

NOTE: You will be emailed a Crowdmark link for submitting the assignment on February 14. If you do not receive the link, please send an email to ajmeneze@uwaterloo.ca.

1. **Hash functions** (10 marks)

- (a) Is a preimage-resistant hash function necessarily second-preimage resistant? (Justify your answer.)

Solution No. Suppose H is a uniform preimage-resistant hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Define $H' : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ to be

$$H'(x) = \begin{cases} H(x), & \text{if } x \text{ is even} \\ H(x+1), & \text{if } x \text{ is odd} \end{cases}$$

Given any $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, if x is even, then $x-1$ is a second-preimage as $H'(x-1) = H(x-1+1) = H(x) = H'(x)$. If x is odd, then $x+1$ is a second-preimage. So H' is not second-preimage resistant.

Suppose H' is not preimage-resistant. Given a randomly chosen hash value $h \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$ produced by H , with probability about 0.5 h has a preimage which is even (since h is uniform). If so we can find its preimage x' by invoking the preimage finding algorithm of H' , namely x' s.t. $H'(x') = h$. Then $H(x') = H'(x') = h$. Since this 0.5 probability is not negligible, H is not preimage-resistant. By contradiction, H' is preimage-resistant.

- (b) Suppose that $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a collision-resistant hash function. Define a new hash function $G : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ by $G(x) = H(H(x))$. Prove that G is also collision resistant. (Note: As mentioned in class, such statements are best proven using the contrapositive statements. That is, you should prove that if G is not collision resistant, then H is not collision resistant.)

Solution Suppose G is not collision resistant. There then exists a collision finding algorithm CF that outputs x, y s.t. $G(x) = G(y) = H(H(x)) = H(H(y))$. Compute $H(x), H(y)$. If $H(x) \neq H(y)$, then $H(x), H(y)$ is a collision since $H(H(x)) = H(H(y))$; Otherwise x, y is a collision. So there exists such a collision finding algorithm for H as well. Therefore G is collision-resistant if H is collision-resistant.

2. Hash functions (10 marks)

Let H be an iterated hash function with compression function $f : \{0, 1\}^{n+r} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. (See slide 155 for a complete description of an iterated hash function.) Suppose that you are given an algorithm A which, on input $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$, finds $s, t \in \{0, 1\}^r$, $s \neq t$, such that $f(z, s) = f(z, t)$. Suppose that the running time of A is T . Let d be a positive integer, and let $D = 2^d$. Show how A can be used to find, in time approximately dT , D pairwise distinct messages m_1, m_2, \dots, m_D such that $H(m_1) = H(m_2) = \dots = H(m_D)$.

Solution Invoke A to find d distinct pairs $(s_i, t_i), i = 1, 2, \dots, d$ such that $s_i \neq t_i, s_i \neq t_j$ if $i \neq j$ and $f(H_{i-1}, s_i) = f(H_{i-1}, t_i)$ where $H_{i-1} = f(H_{i-2}, s_{i-1}) = f(H_{i-2}, t_{i-1})$ for $i > 1$ and H_0 is an arbitrarily chosen n -bit binary string. Let k be a d -bit binary string and k_i is the i th bit of k . Construct string M_k by concatenating d s -bit binary strings where the i th block is s_i if k_i is 0 and t_i if k_i is 1. There are in total 2^d different messages as k varies from 0^d to 1^d . Since $f(H_0, M_{k1}) = f(H_0, M_{k'1}) = f(H_0, s_1) = f(H_0, t_1)$ and $f(H_{i-1}, M_{ki}) = f(H_{i-1}, M_{k'i}) = f(H_{i-1}, s_i) = f(H_{i-1}, t_i)$ where $k \neq k'$ and M_{ki} is the i th block of M_k , $H_d = f(H_{d-1}, M_{kd})$ is equal to $f(H_{d-1}, M_{k'd})$. The length block b for both messages M_k and M'_k are of the same, so the final result $H(M_k) = f(H_d, b) = H(M'_k)$

3. MAC schemes derived from hash functions (10 marks)

Let $f : \{0, 1\}^{256} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{128}$ be a compression function. Let $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{128}$ be an iterated hash function derived from f as follows: To hash a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, do the following:

- (i) Append a single 1 bit to the right of m , followed by just enough 0's so that the bitlength of the resulting message m' is a multiple of 128. Let the 128-bit blocks of m' be m_1, m_2, \dots, m_ℓ .
- (ii) Let b be the 128-bit binary representation of ℓ .
- (iii) Compute $H_1 = f(m_1, 0)$, $H_i = f(m_i, H_{i-1})$ for $2 \leq i \leq \ell$. Then $H(m) = f(b, H_\ell)$.

