

CS323 Operating Systems Security

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Lecture 38
5/2/2003

Reminder

- Conflict exam signup
- Graduate students 1-unit project
- Senior thesis, under-graduate research, independent study

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Content of this lecture

- Security Flaws in Operating Systems
- Attacks on O/S Security
- Viruses and Worms

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Discussion

- How do you break into the machine in DCL 1320?

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Security Flaws in Operating Systems

- Authentication
 - E.g., a dummy program, pretending to be the signon program, asking for the user's password and then storing it.
- Line disconnect
 - When a line is disconnected with a user logged in over it, the system must either log the user out, or at least put the line in a state in which the user must re-authenticate his identity after reconnecting before proceeding with the session.
- Operator carelessness
 - E.g., tricking the operator into mounting a counterfeit operating system disk..
- Residue
 - Interesting information often turns up in wastebaskets; use paper shredders! Information is often left in central memory from a previous user, possibly a system routine; variables that contain sensitive information should be overwritten before they are deallocated!
- Shielding
 - One can inductively ``tap'' a cable, phone line, or in fact any wire over which information passes, without making physical connection to it. Electrical shielding can protect against this.
- Passwords
 - Password guessing, etc./5/1/2003

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Bugs


- Legality checking
 - The system may fail to check parameters supplied by the user in calling system procedures.
- Implicit trust
 - One routine assumes that parameters passed to or shared with another routine are correct; each routine ought to check parameters supplied by another.
- Prohibitions
 - Features which are advertised not to work, or not to work correctly, but which are still executable, with ``interesting'' results.
- Implementation
 - An improper implementation of a well thought out design for a security mechanism.

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Buffer Overflow



- (b) After program A called
- (a) Situation when main program is running
- (c) Buffer overflow shown in gray

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Design Weaknesses

- Encryption
 - Lack of encryption of the password file or other security codewords.
- Implied sharing
 - The system may deposit critical information in a user's space.
- Parameter passing
 - by reference or by value. Passing by reference offers the possibility that the user may present valid arguments for checking, and then modify them just before their use by the system.
- Inter-process communication
 - Use of a send / receive mechanism to test possibilities, e.g., to test for a correct password.

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Classic Problems

- **Privilege**
 - Systems may give programs and/or users more privilege than they need. *Principle of Least Privilege*
- **Trojan Horse**
 - Executing a program written by someone else could use the executor's privileges to send information to the penetrator, or to damage the executor's files, or to open a hole into which the penetrator may later enter.

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Attacks from Inside of the System

- **Trojan Horse**
 - seemingly innocent program contains code to perform an unexpected and undesirable function.
- **Examples**
 - Modifying, deleting or encrypting the user file; copying them into a place where cracker can retrieve them later, or even sending them to the cracker via email or FTP.
- One approach to do this is to place the program as a free, exciting new game, MP3 viewer, or something that attracts attention.
- The Trojan horse approach does not require the user to break into the computer.

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Other Inside Attacks

- **Login Spoofing**
 - attacker writes a false login program that displays on the screen login prompt. This program asks for name, password, user types in login name and password. The false information is written to a file and the phony login program sends a signal to kill the shell. This action logs the attacker out and triggers the real login program. The user assumes that he/she wrote the wrong password and repeats the steps.
- **Logic Bombs**
 - build in bad behavior (e.g., erase a disk) into operating system if certain action is not taken. For example, as long the programmer feeds in a password every day, the behavior is not visible. When a programmer is fired, the password is not given and the bad behavior is triggered.
- **Trap Doors**
 - code is inserted into the system by the system programmer to bypass some normal check. For example, a login program could be written which allows a user to login independent of what password he/she types. The trap-door bypasses the whole authentication process.
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Login Spoofing



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Logic Bombs

- Company programmer writes program
 - potential to do harm
 - OK as long as he/she enters password daily
 - if programmer fired, no password and bomb explodes

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Trap Doors

```
while (TRUE) {  
    printf("login: ");  
    get_string(name);  
    disable_echoing();  
    printf("password: ");  
    get_string(password);  
    enable_echoing();  
    v = check_validity(name, password);  
    if (v) break;  
}  
execute_shell(name);
```

```
while (TRUE) {  
    printf("login: ");  
    get_string(name);  
    disable_echoing();  
    printf("password: ");  
    get_string(password);  
    enable_echoing();  
    v = check_validity(name, password);  
    if (v || strcmp(name, "zzzzz") == 0) break;  
}  
execute_shell(name);
```

(a)

(a) Normal code.

