base64-ng

base64-ng is a no_std-first Base64 crate focused on correctness, strict decoding, caller-owned buffers, and a security-heavy release process. The long-term goal is to provide modern hardware acceleration without making unsafe SIMD the foundation of trust.

The crate starts conservative: a small scalar implementation, strict RFC 4648 behavior, and a test/release system modeled after hardened Rust service projects. Streaming is available behind an explicit feature, fuzz harnesses are isolated from the published crate, and future SIMD and Kani work remain gated until they have evidence.

Current Status

The current public release is 0.8.0. The development branch is 0.9.0-alpha.0.

Implemented now:

• no_std core with optional alloc and std features.
• Zero external runtime or development dependencies in Cargo.toml.
• Standard and URL-safe alphabets.
• Padded and unpadded encoding into caller-provided output buffers.
• Stable compile-time encoding into caller-sized arrays.
• Strict decoding into caller-provided output buffers.
• In-place encoding when the caller provides enough spare capacity.
• Optional alloc vector and string helpers.
• In-place decode API built on the same strict scalar decoder.
• Explicit legacy decode APIs that ignore ASCII transport whitespace while keeping alphabet and padding validation strict.
• Validation-only APIs for strict and legacy profiles when callers need to reject malformed input without materializing decoded bytes.
• Line-wrapped encoding for MIME/PEM-style output and caller-selected wrapping policies.
• Strict line-wrapped validation and decoding profiles for MIME/PEM-style input.
• Custom alphabet validation helpers for user-defined 64-byte alphabets.
• Named dependency-free profiles for MIME, PEM, bcrypt-style, and crypt(3)-style Base64.
• Stack-backed encoded output buffers for short values without alloc.
• Redacted secret owned buffers for sensitive encoded or decoded bytes when alloc is enabled.
• Separate ct scalar validation and decode module for sensitive payloads that avoids secret-indexed lookup tables during Base64 symbol mapping.
• std::io streaming encoders and decoders behind the stream feature.
• Focused unit and integration tests.
• Isolated cargo-fuzz harnesses for decode, in-place decode, and stream chunk-boundary behavior.
• Isolated dudect-style timing harness for the constant-time-oriented scalar decoder.
• Constant-time assembly evidence generation for reviewer inspection.
• Local check scripts, release gate, dependency policy, audit config, CI, SBOM script, and reproducible build check.

Planned behind admission evidence:

• Admitted AVX2, AVX-512, SSSE3/SSE4.1, ARM NEON, and wasm simd128 fast paths after the SIMD admission evidence is complete. Current 0.9 development remains scalar-only unless that full evidence package lands.
• Async streaming wrappers only after the tokio feature passes the dependency and cancellation-safety admission bar in docs/ASYNC.md.
• Expanded Kani proof harnesses.
• Broader benchmark evidence against the established base64 crate.

Trust Dashboard

Area	Status
License	MIT OR Apache-2.0
MSRV	Rust 1.95.0
Runtime dependencies	Zero external crates
Unsafe policy	Scalar encode/decode remains safe Rust; audited unsafe is limited to volatile wiping and SIMD prototypes
Active backend	Scalar only
Strict decoding	Default, canonical, no whitespace
Legacy compatibility	Explicit opt-in APIs
Constant-time posture	Constant-time-oriented scalar validation/decode with isolated dudect-style timing evidence; no formal cryptographic guarantee
Cleanup posture	Best-effort initialized-byte cleanup and redacted secret wrappers
Release evidence	fmt, clippy, tests, docs, deny, audit, license, SBOM, reproducibility

Full adoption details live in docs/TRUST.md. Security-control and CWE mapping lives in docs/SECURITY_CONTROLS.md.

Install

[dependencies]
base64-ng = "0.8.0"

The crate is dual-licensed:

license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"

Features

Feature	Default	Purpose
alloc	yes	Vec and encoded String convenience APIs.
std	yes	std::error::Error support and feature base for I/O.
simd	no	Future hardware acceleration.
stream	no	std::io streaming wrappers.
tokio	no	Reserved for future async streaming wrappers; currently inert and dependency-free.
kani	no	Reserved for verifier harnesses; normal builds do not require Kani.
fuzzing	no	Reserved for verifier and fuzz harness integration; published crate stays dependency-free.

