

CS323 Operating Systems Security

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Lecture 36
4/28/2003

Lessons from Midterm 2

- What are the difference between
 - Virtual memory
 - Physical memory
 - Disk
 - File cache
- Memory address translation vs. page faults
- Memory accesses vs. I/O operations
 - Is Inode related to Virtual memory?
 - What's the meaning of “memory space in disks”?

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Content

- 9.1 The security environment
- 9.2 Basics of cryptography
- 9.3 User authentication
- 9.4 Attacks from inside the system
- 9.5 Attacks from outside the system
- 9.6 Protection mechanisms
- 9.7 Trusted systems


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Question

- How many Hollywood movies about security?



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Total Approach to Security

- External Security
- User Interface Security -- Establishing user identification and access rights.
- Internal Security -- Controls built into the hardware and software to ensure:
 - Reliable and uncorrupted operation of the system.
 - Integrity of programs and data

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External Security

- Physical Security --
 - Protection against disasters
 - Protection against intruders
- Operational Security -- Policies and procedures implemented by the management of a particular computer installation.
 - Authorization -- what access is allowed to what entities.
 - Classification -- parcels the problem into subproblems. Data and users are divided into classes to which particular authorizations are granted.
 - Personnel selection and assignment.
 - Division of responsibilities.
 - Built in controls -- checks and balances.
 - Personnel should be unaware of the nature of the controls, but aware of the fact that the controls are present.

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Internal Threats/Security

- *Data Confidentiality*
 - have secret data remain secret.
- *Data Integrity*
 - unauthorized user should not be able to modify any data without the owner's permission.
- *System Availability*
 - nobody can disturb the system to make it unusable (e.g., make sure that denial of service does not occur).
- *Privacy*
 - the system protects individuals from misuse of information
- The security system needs to protect against
 - intruders (*adversaries*)
 - accidental data loss

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Internal Threats

- Security goals and threats

Goal	Threat
Data confidentiality	Exposure of data
Data integrity	Tampering with data
System availability	Denial of service

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Intruders

- Common Categories
 - Casual prying by nontechnical users
 - Snooping by insiders
 - Determined attempt to make money
 - Commercial or military espionage

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Accidental Data Loss

- Common Causes
 - Acts of God
 - fires, floods, wars
 - Hardware or software errors
 - CPU malfunction, bad disk, program bugs
 - Human errors
 - data entry, wrong tape mounted

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Encryption

- A common method of protecting information transmitted over unreliable links.
- Clear text → Encryption → Ciphertext
- Ciphertext → Decryption → Clear text

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Encryption



E - Encryption Algorithm
D - Decryption Algorithm
k - key(s)
M - Message (clear text)

Alternative notation (public, private keys)



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Encryption

- An encryption algorithm satisfies:
 - $D_k(E_k(M))) = M$
 - Both E_k and D_k can be computed efficiently.
 - The security of the system depends only on the security of the key, and not on the security of the algorithms E and D.

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Encryption Systems

- Public Key Systems
- Secure Secret Key Systems

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Public Key Systems

- Use two keys:
 - public key k_{PUB} which is published by the user
 - private key k_{PRIV} $k_{PRIV} \neq k_{PUB}$
- The holder of k_{PRIV} can send an authenticated message to anyone because they can read the message using k_{PUB} .
- $m = D(k_{PRIV}, E(k_{PUB}, m))$ or
 $m = D(k_{PUB}, E(k_{PRIV}, m))$

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Public Key Systems

- Example:
 - B, C, D can all encrypt message for A using A's public key.
 - If B encrypted message with A's public key
 - A can read the message using A's private key
 - But C cannot decrypt it even if C knew that it was encrypted with A's public key.

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Alternative: Secure Secret Key Systems

- Use single key, called secret key which is shared between encryptor and decryptor (shared key).
- These systems are called Symmetric Systems.
- Example: Data Encryption Standard DES is an example of a shared key.

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Symmetric Systems

- Advantages:
 - Symmetric systems provide a two-way channel to their users;
 - Is public key system symmetric?
 - As long as the key remains secret, the system also provides authentication.
- Problems:
 - If the key is revealed, then interceptor can immediately decrypt and encrypt information.

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Symmetric Systems Challenges

- Distribution of keys
 - Before communication takes place, the secret keys must be sent securely to both the sender and receiver.
 - Couriers are used to distribute keys
 - Split key in pieces and distribute pieces under separate channels (Clipper program uses a 2 pieces key distribution).
- Number of keys increases in square with number of people
 - Why in square?
 - Solution: Use Clearing house or forwarding office

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DES: Data Encryption Standard

- Lucifer algorithm from IBM - 1974
- It uses two main operations:
 - Substitution
 - Permutation (Transposition).
- It derives its strength from repeated application of these two techniques - total 16 cycles.
- Plaintext is encrypted as blocks of 64 bits
 - Key is 64 bits long, however in effect it is only 56 bits long because of 8 parity bits.

