v1.1.3

Security hardening (audit follow-ups), with regression tests.

Security

• SSRF guard on the web-request handlers. WEB_REQUEST and
  WEB_REQUEST_FOLLOW now refuse to connect to loopback, link-local, or cloud
  instance-metadata (169.254.169.254) addresses, and pin the dial to the
  validated IP so DNS cannot rebind to a blocked address between the check and
  the connection. The check lives in the dialer, so it also covers every redirect
  hop (a vetted URL that 3xx-redirects to the metadata IP is blocked). In-cluster
  private (RFC1918) targets stay allowed and allowInsecure still controls TLS
  verification only. Mirrors the node agent's guard. Closes the path by which a
  single inbound instruction could exfiltrate cloud IAM credentials.
• Read-only SQL connections hard-block writes. With readWrite=false, a
  non-read statement (including comment-/whitespace-prefixed writes, SET, and
  DDL) is refused before execution rather than routed to the write path. This is
  the authoritative gate for MySQL (whose SET SESSION READ ONLY does not block
  autocommit DML) and defense-in-depth for Postgres.

Fixed

• PullArchive size cap. Streaming a CLI-archive layer out of Harbor is now
  bounded to the layer's advertised size (a descriptor that streams more than it
  claims is rejected) and to a 1 GiB hard ceiling, so a compromised or corrupt
  registry layer cannot fill disk/memory unbounded.