ballista-compute/sqlparser-rs</code>

```
// Get following users' tweets
                                NewsFeed(user u) {
// Get user's tweets
                                 Begin()
Timeline(user u) {
                                 FW = read("following:"+ u.id)
                                 NF = {}
  Begin()
  key = "tweets:" + u.id
                                \textbf{for each} \ \lor \in \ \texttt{FW:}
  T = read(key)
                                  T = read("tweets:"+ v.id)
                                  NF = NF ∪ T
  Commit()
  return sortByTime(T)
                                 Commit()
                                 return sortByTime(NF)
```

Figure 4.10: Example operations of the Twitter app

## 4.6 EVALUATION: MICROBENCHMARKS

We consider a set of micro-benchmarks inspired from real-world applications (§4.6.1) and evaluate the number of test iterations required to fail an invalid assertion (§4.6.2). We also measure the *coverage* of weak behaviors provided by MonkeyDB (§4.6.3). Each of these applications were implemented based on their specifications described in prior work; they all use MonkeyDB as a library, via its KV interface.

#### 4.6.1 Applications

TWITTER [93] This is based on a social-networking application that allows users to create a new account, follow, unfollow, tweet, browse the newsfeed (tweets from users you follow) and the timeline of any particular user. Figure 4.10 shows the pseudo code for two operations.

A user can access twitter from multiple clients (sessions), which could lead to unexpected behavior under weak isolation levels. Consider the following scenario with two users, A and B where user A is accessing twitter from two different sessions,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ . User A views the timeline of user B from one session  $(S_1: \mathsf{Timeline}(B))$  and decides to follow B through another session  $(S_2: \mathsf{Follow}(A, B))$ . Now when user A visits their timeline or newsfeed  $(S_2: \mathsf{NewsFeed}(A))$ , they expect to see all the tweets of B that were visible via  $\mathsf{Timeline}$  in session  $S_1$ . But under weak isolation levels, this does not always hold true and there could be missing tweets.

SHOPPING CART [89] This application allows a user to add, remove and change quantity of items from different sessions. It also allows the user to view all items present in the shopping cart. The pseudo code and an unexpected behavior under weak isolation levels were discussed in §4.1, Figure 4.1.

Courseware [77] This is an application for managing students and courses, allowing students to register, de-register and enroll for courses. Courses can also be created or deleted. Courseware maintains the current status of students (registered, de-registered), courses (active, deleted) as well as enrollments. Enrollment can contain only registered students and active courses, subject to the capacity of the course.

Under weak isolation, it is possible that two different students, when trying to enroll concurrently, will both succeed even though only one spot was left in the course. Another example that

Application	Assertion	Avg. time to fail	
		(Iters)	(sec)
Stack	Element popped more than once	3.7	0.02
Courseware	Course registration overflow	10.6	0.09
Courseware	Removed course registration	57.5	0.52
Shopping	Item reappears after deletion	20.2	0.14
Twitter	Missing tweets in feed	6.3	0.03

Table 4.1: Assertions checking results in microbenchmarks

breaks the application is when a student is trying to register for a course that is being concurrently removed: once the course is removed, no student should be seen as enrolled in that course.

TREIBER STACK [76] Treiber stack is a concurrent stack data structure that uses compare-and-swap (CAS) instructions instead of locks for synchronization. This algorithm was ported to operate on a kv-store in prior work [76] and we use that implementation. Essentially, the stack contents are placed in a kv-store, instead of using an in-memory linked data structure. Each row in the store contains a pair consisting of the stack element and the key of the next row down in the stack. A designated key "head" stores the key of the top of the stack. CAS is implemented as a transaction, but the pop and push operations do not use transactions, i.e., each read/write/CAS is its own transaction.

When two different clients try to pop from the stack concurrently, under serializability, each pop would return a unique value, assuming that each pushed value is unique. However, under causal consistency, concurrent pops can return the same value.

## 4.6.2 Assertion Checking

We ran the above applications with MonkeyDB to find out if assertions, capturing unexpected behavior, were violated under causal consistency. Table 4.1 summarizes the results. For each application, we used 3 client threads and 3 operations per thread. We ran each test with MonkeyDB for a total of 10,000 times; we refer to a run as an iteration. We report the average number of iterations (Iters) before an assertion failed, and the corresponding time taken (sec). All the assertions were violated within 58 iterations, in half a second or less. In contrast, running with an actual database almost never produces an assertion violation.

### 4.6.3 Coverage

The previous section only checked for a particular set of assertions. As an additional measure of test robustness, we count the number of distinct *client-observable states* generated by a test. A client-observable state, for an execution, is the vector of values returned by read operations. For instance, a stack's state is defined by return values of pop operations; a shopping cart's state is defined by the return value of GetCart and so on.

For this experiment, we randomly generated test harnesses; each harness spawns multiple threads that each execute a sequence of operations. In order to compute the absolute maximum of possible states, we had to limit the size of the tests: either 2 or 3 threads, each choosing between 2 to 4 operations.

