Kriya Console 0.1.2

Kriya Console 0.1.2 (universal) — free tier. Signed with our Apple Developer ID, notarized + stapled by Apple, so it opens with no Gatekeeper prompt. The Console app is closed-source; the kriya runtime in this repo is MIT. Verify with the .sha256 asset.

Kriya Console 0.1.1

Kriya Console 0.1.1 (universal) — free tier. Signed with our Apple Developer ID, notarized + stapled by Apple, so it opens with no Gatekeeper prompt. The Console app is closed-source; the kriya runtime in this repo is MIT. Verify with the .sha256 asset.

Kriya Console 0.1.0

Kriya Console 0.1.0 (aarch64) — free tier. Signed with our Apple Developer ID, notarized + stapled by Apple, so it opens with no Gatekeeper prompt. The Console app is closed-source; the kriya runtime in this repo is MIT. Verify with the .sha256 asset.

kriya-audit 0.1.0 — offline auditor re-prover

kriya-audit — re-prove kriya evidence offline

Don't trust us — check. kriya-audit re-verifies kriya governance evidence — Ed25519-signed
receipts, attestation envelopes, and kriyad read-backs — fully offline: no network, no account,
no telemetry. It links the exact same kriya-verify trust core the kriya Console and kriyad server
use, so its verdict is produced by the audited code path, not a re-implementation.

Exit codes: 0 = everything verified · 1 = any failure · 2 = usage error.

Install

macOS (universal: Apple Silicon + Intel; signed with our Apple Developer ID and notarized by Apple):

curl -fsSLO https://github.com/sandeepshekhar26/kriya/releases/download/audit-v0.1.0/kriya-audit-0.1.0-macos-universal.zip
unzip -o kriya-audit-0.1.0-macos-universal.zip

Linux (fully static, zero dependencies — also aarch64):

curl -fsSL -o kriya-audit https://github.com/sandeepshekhar26/kriya/releases/download/audit-v0.1.0/kriya-audit-0.1.0-linux-x86_64-musl
chmod +x kriya-audit

Integrity: every asset is listed in SHA256SUMS
(shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS).

Verify our sample in 60 seconds

curl -fsSLO https://github.com/sandeepshekhar26/kriya/releases/download/audit-v0.1.0/sample-receipts.jsonl
./kriya-audit sample-receipts.jsonl

sample-receipts.jsonl: 20 receipt(s), 20 signature(s) verified, … — OK

Now tamper with one byte and watch it get caught:

sed '1s/list_transactions/list_transactionsX/' sample-receipts.jsonl > tampered.jsonl
./kriya-audit tampered.jsonl; echo "exit=$?"

tampered.jsonl:1: FAIL — signature does not match
tampered.jsonl: 20 receipt(s), 19 signature(s) verified, … — FAIL
exit=1

That is the whole product in two commands: the bytes either are what the signer signed, or the
verifier tells you they aren't.

The three modes

Mode	Input	What it proves
kriya-audit <receipts.jsonl>	signed audit receipts (what the runtime writes)	every receipt's Ed25519 signature (exit-gated); hash-chain continuity reported as a completeness signal
kriya-audit --envelopes <outbox.ndjson>	AttestationEnvelopes (what a device exports to kriyad)	each envelope's signature, the envelope chain (prev_envelope_hash — deletion/reorder shows up), Merkle-root well-formedness
kriya-audit --readback <verify.json>	a kriyad GET /v1/verify response	all of the above plus the device's signed heartbeat and the tail-truncation anchor (returned_top_seq ≥ seq_seen — a server hiding the newest envelopes is caught)

Try the other two modes on the released samples:

curl -fsSLO https://github.com/sandeepshekhar26/kriya/releases/download/audit-v0.1.0/sample-envelopes.ndjson
curl -fsSLO https://github.com/sandeepshekhar26/kriya/releases/download/audit-v0.1.0/sample-readback.json
./kriya-audit --envelopes sample-envelopes.ndjson
./kriya-audit --readback  sample-readback.json

Reading the verdicts honestly

• OK means: the bytes you hold are byte-identical to what the holder of the signing key signed,
  and (envelopes/read-back) nothing in the sequence was deleted, reordered, or truncated behind the
  signed anchors. Pin your signer: the verifier proves that key signed — confirm the key
  fingerprint out-of-band; it cannot tell you who should hold the key.
• The sample's hash-chain break at line 2 (informational) is expected: sample-receipts.jsonl is a
  bundle of independently signed receipts, not one chained stream. Real runtime logs chain per-stream
  via prev_hash inside the signed bytes, so whole-record deletion surfaces as a chain break.
• This is tamper-evidence, not tamper-proofing: a compromised host that never signs an action, or
  a device that was never enrolled, produces no evidence to verify. The guarantee starts at the
  signing key.
• Receipts are also independently re-verifiable with the open-source verifiers in this repo
  (TypeScript/Rust/Python/.NET/Java) — you don't need this binary to check receipts; it adds the
  envelope and read-back modes and packages the whole thing as one signed tool.

Free, no license required. Feedback: kriyanative@gmail.com · https://kriyanative.com