Disable defaults for embedded or freestanding use:

[dependencies]
base64-ng = { version = "0.8.0", default-features = false }

Example

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, checked_encoded_len};

let input = b"hello";
const ENCODED_CAPACITY: usize = match checked_encoded_len(5, true) {
    Some(len) => len,
    None => panic!("encoded length overflow"),
};
let mut encoded = [0u8; ENCODED_CAPACITY];
let written = STANDARD.encode_slice(input, &mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&encoded[..written], b"aGVsbG8=");

let mut decoded = [0u8; 5];
let written = STANDARD.decode_slice(&encoded, &mut decoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&decoded[..written], input);

In-place encoding:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let mut buffer = [0u8; 8];
buffer[..5].copy_from_slice(b"hello");
let encoded = STANDARD.encode_in_place(&mut buffer, 5).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

For sensitive payloads, encode_slice_clear_tail and encode_in_place_clear_tail clear unused bytes after the encoded prefix and clear the caller-owned output buffer on encode error.

Compile-time encoding:

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};

const HELLO: [u8; 8] = STANDARD.encode_array(b"hello");
const URL_BYTES: [u8; 3] = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_array(b"\xfb\xff");

assert_eq!(&HELLO, b"aGVsbG8=");
assert_eq!(&URL_BYTES, b"-_8");

Stable Rust cannot yet express the encoded length as the return array length directly, so encode_array uses the destination array type supplied by the caller. A wrong output length fails during const evaluation.

For untrusted length metadata, use checked length calculation:

use base64_ng::{
    LineEnding, LineWrap, checked_encoded_len, checked_wrapped_encoded_len, decoded_len,
};

assert_eq!(checked_encoded_len(5, true), Some(8));
assert_eq!(
    checked_wrapped_encoded_len(5, true, LineWrap::new(4, LineEnding::Lf)),
    Some(9)
);
assert_eq!(decoded_len(b"aGVsbG8=", true).unwrap(), 5);

Validation Without Decoding

Use validation-only APIs when a protocol needs to sanitize input before storing, routing, or accounting for it:

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};

assert!(STANDARD.validate(b"aGVsbG8="));
assert!(!STANDARD.validate(b"aGVsbG8"));

STANDARD.validate_result(b"aGVsbG8=").unwrap();

assert!(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.validate(b"-_8"));
assert!(!URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.validate(b"+/8"));

For line-wrapped or spaced legacy inputs, use the explicit legacy profile:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

assert!(STANDARD.validate_legacy(b" aG\r\nVsbG8= "));
assert!(!STANDARD.validate_legacy(b" aG-V "));

let decoded = STANDARD
    .decode_buffer_legacy::<5>(b" aG\r\nVs\tbG8= ")
    .unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.as_bytes(), b"hello");

Line-Wrapped Encoding

Use LineWrap when a protocol needs MIME/PEM-style line lengths:

use base64_ng::{LineEnding, LineWrap, STANDARD};

let wrap = LineWrap::new(4, LineEnding::Lf);
let mut output = [0u8; 9];
let written = STANDARD
    .encode_slice_wrapped(b"hello", &mut output, wrap)
    .unwrap();

assert_eq!(&output[..written], b"aGVs\nbG8=");

Built-in policies include LineWrap::MIME, LineWrap::PEM, and LineWrap::PEM_CRLF. Wrapping inserts line endings between encoded lines and does not append a trailing line ending after the final line.

Named profiles carry the wrapping policy for common protocols:

use base64_ng::{MIME, PEM};

assert_eq!(MIME.line_wrap().unwrap().line_len, 76);
assert_eq!(PEM.line_wrap().unwrap().line_len, 64);

let mut encoded = [0u8; 82];
let written = MIME.encode_slice(&[0x5a; 58], &mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&encoded[76..78], b"\r\n");
assert!(MIME.validate(&encoded[..written]));

When wrapping policy comes from configuration, prefer checked construction:

use base64_ng::{LineEnding, LineWrap, Profile, STANDARD};

let wrap = LineWrap::checked_new(76, LineEnding::CrLf).unwrap();
let profile = Profile::checked_new(STANDARD, Some(wrap)).unwrap();

assert!(profile.is_valid());
assert!(profile.is_wrapped());