Note that any program that concurrently executes operations against a store has two main sources of non-determinism: the first is the interleaving of operations (i.e., the order in which operations are submitted to the store) and second is the choice of read-from (i.e., the value returned by the store under its configured isolation level). MonkeyDB only controls the latter; it is up to the application to control the former. There are many tools that systematically enumerate interleavings (such as Chess [74], Coyote [37]), but we use a simple trick instead to avoid imposing any burden on the application: we included an option in MonkeyDB to deliberately add a small random delay (sleep between 0 to 4 ms) before each transaction begins. This option was sufficient in our experiments, as we show next.

We also implemented a special setup using the COYOTE tool [37] to enumerate all sources of non-determinism, interleavings as well as read-from, in order to explore the entire state space of a test. We use this to compute the total number of states. Figure 4.11 shows the number of distinct states observed under different isolation levels, averaged across multiple (50) test harnesses. For each of serializability and causal consistency, we show the max (as computed by COYOTE) and versions with and without the delay option in MonkeyDB.

Each of these graphs show similar trends: the number of states with causal consistency are much higher than with serializability. Thus, testing with a store that is unable to generate weak behaviors will likely be ineffective. Furthermore, the "delay" versions of MonkeyDB are able to approach the maximum within a few thousand attempts, implying that MonkeyDB's strategy of per-read randomness is effective for providing coverage to the application.




Figure 4.11: State coverage obtained with MonkeyDB for various microbenchmarks

#### 4.7 EVALUATION: OLTP WORKLOADS

OLTPBench [39] is a benchmark suite of representative OLTP workloads for relational databases. We picked a subset of OLTPBench for which we had reasonable assertions. Table 4.2 lists basic information such as the number of database tables, the number of static transactions, how many of them are read-only, and the number of different assertions corresponding to system invariants for testing the benchmark. We modified OLTPBench by rewriting SQL join and aggregation operators into equivalent application-level loops, following a similar strategy as prior work [85]. Except for this change, we ran OLTPBench unmodified.

For TPC-C, we obtained a set of 12 invariants from its specification document [92]. For all other benchmarks, we manually identified invariants that the application should satisfy. We asserted these invariants by issuing a read-only transaction to MonkeyDB at the end of the execution of the benchmark. None of the assertions fail under serializability; they are indeed invariants un-

Benchmark	#Tables	#Txns	#Read-only	#Assertions
TPC-C	9	5	2	12
SmallBank	3	6	1	1
Voter	3	1	0	1
Wikipedia	12	5	2	3

Table 4.2: OLTP benchmarks tested with MonkeyDB

der serializability. When using weaker isolation, we configured MonkeyDB to use latest reads only (§4.5) for the assertion-checking transactions in order to isolate the weak behavior to only the application.

We ran each benchmark 100 times and report, for each assertion, the number of runs in which it was violated. Note that OLTPBench runs in two phases. The first is a loading phase that consists of a big initial transaction to populates tables with data, and then the execution phase issues multiple concurrent transactions. With the goal of testing correctness, we *turn down* the scale factor to generate a small load and limit the execution phase time to ten seconds with just two or three sessions. A smaller test setup has the advantage of making debugging easier. With MonkeyDB, there is no need to generate large workloads.

TPC-C emulates a wholesale supplier transactional system that delivers orders for a warehouse company. This benchmark deals with customers, payments, orders, warehouses, deliveries, etc. We configured OLTPBench to issue a higher proportion (> 85%) of update transactions, compared to read-only ones. Further, we considered a small input workload constituting of one warehouse, two districts per warehouse and three customers per district.

TPC-C has twelve assertions (A1 to A12) that check for consistency between the database tables. For example, A12 checks: for any customer, the sum of delivered order-line amounts must be equal to the sum of balance amount and YTD (Year-To-Date) payment amount of that customer.

Figure 4.12 shows the percentage of test runs in which an assertion failed. It shows that all the twelve assertions are violated under Read Committed isolation level. In fact, 9 out of the 12 assertions are violated in more than 60% of the test runs. In case of causal, all assertions are violated with three sessions, except for A4 and A11. We manually inspected TPC-C and we believe that both these assertions are valid under causal consistency. For instance, A4 checks for consistency between two tables, both of which are only updated within the same transaction, thus causal consistency is enough to preserve consistency between them.

These results demonstrate the effectiveness of MonkeyDB in breaking (invalid) assertions. Running with MySQL, under read committed, was unable to violate any assertion except for two (A10 and A12), even when increasing the number of sessions to 10. We used the same time limit of 10 seconds for the execution phase. We note that MySQL is much faster than MonkeyDB and ends up processing up to  $50\times$  more transactions in the same time limit, yet is unable to violate most assertions. Prior work [85] attempted a more sophisticated test setup where TPC-C was executed on a Cassandra cluster, while running Jepsen [62] for fault injection. This setup also was unable to violate all assertions, even when running without transactions, and on a weaker isolation level

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>We initially observed two assertions failing under serializability. Upon analyzing the code, we identified that the behavior is due to a bug in OLTPBench that we have reported to the authors (link ommitted).




