v0.2.0

Security hardening release

This release is the result of a full security audit of the package — command construction, untrusted input handling, dependencies, and static analysis.

Security

• Shell injection protection: centralized escaping (escape_shell_arg,
  escape_input_text) applied at all user-input call sites — payloads like
  ; rm -rf /, $(...), and backticks are neutralized before reaching adb shell.
• Path traversal guard: safe_join() validates device-supplied filenames during
  file sync pulls, so a malicious device cannot write outside the destination directory.
• XXE / DoS protection: UI hierarchy XML is parsed with entities, DTDs, and network
  access disabled; <!DOCTYPE payloads are rejected outright.
• Untrusted recordings: playback refuses SHELL actions unless allow_shell=True;
  numeric playback parameters are strictly validated.
• Strict TCP serial validation in connection type detection.
• Race-free UI dumps: each dump uses a unique on-device filename and cleans up
  reliably, so concurrent dumps on one device can no longer collide.
• Dependency floors raised: Pillow ≥ 12.2 (CVE-2026-42311) and lxml ≥ 6.1
  (PYSEC-2026-87).
• New unit and e2e security test suites covering injection payloads, path traversal,
  XXE, and recording playback.

Fixed

• mypy --strict is clean with and without the optional [vision]/[ocr] extras installed.
• Sync checksums declare usedforsecurity=False (FIPS-friendly).

Upgrading

pip install -U adbflow

No breaking API changes. Full Changelog: Changelog