The same policy can be used for strict wrapped decoding. Unlike legacy whitespace decoding, this accepts only the configured line ending and requires every non-final line to have the configured encoded length:

use base64_ng::{LineEnding, LineWrap, STANDARD};

let wrap = LineWrap::new(4, LineEnding::Lf);
let mut output = [0u8; 5];
let written = STANDARD
    .decode_slice_wrapped(b"aGVs\nbG8=", &mut output, wrap)
    .unwrap();

assert_eq!(&output[..written], b"hello");

let encoded = STANDARD.encode_wrapped_buffer::<9>(b"hello", wrap).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded.as_bytes(), b"aGVs\nbG8=");

let decoded = STANDARD
    .decode_wrapped_buffer::<5>(encoded.as_bytes(), wrap)
    .unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.as_bytes(), b"hello");

Custom Alphabets

User-defined alphabets can be generated and validated at compile time:

base64_ng::define_alphabet! {
    struct DotSlash = b"./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
}

use base64_ng::Alphabet;

assert_eq!(DotSlash::decode(b'.'), Some(0));

The generated alphabet uses the deliberately conservative default Alphabet::encode implementation: it performs a fixed 64-entry scan for every emitted Base64 byte to avoid secret-indexed table lookups. The built-in alphabets override this with optimized arithmetic mappers. For very large payloads and custom alphabets, benchmark this tradeoff before using them on untrusted high-volume traffic.

Built-in non-RFC alphabets are available for explicit interoperability:

use base64_ng::{BCRYPT, CRYPT};

let mut bcrypt = [0u8; 4];
let written = BCRYPT.encode_slice(&[0xff, 0xff, 0xff], &mut bcrypt).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&bcrypt[..written], b"9999");

let mut crypt = [0u8; 4];
let written = CRYPT.encode_slice(&[0xff, 0xff, 0xff], &mut crypt).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&crypt[..written], b"zzzz");

The bcrypt and crypt(3) profiles provide alphabets and no-padding behavior only. They do not parse or verify complete password-hash strings.

Legacy Whitespace Decoding

Strict decoding rejects whitespace. If an existing protocol allows line-wrapped or spaced Base64, use the explicit legacy APIs:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let mut output = [0u8; 5];
let written = STANDARD
    .decode_slice_legacy(b" aG\r\nVs\tbG8= ", &mut output)
    .unwrap();

assert_eq!(&output[..written], b"hello");

Legacy decoding only ignores ASCII space, tab, carriage return, and line feed. Alphabet selection, padding placement, trailing data after padding, and non-canonical trailing bits remain strict.

Bounded Memory Use

For untrusted payloads, size buffers before decoding or encoding. The checked helpers let callers reject impossible or oversized metadata before allocating:

use base64_ng::{STANDARD, checked_encoded_len, decoded_capacity};

let input = b"hello";
let encoded_len = checked_encoded_len(input.len(), true).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_len, 8);

let mut encoded = vec![0u8; encoded_len];
let written = STANDARD.encode_slice(input, &mut encoded).unwrap();
encoded.truncate(written);

let max_decoded = decoded_capacity(encoded.len());
let mut decoded = vec![0u8; max_decoded];
let written = STANDARD.decode_slice(&encoded, &mut decoded).unwrap();
decoded.truncate(written);

assert_eq!(decoded, input);

decode_vec validates the complete input before allocating decoded output. Use decode_slice or decode_in_place when the caller needs hard memory limits and owns the output buffer.

For sensitive payloads, use decode_slice_clear_tail or decode_in_place_clear_tail to clear unused bytes after the decoded prefix. On decode error these variants clear the caller-owned output buffer before returning the error. The legacy whitespace profile also provides decode_slice_legacy_clear_tail, decode_in_place_legacy_clear_tail, and decode_buffer_legacy. Strict line-wrapped profiles provide decode_in_place_wrapped, decode_in_place_wrapped_clear_tail, and the same in-place behavior through Profile::decode_in_place. The ct module provides the same clear-tail decode variants for callers using the constant-time-oriented scalar decoder, plus ct::CtEngine::decode_buffer for stack-backed no-alloc decoded output.

