v0.7.0

Added

• New rule CL-0020 — credential-shaped env keys with literal values.
  Flags environment: entries whose key matches a credential convention
  (PASSWORD, TOKEN, SECRET, API_KEY, ACCESS_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY,
  CREDENTIAL, plus suffix-anchored _PASS, _PWD, PASSWD, _SALT,
  _DSN) and whose value is a non-empty literal string. Exempts the
  *_FILE secrets-mount convention, ALLOW_EMPTY_* / RANDOM_*
  boolean toggles, and bool/numeric values. Skips ${VAR} substitutions.
  Severity HIGH. Fires on 17.9% of real-world Compose files in the
  corpus. See docs/rules/CL-0020.md. (#190)
• New rule CL-0021 — credentials embedded in connection-string env
  values. Flags environment: values containing a literal
  scheme://user:password@host userinfo regardless of the key name.
  Skips when either userinfo half is a ${VAR} substitution. Catches
  inline credentials in DATABASE_URL, MONGO_URL,
  AIRFLOW__DATABASE__SQL_ALCHEMY_CONN, etc. — the largest detection
  class CL-0020's key-pattern matching misses. Severity HIGH. See
  docs/rules/CL-0021.md. (#193)
• Mutation testing via mutmut configured in pyproject.toml against
  src/compose_lint/rules/ and src/compose_lint/_image.py. Baseline
  documented in docs/mutation-testing.md. New tests/test_rule_loader.py
  exercises rule auto-discovery so loader-logic mutants are caught. (#172)
• Corpus regression snapshot at tests/corpus_snapshot.json.gz plus
  scripts/snapshot.py (generate / diff / verify subcommands) that
  digests compose-lint output across a real-world Compose corpus into a
  (rule_id, service, line) fingerprint per file. A CI-gated schema test
  prevents the digest from accidentally carrying third-party content; an
  opt-in pytest entry (COMPOSE_LINT_CORPUS=<cache-root>) verifies the
  snapshot against the latest local run. See LICENSE-corpus.md for the
  licensing posture and CONTRIBUTING.md for the regen workflow. (#173)
• Negative-coverage fixtures (tests/compose_files/safe_*.yml) asserting that
  hardened-but-unusual Compose patterns do not trigger false positives:
  cap_drop: [ALL] + targeted cap_add for CL-0006/CL-0011, the short-form
  no-new-privileges security option for CL-0003, CMD-SHELL healthchecks
  for CL-0015, and named-volume mounts for CL-0017. (#174)

Changed

• CL-0005 _is_wildcard_ip no longer carries an unreachable defensive
  branch for [0.0.0.0] / [*] — Docker doesn't accept those forms and
  no test exercised them. [::] continues to match via the wildcard set.
  (#172)
• Release docker-smoke jobs (publish.yml, publish-channel.yml) now
  exercise the image with the full hardening flag set documented in the
  README (--read-only, --cap-drop ALL, --security-opt no-new-privileges:true, --network none, --user 65532:65532,
  --pids-limit 256, plus :ro on bind mounts). A copy-paste regression
  in the documented recipe will now fail the release gate. (#196)
• README "Running with full hardening" snippet now uses
  composelint/compose-lint:0.6.0 instead of the
  composelint/compose-lint@sha256:<digest> placeholder, so the recipe
  is copy-paste runnable. A new note points users at Docker Hub or
  docker buildx imagetools inspect if they want to substitute a digest
  pin for full CL-0004 / CL-0019 satisfaction. The new tag form is
  tracked as a fourth version sync point in docs/RELEASING.md.