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DES

- Algorithm is derived from two concepts of Shannon's theory of information secrecy:
 - **Confusion**: a piece of information is changed, so that the output bits have no obvious relationship to the input bits.
 - **Diffusion**: attempts to spread the effect of one plaintext bit to other bits in the ciphertext,
- Substitution provides confusion by systematically substituting some bit patterns for others.
- Permutations provide diffusion by reordering bits.

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Questions about DES

- Number of Iterations (do we need 16?)
- Key length (In original Lucifer the key was 128 bits long)
- Attack: brute force, then to test all keys (2^{56}) one needs:
 - 228 million years if one test of the ciphertext takes 100 ms., 2,280 years if one test takes 1 ms., 2 years if one test takes 1 ns.

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Questions about DES


- Parallel attack:
 - need 106 chips working in parallel at the rate of one key per 1 microsecond, then it takes 1 day. However, the cost of such a machine 50 Million dollars.
 - Use spare cycles in the Internet?
 - Peer-to-peer computing
 - Grid computing

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



Distribution of Keys using Symmetric Keys



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Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) Encryption

- RSA uses two keys: d and e with integer n .
 - pair (e, n) will be the public encryption key;
 - pair (d, n) will be the private key.
- Message m is encrypted as follows: $E(m) = (m^e) \bmod n = C$,
- Message m will be decrypted as follows: $D(C) = (C^d) \bmod n$

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RSA Encryption

- Goal: $((m^e)^d) \bmod n = m$
- n is computed as product of two large primes $n = p * q$ (100 or larger)
- d is random integer such that: greatest common divisor $\gcd(d, (p-1)*(q-1)) = 1$
- e satisfies $e*d \bmod (p-1)*(q-1) = 1$
- Key n is publicly known, its factors are difficult to calculate.
 - What are p and q for 10403

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RSA Encryption

- Example: $e=11$, $n=35$, and let assume $m=3$;
- Assume $p=5$, $q=7$. Then $\gcd(d, 24) = 1$ and $11*d \bmod 24 = 1$ are satisfied if $d=11$
- $E(m) = m^{11} \bmod 35$, $D(C) = C^{11} \bmod 35$.
- $E(3) = 12 = C$, $D(12) = 3$.
- Another example: $D(5) = 10$, $E(10) = 5$.


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Private and Public Keys

- Given the public key system, if a trusted server exists in the system, then it can be used to provide access to other services securely.
- The server can receive secure messages from clients by publishing its "public key".
- The clients encrypt using the public key, but no other client can decrypt the message.



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Private and Public Keys

- The server can sign messages to the clients by encrypting the message with its private key. No other client can send such a message. All clients can decrypt the signed message and know it comes from the server.
- The server can sign a message in the clear by sending a check sum of the message encrypted with its private key. Clients can authenticate the message by computing its checksum and comparing it with the encrypted value received.

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Key Exchange using Asymmetric Keys

- Given the public key system, if a trusted server exists in the system, then it can be used to provide access to other services securely.
- Send an encrypted message to the trusted server TS using its public key and include a public key for the client requesting access to service.
- Similarly for servers S, send a message to the trusted TS server including an S server public key
- The TS trusted server encrypts the S server public key with the clients key and sends a message containing it back to the client

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Encryption and Authentication


- Only the client can decrypt the message to get the public key of the S server. It knows it came from the TS trusted server
- The client can now encrypt a message and send it directly to the S server with the S server's public key, only known to the client and TS trusted server

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



Key Exchange







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
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Key Exchange



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Issues

- Any client can replay an earlier communication, even if the client cannot decode the message in the communication.
 - Some mechanism is needed to make sure communications are fresh! A signed timestamp or message count is often used.
- The server has no way of knowing who a client is.
 - The client needs to have some password or secret it can show to the server. A signed message indicating who the client is and using a different public key for the signature is often used. See CS423.

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
Distribution of Shared Keys Using Public Keys

- A client may have a two way secure communication with a trusted server if the trusted server publishes a public key.
- The client sends a shared key to the server, encrypted with the public key.
- The client and server may exchange secret messages using the shared key.

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Issues

- Once again freshness and client identification is an issue.
- Also, using the same key over and over again may allow other clients to decode the messages.

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
Setting up private communications between Clients

- A client may establish two way secure communication with another client through a server
- The client sends a shared key to the server using the server's public key
- The other client sends a shared key to the server using the server's public key
- If the first client wants to talk to the second client, the server sends the first client's shared key to the second client

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Issues

- Once again, freshness and client identification is an issue.
- Also, both the server and the other client know the key.
- It is better to use a third key for the communication rather than the two shared keys used to communicate with the server.

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Summary

- Symmetric
- Asymmetric
- Authentication
- Privacy
- Key Exchange