Consider now the following four MAC schemes each with 128-bit secret key k :

- (a) $\text{MAC}_k(m) = H(m) \oplus k$.
- (b) $\text{MAC}_k(m) = H(k, m) \oplus k$.
- (c) $\text{MAC}_k(m) = H(k, m) \oplus H(m)$.
- (d) $\text{MAC}_k(m) = H(m, k) \oplus k$.

Show that 3 of these 4 MAC schemes are insecure. That is, describe attacks on 3 of these 4 MAC schemes to demonstrate that they do not resist existential forgery by chosen-message attacks. (Note: It would help to make your attacks as “practical” as possible—that is, use as few hash function evaluations as you can, and use as few calls to the MACing oracle as you can.)

(Note: As with all cryptographic systems considered in the course, you can assume you know all the details of the cryptographic system except for the secret key chosen by Alice and Bob. So, in this problem, you can assume that you know the complete description of f and H , but you do not know the secret key k .)

Solution (a) is insecure. Choose a message M and call MAC oracle once to get $c = H(M) \oplus k$. Compute $h = H(M)$ and recover the key $k = c \oplus h$. For any message m , $\text{MAC}_k(m) = H(m) \oplus k$ where k is now known.

(c) is insecure. For a message m , call the MAC oracle to get $c = H(k, m) \oplus H(m)$. Then $H(k, m) = c \oplus H(m)$. Append a single 1 bit to the right of m followed by enough 0's to make the bit-length of the resulting message m' multiple of 128. Let b be the 128-bit binary representation of the number of 128-bit blocks. One can compute the hash value of $(k, m' || b || y)$ for any message y (assume y has bit length $128t$) as

$$H(k, m' || b || y) = f(b + t, H_{l+1+t})$$

$$\text{where } H_{l+1+j} = f(y_j, H_{l+j}), H_{l+1} = H(m) = f(b, H_l), H_0 = f(k, 0), H_1 = f(m_1, H_0)$$

Thus, one can compute the tag for this new message $m' || b || y$

$$\text{MAC}_k(m' || b || y) = H(k, m' || b || y) \oplus H(m' || b || y)$$

(d) is insecure. By birthday attack we could find two messages m_1, m_2 of the same bitlength $128t$ (WLOG) that collide or $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$ within 2^{64} steps (which is feasible nowadays). Invoke the MACing oracle for the tag of $m_1 || t$. Since $H(m_1 || t, k) = H(m_2 || t, k)$ the tag for $m_1 || t$ is also a tag for $m_2 || t$

4. **Algorithm analysis** (10 marks)

Describe a polynomial-time algorithm which, on input $n \in \mathbb{N}$, determines whether n is an integer fifth power; that is, your algorithm should determine if there exists an integer $a \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $n = a^5$. (\mathbb{N} is the set of natural numbers.) Using big-O notation, give an upper bound on the number of bit operations your algorithm takes.

Solution (1) $down=0$, $up=n$. Compute $mid = \lfloor \frac{down+up}{2} \rfloor$
(2) if $down == up$, Output FALSE; else if $mid^5 > n$, $up=mid$; else if $mid^5 < n$, $down=mid$; else Output TRUE.

This algorithm takes at most $\log_2 n$ steps till it returns, so the running time is bounded by $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil + 1$. For each step, to compute mid^5 one can compute mid^2 , mid^4 , mid^5 . This requires 3 multiplications and additionally for each step the algorithm does at most 3 comparisons, one addition and one full division. So the total running time is (bitlength is t) $O((t+1)(3t+3t^2+t+t^2))$ which is polynomial.

