insto is pre-1.0. Only the latest published release receives security fixes.

Please do not open a public issue for security-sensitive reports. Instead:

1. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository, or
2. Email the maintainer directly (see the GitHub profile linked from pyproject.toml authors).

Include:

• a description of the issue and the impact you observed,
• a minimal reproduction (inputs, commands, expected vs. actual behavior),
• the insto version (insto --version or the installed dist) and Python version.

You can expect:

• an acknowledgement within 7 days,
• a fix or public advisory coordinated within 30 days for confirmed issues,
• credit in the release notes if you'd like it.

In scope:

• Code under insto/ and tests/.
• Default deployment via pip install insto / uv tool install insto.
• Anything that allows reading secrets (hikerapi_token, snapshots) from logs, error output, or ~/.insto/.
• Any path-traversal, MIME-confusion, or remote-content-trust issue in the CDN streamer.
• Schema-drift or rate-limit handling that could exfiltrate the operator's IP / token.

Out of scope:

• Bugs in HikerAPI itself, aiograpi, or the underlying Instagram private API.
• Account-level bans on user accounts that result from real Instagram authentication via aiograpi.
• Information already public on instagram.com about the target — insto reads, it does not create new visibility.

insto is offensive-tooling-adjacent: it queries third-party data, downloads remote media, and stores intel on disk. Even fully patched, the local store at ~/.insto/store.db is not encrypted at rest in 0.1.x. A stolen laptop is still a data-loss event. Treat the output directory like any other source of sensitive material.