For short values, encode_buffer returns a stack-backed EncodedBuffer and decode_buffer returns a stack-backed DecodedBuffer without requiring the alloc feature:

use base64_ng::{BCRYPT, MIME, STANDARD};

let encoded = STANDARD.encode_buffer::<8>(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded.as_str(), "aGVsbG8=");

let decoded = STANDARD.decode_buffer::<5>(encoded.as_bytes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.as_bytes(), b"hello");

let bcrypt = BCRYPT.encode_buffer::<4>(&[0xff, 0xff, 0xff]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(bcrypt.as_bytes(), b"9999");

let wrapped = MIME.encode_buffer::<82>(&[0x5a; 58]).unwrap();
let decoded = MIME.decode_buffer::<58>(wrapped.as_bytes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.as_bytes(), &[0x5a; 58]);

EncodedBuffer exposes bytes only through as_bytes and as_str. DecodedBuffer exposes bytes through as_bytes and provides a fallible as_utf8 view for decoded text. Both expose is_full() and remaining_capacity() for no-alloc sizing checks, redact the payload from Debug, clear their backing arrays when dropped as best-effort data-retention reduction, and use constant-time-oriented equal-length equality, including direct comparisons with byte slices, byte-string literals, borrowed strings, and owned strings in either operand order.

into_exposed_array is the explicit no-alloc ownership escape hatch for both stack-backed buffers. It returns the backing array and visible length, so redacted formatting and drop-time cleanup no longer apply to the returned array.

When an owned heap buffer is acceptable but accidental logging is not, use encode_secret and decode_secret:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let encoded = STANDARD.encode_secret(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded.expose_secret(), b"aGVsbG8=");
assert_eq!(format!("{encoded:?}"), r#"SecretBuffer { bytes: "<redacted>", len: 8 }"#);

let decoded = STANDARD.decode_secret(encoded.expose_secret()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.expose_secret(), b"hello");
assert!(decoded.constant_time_eq(b"hello"));
assert_eq!(format!("{decoded}"), "<redacted>");

let wrapped = STANDARD
    .encode_wrapped_secret(b"hello", base64_ng::LineWrap::PEM)
    .unwrap();
let unwrapped = STANDARD
    .decode_wrapped_secret(wrapped.expose_secret(), base64_ng::LineWrap::PEM)
    .unwrap();
assert_eq!(unwrapped.expose_secret(), b"hello");

let legacy = STANDARD
    .decode_secret_legacy(b" aG\r\nVs\tbG8= ")
    .unwrap();
assert_eq!(legacy.expose_secret(), b"hello");

let decoded = base64_ng::SecretBuffer::try_from("aGVsbG8=").unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.expose_secret(), b"hello");

SecretBuffer clears vector spare capacity when a vector is wrapped, and clears initialized bytes plus spare capacity when dropped. It does not claim formal zeroization and cannot clean historical copies outside the wrapper or make guarantees about allocator behavior. SecretBuffer equality uses the same constant-time-oriented equal-length comparison as constant_time_eq, including direct comparisons with byte slices, byte-string literals, borrowed strings, and owned strings in either operand order. expose_secret_utf8 provides an explicit borrowed text view when the secret bytes are valid UTF-8.

into_exposed_vec is the explicit owned interop escape hatch. It consumes the wrapper and returns a normal Vec<u8>, so redacted formatting and drop-time cleanup no longer apply after that point. try_into_exposed_string provides the same explicit escape hatch for UTF-8 text and returns the redacted wrapper unchanged when the bytes are not valid UTF-8.

SecretBuffer also implements From<Vec<u8>> and From<String> for callers that already own sensitive bytes or text and want to move them into the redacted wrapper without copying initialized bytes. With alloc enabled, stack-backed EncodedBuffer and DecodedBuffer values can also be consumed into SecretBuffer; the stack backing array is cleared when the consumed buffer drops at the end of the conversion.