5. **RSA computations** (10 marks)

Alice chooses $n = 1073$ and $e = 715$ for use in the basic RSA public-key encryption scheme.

- (a) What is Alice's private key?
- (b) Encrypt the message $m = 17$ for Alice.

(The purpose of this problem is to make sure that you remember how to perform the basic RSA operations. You may use a calculator, but please show the main steps of your calculations. If you write a computer program, please hand in the program.)

Solution $1073 = 29 \times 37$

$\Phi(1073) = 28 \times 36 = 1008$

By Extended Euclidean Algorithm (the right column works backward)

$1008 = 715 \times 1 + 293$

$715 = 293 \times 2 + 129 \quad 715 \times (-134) + (1008 - 715) \times 327 = 1 \rightarrow 1008 \times 327 - 715 \times 461 = 1$

$293 = 129 \times 2 + 35 \quad 293 \times 59 - (715 - 293 \times 2) \times 134 = 1 \rightarrow 715 \times (-134) + 293 \times 327 = 1$

$129 = 35 \times 3 + 24 \quad 129 \times (-16) + (293 - 129 \times 2) \times 59 = 1 \rightarrow 293 \times 59 - 129 \times 134 = 1$

$35 = 24 \times 1 + 11 \quad 35 \times 11 - (129 - 35 \times 3) \times 5 = 1 \rightarrow 129 \times (-16) + 35 \times 59 = 1$

$24 = 11 \times 2 + 2 \quad (35 - 24) \times 11 - 24 \times 5 = 1 \rightarrow 35 \times 11 - 24 \times 16$

$11 = 2 \times 5 + 1 \quad 11 - (24 - 11 \times 2) \times 5 = 1 \rightarrow 11 \times 11 - 24 \times 5 = 1$

$5 = 1 \times 5$

Thus $715 \times 461 = 1008 \times 327 - 1$

$715 \times 461 \equiv -1 \pmod{1008}$

$715 \times (-461) \equiv 1 \pmod{1008}$

$715 \times (1008 - 461) \equiv 1 \pmod{1008}$

$715 \times 547 \equiv 1 \pmod{1008}$

(a) Therefore $547 \times 715 \equiv 1 \pmod{1008}$, 547 is the private key.

(b) $c \equiv 17^{715} \equiv 17^{(2^9 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 2^1 + 1)} \equiv 853 \pmod{1073}$. For part b the python script for repeated square and multiply is as follows

```
lst="1011001011" # the binary representation of 715
mult = 17
result = 2
for st in reversed(lst):
    if (st=='1'):
        result = (result * mult) % 1073
        mult=mult**2 % 1073
print (result)
```

You should make an effort to solve all the problems on your own. You are also welcome to collaborate on assignments with other students presently enrolled in CO 487/687. However, *solutions must be written up by yourself*. If you do collaborate, please *acknowledge your collaborators* in the write-up for each problem. *If you obtain a solution with help from a book, research paper, a web site, or elsewhere, please acknowledge your source*. You are *not* permitted to solicit help from online bulletin boards, chat groups, newsgroups, or solutions from previous offerings of the course.

The assignment should be submitted via Crowdmark before **11:00 am on February 28**. Late assignments will not be accepted except in *very* special circumstances (usually a documented illness of a serious nature).

A high workload because of midterm tests and assignments in other courses will *not* qualify as a special circumstance.

Instructor and TA office hours:

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|-----------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Monday: | 1:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Alessandra Graf (MC 5029) |
| | 3:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Alfred Menezes (MC 5026) |
| Tuesday: | 10:30 am – 11:30 am | Priya Soundararajan (MC 5466) |
| | 11:30 am – 12:30 pm | Sam Jaques (QNC 4114) |
| | 1:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Luis Ruiz-Lopez (MC 5486) |
| | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm | Elena Bakos Lang (MC 5474) |
| Thursday: | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | Chris Leonardi (MC 5494) |
| Friday: | 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm | Alfred Menezes (MC 5026) |