Figure 4.12: Assertion checking: TPC-C




Figure 4.13: Assertion checking: SmallBank, Voter, and Wikipedia

than read committed. Only six assertions were violated with 10 sessions, eight assertions with 50 sessions, and ten assertions with 100 sessions. With MonkeyDB, there is no need to set up a cluster, use fault injection or generate large workloads that can make debugging very difficult.

SMALLBANK, VOTER, AND WIKIPEDIA SmallBank is a standard financial banking system, dealing with customers, saving and checking accounts, money transfers, etc. Voter emulates the voting system of a television show and allows users to vote for their favorite contestants. Wikipedia is based on the popular online encyclopedia. It deals with a complex database schema involving page revisions, page views, user accounts, logging, etc. It allows users to edit its pages and maintains a history of page edits and user actions.

We identified a set of five assertions, A13 to A17, that should be satisfied by these systems. For SmallBank, we check if the total money in the bank remains the same while it is transferred from one account to another (A13). Voter requires that the number of votes by a user is limited to a fixed threshold (A14). For Wikipedia, we check if for a given user and for a given page, the number of edits recorded in the user information, history, and logging tables are consistent (A15-A17). As before, we consider small work loads: (1) five customers for SmallBank, (2) one user for Voter, and (3) two pages and two users for Wikipedia.

Figure 4.13 shows the results. MonkeyDB detected that all the assertions are invalid under the chosen isolation levels. Under causal, MonkeyDB could break an assertion in 26.7% (geo-mean) runs given 2 sessions and in 37.2% (geo-mean) runs given 3 sessions. Under read committed, the corresponding numbers are 56.1% and 65.4% for 2 and 3 sessions, respectively.

# 4.8 Testing SQL Database

There have been several directions of work addressing the correctness of database-backed applications. We directly build upon one line of work concerned with the logical formalization of isolation levels [4, 13, 17, 31, 97]. Our work relies on the axiomatic definitions of isolation levels, as given in [17], which also investigated the problem of checking whether a given history satisfies a certain isolation level. Our kv-store implementation relies on these algorithms to check the validity of the values returned by read operations. Working with a logical formalization allowed us to avoid implementing an actual database with replication or sophisticated synchronization.

Another line of work concentrates on the problem of finding "anomalies": behaviors that are not possible under serializability. This is typically done via a static analysis of the application code that builds a static dependency graph that over-approximates the data dependencies in all possible executions of the application [14, 32, 47, 52, 60, 94]. Anomalies with respect to a given isolation level then corresponds to a particular class of cycles in this graph. Static dependency graphs turn out to be highly imprecise in representing feasible executions, leading to false positives. Another source of false positives is that an anomaly might not be a bug because the application may already be designed to handle the non-serializable behavior [25, 52]. Recent work has tried to address these issues by using more precise logical encodings of the application, e.g. [24, 25] or by using user-guided heuristics [52].

Another approach consists of modeling the application logic and the isolation level in first-order logic and relying on SMT solvers to search for anomalies [61, 75, 78], or defining specialized reductions to assertion checking [11, 12]. The Clotho tool [85], for instance, uses a static analysis of the application to generate test cases with plausible anomalies, which are deployed in a concrete testing environment for generating actual executions.

Our approach, based on testing with MonkeyDB, has several practical advantages. There is no need for analyzing application code; we can work with any application. There are no false positives because we directly run the application and check for user-defined assertions, instead of looking for application-agnostic anomalies. The limitation, of course, is the inherent incompleteness of testing.

Several works have looked at the problem of reasoning about the correctness of applications executing under weak isolation and introducing additional synchronization when necessary [10, 55, 68, 77]. As in the previous case, our work based on testing has the advantage that it can scale to real sized applications (as opposed to these techniques which are based on static analysis or logical proof arguments), but it cannot prove that an application is correct. Moreover, the issue of repairing applications is orthogonal to our work.

From a technical perspective, our operational semantics based on recording past operations and certain data-flow and control-flow dependencies is similar to recent work on stateless model checking in the context of weak memory models, e.g. [1, 65]. This work, however, does not consider transactions. Furthermore, their focus is on avoiding enumerating equivalent executions, which is beyond the scope of our work (but an interesting direction for future work).

# 4.9 Conclusion

Our goal is to enable developers to test the correctness of their storage-backed applications under weak isolation levels. Such bugs are hard to catch because weak behaviors are rarely generated by real storage systems, but failure to address them can lead to loss of business [94]. We present MonkeyDB, an easy-to-use mock storage system for weeding out such bugs. MonkeyDB uses a logical understanding of isolation levels to provide (randomized) coverage of all possible weak behaviors. Our evaluation reveals that using MonkeyDB is very effective at breaking assertions that would otherwise hold under a strong isolation level.

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