TryFrom<&str> and TryFrom<&[u8]> for EncodedBuffer<CAP> encode raw input bytes with strict standard padded Base64. The same conversions for DecodedBuffer<CAP> and SecretBuffer decode strict standard padded Base64. Use explicit engine or profile methods for URL-safe, no-padding, MIME/PEM, bcrypt-style, or custom alphabets.

With the default alloc feature, vector and string helpers are available:

use base64_ng::STANDARD;

let encoded = STANDARD.encode_vec(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

let encoded_string = STANDARD.encode_string(b"hello").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_string, "aGVsbG8=");

let decoded = STANDARD.decode_vec(&encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");

With the stream feature, std::io encoders are available:

use std::io::{Read, Write};
use base64_ng::{STANDARD, stream::{Decoder, DecoderReader, Encoder, EncoderReader}};

let mut encoder = Encoder::new(Vec::new(), STANDARD);
encoder.write_all(b"he").unwrap();
encoder.write_all(b"llo").unwrap();
let encoded = encoder.finish().unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, b"aGVsbG8=");

let mut reader = EncoderReader::new(&b"hello"[..], STANDARD);
let mut encoded = String::new();
reader.read_to_string(&mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded, "aGVsbG8=");

let mut decoder = Decoder::new(Vec::new(), STANDARD);
decoder.write_all(b"aGVs").unwrap();
decoder.write_all(b"bG8=").unwrap();
assert!(decoder.has_terminal_padding());
let decoded = decoder.finish().unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");

let mut reader = DecoderReader::new(&b"aGVsbG8="[..], STANDARD);
let mut decoded = Vec::new();
reader.read_to_end(&mut decoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded, b"hello");
assert!(reader.has_terminal_padding());

The stream adapters expose pending_len() and has_pending_input() for partial Base64 quantum visibility. Reader adapters also expose buffered_output_len() and has_buffered_output() for bytes already decoded or encoded but not yet returned to the caller. Decoders additionally expose has_terminal_padding() so framed protocols can tell when a padded payload has ended and leave adjacent bytes for the next protocol layer.

URL-safe, no-padding encoding:

use base64_ng::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;

let mut encoded = [0u8; 7];
let written = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode_slice(b"hello", &mut encoded).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&encoded[..written], b"aGVsbG8");

Security Model

base64-ng treats Base64 as infrastructure code. Fast paths are never allowed to outrun evidence.

Security commitments:

• Stable Rust first. Current toolchain pin: Rust 1.95.0.
• no_std core by default.
• Scalar encode/decode remains safe Rust.
• Audited unsafe helpers in src/lib.rs perform volatile best-effort wiping so cleanup writes are not optimized away.
• Future unsafe SIMD remains isolated under src/simd.rs.
• Local checks verify that allow(unsafe_code) is confined to the volatile wipe helpers and SIMD boundary, every unsafe function is inventoried, and every unsafe block has a nearby SAFETY: explanation. Architecture intrinsics, CPU feature detection, and target-feature gates are checked against the same boundary.
• docs/UNSAFE.md inventories every current unsafe site and its safety invariants.
• docs/ASYNC.md defines the admission bar for any future async/Tokio API while the tokio feature remains inert.
• docs/DEPENDENCIES.md defines the dependency admission bar for any future external crate.
• runtime::backend_report() exposes the active backend, detected candidate, SIMD feature status, and scalar-only security posture for audit logging.
• runtime::require_backend_policy() lets deployments assert scalar execution, disabled SIMD features, or no detected SIMD candidate.
• BackendPolicy::HighAssuranceScalarOnly combines the scalar/no-SIMD deployment checks into one assertion.
• Runtime backend, posture, and policy enums expose stable string identifiers for CI artifacts, audit logs, and deployment evidence.
• Runtime backend reports and policy failures use stable key/value display output for log ingestion.
• Strict decoding rejects malformed padding and trailing data.
• Runtime scalar APIs are expected to return Result or Option for malformed input and size errors instead of panicking.
• Public encoded-length overflow is recoverable through Result or Option; untrusted length metadata should never require a panic.
• Scalar encode avoids input-derived alphabet table indexes, and scalar decode uses branch-minimized arithmetic. A separate ct module provides a constant-time-oriented scalar validation and decode path that scans the selected alphabet for every symbol so custom alphabets do not fall back to standard ASCII assumptions. Its malformed-input errors are intentionally non-localized, clear-tail variants clear caller-owned buffers on error, and it is not documented as a formally verified cryptographic constant-time API.
• Clear-tail encode/decode variants are available for callers that want best-effort cleanup of unused caller-owned buffers without adding a runtime dependency.
• Streaming wrappers clear internal pending and queued byte buffers on drop and as buffered bytes are consumed, as best-effort retention reduction.
• Legacy compatibility must be opt-in.
• Release gates include formatting, clippy, tests, Miri when installed, docs, dependency policy, audit, license review, isolated fuzz/perf dependency checks, SBOM, and reproducible build checks.
• Future Kani proofs target in-place decoding bounds and scalar decoder invariants.