(b)

(b) Code with a trapdoor inserted

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Other Inside Attacks on O/S Security

- Asynchronism
 - One process modifies the arguments another process has passed to an operating system procedure after they have been tested for validity but before they have been used.
- Browsing
 - A user searches the system simply trying things, looking for privileged information.
- Between lines
 - A user taps into a line being used by an inactive but logged-in terminal.
- Clandestine code
 - A patch is made to the system which, instead of or in addition to doing what it is supposed to do, provides a hole that a penetrator can use later.

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Other Inside Attacks on O/S Security

- Denial of access
 - A user writes a program to deliberately crash the system, send it into an infinite loop, or otherwise disrupt use of it by legitimate users.
- Disconnected lines
 - A penetrator tries to find an incoming line that disconnected while someone was logged in using it.
- Masquerade
 - A penetrator assumes another user's identity, typically by stealing his password.
- NAK attack
 - The system may be vulnerable when a running process is interrupted (NAK, Negative Acknowledgment, U, sometimes used as the interrupt key).
 - A penetrator might be able to catch the system in an unprotected state during interruption, and thus seize control.

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Network Security

- External threat
 - code transmitted to target machine
 - code executed there, doing damage
- Goals of virus writer
 - quickly spreading virus
 - difficult to detect
 - hard to get rid of
- Virus = program can reproduce itself
 - attach its code to another program
 - additionally, do harm

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Virus Damage Scenarios

- Blackmail
- Denial of service as long as virus runs
- Permanently damage hardware
- Target a competitor's computer
 - do harm
 - espionage
- Intra-corporate dirty tricks
 - sabotage another corporate officer's files



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How Viruses Work (1)

- Virus written in assembly language
- Inserted into another program
 - use tool called a “dropper”
- Virus dormant until program executed
 - then infects other programs
 - eventually executes its “payload”

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How Viruses Work (2)

Recursive procedure that finds
executable files on a UNIX
system

Virus could
infect them all

```
#include <sys/types.h>          /* standard POSIX headers */
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct stat sbuf;

search(char *dir_name)
{
    DIR *dirp;
    struct dirent *dp;


    dirp = opendir(dir_name);
    if (dirp == NULL) return;
    while (TRUE) {
        dp = readdir(dirp);
        if (dp == NULL) {
            chdir("..");
            break;
        }
        if (dp->d_name[0] == '.') continue;
        lstat(dp->d_name, &sbuf);
        if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode)) continue; /* skip symbolic links */
        if (chdir(dp->d_name) == 0) {
            search(dp->d_name);
        } else {
            if (access(dp->d_name, X_OK) == 0) /* if executable, infect it */
                infect(dp->d_name);
        }
        closedir(dirp);
    }
}
```

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How Viruses Work (3)




- An executable program
- With a virus at the front
- With the virus at the end
- With a virus spread over free space within program

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How Viruses Work (4)



- After virus has captured interrupt, trap vectors
- After OS has retaken printer interrupt vector
- After virus has noticed loss of printer interrupt vector and recaptured it

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How Viruses Spread

- Virus placed where likely to be copied
- When copied
 - infects programs on hard drive, floppy
 - may try to spread over LAN
- Attach to innocent looking email
 - when it runs, use mailing list to replicate

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Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques

- Integrity checkers
- Behavioral checkers
- Virus avoidance
 - good OS
 - install only shrink-wrapped software
 - use antivirus software
 - do not click on attachments to email
 - frequent backups
- Recovery from virus attack
 - halt computer, reboot from safe disk, run antivirus

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The Internet Worm

- Free-standing program designed to travel between systems for some particular purpose.
- Consisted of two programs
 - bootstrap to upload worm
 - the worm itself
- Worm first hid its existence
- Next replicated itself on new machines

