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First of all, great work on Orca — it's an impressive project.
I wanted to raise a security question that I think is important for a tool like this, which runs with elevated privileges on users' machines and integrates deeply with AI agents and code execution.
The concern
Orcas's open-source nature means that anyone can submit a Pull Request. This opens the door to potential supply-chain attacks or malicious contributions, where a bad actor could:
Inject malicious code into core execution paths
Introduce backdoors in agent integrations or terminal/shell runners
Smuggle data-exfiltration logic into networking or API-related modules
Gradually escalate privileges through seemingly innocent incremental PRs
These kinds of attacks are well-documented (e.g., the xz utils backdoor, event-stream npm incident, etc.) and are particularly dangerous for tools that:
Execute code locally
Have access to the filesystem
Communicate with external APIs or AI backends
My questions
What is your current PR review process? Do you have a checklist or policy for reviewing contributions from unknown/new contributors?
Do you use any automated security scanning on PRs (e.g., CodeQL, Dependabot, Semgrep, Socket.dev for supply-chain risks)?
Do you enforce signed commits or any form of contributor identity verification?
Is there a SECURITY.md or responsible disclosure policy in place?
Do you have branch protection rules that require reviews from specific trusted maintainers before merging?
Suggestion
I'd strongly recommend:
Publishing a SECURITY.md with a clear vulnerability disclosure process
Enabling GitHub's dependency review and secret scanning
Requiring at least 2 maintainer approvals for PRs touching sensitive areas (agent execution, networking, auth)
Running SAST tools (CodeQL / Semgrep) automatically on every PR via GitHub Actions
Considering a CODEOWNERS file to assign mandatory reviewers per module
Given that Orca is an AI-powered tool that executes code and interacts with the filesystem, the attack surface is significant. I'd love to understand your current security posture and how the community can help keep this project safe.
Thanks for your time and for maintaining this project!
This discussion was converted from issue #2246 on May 19, 2026 00:48.
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Details
Security Concern: Preventing Malicious Pull Requests
Hi team 👋
First of all, great work on Orca — it's an impressive project.
I wanted to raise a security question that I think is important for a tool like this, which runs with elevated privileges on users' machines and integrates deeply with AI agents and code execution.
The concern
Orcas's open-source nature means that anyone can submit a Pull Request. This opens the door to potential supply-chain attacks or malicious contributions, where a bad actor could:
These kinds of attacks are well-documented (e.g., the xz utils backdoor, event-stream npm incident, etc.) and are particularly dangerous for tools that:
My questions
Suggestion
I'd strongly recommend:
SECURITY.mdwith a clear vulnerability disclosure processGiven that Orca is an AI-powered tool that executes code and interacts with the filesystem, the attack surface is significant. I'd love to understand your current security posture and how the community can help keep this project safe.
Thanks for your time and for maintaining this project!
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