docs(bsm): design — make CLOB attesters slashable for forgery#19
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The redemption-default slash rail is live; CLOB attester misconduct has no on-chain path. This drafts it, honestly scoped: - Forgery (quorum vouched for an order no trader signed) is the one new slashable condition — but the attested path is un-challengeable today: its digest commits only fillsHash and BatchFill carries no signatures, so you can't prove a forgery (no sig to invalidate, "never signed" is a negative). The fix binds an ordersCommitment OVER SIGNED ORDERS into the attested digest (a consensus change), after which challengeForgedBatch is a self-contained proof: re-derive the digest, verify the quorum signed it, prove the order is in the committed set, show its trader sig is invalid → proposeSlash the quorum. - Wrong-match rides the SP1 proven path (a re-proof contradicts the fills). - Censorship is deliberately NOT slashable (can't prove a negative without a DA layer) — handled by set-determinism + proposer rotation. Lists the decisions for Drew (slash split, rate, bounty, sequencing). Not yet implemented — the digest binding is breaking and needs sign-off.
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The "bonded, slashable attesters" claim is aspirational for the CLOB path — peers detect misconduct off-chain (
Verdict::Forged/Censored) but nothing routes it to a slash. This drafts the mechanism, honestly scoped.The hard truth it surfaces
The attested path is un-challengeable today: the quorum signs
H(bookId, nonce, fillsHash)andBatchFillcarries the orders' terms but no signatures. So a forgery ("quorum vouched for an order trader X never signed") has no on-chain proof — there's no signature to invalidate, and "never signed" is a negative. Compression bought this.What the design adds
challengeForgedBatch→ slash the quorumchallengeForgedBatchis self-contained (the signed batch is public): re-derive the digest, verify the quorum signed this ordersCommitment, prove the order is in the committed set, show its trader sig is invalid →proposeSlashevery co-signer (independent re-verification is the slashable duty). No new batch storage.Cost & decisions
The load-bearing part is a consensus change (bind
ordersCommitmentover(order ‖ sig)into the attested digest) — breaking, ships fleet-wide like the proposer-sig change. The doc lists the calls for you: slash split (whole-quorum vs proposer-heavy),FORGERY_SLASH_BPS, challenger bounty, and whether to sequence the proven path first.Not implemented — surfacing the design before touching consensus.
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