See docs/PLAN.md, SECURITY.md, docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE.md, and docs/CONSTANT_TIME.md. For the unsafe hardware acceleration gate, see docs/SIMD.md. For the trust dashboard and CWE/security-control mapping, see docs/TRUST.md and docs/SECURITY_CONTROLS.md. For panic-free public API policy, see docs/PANIC_POLICY.md. For constant-time-oriented decode verification requirements, see docs/CONSTANT_TIME.md. For dependency admission rules, see docs/DEPENDENCIES.md. For adoption guidance from the established base64 crate, see docs/MIGRATION.md. For performance evidence guidance, see docs/BENCHMARKS.md. For fuzz target and corpus policy, see docs/FUZZING.md.

Local Checks

Run the standard gate:

scripts/checks.sh

Check the zero-external-crate policy directly:

scripts/validate-dependencies.sh

Check release-facing documentation versions directly:

scripts/validate-doc-versions.sh

Check reserved feature placeholders directly:

scripts/check_reserved_features.sh

Run the release gate:

scripts/stable_release_gate.sh

Install cross-compilation targets used by the local and CI target checks:

rustup target add aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu x86_64-unknown-freebsd wasm32-unknown-unknown thumbv7em-none-eabihf

Required security tools:

cargo install --locked cargo-audit
cargo install --locked cargo-license
cargo install --locked cargo-deny
cargo install --locked cargo-sbom --version 0.10.0

Optional deep tools:

cargo install --locked cargo-nextest
cargo install --locked cargo-fuzz
cargo install --locked kani-verifier

Verify optional tool installation:

cargo nextest --version
cargo fuzz --version
cargo kani --version

Compile fuzz targets without running a campaign:

scripts/check_fuzz.sh

Validate the committed fuzz corpus policy directly:

scripts/check_fuzz_corpus.sh

Compile and audit the isolated performance harness:

scripts/check_perf.sh

Run the scalar comparison benchmark:

cargo run --release --manifest-path perf/Cargo.toml

Run a target with cargo-fuzz:

cargo +nightly fuzz run decode
cargo +nightly fuzz run in_place
cargo +nightly fuzz run stream_chunks
cargo +nightly fuzz run differential

Miri is installed as a nightly Rust component, not as a Cargo package:

rustup toolchain install nightly --component miri
cargo +nightly miri setup
scripts/check_miri.sh

Kani may need a one-time setup after installation:

cargo kani setup

On openSUSE Tumbleweed, install rustup first if it is not already present:

sudo zypper install rustup

The local release gate runs Miri automatically when rustup run nightly cargo miri is available. scripts/check_miri.sh covers no-default-features scalar APIs and all-features alloc/stream APIs. The large deterministic sweep tests are ignored only under Miri because they are already covered by the normal release gate and are too slow for an interpreter.

Project Principles

• Keep external crates to the absolute minimum. The current crate dependency graph is only base64-ng.
• Correctness first, speed second, unsafe last.
• The scalar implementation is the reference behavior.
• SIMD must prove equivalence to scalar behavior across fuzzed and deterministic inputs.
• Constant-time claims require empirical timing evidence, generated-code review, and explicit documented exclusions.
• Compatibility modes must be visible in the type/API surface.
• Release evidence belongs in the repository and CI, not in memory.

Contributing And Releases

See CONTRIBUTING.md for contribution rules and docs/RELEASE.md for the maintainer release checklist.